THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


ENGLISH    COLONIES 
IN   AMERICA 

THE    MIDDLE    COLONIES 


ENGLISH  COLONIES 
IN  AMERICA 


By  J.  A.  DOYLE,  M.A. 

FELLOW  OF  ALL  SOULS'  COLLEGE,  OXFORD 

8vo.    $3.50  per  volume 


VOL.  I.— VIRGINIA,     MARYLAND, 
AND   THE   CAROLINAS. 

VOL.    II.— THE     PURITAN     COLO 
NIES,  VOL.  I. 

VOL.    III.— THE    PURITAN    COLO 
NIES,    VOL.  II. 

VOL.    IV.— THE     MIDDLE      COLO 
NIES. 

VOL.    V.—  THE   COLONIES    UNDER 
THE  HOUSE  OF  HA  NO  VER. 


HENRY    HOLT    AND    COMPANY 

Publishers  New  York 


ENGLISH    COLONIES 
IN    AMERICA 


VOLUME  IV. 


THE  MIDDLE  COLONIES 


BY 


J.  A.  DOYLE,  M.A. 
n 

FELLOW  OF  ALL  SOULS'  COLLEGE,  OXFORD 

AUTHOB  OF  "VIRGINIA,  MARYLAND,  AND  THE  CABOLINAS," 
"THE  PDBITAN  COLONIES,"  ETC. 


NEW  YORK 
HENRY  HOLT   AND   COMPANY 

1907 


COPYRIGHT,  1907, 

BY 
HENRY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 

Published  January,  KJOTJ 


THE    QUINN-BOOEN    COMPANY    PflESS 
RAHWAY,   N.   J. 


PREFACE. 


THIS  volume  is  the  fourth  of  the  series,  three  of  which 
appeared  some  time  ago,  under  the  title  of  "English  Colonies 
in  America."1  It  brings  the  history  of  the  Middle  Colonies 
down  to  the  point  where  I  left  that  of  the  Northern  and 
Southern,  i.e.  the  accession  of  the  House  of  Hanover. 

A  fifth  volume,  "The  Colonies  under  the  House  of  Hanover/' 
which  is  published  at  the  same  time  as  this,  deals  collectively 
with  the  whole  body  of  colonies  from  that  date  down  to  the 
beginning  of  those  disputes  which  ended  in  separation  from  the 

Mother  Country. 

JON.  A.  DOYLE. 

ALL  SOULS'  COLLEGE,  OXFORD  : 
October  1906. 


1  Virginia,  Maryland,  and  the  Carolinas,  1882  ;  The  Puritan  Colonies,  2  vols. 
1886. 


CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  I. 

FOUNDATION   OF  NEW   NETHERLANDS. 

PAGE 

Dutch  as  colonists i 

The  early  Dutch  voyagers       .......  3 

Henry  Hudson          .........  5 

The  Dutch  in  the  Hudson  River        ......  7 

The  Northern  Company    ........  7 

Treaty  at  Tawasentha       ........  8 

The  Dutch  West  India  Company 9 

Colonial  progress  of  the  Company     .         .         .         .         .         .11 

The  patroons     ..........  12 

Small  proprietors      .........  14 

Increase  of  population       ........  15 

Position  of  the  Governor 15 

Peter  Minuit     ..........  16 

Wouter  Van  Twiller        ........  16 

Van  Twiller  and  De  Vries       .         .         .         .         .         .  17 

Encroachments  from  New  England            .         .         .         .  17 

William   Kieft 18 

The  Twelve  and  the  Indian  War      ......  19 

The  Twelve  and  Kieft      ........  20 

Troubles  with  the  Indians         .......  21 

Attacks  on  Kieft       .........  22 

The  Council  of  Eight        ........  22 

End  of  the  Indian  war      ........  23 

Want  of  constitutional  machinery     ......  25 

Report  of  the  "Rekenkammer"            ......  25 

Peter  Stuyvesant       .........  26 

Representative  government  introduced       .....  27 

Municipal  institutions        ........  28 

New  Amsterdam  becomes  a  city       ......  30 

Action  of  the  town  council       .         .         .         .         .         .         .31 

Stuyvesant's   reform          ........  33 

Conference  of  delegates     ........  34 

Second  conference 35 


Vlll  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

English  influence 36 

The  greater  burghership 37 

Inefficiency  of  the  Company      .  39 

Increase  of  population       ........  41 

Religious  condition  of  the  colony      ......  41 

Independent  congregations        .......  42 

Quakers  in  New  Netherlands     .......  44 

Education 47 

Industrial    life  .........  48 

Dealings  with  Indians       ........  50 

Outbreak  of  war,  1655       .         . 51 

Troubles  with  Indians  in  1658          ......  52 

Dealings  with  the  Five  Nations         ......  53 

The  Swedish  colony         ........  54 

William  Usselinx      .........  54 

Usselinx  and  Gustavus  Adolphus 56 

The  Swedes  at  Swanendael       .......  57 

Formation  of  a  Swedish  Company     ......  58 

The  Swedes  on  the  Schuylkill  ......  58 

Growth  of  the  Swedish  colony         ......  60 

Hostility  between  Dutch  and  Swedes       .....  62 

Policy  of  Stuyvesant  towards  the  Swedes       ....  63 

Further  efforts  by  Sweden       .......  64 

Overthrow  of  the  Swedish  colony  by  Stuyvesant     ...  66 

Foundation  of  New  Amstel       .......  70 

Difficulties  besetting  New  Amstel      ......  70 

Proposed  migration  from  New  Haven       .....  72 

The  Mennonites        .........  73 

Outward  appearance  of  New  Amsterdam          ....  75 

Education  in  New  Netherlands 76 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  ENGLISH   CONQUEST. 

New  Netherlands  gradually  Anglicized     .....  78 

Treaty  of  Hartford 79 

English  settlers  in  New  Netherlands         .....  79 

Stuyvesant  favors  the  English  ......  82 

Disputes  between  Dutch  and  English         .....  82 

English  territorial  claims  .......  84 

Disputes  between  the  Dutch  and  Maryland        ....  85 

Changed  policy  of  England 87 

Disputes  between  the  Dutch  and  Connecticut     ....  87 

John  Scott 89 


CONTENTS.  IX 

PAGE 

Carteret  and  Berkeley 90 

Calumnies  against  New  Netherlands         .....      91 

Duke  of  York's  patent      ........       92 

Moral  aspect  of  the  conquest     .         .         .         .         .         •         •       93 

Grant  to  Carteret  and  Berkeley        ......       94 

Arrangements  for  enforcing  the  Duke's  claim     ....       94 

Richard  Nicolls         .........       95 

Defenseless  condition  of  New  Netherlands       ....       97 

Nicolls  opens  negotiations         .......       99 

Convention  at  Gravesend  .......     101 

Conquest  at  New  Amsterdam     .......     102 

Submission  of  the  rest  of  the  colony         .....     104 

Carr  on  the  Delaware       ........     106 

Nicolls's  policy          .........     107 

System  of  legislation         ........     107 

Convention  at   Heemstede         .......     108 

Influence  of  New  England       .         .         .         .         .         .         .no 

The  Duke's  laws .         .in 

Ecclesiastical  system          .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .112 

Penal  system     .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .113 

Nicolls's  treatment  of  the  Dutch       .         .         .         .         .         .114 

Affairs  at  Albany      .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .114 

New  York  to  be  a  check  on  New  England        .         .         .         .116 

No  disaffection  among  the  Dutch      .         .         .         .         .         .117 

Treaty  of  Breda        .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .118 

Altered  relations  of  the  English  colonies  to  France         .         .118 
Dealings  with  the  Five  Nations       .         .         .         .         .         .119 

The  French  and  the  Indians       .         .         .         .         .         .         .119 

Effect  of  the  grant  to  Carteret  and  Berkeley     ....     125 

The  New  Jersey  concessions     .......     126 

Settlement  of  New  Jersey         .......     126 

Career  and  character  of  Nicolls 128 

CHAPTER  III. 

THE  DUTCH   RECONQUEST. 

Francis  Lovelace       .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .130 

Disaffection  on  Long  Island       .......  130 

General  policy  of  the  Proprietor       ......  133 

Affairs  of  New  Jersey       ........  133 

Insurrection  on  the  Delaware              ......  134 

Attack  from  Maryland      ........  135 

Outbreak  of  war  with  Holland          ......  136 

Dutch  fleet  threatens  New  York        ......  137 


X  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

-Capture  of  New  York      . 138 

Action  of  the  Dutch  commanders       ......  139 

The  colony  under  Colve  .......  140 

Disaffection  among  the  English  inhabitants       ....  141 

Motives  of  the  Dutch  for  retaining  the  colony          .         .         .  143 

Final  cession  of  the  colony  by  the  Dutch       ....  144 

CHAPTER  IV. 

NEW  YORK  UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DONGAN. 

Altered  position  of  New  York         ......     145 

Position  of  Carteret  and  Berkeley     ......     146 

Fresh  grant  to  Carteret     ........     147 

Andros  appointed  Governor      .         .         .         .         .         .         .148 

He  reaches  New  York      ........     148 

Negotiations  with  Colve    ........     149 

Court  martial  on  Manning        .         .         .         .         .         .         .150 

Demand  for  representative  institutions       .....     150 

Dealings  of  Andros  with  New  England     .....     152 

Ecclesiastical  matters         ........     154 

Grievances  of  the  colonists  against  Andros        ....     156 

Dispute  about  customs 157 

Further  demand  for  representation    ......     158 

Probable  influence  of  Penn  with  the  Duke        ....     159 

Dongan  becomes  Governor         .......     160 

His  instructions         .........     161 

First  Assembly  summoned         .......     162 

Composition  of  the  Assembly    .......     163 

The  "Charter  of  Liberties" 163 

Revenue  Act 164 

Growth  of  English  feeling  and  influence        ....     165 

Proposed  incorporation  of  New  York       .         .         .         .         .166 

Disputes  with  New  Jersey       .......     166 

Disputes  with  Connecticut         .......     166 

The  Proprietor  becomes  King    .         .         .         .         .         .         .168 

Incorporation  of  New  York  and  Albany         ....     168 

Fresh   land   patents  ........     169 

Representative  system  annulled         .         .         .         .         .         .170 

James  II.'s  policy  of  consolidation     .         .         .         .         .         .171 

Dongan's  anti-Canadian   policy         .         .         .         .         .         .171 

The  French  and  the  Five  Nations      .         .         .         .         .         .172 

Policy    of    Frontenac         .         .         .         .         .         .         .  173 

French  missions  among  the  Five  Nations         .         .         .         .     175 

Frontenac  replaced  by  De  la  Barre .176 


CONTENTS.  xi 

PAGE 

Dongan's  dealings  with  the  French  and  the  Indians        .         .  176 

Policy  of  the  Iroquois     ........  178 

Denonville  succeeds  De  la  Barre       .         .         .         .         .    ^    .  179 

Treaty  of  Whitehall 180 

Policy  of  Dongan     .........  181 

He  is  supported  by  the  King     .......  183 

James  XL's  projects  of  colonial  union      .....  183 

CHAPTER  V. 

THE  REVOLUTION  IN   NEW   YORK. 

Constitution  of  the  new  province      ......  187 

Andros  appointed   Governor     .......  187 

French  scheme  of  invasion       .......  189 

Mohawks  invade  Canada           .......  189 

News  of  the  Revolution  reaches  New  York      ....  190 

Nicholson's  dispute  with  Leisler        ......  191 

Disaffection  on  Long  Island      .......  192 

Malcontents  seize  the  fort       .......  192 

Progress  of  the  Revolution       .......  193 

Assumption  of  authority  by  Leisler   ......  194 

The  New  York  convention       .......  195 

Anti-Papal  panic       .........  196 

Elections  held  under  Leisler      .......  198 

Position   of   Albany           ........  198 

The  Albany  convention     ........  199 

Preparations  against  French  invasion        .....  200 

Albany  makes  itself  independent  of  Leisler       ....  200 

Further  encroachments  by  Leisler     ......  202 

Proceedings  of  the  Home  Government       .....  202 

Leisler  usurps  the  governorship         ......  203 

An  anti-Leislerite  party     ........  205 

Dealings  with  the  Five  Nations         ......  206 

French  scheme  of  invasion       .......  206 

Destruction  of  Schenectady       .......  207 

Violent  conduct  of  Leisler        .......  208 

He  calls  an  Assembly       .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .  209 

Proposes  a  colonial  convention        ......  210 

Failure    of   the    campaign        .         .         .         .         .         .         .210 

John  Schuyler's  raid         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .211 

The  Assembly  meet         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         .211 

Decline   of  Leisler's   influence           ......  212 

Apathy  of  the  English  Government           .....  212 

Col.  Sloughter  appointed  Governor          .....  213 


Xll  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

His  arrival  delayed           ........  214 

Defiant  attitude  of  Leisler         .         .         .         .         .         .         .215 

He  fires  on  the  troops      ........  216 

Arrival  of  Sloughter         ........  217 

Submission  of  Leisler       ........  218 

His  trial            ..........  218 

Sentence  on   Leisler          ........  220 

An  Assembly  summoned           .......  221 

Discussion  as  to  Leisler's  execution           .....  221 

Leisler  and  Millborne  executed         ......  222 

CHAPTER  VI. 

NEW  YORK  AFTER  THE  REVOLUTION. 

Effect  of  Leisler's  rebellion       .......  224 

Attempts  to  define  the  constitution           .....  225 

Bill  of  Rights 226 

Death  of  Sloughter           ........  227 

Appointment  of  Fletcher            .......  227 

His  instructions         .........  228 

Dispute  about  Church  endowments           .....  228 

John  Nelson  and  his  Indian  policy     ......  230 

Brooke's  and  Nicolls's  memorial       ......  231 

Fletcher  advocates  consolidation        .         .         .         .         .         .231 

Difficulties  with  the  Five  Nations      ......  234 

French  invasion  in  1692    ........  235 

Expedition  under  Peter  Schuyler       ......  235 

Difficulties  of  the  situation       .......  237 

Fletcher  and  the  Mohawks       .......  237 

French  negotiations  with  the  Mohawks     .....  238 

Conference  at  Albany,  1694       .......  239 

Indian  envoys  at  Quebec           .......  239. 

Mohawk  prisoner  tortured  by  the  French         ....  240 

Frontenac  restores  Fort  Cataracouy         .         .         .  .241 

Frontenac's  progress  through  the  Mohawk  country           .         .  242 

Raid  against  Albany         ........  243 

Fletcher's  corrupt  dealings       .......  245 

His  alliance  with  the  Assembly         ......  245 

Bellomont  succeeds  Fletcher     .......  246 

The  election  of  1699         ........  247 

Changes  in  the  Council  and  Assembly       .....  249 

The  French  and  the  Five  Nations     ......  250 

Bellomont's  Indian  and  anti-French  policy        .         .         .         .251 

Lack  of  missionary  enterprise 252 


CONTENTS.  Xlll 

PAGE 

Livingstone's   policy          ........  253 

Cornbury  becomes  Governor     .......  254 

An  interregnum         .........  256 

Revival  of  the  Leislerite  party         ......  257 

Trial  of  Bayard 259 

Cornbury's  policy      .........  261 

His  financial  misdeeds  .......  263 

His  dealings  with  the  Assembly        ......  263 

Ecclesiastical  dispute         ........  265 

Trial  of  M'Kemie 266 

Cornbury's  disputes  with  the  Assembly  ....  268 

Cornbury   recalled     .........  270 

Appointment  and  death  of  Lovelace          .....  271 

Unsuccessful  expedition  against  Canada,  1709          .         .         .  272 

Peter  Schuyler  takes  Mohawk  chiefs  to  England        .         .          .  273 

Character  of  Hunter         ........  274 

He  visits  Albany       .........  275 

Lewis  Morris  .........  276 

Dispute  about  salaries  and  fees          ......  277 

Treaty  of  Utrecht     .........  280 

Dispute  with  the  French  about  Fort  Frontenac        .         .         .  280 

Hunter's  land  policy          ........  281 

The  negro  plot         .........  281 

The   Palatines 284 

General  effect  of  Hunter's  policy      ......  285 

CHAPTER  VII. 

SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

Quakerism  as  a  power  in  colonial  history        ....  287 

New  Jersey  the  earliest  Quaker  colony      .....  289 

The  first  settlement  of  New  Jersey  .....  290 

Dealings  of  the  Proprietors  with  the  existing  settlers         .         .  290 

First  General  Assembly     ........  292 

Difficulties  with  Proprietors  and  settlers    .....  294 

Rebellion  headed  by  James  Carteret  .....  294 

The    Dutch    reconquest     ........  296 

Recovery  of  the  colony  by  the  Proprietors       ....  298 

Transfer  to  Penn  and  his  partners     ......  299 

Fenwick's  proceedings       .  .         .         .         .         .         .  299 

Andros's  dealings  with  Fenwick       ......  300 

Division  of  the  province  .......  301 

Policy  of  Penn  and  his  associates     ......  302 

Articles  of  the  constitution       .......  303 


XIV  CONTENTS. 

PAGE. 

Foundation  of  Burlington         .         .         .         .         .         .         .  305 

Fresh  disputes  between  Andros  and  Fenwick  .         .         .  305 

Position  of  Penn  and  his  partners      ......  306 

Dispute  with  Andros  about  customs          .....  306 

Penn's  remonstrance         ........  307 

Settlement  of  the  dispute          .......  309 

Andros  attempts  to  levy  customs  in  East  Jersey        .         .         .  310 

Andros  arrests  Philip  Carteret  and  summons  an  Assembly         .  312 

Further  disputes  between  Carteret  and  the  settlers     .         .         .  313 
Working  of  the  proprietary  system           .         .         .         .         .315 

Transfer  of  Carteret's  proprietorship       .....  316 

Penn  and  some  Scotchmen  purchase  East  Jersey       .         .         .31? 

Barclay  appointed  Governor     .......  319 

Assembly  called;  its  proceedings       ......  320 

The  Fundamental  Constitutions         .         .         .         .         .         .321 

They  are  modified     .........  323 

Material  condition  of  the  colony 324 

Effect  of  the  change  of  Proprietors          .....  325 

Further  emigration  from  Scotland     ......  326 

New  York  jealous  of  New  Jersey      ......  329 

Dongan's  dealings  with  New  Jersey          .....  329 

Contest  for  Staten  Island          .......  329- 

State  of  West  Jersey        ........  332 

Fenwick's  settlement  incorporated     ......  333 

New  Jersey  forms  part  of  Andres's  province     ....  334 

Surrender  by  the  Proprietors    .......  336 

Daniel    Coxe     ..........  336 

Dealings  of  Andros  with  New  Jersey       .....  337 

The  Revolution  of  1688  in  New  Jersey 337 

Formation  of  a  new  proprietary        ......  338 

Hamilton  Governor  of  both  provinces 339 

Bass  succeeds  him     .........  340 

Difficulty  with  New  York  about  customs    .....  341 

The  case  of  the  Hester      ........  341 

Disunited  state  of  New  Jersey  .         .         .         .         .         .  343 

Morris  and  Bass 344 

Disputes  about  the  governorship       .         .  .  345 

Surrender  of  the  colony  by  the  Proprietors       ....  347 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

NEW  JERSEY  A  CROWN   COLONY. 

General  condition  of  the  colony         .        -.         .         .         .         •  351 

Want  of  money       ....  -  35 1 

Dealings  with  Indians •  352 


CONTENTS. 


State  of  education     .........  353: 

Religious  condition  of  the  colony      ......  353 

Cornbury  appointed  Governor  ......  354 

His  instructions         .........  357" 

Difficulties  of  his  position         .......  358 

Cornbury  and  the  Quakers        .......  359 

His  quarrel  with  the  Assembly         ......  359 

Assembly  elected      .........  359 

Its  proceedings          .........  360 

Action  of  the  English  Government     ......  363 

Assembly  of  1707 364 

Its  dispute  with  Cornbury         .......  365 

Assembly  of  1708 367 

Lovelace's  instructions       ........  368 

Importance  of  the  dispute  between  Cornbury  and  the  Assembly  .  369 

Interregnum  between  Lovelace  and  Hunter       .         .         .         .  371 

Hunter  appointed  Governor       .         .         .         ...         .         .  372 

His  attitude  towards  parties      .......  372 

Sandford  expelled  from  the  Assembly       .....  373 

Disputes  between  the  Council  and  the  Representatives        .         .  375 

Triumph  of  Hunter's  party       .......  376^ 

CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  FOUNDATION  OF   PENNSYLVANIA. 

Absence  of  biographical  interest  in  American  history        .         .  379 

Character  of  Penn  ........  380 

His  scheme  of  colonization       .......  383 

His  grant  of  territory       ........  384 

His  charter       .          .........  385 

His  intentions  as  a  colonizer      .......  387 

His  "concessions"     .........  387- 

His  policy  towards  the  natives  ......  388 

The  first  emigration          ........  388 

Constitutional  arrangements      .......  388- 

Frame  of  government        ........  389^ 

Further  grant  of  territory  from  the  Duke  of  York     .         .         .  393 

Welsh   settlers  .........  394 

Incorporation  of  Newcastle       .......  395 

The  first  Assembly  ........  395 

"The  Great  Body  of  Laws"       .......  396 

Foundation  of  Philadelphia       .......  397 

Penn's  treaty  with  the  Indians          ......  397 

The  second  Assembly 399^ 


XVI  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

The  new  charter 400 

Penn's  account  of  the  colony     .......  401 

His  descriptions  of  the  natives 402 

Penn  accused  of  Popery  .......  403 

Difficulty  about  the  Indian  trade 404 

Establishment  of  a  small  Privy  Council 405 

Lack  of  activity  in  public  life     .......  405 

Legislative  measures         ........  406 

Growth  of  the  colony       ........  406 

Alarm  from  the  Indians  .......  407 

Penn's  instructions  to  his  deputy       ......  408 

George  Keith 409 

Dispute  between  the  province  and  the  territories       .         .         .411 

Pennsylvania  included  in  Fletcher's  commission        .         .         .  413 
Penn's  remonstrance         .         .         .         .         .         .         .         -413 

'  Fletcher  at  Philadelphia 414 

|  His  disputes  with  the  Assembly -415 

Restoration  of  Penn 418 

J  Act  of  Settlement      .........  419 

Penn's  protest  against  smuggling 420 

Penn  revisits  the  colony    ........  420 

His  proprietorship  in  danger     .......  421 

His  territorial  dispute  with  the  settlers       .....  422 

Demand  of  Delaware  for  separation          .....  422 

The  new  constitution .  423 

Charter  granted  to  Philadelphia 424 

Penn  finally  departs          ........  424 

His  dispute  with  Quarry 424 

Hamilton  becomes  Governor     .......  425 

Succeeded  by  Evans 426 

\  Evans  falls  out  with  the  Assembly     ......  426 

j  The  Assembly  attack  Logan 428 

}  Further  disputes 429 

French  intrigues  with  Indians  ......  430 

Gookin  becomes  Governor 430 

t  Disputes  in  the  colony 431 

Penn's  difficulties 432 

Further  disputes  in  the  colony          ......  434 

Question  about  oaths 434 

APPENDIX  I.    Peter  Heyn's  Memorial       .         .         .         . 

APPENDICES  II  AND  III 

APPENDIX  IV.  Middletown  and  Shrewsbury  . 
APPENDIX  V.  Value  of  Land  in  Pennsylvania 
INDEX  


ENGLISH  COLONIES  IN  AMERICA. 


CHAPTER  I. 

FOUNDATION    OF    NEW   NETHERLANDS.1 

IN  estimating  the  fitness  of  the  Dutch  for  the  task  of  coloniza 
tion  we  must  not  mislead  ourselves  by  picturing  the  Holland  of 
The  Dutch  the  sixteenth  after  the  Holland  of  the  nineteenth 
nists.°  century.  The  Holland  that  threw  off  the  Spanish 
yoke  was  made  up  of  city  oligarchies,  full  of  burgess  pride  and 
burgess  luxury,  yet  self-denying  and  pitiless  in  their  public  spirit. 
That  pomp,  that  material  well-being  which  made  Holland  the 
wonder  of  foreign  lands,  brought  with  it  no  languor:  a  craving 
for  wealth  made  the  Dutchman  a  voyager  and  a  discoverer: 
inborn  energy  and  a  spirit  trained  in  strife  made  the  struggle 
as  welcome  as  the  prize.  The  Hollander  had  indeed  more  than 
we  readily  see  in  common  with  his  oppressor.  Likeness  of  tem 
per  with  unlikeness  of  principle,  causes  acting  as  surely  with 
nations  as  with  persons,  severed  the  insurgent  provinces  from 


1  The  loss  of  the  records  of  the  Dutch  West  Indian  Company  has  most  un 
happily  curtailed  our  sources  of  knowledge  as  to  the  establishment  of  the 
colony  of  New  Netherlands.  We  have,  however,  a  most  valuable  magazine  of 
information  in  the  Collection  of  Documents  (fifteen  volumes)  by  Mr.  Brod- 
head,  Mr.  O'Callaghan,  and  Mr.  Fernow  on  the  history  of  New  Netherlands 
and  New  York.  They  consist  of  transcripts  from  Dutch,  English,  French, 
and  Swedish  archives,  carefully  arranged,  extending  down  to  1776.  A  some 
what  similar  collection,  but  much  inferior  in  extent,  arrangement,  and  value, 
is  Mr.  O'Callaghan's  Documentary  History  of  New  York. 

The  Minutes  of  the  City  Council  of  New  Amsterdam  from  1653  to  1674. 
They  have  been  translated  from  Dutch  into  English,  partly  by  Mr.  O'Cal 
laghan,  partly  by  Mr.  Fernow,  and  published  in  six  volumes.  In  addition  to 
the  above  records  the  first  volume  includes  the  ordinances  of  the  Director- 
General  and  his  Council  from  1647  to  1653.  I  refer  to  them  as  Court  Minutes. 

These  ordinances  have  also  been  collected  and  edited  by  Mr.  O'Callaghan  in 
a  separate  volume,  published  in  1868. 

Mr.    Brodhead's   History   of  New   York    (two   volumes),   extending   from  the 


2  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

Spain.  So,  too,  what  the  Moor  had  done  for  Spain,  the 
Spaniard  was  idbfflg  for  Holland.  Tyranny  successfully  re 
sisted,  acting  on  the' temper  of  an  oligarchy,  molded  a  race  of 
ji!ei/ ready  Jofhfcldlth&ii;  own  against  the  world,  with  a  spirit  of 
defiance  which  made  the  struggle  in  no  wise  distasteful.  There 
were  indeed  wide  differences  between  the  Spanish  and  the  Dutch 
discoverer.  The  Spaniard  was  on  his  best  side  a  crusader,  on 
his  worst — and  that  was  often  uppermost — a  self-seeking  ad 
venturer.  A  steady  regard  for  corporate  aims  and  commercial 
results  underlay  all  that  was  done  by  Dutch  explorers.  Yet 
the  dealings  of  Kieft  with  the  natives  of  the  Hudson  Valley 
were  a  faint  copy  of  Spanish  brutality,  and  the  fate  of  Towerson 
and  his  comrades  at  Amboyna  recalls  the  tragedy  which  swept 
away  the  French  colony  from  Florida.  There  was  a  yet 
stronger  point  of  likeness.  Spain  and  Holland  alike  fell  into 
the  snare  which  England  alone  of  colonizing  nations  wholly 
avoided.  With  both  the  era  of  colonization  set  in  before  the 
full  tide  of  discovery,  with  its  romance  and  its  eager  passions, 
had  begun  to  slacken.  Those  who  had  the  control  of  New 
Netherlands  never  learnt  to  regard  the  settlement  as  a  de 
tached,  self-sufficing  community.  To  them  it  was  primarily  a 
trading  station.  A  state  might  grow  up  as  best  it  could  under 
the  shadow  of  the  factory. 

In   other   respects    Holland   was   ill-fitted    for   the   task   of 
colonization.     She  had   no  rural  communities  with  those  in- 


foundation  of  the  colony  down  to  the  suppression  of  Leisler's  Rebellion  in 
1692,  is  a  work  of  inestimable  value.  It  is  monotonous  in  style,  and  the  writer 
too  often  hampers  himself  by  a  strict  adherence  to  chronological  arrangement. 
But  its  fullness,  sobriety  and  impartiality,  and  the  writer's  clear  perception  of 
the  political  influences  at  work  are  beyond  praise.  Mr.  Brodhead  uses  a  great 
number  of  documents  which  are  still  in  manuscript  in  the  New  York  State 
Records.  I  felt  that  to  investigate  these,  when  the  subject  in  hand  was  no 
more  than  an  outlying  province  of  my  main  work,  would  be  superfluous  la 
bor,  and  I  have,  therefore,  trusted  largely  to  Mr.  Brodhead's  guidance.  His 
references  and  quotations  are,  indeed,  so  full  that  his  work  may  almost  be  re 
garded  as  a  collection  of  documents.  There  is  useful  material  to  be  found  in 
the  Collections  of  the  New  York  Historical  Society,  as  also  in  Mr.  Fernow's 
History  of  the  City  of  New  York,  and  Mr.  Tuckerman's  Life  of  Stuyvesant. 
For  the  history  of  the  Swedish  settlement  much  useful  material  is  to  be  found 
in  the  Pennsylvanian  Archives.  Several  documents  of  importance  are  pub 
lished  in  Hazard's  Register  of  Pennsylvania,  vol.  iv.  Acrelius's  History  of 
New  Sweden  was  originally  published  in  1759,  and  republished  by  the  Pennsyl 
vania  Historical  Society  in  1874.  The  writer  was  the  pastor  of  the  Swedish 
Church  at  Christiania,  and  as  such  had  access  to  written  archives  and  was  in 
a  position  to  collect  oral  tradition.  Ferris's  History  of  the  Original  Settle 
ments  on  the  Delaware  is  a  book  of  sound  historical  authority. 


HOLLAND  AND     COLONIZATION.  3 

stitutions  and  instincts  of  self-government  which  enabled '  the 
English  village  to  reproduce  itself  so  effectually  on  the  shores 
of  Boston  Bay  and  on  the  banks  of  the  Connecticut.  She  had  no 
gentry  to  play  the  part  of  Winthrop,  men  whose  tastes  and 
associations  were  of  the  country,  but  who  yet  had  a  share 
in  all  that  was  best  and  strongest  in  the  national  life.  It  was 
certain  that  in  any  Dutch  colony  the  interests  of  the  farmer 
would  give  way  to  the  interests  of  the  merchant.  Nor  had  even 
the  urban  and  mercantile  part  of  Holland  that  training  in  self- 
government  needful  for  colonists.  The  whole  political  life  of 
Holland  existed  in  oligarchies;  each  city  was  ruled  by  a  close,, 
self-electing  order ;  and  so  far  as  it  formed  part  of  the  province, 
and  through  the  province  of  the  whole  Federation,  was  solely 
represented  by  these  oligarchies.  The  unflinching  patriotism 
with  which  they  had  sustained  the  struggle  with  Spain  gave  them 
a  hold  on  the  national  sympathy,  which  made  full  amends  for 
their  lack  of  any  representative  character.  But  to  say  that  is  only 
to  urge  the  defense  often  put  forward  on  behalf  of  a  benevolent 
despotism.  They  who  use  that  plea  forget  that  it  is  not  enough 
that  a  system  should  have  secured  good  administration  when  the 
ruler  and  the  ruled  are  at  one;  it  must  contain  in  itself  some 
guarantee  that  it  will  work  well  under  less  favorable  conditions. 
Study  the  early  history  of  New  Netherlands;  compare  its  life 
with  that  of  the  English  colonies  on  its  north-eastern  frontier. 
At  every  turn  we  are  reminded  that  the  Dutch  settlers  suc 
cumbed  to  difficulties  which  the  English  escaped,  because  the 
latter  easily,  almost  spontaneously,  adopted  machinery  which 
enabled  the  popular  voice  to  make  itself  heard,  while  the  Dutch 
in  like  circumstances  were  feeling  for  such  machinery  helplessly 
and  blindly. 

Up  to  a  certain  period  Holland  and  England  ran  almost 
identical  courses,  not  in  colonization,  but  in  those  preliminary 
The  early  stages  of  discovery  which  introduce  colonization. 
vouy!gers.  With  the  early  Dutch  explorers,  as  with  their 
English  rivals,  the  prospects  of  colonization  counted  for  little. 
Far  more  important  in  their  eyes  was  the  discovery  of  new 
routes  for  trade.  The  Dutch  entered  on  the  field  of  Arctic 
discovery  just  at  the  time  when  it  seemed  to  be  abandoned  by 
the  English.  In  1594  voyagers  were  sent  out  both  from 
Amsterdam  and  Enchuysen  in  quest  of  a  north-east  passage  to 


4  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS.  * 

Cathay.1  All  that  accrued  was  a  fuller  knowledge  of  the 
northern  seas,  of  the  coast  of  Nova  Zembla  and  Spitzbergen, 
and  of  the  sea  of  Kara.  Then  comes  a  lull  of  ten  years.  Mean 
while  another  motive  was  at  work  identical  with  that  which  had 
impelled  the  great  English  voyagers  of  the  Elizabethan  age. 
It  was  manifest  to  Englishman  and  Dutchman  alike  that  the 
American  empire  of  Spain  might  be  the  vulnerable  point  in  her 
arrrior.  It  would  seem  indeed  to  have  been  an  English  sea-cap 
tain  (Beets  or  Bates)  who,  in  1581,  first  definitely  put  the  idea  in 
shape  and  laid  it  as  a  practical  scheme  before  the  rulers  of  the 
revolted  provinces.  That  policy  was  followed  up  a  few  years 
later  by  one  who  might  be  called  the  Dutch  Gilbert,  William 
Usselinx.2  The  two  men  were  no  doubt  severed  by  wide  dif 
ferences — difference  of  character,  training,  and  circumstances. 
Gilbert  was  an  English  gentleman,  anchored  to  high  and  un 
selfish  purposes  and  to  public  duty,  alike  by  hereditary  tradi 
tion  and  those  conceptions  of  chivalry  which  formed  the  better 
side  of  the  English  Renaissance.  Usselinx  was  a  citizen  of  the 
world,  an  adventurer,  who  had  seen  the  ways  and  cities  of  men. 
He  had  been  a  merchant  in  the  Azores,  he  had  traveled  in 
Spain  and  Portugal,  possibly  even  in  Brazil  and  the  West 
Indies.  Yet  with  all  these  differences  there  were  between  the 
two  men  points  of  likeness  in  temper,  and  even  more  in  policy. 

Each  was  sanguine  and  impetuous,  aiming  at  great  schemes 
full-blown,  not  content  to  lay  unpretending  foundations  and 
leave  time  to  do  its  work.  Each,  too,  strove  for  a  combination 
of  objects  which  events  showed  to  be  irreconcilable,  for  a 
scheme  which  should  be  at  once  colonial,  commercial,  and  war 
like.  To  neither  Gilbert  nor  'Usselinx  was  it  granted  to  have 
any  share  in  such  success  as  their  projects  achieved.  There 
was  nothing  in  Usselinx's  career  as  strikingly  tragic  as  Gilbert's 
end.  Yet  Gilbert,  swept  away  as  he  sailed  back  from  that 
enterprise  which  was  heroic  even  in  its  failure,  is  not  so  sad  a 
figure  as  Usselinx,  branded  as  an  unsuccessful  and  disappointed 
dreamer,  hawking  his  schemes  and  his  services  at  a  foreign 
court,  ready  at  last  to  be  the  rival  of  his  countrymen  who  had 

1  Mr.  Asper  gives  a  full  account  of  these  voyages,  but  most  unfortunately 
does  not  give  his  authority,  or  authorities,  for  them. 

1  All  that  is  to  be  known  about  Usselinx  is  brought  together  in  a  monograph 
by  Mr.  Franklin  Jameson  in  the  second  volume  of  the  Papers  of  the  American 
Historical  Association. 


HENRY  HUDSON.  5 

first  neglected  and  then  imitated  him.  Usselinx,  willing  to 
work  for  Sweden  when  his  own  country  would  have  none  of 
him,  willing  when  Sweden  hung  back  to  build  up  a  company 
taken  from  among  the  various  nations  of  Europe,  was  a  type 
of  that  cosmopolitanism  which  was  fatal  to  the  colonial  career 
of  Holland.  It  was  that  spirit  which  made  New  Netherlands, 
with  its  eighteen  languages,1  a  mart  for  men  of  every  race  who 
chose  to  seek  it,  not,  like  the  English  colonies,  a  community 
striving  to  reproduce  the  social  and  political  life  of  the  parent 
state. 

If  the  schemes  of  Dutch  projectors  and  the  exploits  of  Dutch 
seamen  suggest  an  English  parallel,  the  likeness  may  be  carried 
Dutch  coio-  a  stage  further.  The  hindrances  which  fought 
hlnde're'd  against  Usselinx  were  closely  akin  to  those  which 
consider"1  f°ught  against  Gilbert's  successors.  James  I.,  dread- 
tions.  jng  iest  Virginian  colonization  should  excite  the 

wrathful  jealousy  of  Spain,  has  his  counterpart  in  the  Dutch 
Arminians  anxious  to  avoid  any  measure  which  might  drive  the 
enemy  to  extremities.  Yet  theirs  was  something  better  than 
the  timid  servility  which  sacrificed  Raleigh,  and  all  those  ends 
which  Raleigh  held  most  dear,  to  the  hopes  of  the  Spanish 
Marriage.  The  motive  of  Barneveldt  and  his  followers  was 
patriotic,  though  their  patriotism  may  have  been  somewhat  nar 
row  and  short-sighted.  They  looked  on  the  question  as  Hol 
landers,  just  as  Usselinx  looked  on  it  as  a  Belgian.  They  had 
no  wish  to  see  continued  hostility  with  Spain,  since  such  hos 
tility  if  successful  meant  the  return  to  Belgium  of  those  exiles 
who  had  just  furnished  a  new  element  of  industry  and  enterprise 
to  the  population  of  Holland.  To  keep  the  Belgians  was,  in  the 
judgment  of  the  peace  party,  more  gainful  to  Holland  than  to 
form  part  of  a  liberated  and  united  Netherlands. 

The  course  of  Dutch  discovery,  interrupted  for  more  than 
ten  years,  was  renewed  by  one  of  the  most  brilliant  of  those 
Henry  great  seamen  of  whom  the  sixteenth  century  was 
Hudson.  SQ  fruitfu^  Henry  Hudson.  Although  Hudson 
achieved  his  greatest  exploits  in  the  service  of  a  foreign  nation, 
yet  England  can  claim  him  as  hers  not  only  by  birth  but  by  train 
ing.  He  was  a  pupil  in  that  school  of  seamanship,  as  we  may 

1  See  p.  15. 


6  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

call  it,  founded  by  Cabot — the  Muscovy  company.  That  which 
has  given  Hudson's  name  an  abiding  place  in  colonial  history — 
the  exploration  of  the  river  now  called  after  him — was  a  chance 
incident  in  a  voyage  undertaken  with  wholly  different  aims. 
In  two  successive  years,  in  1607  and  1608,  Hudson  had  en 
deavored  to  solve  that  problem  which  so  many  of  his  country 
men  had  set  before  them  to  no  purpose,  and  to  make  his  way  to 
Cathay  by  the  north-east.  Baffled  each  time,  in  1609  he 
renewed  the  effort.1  He  was  then  acting  on  behalf  of  the 
Dutch  East  India  Company,  with  a  crew  half  Dutch,  half 
English.  Some  discord  crept  in;  it  may  be  that  there  were 
faults  of  temper  and  character  in  Hudson  which  led  to  trouble 
here,  as  they  did  to  the  tragedy  of  his  last  voyage.  Through 
out  the  voyage  he  was  hampered  in  his  exploration  by  the 
backwardness  of  his  men,  and  by  breaches  of  discipline  which 
perpetually  threatened  to  embroil  them  with  the  savages.  This 
time  he  attempted  a  passage  in  a  new  direction.  He  was 
acquainted  with  John  Smith,  and  had  learnt  from  him  the 
existence  of  a  river,  north  of  Virginia,  which  Smith  believed 
would  lead  to  the  Pacific.  Hudson  accordingly  abandoned  his 
scheme  of  finding  a  passage  to  the  north,  and  coasted  along  the 
shore  of  Virginia.  From  the  mouth  of  "the  King's  river  in 
Virginia  where  our  Englishmen  are"  he  turned  north,  and  then, 
hoping  in  all  likelihood  that  he  had  found  the  passage  suggested 
by  Smith,  he  sailed  up  the  river  which  now  bears  his  name. 
Relations  with  the  natives  opened  badly,  and  in  a  midnight 
skirmish  an  Englishman  was  killed. 

Hudson  then  unwisely  captured  some  of  the  natives, 
and,  as  so  often,  a  petty  act  of  pilfering  by  a  savage  led  to 
further  violence.  However,  no  serious  obstacle  was  offered 
to  the  progress  of  the  discoverers  up  the  river  till  at  what 
was  afterwards  the  site  of  Albany  the  exploring  party  which 
he  had  sent  on  in  a  boat  reported  the  stream  too  shallow  for 
further  navigation.  With  Hudson's  departure  from  the  river 
his  connection  with  American  colonization  ends.  The  re- 
.port  which  he  brought  home  of  the  river,  and  his  descrip 
tion  of  the  Chesapeake  Bay,  disclosed  a  country  which  might 

1  Mr.  Asper  publishes  the  original  accounts  of  these  voyages.  That  of  the 
first  is  written  by  Hudson  to  one  of  his  crew,  of  the  second  wholly  by  Hud 
son,  of  the  third  by  his  mate,  Robert  Juet  of  Limehouse,  probably  an  English 
man. 


THE  DUTCH  NORTHERN  COMPANY.  7 

amply  repay  its  occupants.  The  sailors  had  "caught  great  store 
of  very  good  fish,"  the  natives  had  been,  in  the  main,  friendly. 
The  country  appeared  fertile  and  rich  in  timber,  and  on  the 
banks  of  the  river  Hudson  had  marked  "a  very  pleasant  place 
to  build  a  town."  The  inducement  most  likely  of  all  to  operate 
with  the  Dutch  was  the  abundance  of  furs,  and  the  readiness 
of  the  natives  to  exchange  them  for  knives  and  hatchets. 

Cautiously  and  gradually  Holland  felt  its  way  along  the 
path  which  Hudson  had  opened.  Trading  voyages  were  sent 
The  Dutch  out  j  young  savages  were  brought  home  to  Holland,1 
Hudson.  and  the  Dutch  became  familiar  not  only  with  the 
Hudson  and  Manhattan  Island,  but  with  Narragansett  Bay  2 
and  the  Connecticut.  Holland  claimed  the  river  which  Hudson 
had  discovered  and  made  it  her  own  in  title,  calling  it  after  her 
young  stadtholder,  Mauritius.  The  highest  point  of  the  river 
which  Hudson  had  touched  was  chosen  as  a  permanent  trading 
station,  and  received  the  name  of  Fort  Nassau.  There,  in  a 
moated  and  stockaded  house,  with  thirteen  cannon  and  a  garrison 
of  twelve  men,  a  merchant  clerk  from  Amsterdam  trafficked 
with  the  natives  for  their  beaver-skins.'  On  Manhattan  Island 
a  few  huts  were  thrown  up  which  served  as  winter  shelter  for 
a  crew  whose  vessel  had  been  burnt,4  and  though  their  exact  site 
and  character  is  unknown,  there  is  ground  for  thinking  that  one 
or  two  more  factory  stations  were  in  existence  on  the  southern 
bank  of  the  Hudson  and  in  Delaware  Bay.5 

So  far,  however,  nothing  had  been  done  towards  the  creation 
of  a  permanent  and  self-supporting  settlement.  That  was  only 
The  to  come  as  the  indirect  result  of  an  extended  com- 

Company.  merce.  In  1614  that  scheme  for  which  Usselinx 
had  failed  to  gain  a  hearing  was  revived.  Early  in  that  year  a 
company  was  incorporated  under  a  charter  from  the  States- 
General,  with  the  right  of  whale-fishing  in  the  northern  seas, 
and  with  the  further  object  of  discovering  a  north-east  passage.8 
The  success  of  the  Dutch  East  India  Company,  formed  in 
1602,  gave  encouragement  to  such  a  scheme.  The  States- 


1  Wassenaar  in  Callaghan,  vol.  iii.  p.  25. 
-  De  Laet,  vol.  i.  pp.  7,  8. 

3  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  55. 

4  Ib.  p.  48.     Mr.   Brodhead  quotes  original  authorities. 

8  See  the  appendices  to  Asper's  translation  of  Wassenaar. 
8  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  59.     He  refers  to  the  Dutch  archives. 


8  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

General,  too,  offered  inducements  to  private  explorers  by  promis 
ing  that  any  discoverer  of  new  lands  should  have  a  monopoly  of 
trade  there  for  four  voyages.1 

The  principle  of  co-operation  was  soon  carried  further.  In 
the  autumn  of  1614  some  of  those  merchants  whose  ships  had 
The  Am-  been  trading  with  the  lands  discovered  by  Hudson 
Company,  formed  themselves  into  a  company.  The  privileges 
which  they  received  may  be  said  to  have  called  into  existence  the 
province  of  New  Netherlands.2  Their  charter  for  the  first 
time  recognized  and  asserted  on  behalf  of  Holland  a  title  to  a 
tract  of  land  on  the  American  coast.  It  granted  to  the  Com 
pany  the  exclusive  right  of  trading  with  New  Netherlands,  and 
it  defined  that  territory  as  lying  between  New  France  and 
Virginia,  and  extending  from  the  fortieth  to  the  forty-fifth 
degree  of  latitude.  The  name  of  the  territory  was  beyond  doubt 
an  implied  claim.  Yet  the  document  said  nothing  of  adverse 
possession  against  the  possible  title  of  other  nations,  nor  did  it 
give  any  sort  of  territorial  right  nor  any  jurisdiction  to  the 
grantees.  It  did  nothing  but  establish  a  commercial  monopoly. 

Such  rights  as  were  granted  to  this  body  known  as  the 
Amsterdam  Company  were  limited  to  four  years.  The  scheme 
Treaty  of  did  not  therefore  profess  to  have  in  it  any  element 
sentha.  of  permanence.  It  could  not  possibly  serve  as  a 
basis  for  colonization.  Yet  one  of  its  proceedings  had  an 
abiding  influence  in  colonial  history.  In  1617  it  became  clear 
that  the  settlement  at  Fort  Nassau  was  unsafe  against  winter 
floods.  The  factory  was  moved  to  the  western  bank,  near  the 
mouth  of  a  tributary  stream,  the  Tawasentha. '  In  dealing 
with  savages  one  cannot  speak  with  strict  propriety  of  territorial 
bounds.  But  the  site  of  the  settlement,  if  not  in  the  lands  of  the 
Mohawks,  was  within  their  control,  and  an  alliance  with  them 
was  a  needful  condition  for  the  safety  of  the  foreign  traders. 
Of  the  treaty  ratified  at  the  Tawasentha  between  the  Dutch 
factors  and  the  Mohawks  nothing  is  known  in  detail.4  But 

1  New  York  Documents,  vol.  i.  p.   5. 

2  The  charter  (translated)   is  among  the  New  York  Documents,  vol.  i.  p.   n. 

3  Wassenaar,  p.   9. 

4  Mr.  Brodhead  (vol.  i.  p.  88)   gives  a  full  account  of  this  treaty.     The  only 
specific  authorities  whom   he   quotes   are   Moulton   and   Schoolcraft.      I   cannot 
discover  who  Moulton  is,  and  the  reference  to  Schoolcraft  is  too  vague  to  be 
of  any  service.     I  am,  however,  prepared  to  accept  Mr.   Brodhead's  judgment 
as  authority  for  the  existence  of  the  treaty. 


THE  DUTCH    WEST  INDIA    COMPANY.  9 

the  alliance  thus  begun  had  an  influence  which  cannot  be  over 
rated.  The  conquest  of  New  Netherlands  gave  the  English 
colonies  a  continuous  sea-board.  It  gave  them  what  was  of  even 
greater  value  in  the  coming  struggle  with  France,  the  control  of 
the  Hudson  and  the  friendship  of  the  Five  Nations. 

The  privileges  of  the  Amsterdam  Company  came  to  an  end 
in  1618.  It  soon  had  a  successor  with  far  wider  aims  and 
The  Dutch  powers.  The  body  incorporated  as  the  Dutch  West 

West  India     *,     ,.       „  j        •  i  i    r    • 

Company.  India  Company  was  not  endowed  with  any  definite 
territorial  grant.1  Nor  was  it  confined  by  its  charter  to 
America.  It  might  extend  its  action  not  only  to  any  portion  of 
the  American  sea-board,  but  to  the  coast  of  Africa  between  the 
Tropic  of  Cancer  and  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope.  Within  these 
limits  it  was  secured  against  any  Dutch  competitor.  Within 
the  same  limits  it  might  establish  settlements  over  which  it  could 
exercise  sovereign  power,  administering  justice,  making  alliances 
and  conducting  wars,  with  no  restraint  beyond  the  obligation  to 
report  its  doings  to  the  States-General.  Technically  indeed  a 
declaration  of  war  must  be  approved  by  the  States-General,  but 
how  could  such  a  restraint  act  when  barbarians  many  thousand 
miles  away  were  the  enemy?  It  is  clear  that  there  was  not  in 
this  charter  any  special  assertion  of  a  territorial  claim  over 
New  Netherlands.  The  document  must  be  held  to  mean  that 
all  the  territories  referred  to  were  vacuum  domicilium,  except 
where  any  other  nation  could  urge  some  special  claim  of  oc 
cupancy  or  possession.  One  great  fault  underlay  the  constitu 
tion  of  the  Company.  Conforming  too  closely  to  that  of  the 
States-General  themselves,  it  was  a  federation  without  an 
effective  center.  The  affairs  were  managed  by  five  separate 
chambers  of  directors,  representing  Amsterdam,  Zeeland, 
Dordrecht,  and  North  Holland,  with  a  fifth  joint  chamber  for 
Friesland  and  Groningen.  The  business  of  these  chambers  was 
mainly  financial.  The  capital  of  the  Company  was  divided  into 
nine  shares;  of  these  four  were  allotted  to  Amsterdam,  two  to 
Zeeland,  and  one  to  each  of  the  other  chambers.  The  directors 
were  elected  by  the  various  chambers.  Amsterdam  had  twenty, 
Zeeland  twelve,  each  of  the  other  chambers  fourteen. 

The  executive  was  a  board  to  which  the  Amsterdam  chamber 
sent  eight  representatives,  Zeeland  four  and  each  of  the  others 

1  The  charter  is  given  both  by  Hazard  and  by  O'Callaghan. 


10  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

two,  while  one  attended  on  behalf  of  the  States-General.  Such 
a  constitution  was  ill-fitted  to  give  promptness  or  efficiency  of 
action. 

An  elaborate  federal  constitution  was  not  the  only  hindrance 
to  the  success  of  the  Company.  It  belonged  to  a  party  rather 
The  Com-  than  to  the  nation.  It  represented  the  views  and 
aentsthe""  gave  effect  to  the  schemes  of  the  thoroughgoing  war 
war  party,  party,  of  those  who  were  fain  to  force  Spain  to  the 
last  extremity,  and  thus  it  lost  the  support  of  the  many  wealthy 
merchants  who  favored  the  policy  of  Barneveldt.  Such  hin 
drances  told  against  the  vitality  of  the  Company,  against  its 
•efficiency  as  an  instrument  for  colonization.  They  did  not 
abate  its  successful  ambition,  or  check  a  stream  of  wealth  which 
flowed  from  war  rather  than  trade.  Not  our  own  East  India 
Company  in  the  days  when  it  overturned  thrones,  and  held  the 
descendants  of  an  emperor  for  its  vassals,  made  more  daring 
•claims  or  furthered  them  with  more  high-handed  gallantry. 
We  read  of  the  Company  with  its  navy  of  a  hundred  ships  and 
its  army  of  fifteen  thousand  men,  of  Peter  Heyn  capturing  the 
Spanish  treasure  fleet,  and  returning  with  seventeen  captive 
galleons  bearing  a  treasure  of  twelve  million  dollars.1  As  we 
look  on  Heyn's  stately  memorial  in  Delft  Church,  and  read  how 
he,  a  second  Jason,  sailing  to  the  colonies  of  the  New  World, 
tore  from  the  King  of  Spain  that  Golden  Fleece  which  had  been 
a  terror  to  other  voyagers,  and  bore  it  home,  not  to  Greece  but 
to  the  United  Provinces,  we  feel  that  the  spirit  of  Drake  and 
Hawkins  had  passed  from  the  shores  of  Devon  to  the  banks 
of  the  Texel.2 

The  directors  of  the  Company,  indeed,  openly  avowed  that 
they  had  changed  the  purpose  with  which  they  had  set  out, 
that  the  career  of  a  patriotic  buccaneer  was  better  than  that  of 
a  merchant,  and  that  it  was  cheaper  for  the  States-General  to 
entrust  the  war  to  a  company  who  spent  their  winnings  at  home 
than  to  subsidize  foreign  mercenaries.  Their  object  was  not 
"trifling  trade  with  the  Indians  nor  the  tardy  cultivation  of 
uninhabited  regions,"  but  "acts  of  hostility  against  the  ships  and 
property  of  the  King  of  Spain  and  his  subjects."1  Thus,  too 

1  Brodhead  (who  quotes  authorities),  vol.  i.  p.   184. 

2  I  give  the  text  of  the  monumental  inscription  in  an  Appendix. 

3  Remonstrance   of   the   West    India   Company   against    a   peace   with    Spain, 
Brodhead,  Documents,  vol.  i.  p.  62. 


COLONIAL  PROGRESS  OF   THE   COMPANY.  1 1 

.a  shrewd  and  somewhat  unfriendly  critic  notices  that  the 
Company  having  come  into  possession  of  Peter  Heyn's  booty 
bestowed  not  a  thought  upon  their  best  trading  port  at  Fort 
Orange.1 

Such  gains  and  such  hopes  were  rendering  the  Company 
utterly  unfit  for  the  slow,  dull  task  of  colonization,  with  no 
immediate  hopes  of  profit.  At  the  very  time  that  the  Company 
was  thus  matching  itself  against  the  whole  might  of  the  Spanish 
Empire,  and  overawing  the  conquerors  of  Mexico  and  Peru,  its 
.settlers  on  the  Hudson  were  hemmed  into  a  ruinous  village ; 
that  which  should  have  been  a  fort,  open  on  every  side  to  the 
enemy,  the  farms  tenantless  and  unfenced,  the  site  of  its  one 
warehouse  hardly  to  be  found,  the  only  trace  of  prosperity  in 
the  estate  of  the  resident  director.  Moreover  the  administration 
of  New  Netherlands  was  vested,  not  in  the  whole  Company, 
but  only  in  a  section  of  it.  That  part  of  the  corporate  business 
was  handed  over  to  the  Amsterdam  chamber.  Thus  the  Com 
pany  as  a  whole  had  no  direct  control  over  the  colony,  and 
felt  no  responsibility  for  it.  If  any  dispute  arose  between  the 
chambers,  or  any  lack  of  harmony  in  the  working  of  the  Com 
pany,  New  Netherlands  as  a  dependency  of  Amsterdam  would 
be  looked  on  not  merely  with  indifference,  but  with  jealousy  and 
ill-will. 

All  that  the  Company  could  claim  to  have  done  for  coloniza 
tion  was  to  have  set  on  foot  a  movement  which  had  in  it  an 
Colonial  element  of  vitality,  a  principle,  though  weak  and 
progress  torpid,  of  growth.  In  the  history  of  New  Nether- 
Company.  lan(is  there  was  nothing  like  that  solid  and  effective 
progress  with  which  New  England  stretched  her  robust  grasp 
over  the  wilderness.  Yet  something  was  done.  During  the 
first  seventeen  years  of  the  Company's  corporate  life  settlements 
were  established  not  only  on  the  Hudson,  but  on  Long  Island 
and  on  Delaware  Bay.  A  fresh  post,  called  Fort  Orange,  was 
established  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Hudson,  to  the  north  of  Fort 
Nassau,  which  it  superseded.2  The  name  of  Nassau  was 
transferred  to  a  fort  near  the  union  of  the  Schuylkill  and  the 
Delaware,  founded  in  1623,  but  deserted  after  three  years'  oc- 


1  De  Vries  in  N.  Y.  Docs.  i.   145. 

2  Journal  of  New  Netherlands,   Holland  Documents,  vol.  i.  p.   181. 


12  FOUNDATION'  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

cupation.1  By  1626  there  were  at  Manhattan  some  thirty 
scattered  houses.1  In  that  year  the  place  was  regularly  secured 
by  a  fortification  and  a  battery.8  Beside  the  farmers  of  Man 
hattan  there  was  another  agricultural  settlement,  that  at  Waal- 
boght  on  Long  Island,  formed  by  Walloons  settled  there  in 
1623.*  Nassau  was  not  the  only  settlement  towards  the  south. 
Another  called  Swanendael  was  formed  on  Delaware  Bay,  at 
what  is  now  Lewistown.  That,  however,  was,  as  we  shall  see, 
but  short-lived.  The  fur  trade  was  the  one  means  through 
which  the  colony  seemed  in  any  way  likely  to  repay  its  founders. 
Its  only  other  productive  industry  was  ship-building.  That  for 
a  while  throve,  though  it  was  in  all  likelihood  ostentation  rather 
than  reasonable  enterprise  which  built  and  launched  a  vessel 
of  at  least  six  hundred  tons.5  Sawmills  also  were  tried  but  did 
not  answer.  The  Company,  too,  traded  with  New  England, 
importing  hither  tobacco  and  live  stock.  That,  however,  was  no 
benefit  to  New  Netherlands,  but  rather  to  its  prejudice,  as 
giving  the  settlers  competitors  for  the  necessaries  of  life. 

It  is  not  a  little  to  be  regretted  that  the  continuous  records 
of  the  Company  are  no  longer  extant.  Thus  we  have  nothing 
like  a  clear  history  of  the  early  economical  life  of  the  settlement, 
nor  of  the  terms  on  which  the  first  settlers  occupied  their  hold 
ings.  It  would  seem,  however,  that  not  only  the  land,  but  the 
stock  upon  it,  belonged  to  the  Company.  The  so-called  farmer 
was  not  so  much  a  tenant  as  a  servant  paid  by  certain  allowances 
in  kind.  The  whole  business  of  the  Company,  its  land  and  its 
fur  trade,  was  under  the  control  of  one  official,  the  Director. 
He  was  assisted  by  a  Council,  and  in  conjunction  with  them  had 
certain  limited  judicial  powers.  Below  him  were  two  other 
executive  officers — the  Koopman,  that  is,  the  bookkeeper  and 
secretary,  and  the  Schout,  responsible  for  the  observance  of  the 
criminal  law.  All  these  functionaries  were  directly  appointed 
by  the  Company,  and  seem  to  have  been  removable  at  pleasure. 

It  was  plainly  impossible  that  with  this  constitution  the  Com 
pany  could  extend  its  agricultural  operations  far.  To  supple- 
The  ment  this,  a  scheme  was  introduced  in  1629  for  estab- 

patroons.  lishing  a  class  of  landed  proprietors.  Like  a  medi- 

1  Journal  of  New  Netherlands,  Holland  Documents,  vol.  i.  p.  181. 

2  Ibid.  3  Wassenaar,  p.  37. 
4  Brodhead,  i.   155.     He  quotes  the  Albany  Records. 

*  Letter  from  Mason,  the  proprietor  of  New  Hampshire.     N.  Y.  Docs.  iii.  27- 


THE  PATROONSHIPS.  13 

aeval  king,  the  Company  allotted  portions  of  its  territory  to  indi 
viduals,  on  whom  it  conferred  not  only  proprietary  rights  but 
also  certain  subordinate  jurisdiction.  These  grantees — patroons 
as  they  were  called — were  tempted  by  an  exceedingly  restricted 
share  in  the  Company's  monopoly  of  trade.  Each  was  to  bring 
out  fifty  adult  emigrants,  and  in  return  was  to  receive  a  tract  of 
land  reaching  sixteen  miles  along  the  river,  all  on  one  bank  or 
half  on  each,  with  no  fixed  limit  of  width. 

The  colonists  whom  the  patroon  took  out  were  to  be  ascripti 
glebce.  The  patroon  himself  was  to  hold  manorial  courts,  from 
which  there  was  a  right  of  appeal  to  the  Company.  If  he  could 
found  townships  within  his  territory,  he  might  himself  appoint 
in  them  a  staff  of  officials.  A  privilege  of  the  Old  World,  too, 
was  renewed  for  the  benefit  of  the  patroon.  The  tenant  might 
grind  corn  nowhere  but  at  his  mill.  On  the  patroons  the  Com 
pany  cast  a  duty  which  they  might  themselves  have  fitly  dis 
charged,  that  of  providing  ministers  and  schoolmasters.1 

The  objections  to  these  arrangements  were  many  and  obvious. 
It  meant  the  introduction  of  a  landed  aristocracy  among  a 
people  whose  life  in  the  Old  World  had  done  nothing  to 
familiarize  them  with  such  a  system.  To  leading  members  of 
the  Company  it  offered  opportunities  for  large  and  lucrative 
speculation  in  land.  Thus  we  find  one  director,  Kiliaen  van 
Rensselaer,  an  Amsterdam  jeweler,  acquiring  a  territory  on  the 
upper  Hudson  so  vast  that  as  a  concession  to  the  general  outcry 
he  had  to  slice  it  up  into  five  patroonships.  It  was  a  system, 
too,  which  went  to  make  any  effective  central  government  im 
possible,  alike  for  civil  or  military  purposes.  There  was  no 
cohesion  between  the  patroonships,  no  interdependence:  one 
might  prosper  without  benefiting  its  neighbors.  Moreover, 
the  patroon  was  usually  an  absentee,  and  the  conditions  of  a 
new  country  leave  no  margin  for  rent.  The  patroon  often 
delegated  his  post  to  an  agent ;  the  land  had,  in  modern  phrase, 
to  keep  two  gentlemen. 

One  indirect  and  remote  gain  the  system  brought.  The 
inhabitants  of  each  patroonship  might  appoint  a  deputy  to  confer 
upon  its  own  affairs  with  the  Director  and  Council  of  the 
Colony.  It  is  a  long  step  from  that  to  a  stable  system  of 

1  The  Charter  of  Patroons  is  in  the  Collections  of  the  New  York  Historical 
Society,  and  series,  vol.  i.  p.  370. 


14  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

representative  government.  But  in  New  Netherlands  represent 
ative  government  was  attained  so  slowly,  and  through  so  many 
incomplete  experiments,  that  one  may  reckon  even  a  faint  and 
imperfect  approach  towards  it  as  a  step  in  advance. 

Two  attempts  were  made  to  modify  the  system,  not  wholly 
without  success.  In  1640  the  patroonships  were  reduced  in  ex- 
Smaii  pro-  tent  an^  a  smaller  class  of  proprietor  was  introduced, 
prietors.  holding  two  hundred  acres,  and  tilling  it  with  five 
servants  brought  out  at  his  own  expense.  Ten  years  later  the 
Company  tried  the  experiment  of  supplying  tenants  with  stock. 
A  tract  of  land  was  granted  to  a  farmer.  The  ground  was 
partly  cleared,  and  there  was  on  it  a  house  and  a  barn.  The 
tenant  was  to  be  supplied  with  implements  and  with  live  stock, 
four  horses,  as  many  cows,  and  a  certain  number  of  sheep  and 
pigs.  He  was  to  pay  a  fixed  rent,  partly  in  money,  partly  in 
butter.  For  six  years  the  stock  were  to  remain  on  the  tenant's 
hands  at  the  joint  risk  of  himself  and  the  Company.  At  the 
end  of  that  time  the  Company  is  to  receive  back  the  stock  or  an 
equivalent.1  But  the  system,  however  modified,  had  in  it  no 
element  of  success.  The  agricultural  prosperity  of  New 
Netherlands  did  not  begin  till  rural  communities  sprung  up  like 
those  of  New  England,  some  actually  formed  by  emigrants 
thence,  others  fashioned  on  that  model. 

In  1638  the  Company  granted  to  its  subjects  a  strictly  limited 
share  in  its  own  commercial  advantages.  Private  persons  might 
The  Com-  import  and  export  in  the  Company's  ships,  paying  a 

pany  modi-       ,  ,  ,       .  ,         .  , 

fies  its  duty  of  ten  per  cent,  on   goods   brought  into   the 

of°rade.y  colony,  fifteen  on  exports.  But  inasmuch  as  it  was 
at  the  same  time  enacted  that  each  colonist  was  to  pledge  him 
self  voluntarily  to  submit  to  the  regulations  and  commands  of 
the  Company's  officers,  the  scanty  privileges  rested  on  a  pre 
carious  basis.2 

Moreover,  even  if  such  a  measure  did  something  for  the  com 
mercial  prosperity  of  the  colony,  yet  it  failed  to  meet  the  chief 
need  and  to  give  life,  strength,  and  cohesion  to  the  several  parts 
of  the  settlement.  For  a  community  which  has  yet  to  grow  into 
civic  life  there  is  no  little  truth  in  the  Greek  theory,  that  it  is 

1  These   conditions   are   set   forth   in   a   pamphlet   written   by   Tienhoven,    the 
Secretary  to  the  Colony,  in  1650.     O'Callaghan,  vol.  iv.  p.  26. 

2  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  288. 


COSMOPOLITANISM  OF   THE   COLONY.  1$ 

against  good  order  to  have  a  crowd  of  traders  coming  and 
going.1 

The  change,  however,  did  at  least  stimulate  immigration. 
In  eight  years  the  number  of  farms  had  multiplied  fourfold.2 
increase  of  But  even  tni§  brought  its  drawbacks.  It  complicated 
population,  tjje  relations  with  the  savages.  The  peace  of  the 
colony  might  at  any  time  be  imperiled  by  one  unscrupulous 
trader.  Commerce,  too,  brought  in  a  miscellaneous  horde  with 
no  sense  of  corporate  life,  of  a  common  origin,  of  common  tradi 
tions.  One  is  compelled  to  think  that  the  statement  of  a  Jesuit 
visitor  in  1644  who  found  eighteen  different  tongues  must  have 
been  colored  by  a  Frenchman's  rhetoric.3  But  several  of  these 
tributary  streams  can  be  clearly  identified.  English  there  were, 
many  no  doubt,  like  Underbill,  men  whom  the  rigid  ecclesiastical 
corporations  of  New  England  with  their  exacting  tests  excluded. 
Others,  French  Huguenots,  Walloons,  Scotch  peddlers,  Jews, 
have  left  the  trace  of  their  existence  in  the  records  of  the 
community. 

The  result  was  a  total  absence  of  that  unity  which  in  New 
England  was  so  intense.  She  with  all  her  errors,  and  in  a 
measure  by  those  errors,  created  that  "cake  of  custom,"  as  a 
thoughtful  writer  has  called  it,4  so  needful  to  give  firmness  and 
cohesion  where  the  conventional  ties  of  old  countries  are  absent, 
the  want  of  which  made  the  early  political  life  of  New  Nether 
lands  so  weak  and  unstable. 

Since  the  records  of  the  Dutch  West  India  Company  have 
perished,  nearly  all  the  documentary  evidence  as  to  its  early 
impor-  proceedings  that  survives  consists  of  controversial 

tanceofthe  ..  .  rr-i  i      i     •       i    r  T 

Governors,  writings,  attacks  on  omcials  and  their  defense.  In 
deed  in  the  absence  of  records  the  whole  subject  becomes  in 
tensely  personal:  the  characters  and  motives  of  the  Governors 
assume  a  preponderating  importance.  To  speak  of  the  Gov 
ernors  at  the  outset  by  that  name  is  almost  misleading.  It  calls 
up  associations  of  the  full  and  vigorous  political  life  of  Mas 
sachusetts  or  Virginia.  For  some  years  the  Governor,  or,  to 
give  him  his  proper  title,  the  Director  of  New  Netherlands,  was 
really  but  the  manager  of  a  large  trading  house. 

1  Aristotle's  Politics,  b.  vii.  ch.  6. 

2  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  290. 

8  Father  Jogues.     His  report  is  in  O'Callaghan,  vol.  iv.  p.   15. 
*  Bagehot,  in  Physics  and  Politics. 


1 6  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

That  is  certainly  true  of  the  first  Governor,  Jacobsen  May, 
and  his  successor  William  Verhulst.  We  can  hardly  say  more 
Peter  °f  ^e  third,  Peter  Minuit.  Yet  there  was  enough 

Minuit.  that  was  noteworthy  and  typical  in  Minuit's  career 
and  character  to  deserve  notice.  His  course  was  not  unlike  that 
of  Usselinx;  each  illustrates  the  fatal  cosmopolitanism  which 
marred  the  fortunes  of  New  Netherlands.  Sent  out  as  Director- 
General  in  1626,  in  1631  he  incurred  the  displeasure  of  the 
Company  by  favoring  the  patroons  in  their  schemes  for  ac 
cumulating  landed  property.1  Dismissed  on  this  ground,  like 
Usselinx  he  transferred  his  services  to  another  country,  and 
thus  became  one  of  the  chief  instruments  in  overthrowing  the 
Dutch  settlement.  For  while  the  Swedish  colony  itself  fell 
easily  before  the  energy  of  New  Netherlands,  the  effort  of  that 
struggle  left  the  conqueror  in  turn  defenseless. 

Despite  Minuit's  lack  of  patriotism,  his  strenuous  energy 
makes  him  stand  out  a  vivid  figure  in  annals  which  till  then  are 
wouter  void  of  biographical  interest.  His  successor,  Van 
Twiiier.  Twiller,  is  saved  from  nonentity  by  strange  incon 
gruity  of  character  and  position.  There  is  nothing  to  show 
him  unfit  to  have  carried  on  the  affairs  of  the  Company  in 
ordinary  times.  In  the  mere  head  of  a  factory,  his  hard  drink 
ing,  his  bluster,  and  his  cowardice  might  have  been  atoned  for 
by  his  tradesmanlike  shrewdness.  By  the  irony  of  fate  he  was 
placed  at  the  head  of  affairs  just  as  the  colony  was  emerging 
from  the  purely  trading  stage,  just  as  it  was  first  entangled  in 
conflicts  which  heralded  the  transfer  of  European  battles  to  the 
New  World.  Full  justice,  too,  was  done  to  his  grotesque 
failure  by  a  shrewd  and  unfriendly  observer.  During  his  term 
of  office  the  colony  was  revisited  by  David  de  Vries,  that  resolute 
and  enterprising  man,  the  leading  partner  in  the  abortive  attempt 
to  form  a  settlement  at  Swanendael.  With  views  that  took  in 
more  than  trade,  he  explored  the  Hudson,  the  Delaware,  and 
the  shores  of  Chesapeake  Bay,  planning  the  establishment  of  a 
whale  fishery,  making  friends  with  the  savages,  and  opening 
intercourse  with  the  English  in  Virginia.  We  learn  from  his 
writings  how,  during  his  stay  at  Fort  Amsterdam,  an  English 
ship  sailed  into  the  Hudson.  Her  captain,  Eelkens,  wras  a 
discharged  servant  of  the  Company.  Like  Minuit,  he  did  not 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  213. 


DE    VRIES.  17 

scruple  to  turn  his  local  experience  against  his  former  employers. 
The  voyage  was  more  than  an  unauthorized  intrusion  on  Dutch 
trade.  It  was  accompanied  by  a  claim  on  the  part  of  Eelkens 
and  his  employers  to  equal  rights  with  the  Dutch  on  the  river 
discovered  by  the  Englishman,  Hudson.  De  Vries  tells  us  how 
Eelkens  demanded  a  pass  from  Van  Twiller ;  how,  after  a  week's 
delay,  no  pass  came,  and  how,  thereupon,  Eelkens  sailed  under 
the  guns  of  Fort  Amsterdam  with  the  English  flag  flying, 
while  the  Director  on  the  quay  stood  before  an  open  cask  of 
wine,  drinking  with  his  friends  the  health  of  the  Prince  of 
Orange,  and  appealing  to  them  to  protect  him  against  violence. 
The  Director's  underlings  did  something  to  supply  his  own  lack 
of  courage.  By  judicious  and  persistent  interference  they  with 
held  the  Indians  from  trade  with  the  new-comer. 

The  dealings  of  the  Director  with  De  Vries  himself  were 
marked  by  the  same  spirit  of  ineffective  bluster.  The  Director 
His  deal-  demanded  that  De  Vries's  ship  should  be  inspected 
DC  Vries.  before  she  sailed.  De  Vries  refused ;  twelve  mus 
keteers  were  sent  down  to  enforce  the  order;  in  quiet  defiance 
of  the  threat  De  Vries  rowed  from  the  shore  and  bade  his  crew 
weigh  anchor. 

Two  years  later  Van  Twiller  had  thankfully  to  accept  the 
services  of  the  man  who  defied  him.  Fort  Nassau,  the  Dutch 
station  on  the  Delaware,  was  now  deserted,  and  a  small  party 
from  Maryland  seized  on  the  vacant  site.  One  of  them,  a 
deserter  whose  motives  are  nowhere  explained,  brought  news  to 
New  Amsterdam  of  the  encroachment.  Van  Twiller  at  once 
sent  De  Vries  to  deal  with  the  matter.  A  second  party  of 
twenty  men  was  just  ready  to  assist  the  new  settlement.  But 
the  assailants  arrived  before  the  relieving  force  could  sail,  and 
the  intruders  were  peacefully  removed  and  transported  back  to 
Maryland.1 

Like  encroachments  were  being  attempted  with  more  success 
to  the  north  by  the  New  England  settlers  in  the  valley  of  the 
Encroach-  Connecticut.  With  no  better  resources,  his  em- 
NewEfng™  ployers  supine  about  everything  but  the  beaver  trade, 
land.  his  coiony  a  number  of  scattered  outposts,  with  no 

1  For  all  these  transactions  De  Vries  himself  is  our  authority.  I  cannot  find 
any  explicit  statement  to  the  effect  that  the  Dutch  reoccupied  Fort  Nassau. 
But  that  they  did  so  is  clear  from  what  follows  (inf.  p.  58). 


1 8  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

actual  organization  and  no  corporate  life,  one  may  doubt  if 
Van  Twiller  could  have  done  anything  to  check  the  stren 
uous  advance  of  English  Puritanism.  Yet  one  may  well  be 
lieve  that  his  known  incapacity  encouraged  that  defiant  pol 
icy  against  which  his  more  energetic  successors  were  pow 
erless. 

Van  Twiller's  successor,  William  Kieft,  was  a  man  of  widely 
different  character.  He  had  no  lack  of  energy.  If  good 
William  government  lay  in  the  contriving  of  administrative 
machinery,  he  would  have  been  a  good  governor. 
Within  the  little  sphere  of  his  province  he  aimed  at  ubiquitous 
despotism.  His  very  first  step  was  to  reduce  the  Council  to  a 
nullity  by  nominating  only  one  councilor  and  reserving  to  him 
self  a  double  vote.  Since  the  Council  was  the  one  judicial 
body,  this  practically  made  Kieft  supreme  and  irresponsible  in 
civil  and  criminal  cases.  He  may  not  have  been  personally 
corrupt,  though,  even  there,  his  character  was  not  beyond 
suspicion.  But  he  had  no  scruple  about  acting  through  corrupt 
instruments.  In  his  secretary,  Van  Tienhoven,  he  had  a  sub 
ordinate  who  saw  clearly  that  a  minute  and  pervading  despotism 
such  as  Kieft  aimed  at  left  room  for  plenty  of  official  corruption. 
Thus,  for  instance,  Kieft  ordered  that  no  deposition  or  other 
document  should  be  valid  as  evidence  unless  written  by  the 
Secretary.  Here  the  Secretary's  greed  and  the  Governor's  love 
of  official  interference  worked  together.  Kieft,  too,  was  mani 
festly  one  of  those  who  think  that  a  community  can  be  drilled 
into  prosperity  and  morality.  He  fenced  in  trade  with  severe 
edicts.  Many  of  his  orders  were  in  themselves  reasonable. 
His  error  lay  in  forcing  them  simultaneously  and  with  ostenta 
tious  severity  on  a  community  used  only  to  lax  authority.  No 
officials  were  to  trade  in  furs,  and  the  right  of  exportation,  lately 
granted  to  private  persons,  was  withdrawn.  To  sell  guns  or 
powder  to  the  Indians  was  made  a  capital  crime.  Kieft  was 
plainly  a  man  of  austere  private  life.  New  Amsterdam,  with 
its  mixed  population  of  sailors  and  traders,  left  plenty  of  scope 
for  an  earnest  moral  reformer.  The  Governor  exercised  the 
right  of  licensing  vintners  at  his  own  discretion;  hours  were 
fixed  for  work.  A  proclamation  was  issued  with  a  list  of 
prohibited  vices,  including  lewdness  and  calumny,  and  ending 
with  the  comprehensive  form,  "all  other  immoralities."  Sailors, 


WILLIAM  KIEFT.  19 

who  no  doubt  contributed  their  full  share  to  the  catalogue,  were 
to  be  on  land  only  in  the  daytime.1 

A  man  of  winning  tact  or  of  commanding  dignity  and  re 
strained  temper  might  possibly  have  carried  out  such  a  policy. 
The  Kieft,  it  is  plain,  was  neither.  His  only  positive  influ- 

Tvveive  and  ence  was  that  indirect  one  by  which  despotism  works 
its  own  cure.     His  harsh  and  ill-judged  interference 


war. 


woke  in  the  settlers  a  spirit  of  resistance  which  under  mere  neg 
lect  and  bad  administration  might  have  slumbered.  Thus 
it  came  that  under  the  most  despotic  of  its  early  rulers  the 
colony  took  its  first  steps,  slight  indeed,  but  yet  containing  the 
seeds  of  better  things,  towards  representative  government.  As 
usual,  external  danger  gave  the  opening  for  resistance.  In  1641 
a  settler  was  murdered  by  an  Indian  in  fulfillment  of  an  ancient 
blood  feud.  Fifteen  years  before,  a  chief  of  the  same  tribe 
bringing  furs  to  sell  at  Manhattan  was  robbed  and  murdered 
by  three  servants  of  Minuit.  With  the  victim  was  his  nephew, 
a  young  lad.  He  escaped  and  grew  to  manhood  with  a  fixed 
purpose  of  revenge  for  the  deed  which  he  had  beheld.  His 
vengeance,  however,  fell  on  one  who  seems  to  have  been  in  no 
way  connected  with  the  original  outrage.  One  Claus  Smit,  a 
wheelwright,  had  settled  in  an  isolated  hut,  north-east  of  Man 
hattan.  The  Indian  visited  him  on  the  pretext  of  trade  and, 
getting  behind  him,  treacherously  drove  his  tomahawk  into 
Smit's  head.  Kieft  was  not  the  man  to  pass  over  such  a  matter. 
Yet  he  might  well  feel  that  it  was  a  hopeless  task  to  retaliate 
with  an  exasperated  population  at  his  back,  and  with  no  ma 
terials  better  than  these  at  hand  he  might  well  refuse  to  be 
personally  responsible  for  the  security  of  the  colony.  His  first 
need  was  popular  support.  Kieft  at  once  called  a  general  meet 
ing  of  householders  and  laid  the  case  before  them,  suggesting  a 
demand  for  the  surrender  of  the  murderer ;  if  that  were  refused, 
retaliation.  The  meeting  at  once  appointed  twelve  representa 
tives  under  the  presidency  of  De  Vries  to  act  for  them.  It  is 
clear  that  Kieft  had  little  intention  of  submitting  his  own 
judgment  to  that  of  the  colonists  or  their  delegates:  he  wanted 

1  For  Kieft's  regulation  see  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  pp.  277-8. 

2  Our  knowledge  of  these  proceedings  is  partly  due  to   De   Vries,   partly  to 
a  letter  or  pamphlet  in  the  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  i.  p.  179.     It  is  calendared  by  Mr. 
Brodhead  by  the  title  of  Journal  of  New  Netherlands.     I  refer  to  it  by  that 
title. 


20  FOUNDATION    OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

support,  not  advice.  Kieft's  own  policy  was  one  of  merciless 
retaliation  and  intimidation.  The  consent  of  the  Twelve  was 
reluctantly  given.  A  troop  of  eighty  soldiers  was  sent  out  to 
obtain  redress;  ignorance  of  the  country,  and  one  may  well 
believe  the  backwardness  of  the  settlers,  brought  the  expedition 
to  nothing.  But  though  they  returned  to  New  Amsterdam 
without  striking  a  blow,  yet  the  attempt  was  enough  to  terrify 
the  offending  tribe.  Peace  was  made,  with  a  promise,  never 
fulfilled,  to  give  up  the  murderer. 

Meanwhile  the  Twelve  were  availing  themselves  of  the 
position  which  they  had  gained  to  make  certain  demands  on 
Demands  behalf  of  the  settlers.  In  the  Fatherland,  they  said, 
Twelve. i  every  small  village  had  its  five  or  seven  schepens. 
Yet  the  citizens  of  New  Netherlands  were  allowed  no  share  in 
the  control  of  their  own  affairs.  Even  such  a  slight  check  on 
the  Governor  as  was  imposed  by  the  existence  of  the  Council  was 
frustrated  since  places  in  that  body  were  allowed  to  remain 
vacant.  Let  the  Council  be  filled  up  and  let  the  freemen  elect 
four  members  of  it.  Let  the  elected  Twelve  representatives 
have  a  right  of  veto  upon  any  taxes  imposed.  Let  there  be  an 
annual  muster  under  arms.  These  indeed  would  be  the  best 
security  for  popular  rights.  A  people  capable  of  bearing  arms 
surrounded  by  enemies  could  with  due  perseverance  make  their 
own  terms  against  a  governor  unsupported  by  mercenary  troops. 

Kieft,  strong  in  his  own  despotic  temper  and  in  the  anticipated 
support  of  the  Company,  hardly  yielded  an  inch  of  ground.  The 
Kieft's  muster  might  be  held,  but  the  Company  could  not  af- 
answer.  for(j  to  gjve  pOW(}en  No  control  over  taxation  can 
be  granted  to  the  popular  representatives.  The  Council  Kieft 
admits  is  small.  He  is  hoping  for  -the  arrival  of  some  persons 
of  rank.  Then  he  will  fill  it  up.  The  freemen  may  appoint 
four  Councilors,  two  to  retire  each  year.  He  winds  up  with  the 
conventional  plea  for  an  arbitrary  system :  "of  what  practical  in 
jury  can  the  settlers  complain?" 

The  only  point  on  which  Kieft  gave  way  was  in  connection 
with  certain  questions  of  trade.  The  Twelve  had  petitioned 
for  trade  with  foreign  vessels.  This  was  granted  with  certain 
restrictions  necessary  for  good  order.  The  Twelve  also  treated 
the  importation  of  English  cattle  as  a  grievance  to  the  farmer. 

1  For  these  demands  and   Kieft's  answer,   see  Brodhead,   vol.   i.  pp.   326-8. 


TROUBLES   WITH   THE  INDIANS.  21 

Accordingly  it  was  provided  that  such  importation  should  be 
limited  to  bulls  and  he-goats.  There  had  been  certain  attempts 
to  regulate  arbitrarily  the  value  of  money.  This  had  led  to  the 
exportation  of  specie.  Kieft  promised  that  it  should  be  dis 
continued.  With  these  bare  installments  of  reform  the  Twelve 
were  dismissed. 

It  was  not  long  before  the  troubles  with  the  Indians  were 
renewed.  A  native,  who  had  been  made  drunk  and  cheated! 
Further  by  a  Dutchman,  took  the  law  into  his  own  hands 
withbthe  and  murdered  the  offender.  His  tribesmen  were  re- 
indians.  quired  to  give  up  the  murderer.  They  offered  a 
large  store  of  wampum  as  compensation,  but  were  unable  or 
unwilling  to  arrest  the  criminal.  There  was  reason  to  fear  that 
this  was  not  an  isolated  outrage.  Rumors  of  an  impending 
massacre  ran  through  the  scattered  Dutch  plantations. 

Meanwhile  their  Indian  enemies  were  themselves  threatened 
on  the  other  side  by  the  Mohicans,  and  were  fleeing  from  their 
villages  to  the  coast.  Two  lines  of  policy  presented  themselves 
to  the  settlers.  Some,  headed  by  De  Vries,  saw  in  the  danger  of 
these  Indians  an  opportunity  for  winning  their  gratitude.  The 
houseless  fugitives  might  be  sheltered  and  abide  in  safety  till 
the  tide  of  Mohawk  invasion  flowed  back.  Others  saw  in  the 
weakness  of  the  enemy  an  opportunity  for  exacting  retribution 
and  striking  terror.  Kieft,  having  by  his  own  act  dismissed  the 
Twelve,  could  not  with  any  show  of  reason  throw  himself  on 
their  advice  or  require  them  to  share  his  responsibility.  Never 
theless  when  three  members  of  that  body  petitioned  him  to  de 
clare  war,  he  at  once  accepted  their  policy  and  justified  himself 
by  pleading  popular  approval.  The  result  was  a  hideous  and 
undiscriminating  massacre,  well-nigh  as  black  a  chapter  as  any 
in  the  history  of  civilized  men  and  barbarians.  Nor  was  Kieft 
alone  in  his  folly.  A  wanton  raid  by  the  Long  Island  settlers 
on  the  granaries  of  the  friendly  Indians  brought  another  attack 
upon  the  settlers.  On  every  side  the  colony  was  hemmed  in 
with  enemies  of  its  own  making.  From  a  multitude  of  tribes 
owning  no  common  allegiance  it  was  impossible  to  obtain  a 
secure  peace.  Terms  indeed  were  made  with  the  Long  Island 
savages,  but  with  little  confidence  or  good  will  on  either  side. 
Later  on  in  the  summer  news  came  that  the  savages  about  Fort 
Orange  were  up  in  arms,  and  that  fifteen  of  the  Dutch  had 


22  FOUNDATION-  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

perished.  The  settlers  could  only  cower  together  within  the 
fortifications  of  New  Amsterdam,  leaving  behind  a  wilderness  of 
wasted  fields  and  burning  houses. 

In  like  trials  the  people  of  New  England  had  ever  been  borne 
up  by  a  strong  sense  of  corporate  unity  and  an  unshaken  con- 
Attacks  fidence  in  rulers  of  their  own  choice.  The  unhappy 
on  Kieft.  New  Nethcrlanders  had  no  such  stay  in  their  distress. 
Hints  at  the  expediency  of  deposing  the  Governor  were  heard. 
He  who  had  ever  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  all  popular  remonstrance 
or  demand  now  tried  to  shift  the  blame  of  his  failure  on  his 
advisers.  The  plea  roused  the  fury  of  one  who  had  been  at 
once  the  partner  and  the  victim  of  Kieft's  misdeeds.  One  of 
the  three  who  had  counseled  war,  Adriaensen,  had  seen  his  own 
plantation  in  flames  and  desolate.  Kieft's  attempt  to  shield 
himself  was  practically  giving  up  Adriaensen  to  popular  fury. 
The  injured  man  broke  in  on  Kieft,  charged  him  with  calumny, 
and  then,  supported  by  two  of  his  followers,  attempted  the 
Governor's  life.1 

In  these  straits,  beset  by  savages  without  and  disaffected  sub 
jects  within,  Kieft  as  before  sought  to  shift  his  responsibility 
The  on  to  the  people.  He  again  called  a  meeting  of 

Council  of       ,  ,     ,  ,  iiir  •  ^T-i 

Eight.  householders  and  asked  for  a  committee.  1  he  set 
tlers  might  well  feel  that  it  was  useless  to  co-operate  with  one 
so  arbitrary  and  so  untrustworthy,  one  who  thus  evaded  responsi 
bility  and  defied  control.  They  demanded  that  the  Governor 
should  nominate  the  board,  leaving  the  householders  a  veto. 
At  length  after  some  wrangling  the  householders  accepted  Kieft's 
proposal  and  chose  a  board  of  eight.2 

They  at  once  took  an  important  step.  Hitherto  the  colony 
had  no  relations  with  the  mother-country  save  through  the  Com- 
The  Eight  pany.  The  Eight  now  sent  a  letter  to  the  Company 
the  states-  setting  forth  their  woes  and  their  dangers.  But  at 
General. 3  ^e  same  tjme  they  made  a  direct  appeal  to  the  States- 
General.  Though  it  was  not  formally  and  avowedly  an  attack 
on  the  Company,  yet  every  line  of  it  told  of  the  Company's 
neglect.  There  was,  they  said,  no  effective  resistance.  The 
garrison  was  insufficient  and  had  no  powder,  while,  thanks  to 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.   357. 

2  Ib.  p.  365- 

8  Mr.    Brodhead  gives   the  text  of  the  appeal,   vol.   i.   p.    371,  &c. 


END   OF   THE  INDIAN    WAR.  23 

the  contraband  trade,  the  enemy  was  abundantly  supplied.  Aid 
might  have  been  got  from  New  England,  but  the  colony  had  no 
means  of  paying.  Last  came  a  prophetic  warning,  which,  even 
though  the  Company  were  deaf  to  it,  might  touch  patriotic 
statesmen.  If  the  colonists  were  left  unaided,  they  would  have 
to  desert  their  homes  and  join  their  neighbors  to  the  east.  The 
whole  country,  with  its  fertile  soil,  its  harbors,  and  its  fur  trade, 
would  become  English  territory. 

All  through  the  next  year  the  war  dragged  on.  It  was  not 
as  when  the  Pequods  threatened  Connecticut,  or  when  the 
End  of  the  various  tribes  on  the  New  England  frontier  were 
war.  marshaled  under  the  dominant  will  of  Philip. 

Here  the  settlers  were  menaced  in  every  quarter  by  enemies 
acting  with  little  concert.  This,  while  it  saved  the  settlers 
from  one  overwhelming  attack,  increased  the  ever  present  sense 
of  insecurity  and  the  difficulty  of  making  an  abiding  peace. 
Mercenaries  were  hired  from  New  England,  among  them  that 
strange  Puritan  soldier  of  fortune,  John  Underbill.  The 
strategy  which  he  had  learned  under  Mason  stood  him  in  good 
stead.  On  a  March  night,  with  snow-covered  ground,  a  force 
of  a  hundred  and  fifty  men  surrounded  an  Indian  village  near 
the  Connecticut.  The  occupants  were  over  five  hundred. 
Mason  with  greater  inequality  of  numbers  had  boldly  forced 
the  palisade,  and  only  resorted  to  fire  when  his  troops  seemed  in 
danger  of  being  overwhelmed.  Underbill's  strategy  was  more 
cautious  and  more  merciless.  The  place  was  surrounded  and 
every  Indian  that  tried  to  break  through  was  shot.  Then  fire 
was  used  to  complete  the  work.1 

Underbill's  unsparing  blow  was  effective.  It  at  once  brought 
the  savages  on  Long  Island  and  the  adjacent  mainland  to  terms, 
leaving  the  colony  only  threatened  on  the  south  and  west. 
There,  however,  things  were  little  better.  But  the  opportune 
arrival  of  a  hundred  and  thirty  soldiers,  sent  by  the  Governor 
of  Curaqoa,  brought  with  it  some  security.  During  the  whole 
of  1644  the  settlers  were  clamoring  for  vigorous  measures. 
Indifferent  as  Kieft  no  doubt  was  to  the  real  well-being  of  the 
colony,  yet  one  may  well  believe  that  he  felt  sorely  hampered 
by  the  disunion  among  the  settlers,  and  by  the  total  want  of 
any  vigorous  corporate  life.  We  have  evidence  that,  at  least  in 

1  Brodhead,  vol.   i.   pp.  390-1. 


24  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

the  case  of  the  patroons,  desire  for  gain  had  swept  away  all  sense 
of  public  responsibility  and  common  interest.  In  the  very  thick 
of  the  Indian  trouble  a  ship  sent  out  by  Rensselaer  reached 
Manhattan.  Amongst  her  freight  were  shoes.  These  were 
urgently  needed  for  the  soldiers.  The  supercargo  refused  to 
sell  them.  A  dispute  followed  which  led  to  a  complete  search 
of  the  vessel,  and  the  discovery  of  a  supply  of  arms  and  am 
munition.  There  was  at  that  time  an  extensive  fur  trade  at 
Rensselaerwyck,  and  we  cannot  doubt  that  the  guns  and  powder 
would  have  soon  been  in  the  hands  of  the  men  before  whom  the 
colony  was  cowering.1 

Had  the  savages  been  actuated  by  any  well-defined  common 
purpose,  had  they  been  under  the  guidance  of  a  leader  with  a 
deliberate  scheme  for  exterminating  the  intruders,  the  case  of 
the  Dutch  settlement  would  in  all  likelihood  have  been  hopeless. 
Happily  for  the  colonists  the  anger  of  the  savages  was,  like 
their  friendship,  fickle  and  wayward:  resentment  led  them  to 
harass  and  to  plunder,  it  could  not  give  them  the  steady 
patience  to  carry  a  long  war  to  a  successful  issue.  In  the 
summer  of  1645  peace  was  made  first  with  the  Indians  on  the 
upper  Hudson,  soon  after  with  those  about  Manhattan.  The 
principle  of  the  latter  treaty  was  to  restrict  as  far  as  might  be 
all  private  and  unauthorized  intercourse  between  the  settlers 
and  the  natives.  No  armed  Indian  was  to  enter  the  Dutch 
settlement:  no  Dutchman  was  to  visit  a  native  village  unless 
under  the  escort  of  a  native.2  This  was  followed  by  a  treaty 
with  the  Mohawks.1 

Five  years  of  war  such  as  had  been  waged  had  shattered  the 
commercial  prosperity  of  the  colony  in  every  direction.  Its  ex 
port  trade  depended  on  the  purchase  of  beaver  skins  from  the 
savages,  its  internal  prosperity  on  agriculture,  and  both  were  at 
a  standstill.  Nor  was  the  material  loss  and  suffering  all. 
Seven  years  before  Connecticut  had  gone  through  like  trials. 
She  had  emerged  from  them  strengthened,  schooled  in  endurance 
and  self-reliance,  in  military  discipline  and  civil  cohesion.  For 
New  Netherlands  there  was  no  such  compensation.  The  best 


1  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  390. 

2  Ib.  vol.   i.   p.   407. 

*Ib.  vol.  i.  p.  408.     The  treaty  is  referred  to  in  Van  Der  Donck's  account 
of  New  Netherlands.     N.  Y.  Hist.  Coll.,  and  series,  vol.  i.  p.   161. 


WANT  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  MACHINERY.  25- 

that  could  be  said  was  that  harsh  schooling  had  brought  home 
clearly  to  men's  minds  the  faults  of  their  political  system. 

We  have  seen  how  imperfect  was  the  amount  of  representation 
granted  to  the  people.  The  Twelve  and  the  Eight  were  in> 
want  of  truth  nothing  more  than  executive  committees  ap- 
ti°onSaitu"  pointed  for  a  special  purpose.  They  had  no  per- 
machinery.  manent  constitutional  functions.  Nor  did  they  serve 
to  bind  together  the  different  parts  of  the  colony.  As  a  part  of 
the  machinery  of  government  they  were  worthless:  their  value 
was  that  they  did  something  towards  enabling  the  people  to- 
make  their  complaints  heard.  They  did  not  secure  the  forms  of 
responsible  government,  but  they  taught  the  Company  that  it 
was  not  safe  to  leave  the  voice  of  the  settlers  unheeded.  The 
remonstrance  already  mentioned  was  followed  up  by  another 
petition,  repeating  even  more  emphatically  the  tale  of  the  colo 
nists'  sufferings.  The  Eight  charged  Kieft  with  having  through 
wanton  brutality  changed  the  Indians  from  friends  to  foes,  with 
turning  a  deaf  ear  to  the  wishes  of  the  people,  and  misleading 
the  Company  with  false  reports.  They  petitioned  for  his  re 
moval,  and  for  a  fresh  governor  with  more  emigrants,  not  to 
be  scattered  abroad  in  patroonships  or  scattered  holdings,  but 
grouped  as  in  New  England  in  townships,  each  with  its  own 
elected  officials,  who,  all  in  combination,  should  make  up  the 
government  of  the  colony.  It  is  to  be  noticed,  too,  that  while 
the  Twelve  only  addressed  Kieft,  the  Eight  went  a  step  further,, 
and  petitioned  the  Council.1 

Supine  as  the  Company  had  been  in  care  for  their  colonists, 
they  at  least  saw  that  it  was  useless  to  retain  Kieft.  The  whole 
Report  of  question  was  referred  to  the  "Rekenkammer,"  a  com- 

the  Reken-  .  r      i        /-.  •          i  •      i  i  • 

kammer.a  mittee  or  the  Company  appointed,  strictly  speaking, 
for  the  control  of  finance,  but  allowed  to  go  beyond  that  and 
deal  with  general  questions  of  organization.  They  produced  a 
report,  proposing  certain  administrative  reforms.  Kieft  was  to 
be  superseded  and  called  to  account  for  his  first  attack  on  the 
Indians.  Trade  was  to  be  thrown  open  to  all  permanent  resi 
dents  in  the  colony,  but  there  was  to  be  no  sale  of  arms  to  the 
natives.  New  Amsterdam  was  to  be  fortified  and  garrisoned: 

1  Brodhead    (vol.    i.    pp.    397-400)    reproduces    this    memorial    almost    textu- 
ally. 

2  N.  Y.  Docs,  vol.  i.  p.  149. 


26  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

every  settler  throughout  the  colony  was  to  have  a  musket  and 
side  arms;  their  efficiency  was  to  be  tested  by  two  annual  in 
spections.  Kieft's  successor  was  to  take  out  with  him  a  body  of 
colonists  who  were  to  be  grouped  in  townships  as  in  New  Eng 
land.  Lastly,  representative  government  was  to  be  instituted. 
The  "Freedoms,"  the  conditions  that  is  by  which  the  patroons 
held  their  estates,  already  provided  that  each  township  should 
appoint  one  or  two  delegates  to  represent  it  at  Manhattan. 
This  somewhat  vague  condition  was  now  made  definite  by  the 
proposal  that  deputies  should  meet  every  six  months  to  confer 
with  the  Governor  and  Council  on  public  affairs.1  The  reforms 
granted  by  the  Company  fell  far  short  of  these  recommenda 
tions.  They  did  not  in  fact  amount  to  much  more  than  a 
change  of  governor.  But  that  change  brought  with  it  a  change 
of  system.  Kieft's  successor  had  in  theory  as  little  love  for 
popular  government  as  Kieft  himself.  But,  unlike  Kieft,  he  had 
an  honest  desire  to  govern  the  colony  in  the  interests  of  the 
settlers,  and  practice  showed  that  he  could  reach  that  end  only 
through  a  concession  of  popular  rights. 

In  1645  Kieft  was  superseded  and  replaced  by  Peter  Stuy- 
vesant.  The  personal  misconduct  of  Kieft  and  the  selfish 
Peter  neglect  of  the  Company  had  prepared  the  settlers  to 

stuyvesant.  see  an  enemy  jn  any  governor.  There  was  nothing  in 
the  personal  character  of  Stuyvesant  to  efface  such  impressions. 
An  austere  Puritan  in  a  community  of  lax  morals,  an  educated 
gentleman  with  a  strong  dash  of  pedantry  among  tradesmen  and 
boors,  a  martinet  in  a  shifting  crowd  of  varied  origin  with  no 
fixed  political  institutions,  Stuyvesant  was  at  every  step  severed 
from  his  subjects  by  some  barrier  of  principle  or  sentiment.  Yet 
two  things  more  than  made  amends.  Stuyvesant  had  shown 
himself  a  good  soldier:  his  loss  of  a  leg,  shot  away  by  a  Portu 
guese  gunner  before  St.  Martin's,  impressed  that  side  of  his 
character  on  men's  imaginations,  and  they  soon  had  better  reason 
for  knowing  that  he  could  give  the  colony  that  security  which 
was  its  first  need.  He  had  a  still  higher  claim  to  honor.  He, 
almost  alone  among  all  who  controlled  the  destinies  of  New 
Netherlands,  regarded  the  colony  as  a  political  society,  not  a 
trading  station.  His  narrow  and  unsympathetic  temper  with 
held  him  from  entering  fully  into  the  life  of  the  settlers.  But 

1 N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  i.  p.  149. 


PETER  STUYVESANT,  27 

if  he  did  not  trouble  himself  about  their  wishes,  he  was  clear 
sighted  enough  to  understand  their  needs,  and  honest  and  public- 
spirited  enough  to  struggle  for  them.  He  was  in  a  sense  the 
founder  of  the  colony:  he  freed  it  from  a  commercial  tyranny, 
from  the  dominion  of  traders  and  clerks;  the  colonists  did  the 
rest  for  themselves. 

The  new  Governor  took  out  instructions,  embodying  in  some 
measure  the  reforms  suggested  by  the  Rekenkammer.  The  dif- 
Hisin.  ferent  townships  were  to  send  delegates  to  the 
structions.»  Council.  That,  however,  was  a  far  less  effectual 
guarantee  for  liberty  than  would  have  been  a  chamber  of  repre 
sentatives  sitting  as  a  separate  and  independent  body.  A  formal 
boundary  was  to  be  arranged  with  the  Indians,  and  the  settlers 
were  to  be  organized  as  a  militia.  The  colonists  were  to  be  per 
suaded  to  group  themselves  in  townships  "as  the  English  do." 
Unluckily  the  Company  forgot  that  these  townships  were  only 
part  and  parcel  of  a  system  of  self-government,  and  that  they 
would  never  have  existed  but  for  the  strong  corporate  feeling 
which  actually  called  the  community  into  existence  before  it  had 
a  local  habitation. 

As  I  have  said,  Stuyvesant  had  no  faith  in  popular  govern 
ment.  On  that  subject  his  doctrines  were  as  vigorous  and  as  de- 
introduc-  cided  as  those  which  Herodotus  puts  into  the  mouth 
represent-  of  Megabyzus.  Give  the  election  of  rulers  to  the 
ernrnentT"  commons,  and  every  scoundrel  will  vote  for  his  like. 
The  thief,  the  drunkard,  and  the  cheat  will  each  wish  for  a 
representative  who  shares  his  infamy.2 

Stuyvesant,  however,  soon  found  that  his  trenchant  theories 
must  give  way  to  practical  necessities.  The  first  thing  to  be 
done  was  to  make  the  fortifications  of  New  Amsterdam  secure 
against  attack.  The  Company  could  not  or  would  not  bear  the 
whole  cost:  money  had  to  be  raised  and  the  necessities  of  the 
ruler,  according  to  regular  historical  precedent,  made  for  the 
constitutional  rights  of  the  subject.  A  chamber  of  representa 
tives  was  appointed  by  a  process  which  divided  the  choice  be 
tween  the  Governor  and  the  freemen.  The  whole  body  of  free 
men  from  Manhattan  and  three  adjacent  districts  were  to  nomi 
nate  eighteen  representatives.  Of  these,  the  Governor  was  to 
elect  nine  who  were  to  form  a  second  chamber,  tribunes  of  the 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  414.  2  Ib.  p.  574. 


28  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

commons,  as  Stuyvesant,  with  a  characteristic  touch  of  pedantry, 
called  them.1 

This  was  undoubtedly  a  step  in  advance  of  anything  that  had 
gone  before.  The  Nine  were  more  like  constitutional  repre 
sentatives  of  the  people  than  the  Twelve  or  the  Eight  who  had 
preceded  them.  Their  functions  were  general:  they  were  not 
called  into  existence  by  one  special  emergency.  But  if  the 
change  was  a  step  towards  representative  government,  there  was 
yet  a  long  distance  to  be  traversed.  The  Nine  were  to  deliberate 
with  the  Council  on  public  affairs ;  three  of  them  were  to  share 
the  judicial  functions  of  the  Council,  sitting  in  turn,  one  for  a 
week.  They  had,  however,  no  legislative  powers:  there  was  na 
provision  for  any  exact  division  of  powers  between  the  Council 
and  the  Nine.  Their  undefined  position  was  shown,  too,  by 
the  fact  that  the  qualifications  of  electors  were  not  specified. 

Indeed,  it  was  hardly  worth  while  to  define  the  qualifications 
of  the  freemen  since  their  function  did  not  extend  beyond  the 
first  election.  After  that  the  body  was  to  become  self-electing, 
with  certain  right  of  veto  vested  in  the  Governor.  Every  year 
six  were  to  retire;  before  that  retirement  the  Nine  were  to 
nominate  twelve  candidates  for  the  vacancies,  and  of  these  half 
were  to  be  chosen  by  the  Governor. 

Another  element  was  wanting.  There  was  nothing  of 
local  representation  in  the  system.  The  inhabitants  of  four 
districts  elected,  but  they  elected  collectively,  and  there  was 
nothing  to  hinder  the  whole  nine  from  being  residents  in  New 
Amsterdam. 

Yet  the  system  was  a  gain,  not  only  as  an  earnest  of  better 
things,  but  in  itself.  Even  if  we  regard  it  as  only  the  appoint 
ment  of  a  standing  executive  committee  that  was  something.  In 
such  a  community  as  New  Netherlands  it  was  something  to 
spread  power.  Granted  that  the  Nine  were  in  theory  an  irre 
sponsible  body,  yet  public  opinion  could  act  upon  them  far  more 
quickly  and  effectively  than  it  could  on  the  Governor  and 
Council. 

Popular  rights  in  New  Netherlands  advanced  on  two  distinct 
lines.  The  commonalty  as  a  whole  were  slowly  and  imperfectly 
Municipal  acquiring  certain  rights  of  self-government.  Mean- 
tions.  while  the  different  sections  of  the  community  were 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  i.   p.   474;   N.  Y.   Docs.   vol.   i.  p.   309. 


STUYVESANT  AND    THE  PATROONS.  29 

acquiring  like  rights,  locally,  and  in  a  restricted  form.  In  New 
Netherlands  the  municipal  freedom  of  the  towns  was  acquired 
partly  because  circumstances  made  it  a  necessity,  partly  as  the 
result  of  intercourse  with  New  England.  As  early  as  1645 
Kieft  granted  a  charter  to  a  body  of  emigrants  from  Massa 
chusetts.  Their  leader,  Lady  Deborah  Moody,  described  by 
Winthrop  as  "a  wise  and  anciently1  religious  woman,"  had  been 
censured  by  the  Church  of  Salem  as  an  Anabaptist.  She  was  ap 
parently  not  banished,  but  withdrew  peacefully  of  her  own  ac 
cord  with  a  number  of  those  who  shared  her  religious  views. 
They  established  themselves  on  Long  Island  at  a  place  called  by 
the  Dutch  Gravesand,  a  name  which  the  new-comers  anglicized 
into  Gravesend.  In  1644  the  settlement  was  attacked  by  the 
savages.  Lady  Moody,  however,  escaped  the  fate  of  her  sister 
heretic,  Anne  Hutchinson.  Her  new  home  was  well  garrisoned 
with  forty  men,  and  after  a  stubborn  resistance  the  assailants 
were  beaten  off.  In  the  next  year  the  freemen  at  Gravesend 
were  incorporated  as  a  township,  with  power  to  make  such  "civil 
ordinances"  as  the  majority  should  think  good.  They  were  to 
elect  from  among  themselves  three  magistrates,  approved  by  the 
Governor,  who  should  act  as  a  court.2 

In  the  same  year  the  like  privileges  were  granted  to  the 
settlers  at  Breuckelen.  In  their  case  we  have  direct  evidence 
that  joint  tenure  was  one  of  the  incidents  of  their  corporate 
existence,  since  the  deprivation  of  a  share  on  the  common  land 
was  the  penalty  attached  to  disobedience  to  the  elected  magis 
trates.3  The  policy  of  creating  municipalities  with  certain  rights 
of  self-government  was  carried  further  by  Kieft's  successor. 
Stuyvesant  had,  as  we  have  seen,  little  liking  for  democratic  in 
stitutions.  But  he  had  equally  little  liking  for  the  independent 
jurisdiction  of  the  patroons.  Just  as  a  mediaeval  king  built  up 
extra-feudal  communities  with  certain  rights  of  self-govern 
ment  as  a  check  on  the  nobles,  so  now  Stuyvesant  strengthened 
the  townships  as  a  check  on  the  patroons.  We  have  seen  already 
how  the  independent  patroonship  of  Rensselaerwyck  became  ob 
noxious  to  Kieft.  Under  Stuyvesant  the  struggle  between  the 
rights  of  the  Company  and  the  privileges  of  the  patroons  went 

1  Anciently,     i.e.     formerly,   with   reference  to   her   lapse  into   heresy. 

2  Doc.  Hist.  vol.  i.  pp.  4-12. 

3  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  422. 


30  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

on.  The  independent  jurisdiction  of  the  patroons  was  an 
obstacle  to  any  common  system  of  defense,  and  it  also  inter 
fered  with  the  commercial  supremacy  of  the  Company.  Indeed, 
the  trade  with  the  natives  in  arms  and  ammunition  was  ob 
noxious  in  both  of  these  ways.  The  principal  offenders  in  these 
matters  were  the  agents  of  Rensselaer,  whose  territory  on  the 
upper  Hudson  commanded  the  highway  of  the  Indian  fur  trade. 
They  refused  to  fulfill  a  stipulation  specially  inserted  in  the 
grant  of  territory  binding  the  patroon  to  give  an  annual  report 
of  the  condition  of  his  settlement  to  the  Company.  Moreover 
they  endeavored  to  bind  over  their  settlers  not  to  appeal  against 
any  of  their  proceedings  to  the  Governor  and  Council.  One 
special  act  of  insubordination  brought  matters  to  a  head. 
Within  the  territory  of  Rensselaerwyck  stood  a  little  group  of 
farmhouses  forming  the  hamlet  of  Beverswyck.  In  March  1648 
the  Governor  proclaimed  a  fast  throughout  the  colony.  The 
proclamation  was  posted  in  Beverswyck.  Thereupon  Van  Slech- 
tenhart,  the  agent  for  the  settlement,  declared  that  Stuyvesant 
had  encroached  on  the  rights  of  the  patroon.  A  further  dispute 
arose.  Fort  Orange  actually  stood  within  the  territory  of 
Rensselaerwyck.  It  was  plainly  needful  that  the  authorities 
who  were  responsible  for  the  safety  of  the  fort  should  have  some 
control  over  the  land  around.  Stuyvesant  with  good  reason  for 
bade  the  erection  of  any  houses  within  musket-shot  of  the  fort. 
The  agent  defied  this  order,  and  was  arrested  and  brought  to 
New  Amsterdam. 

Under  these  circumstances  it  was  natural  that  Stuyvesant 
should  assert  the  direct  authority  of  the  Company  over  the 
settlers  at  Beverswyck,  and  it  was  natural  too  that  he  should 
purchase  their  loyalty  by  a  grant  of  privileges.  In  April  1652 
the  Director  on  his  own  authority  proclaimed  Beverswyck  a 
township  independent  of  the  patroon.1 

In  the  same  year  the  privileges  which  had  been  granted  to 
Breuckelen  were  extended  to  New  Amsterdam.  An  order  had 
New  Am-  been  issued  by  the  Company  in  1650  that  New  Am- 
blVomTs  sterdam  should  be  made  a  municipal  government 
«» c'ty.  with  a  Schout — that  is  to  say,  an  official  responsible 

for  the  administration  of  ordinary  criminal  justice,  a  Burgo 
master  and  Schepens,  functionaries  who  may,  by  a  convenient 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  pp.  491-4,  533-5. 


NEW  AMSTERDAM  A    CITY.  31 

analogy,  if  not  with  scientific  precision,  be  called  a  Mayor  and 
Aldermen.  Stuyvesant,  as  it  would  seem,  considered  that  he 
might  put  his  proposed  constitution  in  force  or  not,  as  he 
pleased.  It  was  not  till  two  years  after  the  issue  of  the  order, 
till  as  we  have  seen  the  system  of  municipal  government  was  es 
tablishing  itself  in  other  parts  of  the  colony,  that  the  privileges 
thus  granted  to  New  Amsterdam  were  actually  enjoyed.  One 
cannot  doubt  that  the  example  of  Breuckelen  had  a  direct  in 
fluence  on  her  more  important  neighbor.  As  early  as  1642  the 
Twelve  in  their  remonstrance  to  the  Company  had  pointed  out 
that  in  the  Fatherland  every  village  had  its  five  or  seven 
Schepens.  Now  they  saw  a  mere  hamlet  at  their  own  doors  en 
joying  like  privileges.  Were  they  to  be  withheld  from  the 
capital  of  the  colony,  with  its  five  stone  warehouses  and  its 
harbor,  where  twenty  merchantmen  might  be  seen  riding  at 
anchor?  Stuyvesant  can  hardly  be  said  to  have  yielded  to  the 
demand  for  popular  government.  Rather  he  stayed  that  demand 
by  a  partial  and  almost  deceptive  concession.  New  Amsterdam 
was  to  have  two  Burgomasters  and  five  Schepens,  but  they  were 
to  be  nominated  by  the  Governor.  Such  a  change  did  not  in 
theory  shift  the  basis  of  sovereignty.  Yet,  as  was  said  before,  in 
such  a  community  as  New  Netherlands  to  delegate  the  exercise 
of  power  is  an  important  change.  Let  the  Governor  choose  his 
municipal  staff  with  never  so  little  regard  to  the  wishes  of  the 
people,  yet  such  a  body  must  be  in  some  measure  amenable  to 
public  opinion.1 

The  value  of  the  point  gained  was  soon  seen.  Within  six 
months  of  their  appointment  the  new  officials — the  Town 
Action  of  Council  as  one  may  for  convenience  call  them — sent 

the  Town  c     i     •  i  *  i  i         i      r  i 

Council.  one  of  their  number  to  Amsterdam  to  lay  before  the 
Company  various  grievances  and  complaints  against  the  Gov 
ernor.2  Soon  after  they  showed  in  another  matter  that  though 
they  might  be  Stuyvesant's  nominees,  they  were  not  his  obedi 
ent  servants.  The  defenses  of  the  city  were  a  subject  of  jeal 
ousy  and  dispute.  The  settlers  were  willing  to  spend  money 
on  palisading  the  city  itself.  They  not  unnaturally  demanded 
that  the  Fort  which  existed  mainly  to  secure  the  commerce  of 

1  Memorial  History,  vol.  i.  p.  278.     The  author,  Mr.  Fernow,  refers  to  New- 
York   Documents. 

2  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  559. 


3  2  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NEl^HERLANDS. 

the  Company  should  be  fortified  at  the  Company's  expense. 
When  the  Town  Council  was  called  on  to  contribute  to  that 
end  they  refused. 

In  a  New  England  township  the  town  meeting  would  at  once 
furnish  a  ready  means  for  the  expression  of  popular  feeling.  As 
it  was,  the  Burgomasters  and  Schepens  summoned  certain  lead 
ing  citizens  to  devise  means  for  meeting  the  public  expenditure. 
Twenty-four  townsmen  attended  the  meeting.  It  was  agreed  to 
propose  to  Stuyvesant  that  the  Excise  be  handed  over  to  the 
Burgomasters  and  Schepens,  to  be  applied  to  the  payment  of 
public  expenses.  This  was  submitted  to  Stuyvesant,  but  re 
fused. 

Two  months  later  another  meeting  of  town  delegates  chosen 
T?y  the  Burgomasters  and  Schepens  was  held.  Their  policy  was  a 
mere  renewal  of  their  past  offer.  But  apparently  the  Burgo 
masters  and  Schepens  only  gave  their  consent  to  the  arrange 
ment  on  condition  that  the  townsmen  agreed  to  submit  to  such 
•expenditure  and  such  measures  as  should  be  enacted  and  adopted 
by  them  for  the  support  of  the  city. 

This  second  attempt  was  more  successful  than  the  first.  Des 
potic  as  the  government  of  New  Netherlands  was,  yet  leavened 
as  her  nationality  was  with  alien  elements,  there  was  too  much 
of  the  old  Dutch  temper,  of  the  spirit  of  the  men  who  had  defied 
Charles  and  Philip,  to  suffer  the  power  of  the  purse  wholly  to 
pass  out  of  their  hands.  According  to  what  one  may  call  the 
customary  precedent  of  the  Old  World,  external  danger 
furnished  the  community  with  an  effective  weapon  against  its 
rulers.  At  the  very  time  when  the  colonists  were  pressing  their 
demands  the  New  England  confederation  was  only  withheld 
from  active  hostility  by  the  fortunate  disloyalty  of  Massachu 
setts  to  its  associates.1  That  danger  was  materially  increased  by 
the  existence  of  settlements  on  Long  Island,  nominally  under 
Dutch  jurisdiction,  but  English  in  origin  and  sympathies.  Ob 
stinate  Stuyvesant  might  be,  but  he  was  clear-sighted  enough  to 
see  that,  without  some  measure  of  popular  support,  his  own  po 
sition  and  that  of  the  colony  was  desperate,  and  that  he  could 
only  win  that  support  by  concessions  on  the  lines  suggested  by 
the  townsmen.  On  November  n  Stuyvesant  announced  that 
he  was  prepared  to  surrender  a  portion  of  the  Excise  to  be  ad- 

1  See  The  Puritan  Colonies,  vol.  i.  pp.  299-301. 


STUYVESANT  AND    THE    TOWNSMEN,  33 

ministered  by  the  Burgomasters  and  Schepens — the  Town 
Council  as  we  may  for  convenience  call  them.  But  the  conces 
sion  was  fettered  with  conditions  which  went  far  to  destroy  its 
value.  The  Company  must  give  their  consent.  The  townsmen 
must  maintain  at  their  own  cost  a  preacher  and  a  schoolmaster. 

These  charges  the  townsmen  at  first  said  would  swallow  up 
the  whole  sum  made  over  to  them.  Finally,  however,  after 
some  demur  they  agreed  to  the  terms.1 

Later  on  in  the  year  the  Burgomasters  and  Schepens  addressed 
a  petition  to  the  Company  asking  on  behalf  of  the  city  fuller 
rights,  modeled  on  those  of  Amsterdam.  They  asked  that  the 
burghers  should  choose  their  own  Schout,  that  the  Excise  should 
be  made  over  to  them  unconditionally,  and  that  they  should  have 
power  to  levy  rates  and  expend  the  proceeds/ 

On  January  24,  before  an  answer  could  be  received  to  these 
requests,  the  Burgomasters  and  Schepens  again  approached 
Stuyvesant.  They  proposed  that  the  Council  of  the  Colony 
should  still  be  nominated  by  the  Director,  but  from  a  list  con 
taining  twice  the  number  of  names  necessary,  sent  in  by  them 
selves.  This  Stuyvesant  refused.  As  a  minor  concession  he 
granted  salaries  to  the  officials,  to  the  Burgomaster  three  hun 
dred  and  fifty  guilders  a  year,  to  the  Schepens  two  hundred  and 
fifty.  This  sounds  like  an  attempt  to  bribe  the  recipients  into 
an  abandonment  of  popular  rights. 

In  answer  to  the  petition  the  Company  made  but  a  petty  con 
cession.  The  Schout  was  to  be  appointed  as  before  by  the  Com 
pany,  but  was  to  be  in  some  measure  under  the  control  of  the 
Burgomasters  and  Schepens.3 

The  somewhat  harsh  and  dictatorial  temper  of  the  new  Di 
rector  made  almost  impossible  a  task  already  difficult  enough  in 
Stuyvesant  itself.  He  was,  like  Dale,  a  resolute  martinet, 
reformer.  trained  in  military  methods  and  determined  to  intro 
duce  discipline  and  something  of  austerity  into  the  life  of  a  lax 
and  somewhat  corrupt  society.  Attendance  at  Divine  worship 
was  made  compulsory.  The  problem  of  enforcing  sobriety  and 
controlling  taverns  was  dealt  with  in  a  manner  which  curiously 
anticipated  the  ideas  of  modern  temperance  reformers.  Taverns 

1  For  all  these  negotiations  see  Court  Minutes. 
1  Court  Minutes,   vol.   i.   pp.   92-5. 
*  Ib.   p.    157. 


34  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

were  to  close  at  nine  in  the  evening.  Inasmuch  as  brawling  and 
fighting  in  taverns  even  on  the  Lord's  day  of  rest  was  common,, 
they  were  to  be  closed  on  Sunday  till  two  in  the  afternoon, 
except  for  travelers,  and  for  the  sale  of  drink  to  be  consumed  in 
private  houses. 

Other  ordinances  imposed  by  Stuyvesant  throw  light  on  the 
life  of  the  community.  The  danger  of  fire  is  shown  by  a  regula 
tion  which  enforced  the  sweeping  of  chimneys,  and  by  a  pro 
hibition  of  any  further  building  of  wooden  chimneys.  By  a  later 
ordinance,  thatched  roofs  and  wooden  chimneys  are  to  be  re 
moved.  An  attempt  is  made  to  check  the  promiscuous  influx  of 
foreign  traders  by  an  ordinance  permitting  no  one  to  engage  in 
trade  unless  he  has  a  house  in  the  colony  and  resides  for  three 
years. 

In  conformity  with  the  instruction  of  the  Company  an  ordi 
nance  was  issued  urging  the  settlers  to  consolidate  themselves 
into  villages,  but  there  is  no  trace  of  any  attempt  to  enforce  this. 
The  mixture  of  urban  and  rural  conditions  which  prevailed  in 
New  Amsterdam  itself  is  shown  by  the  prohibition  of  hayricks 
within  the  town,  and  of  stray  hogs,  as  unwholesome  and  un 
sightly,  and  likely  to  injure  the  fortification.1 

The  Excise  was  to  be  handed  over  to  the  Council  and  applied 
to  the  payment  of  salaries,  and  they  might  with  the  approval  of 
the  commons  impose  certain  rates.2  The  disposition  of  the 
Excise  soon  gave  rise  to  further  disputes.  The  Town  Council, 
it  was  alleged,  expended  the  money  exclusively  on  the  city  de 
fenses  and  neglected  those  of  Fort  Amsterdam.  Accordingly 
the  Governor,  supported  by  his  Council,  resumed  the  Excise,  and 
as  before  sold  the  right  of  levying  it  to  the  highest  bidder.' 

If,  however,  this  portion  of  the  popular  demands  appeared  to- 
have  been  lost  almost  as  soon  as  gained,,  there  were  compensa- 
Conference  tions  elsewhere.  Hitherto  such  assertions  of  popular 
A^mster-  rights  as  had  been  made  had  been  limited  to  the 
dam.  capital  of  the  colony.  In  November  1653  the  agita 

tion  entered  on  a  new  phase.  A  conference  of  delegates  met  at 
New  Amsterdam.4  There  were  two  from  New  Amsterdam 
itself,  two  each  from  Gravesend  and  Flushing,  and  two  from  a 
third  English  settlement  on  Long  Island,  incorporated  by 

1  For  all  these  regulations  see  Court  Minutes,  vol.  i.  p.   135. 

2  Ib.   p.   218.  *  Jb.   p.   341.  *  Brodhead,  vol.  i.   p.   569. 


CONVENTION  OF  DELEGATES.  35 

Stuyvesant  in  1650,  by  the  name  of  Middelburg.  There  were 
also  two  representatives  of  the  Council  of  New  Netherlands. 
It  would  not  be  easy  to  imagine  a  more  curiously  complicated 
situation.  Stuyvesant  throughout  showed  himself  inclined  to 
favor  the'  settlements  of  English  origin.  Puritan  rigidity  ap 
pealed  to  him  far  more  effectively  than  did  the  lax  cosmopoli 
tanism  of  New  Netherlands.  Between  the  Dutch  settlers  and 
the  English  immigrants  there  was  little  jealousy.  Yet  here  were 
Stuyvesant's  clients,  one  may  almost  call  them,  the  English 
settlers,  making  common  cause  with  their  Dutch  rivals. 

The  immediate  object  of  the  conference  was  one  which  did 
not  directly  touch  the  question  of  either  popular  rights  or 
English  encroachment.  It  was  to  take  measures  for  protecting 
the  colony  against  attacks  by  the  Indians  and  by  pirates. 

No  definite  measures  of  defense  were  adopted,  and  the  con 
gress  adjourned  till  the  following  month.  But  when  once 
machinery  is  constructed  which  lends  itself  even  incompletely  to 
the  assertion  of  popular  rights,  it  is  no  easy  matter  to  limit  its 
action.  The  English  representatives  hinted  that  unless  some 
thing  was  done  for  their  protection  the  Long  Island  townships 
would  have  to  form  themselves  into  some  kind  of  corporate  as 
sociation.  Stuyvesant  might  look  with  undue  favor  on  English 
claims.  But  an  assertion  of  the  rights  of  self-government, 
coupled  with  a  scarcely  veiled  threat  of  secession,  could  not  fail 
to  move  him.  To  balance  the  three  English-speaking  townships 
Stuyvesant  announced  his  intention  of  incorporating  three  Dutch 
townships  of  Amersfort,  Breuckelen,  and  Midwout.1 

Although  these  concessions  were  only  promised  and  not  form 
ally  granted,  yet  the  inhabitants  now  ventured  to  act  as  a 
Conven-  corporate  body.  Consequently,  when  the  convention 
delegates. »  reassembled  in  December  its  composition  differed 
widely  from  what  it  had  been  a  month  before.  Amersfort, 
Breuckelen,  and  Midwout  all  sent  representatives.  So  did  the 
English  settlement  of  Heemstede,  which,  though  it  had  a 
share  in  summoning  the  first  meeting,  took  no  active  part 
therein.  Amersfort  for  some  reason  was  allowed  three  repre 
sentatives.  This  brought  the  whole  number  up  to  seventeen,  of 

1  Breuckelen,  it  is  scarcely  needful  to  say,  is  the  modern  Brooklyn.  Amers 
fort  and  Midwout  are  now  Flatlands  and  Flatbush,  at  the  south-east  extremity 
of  Long  Island. 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  pp.  571-5. 


36  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

whom  nine  were  Dutch,  eight  English.  We  may  fairly  con 
jecture  that  Stuyvesant's  object  in  incorporating  the  three  town 
ships  was  to  insure  that  neither  party  should  preponderate,  and 
also  to  grant  no  popular  rights  save  such  as  were  absolutely 
needful  for  the  protection  of  the  colony  from  invasion. 

An  historical  paradox-monger,  whom  it  would  be  flattery  to 
call  ingenious,  has  maintained  the  thesis  that  North  America 
English  owes  everything  that  is  wholesome  in  her  political 
influence.  anj  intellectual  life  to  Holland.1  It  would  be  nearer 
to  the  truth,  though  an  exaggeration,  to  say  that  such  political 
freedom  as  the  Dutch  colony  enjoyed  was  won  for  it  by  the 
efforts  of  those  English  allies  who  came  in  the  guise  of  invaders. 
We  cannot  doubt  that  the  practical  training  in  the  arts  of  self- 
government  which  the  English  delegates  brought  with  them 
from  their  earlier  colonial  home,  the  habit  of  readily  translating 
the  abstract  doctrines  of  political  freedom  into  concrete  form, 
the  comprehension  of  the  value  and  limits  of  political  machinery, 
made  them  now  invaluable  allies. 

That  view  is  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  the  drafting  of  a 
petition  of  rights  and  grievances  was  intrusted  to  George  Baxter. 
The  document  was  in  six  heads.  It  complained  of  the  arbitrary 
action  of  the  Director  both  in  making  enactments  and  appoint 
ments,  and  granting  lands  to  favored  individuals.  Proclamations 
remained  in  force  without  the  inhabitants  being  duly  notified  of 
their  existence.  There  was  no  proper  system  of  public  defense. 
Settlements  had  been  made  on  the  strength  of  promised  patents, 
and  these  had  been  delayed  without  reason.* 

In  no  one  specific  instance  did  Stuyvesant  acknowledge  the 
justice  of  these  complaints  or  offer  a  remedy  of  the  alleged 
grievance.  Yet  we  are  not  to  suppose  that  the  action  of  the 
delegates  bore  no -fruit.  We  can  distinctly  trace  in  the  subse 
quent  policy  of  the  Director  a  tendency  to  concession  which  we 
may  fairly  set  down  to  the  resolute  attitude  of  the  settlers. 

Breuckelen  already  had  two  Schepens  elected  by  the  towns 
men.  In  1654  tne  number  was  raised  to  four,  and  they  were  al 
lowed  to  elect  a  Schout.  Privileges  of  the  same  kind  were 


1  Mr.  Campbell  in  The  Puritan  in  Holland,  England  and  America. 

*  It  was  in  answer  to  these  representations  that  Stuyvesant  delivered  himself 
of  his  comprehensive  condemnation  of  the  system  of  popular  election,  v.s. 
p.  27. 


DEVELOPMENT  OF  MUNICIPAL  RIGHTS.  37 

granted  to  Midwout  and  Amersfort,  and  the  three  villages  were 
to  unite  into  a  district  with  an  administrative  council  of  elected 
delegates.1 

The  privileges  of  these  outlying  settlements  formed  in  turn  a 
standard  to  be  arrived  at  by  New  Amsterdam.  Thus  in  1656 
we  find  the  Council  complaining  with  good  reason  that,  while 
almost  every  village  in  the  colony  had  a  municipal  government 
of  its  own  election,  that  of  New  Amsterdam  was  nominated  by 
the  Governor.2 

After  some  dispute  a  compromise  was  reached  which  prac 
tically  meant  that  the  Burgomasters  and  Schepens  should  elect 
their  successors,  but  that  Stuyvesant  should  have  a  right  of 
veto.3  Two  years  later  this  was  modified.  An  arrangement 
which  had  been  before  suggested  was  now  adopted.  The  Town 
Council  sent  a  list  of  names,  twice  as  many  as  there  were  places, 
and  Stuyvesant  chose  one  half.4 

The  gradual  and  piecemeal  growth  of  popular  government  in 
New  Netherlands  was  strictly  according  to  mediaeval  precedent. 
The  greater  The  parallel  went  a  stage  further.  In  the  Old 
shYp.  ei  World  the  change  from  serfdom  to  municipal  free 
dom  was  too  often  followed  by  a  change  from  a  democratic  to  an 
oligarchical  municipality.  New  Netherlands  did  not  escape  the 
danger.  From  almost  its  earliest  days  the  city  had  numbered 
among  its  population  traders  who  had  no  fixed  connection  with 
the  colony,  and  contributed  nothing  to  its  permanent  stability 
and  prosperity.  In  1657  the  Town  Council  sent  an  address  to 
Stuyvesant  calling  attention  to  this,  and  petitioning  that  the 
right  of  trade  should  be  restricted  to  burghers. 

We  learn  incidentally  from  this  petition  that  Scotch  traders 
were  a  special  object  of  jealousy  and  disapproval.  "They  sail 
hither  and  thither  to  the  best  trading  places,  taking  the  bread  as 
it  were  out  of  the  mouths  of  the  good  burghers  and  resident  in 
habitants,  without  being  subject  in  time  of  peace  or  war  to  any 
trouble  or  expense."  "They  carry  away  the  profits  in  time  of 
peace,  and  in  time  of  war  abandon  the  country  and  the  in 
habitants  thereof."5 


1  Brodhead,   vol.   i.   p.   580.  -  Ib.   p.   613. 

*  Ib.  p.  613.  *  Ib.  p.  639. 

6  The  petition,  and  Stuyvesant's  answer  to  it  are  in  the  Court  Minutes,  voL 
ii.  pp.  286-7. 


432337 


38  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

The  proposal  of  the  Town  Council  fell  in  with  Stuyvesant's 
love  of  rigid  discipline  and  his  oligarchical  prejudices.  He  saw 
in  it,  too,  an  opportunity  for  increasing  the  revenue.  Any 
trader  might  acquire  the  rights  of  burghership  by  paying  a  fee  of 
twenty  guilders.  The  same  privileges  were  granted  without 
payment  to  all  who  were  born  in  the  city  or  dwelt  there  for  the 
oddly  devised  term  of  a  year  and  six  weeks,  and  to  all  who 
married  the  daughters  of  burghers. 

This  restriction  was  undoubtedly  fair  and  expedient.  Un 
fortunately  it  was  made  the  occasion  for  a  thoroughly  unwise 
extension  of  the  principle  of  oligarchy.  Nor  was  this  forced  on 
by  Stuyvesant;  it  was  approved  and  in  part  suggested  by  the 
Town  Council.  The  scheme  created  a  class  of  great  burghers 
as  they  were  called,  in  distinction  to  the  common  or  small 
burghers  above  described.  This  right  was  to  be  obtained  by  a 
payment  of  fifty  guilders;  those  who  enjoyed  it  were  to  be 
exempt  from  military  service  and  from  arrest,  and  they  only 
were  to  be  eligible  for  the  city  offices.  This  greater  burghership 
was  to  be  extended  to  the  officers  of  the  Company  and  to  minis 
ters  of  the  Gospel,  to  those  holding  military  commissions,  and  to 
all  who  had  as  yet  served  as  Burgomasters  and  Schepens,  and  it 
was  to  be  continued  to  all  their  male  descendants.  Since  the 
Town  Council  was  a  self-creating  and  not  an  elective  body,  the 
system  practically  disfranchised  for  municipal  purposes  all  but 
the  richer  citizens  and  the  officials  of  the  Company.1 

Happily  the  mistake  was  soon  seen  and  repaired.  It  is  not 
unlikely  that  the  purpose  of  the  scheme  was  as  much  financial  as 
political.  Few  took  up  the  greater  burghership ;  the  scheme  was 
unremunerative,  and  it  inconveniently  limited  the  choice  of 
public  officials.  To  meet  this  difficulty  Stuyvesant  at  his  own 
discretion  nominated  no  persons  to  the  greater  burgher  right, 
a  proceeding  approved  of  by  the  Burgomaster  and  Schepens.2 
This  may  perhaps  be  taken  as  an  evidence  of  the  establishment 
of  more  friendly  relations  between  the  Director  and  those  under 
him.8 


1  On  the  ordinance  creating  the  greater  and  smaller  burghers  see  Laws  and 
Ordinances,  p.  301. 

1  Court  Minutes,  vol.  it.  p.  315. 

8  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  271-2.  He  gives  the  text  of  the  more  important  por 
tions,  and  epitomizes  the  rest. 


CONSTITUTIONAL  DEVELOPMENT.  39 

Eleven  years  after  the  convention  of  1653,  when  the  storm- 
cloud  of  invasion,  soon  to  burst  with  overwhelming  force,  over- 
The  con-  hung  the  colony,  another  meeting  of  a  like  kind  was 
of  1664.  called.  Its  proceedings  will  more  fitly  come  be 
fore  us  as  an  incident  in  the  struggle  which  made  New  Nether 
lands  English  territory.  It  is  enough  for  the  present  to  notice 
how  imperfect  an  approach  these  conventions  were  to  an  effect 
ive  system  of  representative  government.  They  were  called 
merely  to  meet  an  emergency;  they  had  no  defined  functions  or 
specified  rights;  they  failed  to  give  the  citizens  any  certain  or 
continuous  training  in  self-government. 

Yet  it  would  be  a  great  mistake  to  set  them  down  as  useless. 
We  fail  to  understand  the  constitutional  history  of  New  Nether 
lands  unless  we  look  at  it  as  a  struggle  for  popular  rights  against 
a  body  of  commercial  monopolists,  fought  not  on  any  one  battle 
field,  but  here  and  there  as  occasion  offered.  There  was  not,  as 
in  the  New  England  colonies,  a  comprehensive  and  systematic 
machinery  of  self-government  under  which  the  citizen  had  a 
double  set  of  rights,  the  one  as  a  townsman,  the  other  as  a  free 
man  of  the  colony,  while  at  the  same  time  the  relations  of  the 
municipality  to  the  State  were  harmoniously  adjusted.  In  New 
Netherlands  we  must  cast  aside  all  these  ideas,  and  be  content 
to  study  the  measures  by  which  at  any  time  and  in  any  fashion, 
whether  as  freemen  of  their  town  or  citizens  of  New  Nether 
lands,  the  settlers  asserted  and  gained  the  right  of  managing 
their  own  affairs. 

Looked  at  from  one  point  of  view,  all  these  incidents  are 
stages  in  the  political  development  of  the  colony.  From  another, 
ineffi-  they  mark  a  continuous  struggle  against  the  narrow 

Company,  and  selfish  policy  of  the  Company.  Any  care  which 
they  might  have  felt  for  the  permanent  advancement  of  the 
colony  was  dwarfed  and  thrust  into  the  background  by  other 
interests,  first  by  the  struggle  with  Spain,  then  by  the  contest 
with  the  Portuguese  for  trade  and  territory  in  Brazil.  When 
the  Finance  Board  of  the  States-General  urged  the  Company  to 
a  more  liberal  and  public-spirited  policy,  the  appeal  was  met 
with  indifference  and  evasion.  Certain  definite  reforms  were 
proposed.  The  trade  which  supplied  the  Indians  with  guns  and 
powder  was  to  be  abolished.  The  Amsterdam  Chamber,  speak 
ing  for  the  Company,  simply  answered  by  pointing  out  the  im- 


40  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

mense  price  which  the  Indians  were  ready  to  pay.  There  should 
be  more  clergymen  and  schoolmasters:  none  were  wanted. 
Stuyvesant  should  be  recalled  to  report  on  the  real  state  of 
the  colony:  his  information  was  needless.  Fifteen  thousand 
guilders  should  be  spent  every  year  by  the  Company  in  exporting 
farmers  and  husbandmen:  the  Company  could  not  meet  such  a 
charge.1 

The  colonists,  too,  could  not  appeal  with  any  effect  against 
the  Company's  officials.  The  Governor  and  the  other  servants 
could  plead  their  instructions:  the  Company  could  plead  that 
these  instructions  had  been  misunderstood  or  could  disavow  them 
altogether;  between  them  the  settlers  looked  in  vain  for  redress 
or  reform. 

The  colonists  did  indeed  succeed  in  obtaining  the  recall  of 
Kief t,  but  that  was  hardly  from  regard  for  the  settlers ;  rather 
because  his  misgovernment  was  so  manifestly  making  the  colony 
a  source  of  scandal  and  loss  to  the  Company.  The  ineffectual 
struggle  to  get  rid  of  an  obnoxious  official,  Cornelius  Van  Tien- 
hoven,  the  hopelessness  of  any  attempt  to  get  a  fair  hearing 
against  Stuyvesant,  are  sufficient  illustrations  of  the  mischief 
inherent  in  the  Company's  control.  The  charges  of  maladmin 
istration  brought  against  Tienhoven  may  have  been  exaggerated. 
But  it  is  clear  enough  that  he  was  a  man  of  notoriously  dis 
reputable  life,  that  it  was  an  open  scandal  to  retain  such  an  one 
in  office.  So  too,  in  1650,  we  find  the  Vice-Director  writing 
pathetically  to  the  Company  that  two  letters  of  his  protesting 
against  the  arbitrary  proceedings  of  Stuyvesant  had  met  with  no 
answer.  In  a  letter  of  the  same  date  we  find  the  select  men  of 
New  Amsterdam  complaining  that  while  they  were  endeavoring 
to  call  the  attention  of  the  Company's  Directors  to  the  miscon 
duct  of  Stuyvesant,  members  of  that  body  were  privately  send 
ing  him  messages  of  encouragement.2 

The  administrative  failure  of  the  Company  was  in  part  due 
to  their  system  of  choosing  and  promoting  their  servants.  This 
is  described  by  De  Vries,  who  contrasts  it  with  the  method 
adopted  by  the  Dutch  East  India  Company.  There  every 
official  passed  through  a  regular  gradation  of  service,  learning 
his  duties  step  by  step.  In  the  West  India  Company  an  untried 

1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  i.  pp.  387-95.  2  Ib.  pp.  445-6. 


RELIGIOUS  CONDITION  OF   THE  COLONY.  4* 

man  might  be  at  once  thrown  into  a  position  of  dignity  and  re 
sponsibility  without  any  preparation  or  training.1 

The  loss  of  the  Company's  Records  leaves  us  without  adequate 
data  by  which  to  gauge  the  progress  of  population  during  the 
increase  of  years  of  the  Company's  control.  By  1664  Stuyvesant 
population,  estimated  it  at  full  ten  thousand,2  a  number  whose 
symmetry  naturally  excites  suspicion.  We  have  already  seen  how 
that  population  was  made  up  of  miscellaneous  nationalities.  Di 
verse  in  origin,  the  settlers  were  not  held  together  by  that  com 
munity  of  religion  which  was  so  terribly  effective  a  bond  of  union 
for  New  England.  Jogues  was  as  much  startled  by  the  variety 
of  sects  as  by  that  of  races.  Besides  Presbyterian  Calvinists, 
there  were  to  be  found  Romanists,  Lutherans,  Anabaptists,  and 
English  Independents. 

In  this  the  colony  only  followed  the  example  of  the  mother 
country.  As  there  Calvinism  was  the  recognized  creed.  The 
Religious  difficulties  of  the  relations  between  Church  and  State 
the  colony,  were  effectively  illustrated  on  the  small  field  of  New 
Netherland  history.  The  clergy  were  primarily  responsible  to 
the  Classis  of  Amsterdam,  the  governing  body,  that  is,  of  the 
Presbyterian  Church  in  that  city.  At  the  same  time  they  were 
paid  by  the  Company,  and  were  therefore  in  a  certain  sense  its 
servants.  Thus  in  1638  a  complaint  was  lodged  with  the  Classis 
against  Bogardus,  the  pastor  at  New  Amsterdam.  Bogardus 
wished  to  return  and  meet  the  charges,  but  was  forbidden  by 
Kieft.8  Four  years  later  the  Classis  licensed  John  of  Mecklen- 
burgh — or,  to  give  him  the  name  more  familiar  in  New  Nether- 
land  history,  Johannes  Megapolensis — as  pastor  of  Rens- 
selaerwyck.  Thereupon  the  Company  claimed  the  right  to 
approve,  and  therefore  by  implication  to  veto,  the  appointment.* 

Till  1628  there  seems  to  have  been  no  ministry  and  no 
church  at  Manhattan.  A  congregation  occasionally  met  and 
Church  were  ministered  to  by  two  functionaries  of  an  inferior 
hattan.  order,  called  Krankbesoeckers,  visitors  of  the  sick.5 
In  that  year  an  ordained  clergyman  sent  out  from  Amster- 

1  De  Vries,  p.    151. 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  734.  He  quotes  a  letter  of  Stuyvesant's  written  June 
10,  1664. 

3Ib.  pp.  173,  278. 

*  Ib.  p.  342. 

8  This  is  stated  in  the  Memorial  History,  p.  189  (ch.  v.).  The  editor,  who  is 
also  the  author  of  this  chapter,  gives  the  names  of  the  two  officials. 


42  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

dam  ministered  to  a  mixed  congregation  formed  of  Dutch  and 
Walloons.1  Fourteen  years  later  the  outward  fabric  of  the 
church  was  such  as  to  call  forth  a  remonstrance  from  De  Vries. 
In  New  England,  he  told  Kieft,  the  first  thought  after  a  settle 
ment  had  fashioned  its  needful  habitations  was  the  church.  The 
Dutch  had  lime,  stone,  and  wood,  why  should  they  fall  short?2 
Kieft,  who  to  do  him  justice  had  some  care  for  the  dignity  and 
good  order  of  his  settlement,  answered  to  the  appeal.  His 
enemies  tell,  with  grotesque  indignation,  how  he  took  the  oppor 
tunity  of  a  great  wedding  feast  to  open  a  collection  for  the  build 
ing  of  the  church,  how  the  guests  responded  with  convivial 
enthusiasm,  replaced  next  day  by  ineffectual  repentance.  It 
would  be  well  for  Kieft's  reputation  if  that  had  been  the 
weightiest  charge  brought  against  him.* 

In  1652  a  second  pastor  was  appointed  at  New  Amsterdam, 
and  it  is  characteristically  illustrative  of  the  condition  of  the 
colony  that  he  was  chosen  as  able  to  preach  in  Dutch,  French, 
and  English.4 

As  early  as  1643  Beverswyck  had  a  church,  and  in  1654  a 
fourth  was  founded  at  Midwout,  and  before  New  Netherlands 
other  ceased  to  be  Dutch  territory  there  were  churches  at 

churches.6  Brcuckelen,  and  at  Bergen  in  what  is  now  the  terri 
tory  of  New  Jersey. 

The  English  emigrants,  who  had  passed  sometimes  singly, 
sometimes  in  organized  groups,  into  the  Dutch  territory,  were 
independ-  for  the  most  part  men  who  had  withdrawn  volun- 

ent  congrc-  .,  ,  ,  ,  ..... 

gations.  tarily  or  under  pressure  from  the  too  rigid  ecclesias 
tical  system  of  New  England.  It  is  therefore  no  matter  for  sur 
prise  that  in  New  Netherlands  we  hear  little  of  Independent 
churches,  with  a  regular  ministry.  The  nearest  approach  to 
such  seems  to  have  been  at  West  Chester,  where  a  party  from 
New  Haven  had  occupied  the  site  where  Mrs.  Hutchinson  met 
with  her  death,  and  at  Middelburgh  on  Long  Island.  At 
neither  place  was  there  an  established  mininstry  nor  an  organ- 


1  His  name  was  Jonas  Michaelius.  A  letter  from  him  describing  his  position 
and  the  condition  of  his  church  is  in  the  N.  Y.  Documents,  vol.  ii.  p.  763.  It 
is  translated  by  Mr.  H.  C.  Murphy. 

a  De  Vries,  p.   148. 

8  Vertoogh  in  N.  Y.   Docs.  vol.  i.  p.  299. 

4  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  537. 

*  Ib.  pp.  374,  581,  615,  692. 


TREATMENT  OF  NONCONFORMISTS.  43 

ized  church,  but  Middelburgh  had  a  preacher,  and  at  West 
•Chester  we  hear  of  certain  collective  religious  exercises.1 

It  is  probable  that  such  congregations  would  have  been  more 
numerous  but  for  an  ordinance,  passed  by  the  Director  and 
Council  in  1656,  prohibiting  private  conventicles.2 

By  1654  the  Lutherans  at  New  Amsterdam  had  become 
numerous  enough  to  demand  a  church  of  their  own.  The 
petition  was  laid  before  Stuyvesant.  State  toleration 
was  a  principle  as  abhorrent  to  the  Calvinist  dis 
ciplinarian  as  it  could  be  to  Endicott  or  Dudley.  The  Presby 
terian  clergy  of  the  colony  supported  the  Governor,  and  the 
Company  refused  the  request,  accompanying  their  refusal  with 
an  instruction  to  Stuyvesant  to  do  all  in  his  power  to  draw  over 
the  Lutherans  to  the  Calvinistic  faith.* 

New  Netherlands  had  at  least  the  compensating  merits  of  her 
defects.  If  she  had  not  the  cohesion,  the  constraining  sense  of 
Treatment  corporate  existence,  which  bound  together  New  Eng- 
formists.  land,  she  at  least  escaped  the  hideous  tragedies  which 
deface  the  history  of  the  Puritan  colonies.  Such  persecution  as 
there  was  in  New  Netherlands  was  no  more  than  the  petty  and 
harassing  interference  which  in  the  seventeenth  century  in  every 
country  almost  inevitably  followed  any  deviation  from  the  ac 
cepted  State  creed.  In  1656  Stuyvesant,  moved  by  the  com 
plaints  of  the  orthodox  ministry,  forbade  all  conventicles  not 
•called  by  established  authority,  and  where  doctrines  were  set 
forth  not  in  harmony  with  the  Calvinistic  faith  as  defined  by 
the  Synod  of  Dort.  Unlicensed  preachers  holding  such  con 
venticles  and  those  attending  them  were  to  be  punished  by  fine. 
The  ordinance  did  not,  however,  apply  to  family  worship.4 

This  proceeding  brought  upon  Stuyvesant  a  sharp  rebuke 
from  his  superiors.5  Yet,  when  a  Lutheran  clergyman  was  sent 
out  by  the  members  of  that  Church  in  Amsterdam,  Stuyvesant 
was  permitted  to  silence  him."  One  concession  only  the 
Lutherans  could  obtain :  to  meet  their  views  a  slight  modification 
was  introduced  into  the  Calvinistic  liturgy.7 


1  Letter    from    Megapolensis    and  Drusius    to    the    Classis    at    Amsterdam. 
O'Callaghan,  vol.  iii.  p.  69,  &c. 

2  Court  Minutes,  vol.  i.  p.  20.  3  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  582. 

*  Laws  and  Ordinances,  p.  211.  •  Ib.  p.  618. 

*  Megapolensis  as  above.  T  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  642. 


44  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

Quakerism,  so  appalling  a  portent  to  the  New  Englander  with 
his  rigid  creed,  his  mechanical  theology,  and  his  precisely  organ- 
Quakers  in  ized  ecclesiastical  system,  was  far  less  so  to  the 

New  Neth-      _         ,  ,  ,        ,  .  ..  , 

eriands.'  Dutchman,  whose  land  was  already  a  staple  of  sects 
and  mint  of  schism."2 

The  sufferings  of  the  Quakers  in  New  Netherlands  were  light 
indeed  compared  with  their  fate  in  New  England.  Yet  in  the 
Dutch  colony  their  attempts  to  figure  as  the  unauthorized  and 
self-appointed  regenerators  of  society  soon  brought  them  into 
trouble.  It  was  not  till  a  year  after  the  persecution  of  Fisher 
and  Austin  in  Massachusetts  that  the  Quakers  made  their  first 
inroad  upon  New  Netherlands.  On  the  ist  of  June,  1657,  ^ve 
of  them  landed  at  New  Amsterdam.  Their  first  reception  by 
Stuyvesant  was  friendly,  and  they  themselves  ascribed  the  sub 
sequent  change  to  the  influence  of  New  Englanders.  It  is  cer 
tain  that  conditions  which  will  come  before  us  again  had  forced 
Stuyvesant  into  an  alliance  with  that  section  of  his  colony  which 
had  immigrated  from  New  England,  a  section  growing  ia 
numbers  and  importance.  Yet  the  proceedings  of  the  Quakers- 
were  in  themselves  so  repellent  to  a  man  of  Stuyvesant's  temper 
that  his  action  need  not  be  assigned  to  foreign  interference. 

Of  the  five  Quakers,  three  were  women.  Two  of  these — 
Mary  Weatherhead  and  Dorothy  Waugh — two  days  after  land 
ing  began  preaching  in  the  streets  of  New  Amsterdam.  They 
were  arrested  and  imprisoned,  subjected  not,  as  it  would  seem, 
to  absolute  cruelty  but  to  much  discomfort,  and  after  eight  days 
suffered  to  sail  for  Rhode  Island. 

In  the  meantime  their  three  companions  chose  another  field  of 
ministration  in  Long  Island.  Two  soon  departed.  The  third, 
Robert  Hodgson,  was  almost  at  once  arrested.  He  contrived, 
however,  to  turn  the  magistrate's  house  where  he  was  detained 
into  a  place  for  a  religious  meeting.  The  matter  was  reported 
to  Stuyvesant ;  the  Quakers  and  two  of  those  who  had  befriended 
him  were  sent  as  prisoners  to  New  Amsterdam,  Hodgson  him- 

1  The  Quaker  historians  deal  very  scantily  with  the  sufferings  of  the  Friends, 
in   New   Netherlands.      I    have,    therefore,   been   compelled   to    rely   mainly   on 
Brodhead,  and  the  authorities  whom  he  quotes   (vol.   i.  pp.  635-9,  689,   705-7). 
It  would  seem  as  if  in  the  eyes  of  the  Quakers  the  iniquities  of  New  England 
had   made  so  deep  an  impression   that  injustice   perpetrated   in   other   colonies 
was    overlooked    or    forgotten.       Besse,    indeed     (vol.    ii.    p.     182),    attributes- 
Stuyvesant's  severity  to  the  instigation  of  Willett. 

2  Marvell,  ed    1766,  vol.  iii.  p.  290. 


QUAKERS  AT  FLUSHING.  45 

self  brutally  dragged  for  thirty  miles  over  rough  roads  at  the 
tail  of  a  cart.  The  Council  sat  in  judgment  on  him,  and  sen 
tenced  him  to  a  fine  of  six  hundred  guilders.  In  default  of  pay 
ment  he  was  to  be  flogged,  and  publicly  worked  in  the  streets 
for  two  years,  chained  to  a  wheelbarrow.  With  that  craving 
for  martyrdom  which  somewhat  mars  the  heroism  of  the  early 
Quakers,  Hodgson  refused  the  help  of  certain  benevolent  persons 
who  would  have  paid  his  fine. 

The  sentence,  however,  was  soon  remitted.  According  to  a 
Quaker  tradition,  not  very  probable  in  itself,  Willett,  of  New 
England,  who  had  been  the  instigator  of  Stuyvesant's  cruelty, 
was  now  by  popular  clamor  brought  to  repentance,  or  at  least  to 
a  sense  of  shame.  He  interceded  for  the  prisoner;  his  prayer 
was  backed  by  Stuyvesant's  sister,  and  within  a  month  Hodgson 
was  set  free.  Short  as  were  Hodgson's  missionary  labors  on 
Long  Island,  they  seem  to  have  borne  fruit.  In  the  very  same 
month  that  he  was  suffering  at  New  Amsterdam,  his  disciples 
had  become  numerous  enough  and  in  Stuyvesant's  eyes  formida 
ble  enough  to  make  special  measures  needful.  A  proclamation 
was  issued  making  it  an  offense  punishable  by  a  fine  of  fifty 
pounds  to  harbor  a  Quaker,  while  if  a  sea-captain  landed  any  of 
the  sect  he  was  to  forfeit  his  vessel. 

The  proclamation  had  unlooked-for  political  effects.  The 
citizens  of  Flushing  had  already  been  excited  by  the  punishment 
Disturb-  of  one  Henry  Townshend,  who  had  formerly  lived 

ances  at  ..  T-III-          r^       \  ••'«.« 

Flushing.  in  that  town,  ror  holding  Quaker  meetings  in  his 
house  he  had  been  fined.  In  default  he  was  to  be  banished,  and 
was  to  be  flogged  if  he  stayed  in  defiance  of  the  order.  When 
the  proclamation  was  posted  a  number  of  the  inhabitants  drew 
up  an  address  to  Stuyvesant,  declaring  the  injustice  of  his  pro 
ceedings  and  distinctly  refusing  to  obey  his  edict.  Stuyvesant 
dealt  with  the  recalcitrant  town  in  a  fashion  for  which  mediaeval 
history  offers  many  precedents.  Not  only  was  the  Schout  who 
had  been  specially  forward  in  befriending  Quakers  deposed  and 
fined,  the  political  rights  granted  by  Kieft  were  withdrawn ;  the 
town  was  henceforth  to  be  governed  by  a  council  of  seven  nomi 
nated  from  among  its  own  inhabitants  by  the  Governor.  At 
New  Amsterdam  we  hear  no  more  of  Quakerism.  It  continued 
to  make  its  way  among  the  half  independent  settlements  on 
Long  Island,  harassed  by  fines  and  the  dispersion  of  meetings, 


46  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

but  not,  as  in  New  England,  the  victim  of  any  thoroughgoing: 
attempt  at  extirpation. 

To  suppress  a  sect  which  had  no  organized  ministry  and  no 
fixed  places  of  worship  was  indeed  a  hopeless  task  unless  the 
whole  of  the  community  were  really  in  earnest  in  aiding  the 
Government.  Meetings  were  held  in  barns,  in  woods,  and  in 
fields.  But  in  1662,  emboldened  perhaps  by  impunity,  the 
Quakers  about  Flushing  established  a  regular  meeting  house  in 
the  abode  of  one  John  Bowne,  a  yeoman  who  had  emigrated 
from  Derbyshire. 

Stuyvesant  met  this  breach  of  law,  as  he  deemed  it,  by  a 
fresh  proclamation.  It  was  directed  nominally  at  every  deviation 
from  the  orthodox  State  creed.  The  conventicles  of  every  other 
religion  were  declared  illegal,  and  attendance  at  them  was  to  be 
punished  by  fine.  Seditious  books  were  to  be  neither  imported 
nor  distributed,  and  all  new-comers  were  to  report  themselves  to 
the  Secretary. 

At  the  same  time  Bowne  was  fined,  and  refusing  to  pay  his 
fine  was  sent  as  a  prisoner  to  Amsterdam.  There  by  good 
fortune  he  contrived  to  get  a  hearing  before  the  Directors  of  the 
Company.  Stuyvesant's  proclamation  might  well  alarm  them. 
In  his  eagerness  to  strike  at  Quakers  he  had  asserted  a  doctrine 
which  the  rulers  of  the  colony  had  never  approved — the  need  of 
conformity  as  enforced  by  the  State — a  doctrine  which  must  be 
fatal  to  a  community  composed  as  was  New  Netherlands.  If 
the  Directors  were  inclined  to  befriend  the  Quakers,  the  form  in 
which  Stuyvesant  had  made  his  attack  gave  them  the  very  oppor 
tunity  which  they  needed.  They  addressed  a  sharp  admonition 
to  Stuyvesant  on  the  whole  question  of  toleration,  and  of  the 
proper  method  to  be  adopted  towards  sectaries.  They  laid  down 
no  theories  of  freedom  of  conscience.  Apparently  they  held  that 
the  right  to  check  heresy  might  be  kept  in  reserve,  a  weapon  to 
meet  extreme  cases.  But  in  practice  no  man  was  to  be  molested 
as  long  as  he  created  no  civil  disturbance.  It  would  be  better 
that  there  should  be  no  sectaries :  but  if  there  were  any  let  them 
be  connived  at,  otherwise  population,  so  needful  to  a  youthful 
state,  would  be  destroyed.  Not  a  word  was  said  of  the  Quakers^ 
but  the  remonstrance  of  the  Company  gave  them  the  protection 
which  they  needed.  In  that  declaration  we  have  the  key  to  the 
policy  which  molded  the  life  of  New  Netherlands,  the  absolute 


EDUCATION  IN  NEW  NETHERLANDS.  4T 

opposite  to  the  central  principle  of  New  England.  The  ideal 
of  the  one  was  a  numerous  and  materially  thriving  population ; 
religious  diversity  might  be  an  evil,  but,  since  the  conditions  of 
success  required  inclusiveness,  such  diversity  must  be  permitted. 
The  ideal  of  the  other  was  rigid  identity  of  thought,  belief,  and 
purpose,  running  through  all.  If  that  could  be  won  and  ma 
terial  prosperity  come  with  it,  well  and  good.  But  the  State 
must  shrink  from  no  exclusion  which  could  bring  that  ideal  one 
step  nearer.  May  we  not  say  that,  even  yet,  in  the  character  of 
the  two  states  can  be  found  some  traces  of  the  impress  left  on 
each  by  its  founders? 

On  one  point  Stuyvesant  and  his  subjects  were  agreed.  We 
find  each  urging  on  the  Company  the  need  for  a  fuller  and  more 
effective  system  of  education.  In  their  remonstrance, 
before  referred  to,  sent  home  in  1649,  the  Nine  specify 
as  one  of  the  evils  to  be  remedied  the  lack  of  continuous  and 
systematic  teaching.  As  early  as  1633,  indeed,  a  schoolmaster 
had  come  out  to  New  Amsterdam^  and  the  necessity  of  maintain 
ing  schools  had  been  over  and  over  again  acknowledged  by  the 
Company.  But  there  was  no  schoolhouse,  and  no  regular  and 
certain  provision  for  teaching.  The  school  was  opened  at  irreg 
ular  intervals,  at  the  uncertain  choice  or  pleasure  of  indi 
viduals.1 

In  1650  we  find  a  schoolmaster  appointed  at  New  Amster 
dam.2  Two  years  later  a  higher  class  school  was  to  have  come 
into  existence,  held  provisionally  in  the  city  tavern."  About  the 
same  time  a  school  was  established  at  Rensselaerwyck,  at  which 
the  post  of  master  was  combined  with  that  of  clergyman.4  In 
1658  we  find  the  Town  Council  of  New  Amsterdam  making  a 
petition  to  the  Company,  which  at  once  illustrates  the  lack  of 
education  and  the  social  and  economical  advance  of  the  colony. 
They  ask  for  a  schoolmaster  competent  to  teach  Latin.  At 
present  all  who  wish  for  a  classical  education  must  seek  it  at 
Boston.5  A  community  which  has  begun  to  feel  a  need  for  what 
one  may  call  educational  luxuries  has  emerged  from  that  hard 
struggle  for  bare  existence  which  is  the  first  stage  of  colonial 
life. 


1  Vertoogh,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  i.  p.  317.  "Brodhead.  vol.   i.  p.   516. 

*  lb.  p.   537.  '  lb.    p.    538. 

8  Court  Minutes,  vol.  iii.  p.  15. 


48  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

The  efforts  of  the  settlers  on  behalf  of  education  were  sec 
onded  by  Stuyvesant.  A  Latin  schoolmaster,  Alexander  Curtius, 
was  engaged.  He  was  the  joint  servant  of  the  Company  and  the 
municipality,  receiving  from  the  former  five  hundred,  from  the 
latter  two  hundred  guilders,  and  eking  out  his  salary  by  practice 
as  a  physician.1 

The  union  of  leech  and  teacher  does  not  seem  to  have 
worked  well.  In  1662  Curtius  returned  to  Holland.  His 
place  was  filled  by  one  Luyck,  whom  Stuyvesant  had  brought 
out  as  private  tutor  for  his  own  household.  Under  him  a 
high  school  arose,  flourishing  enough  to  attract  pupils  from 
Virginia.2 

As  it  was  in  religion,  so  was  it  in  social  and  industrial  life. 
There  was  not  in  New  Netherlands  anything  of  that  pressure  of 
industrial  custom  or  of  public  opinion  which  in  New  England 
hfe.  created  uniformity  in  almost  every  department.  In 

outward  appearance,  in  productive  industry,  and  in  daily  habits 
the  settlements  on  Long  Island  can  have  differed  but  little  from 
those  of  New  England.  On  the  Hudson  and  on  the  shores 
of  Delaware  Bay  the  traveler  would  have  seen  perhaps  more  like 
ness  to  Maryland  or  Virginia.  Their  tobacco  plantations  might 
be  seen  worked  by  negro  slaves.  The  estates  of  the  patroons  were 
not  unlike  the  great  plantations  of  the  southern  colonies.  There 
was,  however,  this  difference.  There  was  always  a  tendency, 
illustrated  by  Beverswyck,  for  villages  to  grow  up  within  the 
patroonship,  just  as  the  English  village  or  country  town  often 
grew  up  under  the  shadow  of  the  manor.  There  were  also  an 
other  class  of  farmers,  the  tenants  of  the  Company,  already 
described,  chiefly  it  would  seem  in  the  neighborhood  of  Man 
hattan. 

One  cause  which  undoubtedly  depressed  the  free  laborer,  and 

prevented  the  growth  of  an  industrial  and  territorial  system  like 

that  of  New  England,  was  the  presence  of  negro 

slavery.    The  slave,  cheaply  fed  and  slightly  housed, 

is  a  formidable  rival  to  the  free  laborer,  and  the  large  estate  with 

its  staff  of  servile  labor  crushes  by  its  rivalry  the  small  farm. 

The  latter  is  incomparably  better  in  its  social  results.     It  may 

be  even  a  more  efficient  instrument  of  production,  but  of  the 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  656  *  Ib.  p.  634. 


FOREIGN   TRADE   OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS.  49 

product  a  larger  portion  is  intercepted  by  the  wants  of  the 
laborer  himself,  and  a  smaller  margin  left  for  mere  return  on 
capital. 

There  are  no  statistics  of  sufficient  fullness  to  show  at  what 
rate  the  importation  of  negro  slaves  went  on.  We  know  that  in 
the  original  instrument  defining  the  privileges  of  the  patroons  the 
Company  pledged  itself  to  supply  the  settlers  with  negroes. 
That  promise  was  repeatedly  renewed  in  a  manner  which  shows 
that  it  was  a  concession  specially  valued.  It  was  also  in  a  great 
measure  by  Dutch  ships  that  Virginia  was  supplied  with  slaves 
from  Africa.  In  practice  the  heavy  duty  imposed  by  the  Com 
pany  seems  to  have  discouraged  any  large  importation.  As  a 
natural  consequence,  too,  most  of  those  imported  seem  to  have 
been  in  the  employment  of  the  Company.  Thus  we  learn  that 
the  fort  at  New  Amsterdam  was  mainly  built  by  negro  labor. 
The  Company  seems  wisely  to  have  made  arrangements  whereby 
its  slaves  should  be  gradually  absorbed  in  the  free  population. 
In  1644  an  ordinance  was  passed  emancipating  the  slaves  of  the 
Company  after  a  fixed  period  of  service.  They  were  still,  how 
ever,  to  pay  certain  dues  in  kind,  and  their  children  were  to  re 
main  slaves.  By  a  like  arrangement  in  1663  certain  of  the 
Company's  slaves  were  granted  a  qualified  form  of  freedom, 
working  alternate  weeks,  one  for  themselves,  one  for  the  Com 
pany. 

One  entry  in  the  Records  clearly  shows  that  difference  of 
climate  and  of  economical  conditions  rather  than  any  moral  or 
religious  motives  excluded  slavery  from  New  England,  since  we 
find  the  settlers  at  Gravesend,  in  a  petition  addressed  in  1651  to 
the  Company,  specially  asking  for  an  increased  supply  of 
negroes.1 

The  foreign  trade  of  New  Netherlands  differed  not  only  in 

its  details,  but  in  its  whole  principle,  from  that  of  New  England. 

The  system  on  which  New  England  was  organized 

Commerce.      .    .    ..     ,        ,  ,  ° 

left  little  place  for  non-resident  merchants,  or  for  any 
whose  connection  with  the  colony  was  but  temporary.  At  Bos 
ton  the  man  who  did  not  belong  to  a  church  must  have  felt  him 
self  one  of  a  grade  lower  than  his  neighbors.  Even  a  sea- 
captain  and  his  crew  we  may  be  sure  can  have  found  Boston  no 

1  Letter  from  the  townsmen  of  Gravesend  to  the  Company  referred  to  by 
Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  526. 


5»  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

pleasant  port  if  they  were  wholly  out  of  harmony  with  its  popu 
lation.  Thus  the  trade  of  Massachusetts  was  mainly  in  the 
hands  of  residents ;  the  capital  that  sustained  it  was  largely  sup 
plied  by  the  profits  of  the  New  England  farmer.  In  New 
Netherlands  it  was  otherwise.  In  the  Fatherland  there  was 
little  community  between  the  burgesses  or  artisans  of  Amster 
dam  and  the  farmers  and  hinds  of  the  adjacent  country.  So  it 
was  at  Manhattan.  The  fact  that  trade  was  largely  in  the 
hands  of  a  shifting  crowd  of  divers  nationalities  went  far  to 
justify  the  rigid  commercial  policy  of  the  Company. 

There  was  another  reason  for  that.  The  whole  commercial 
prosperity  of  New  Netherlands  turned  on  that  most  perilous 
Trade  form  of  trade,  trade  with  the  Indians.  On  the  part 

Indians.  of  the  Dutch  there  was  an  unlimited  demand  for 
furs,  and  on  the  side  of  the  savages  an  equally  unlimited  demand 
for  guns,  powder,  and  strong  drink.  Thus  illicit  trade  was  not 
only  an  offense  against  the  revenue.  It  was  far  worse:  the 
smuggler  as  an  inevitable  incident  of  his  crime  entangled  the 
colony  in  the  dangers  of  war,  and  supplied  the  enemy  with 
munitions. 

That  the  Company  and  those  who  administered  its  affairs  in 
the  colony  should  have  steered  the  colony  safely  through  these 
dangers  atones  for  many  of  their  shortcomings.  The  most  im 
portant  legacy  which  the  Dutch  rulers  left  to  their  English  suc 
cessors  was  the  relations  of  the  colony  to  the  Indians,  and  it  is 
to  their  high  praise  that  these  were  relations  of  mutual  trust  and 
good  will. 

That  in  spite  of  Kieft's  errors,  a  name  perhaps  too  lenient, 
this  should  have  been  so  was  in  no  small  measure  due  to  the 
stuyve-  personal  influence  of  Stuyvesant.  Harsh,  masterful, 
fngs'wffh1"  narrow  in  views  and  sympathy,  yet  he  was  essentially 
the  natives.  a  just  man_  fjjs  self-reliance,  his  experience  as  a 
soldier,  his  stolid  indifference  to  popular  feeling,  made  him  panic- 
proof.  And  no  one  can  follow  the  relations  between  the  Euro 
pean  and  the  savage  in  every  part  of  North  America  without 
seeing  that  justice  far  more  than  humanity  was  the  key-stone  of 
stable  relations.  The  Indian  might  be  treacherous  himself, 
though  his  imputed  treachery  was  often  no  more  than  the  neces 
sary  consequence  of  negotiations  in  a  language  imperfectly  un 
derstood.  Bui  he  at  least  clearly  knew  whether  those  with 


OUTBREAK  OF    WAR  IN  1655.  51 

whom  he  dealt  were  trustworthy  or  faithless.  The  unflinching 
devotion  of  the  French  missionary,  the  hearty  good-fellowship 
with  which  the  French  trapper  threw  himself  into  the  life  of  the 
Indians,  the  worse  compliance  with  which  the  rulers  of  New 
France  made  themselves  accomplices  in  the  atrocities  wrought 
by  their  allies:  all  these  were  outweighed  by  isolated  acts  of 
treachery  such  as  that  by  which  Denonville  and  Champigny  sent 
a  band  of  Iroquois  chiefs  to  the  French  galleys.1 

The  peace  made  in  1645  between  the  Dutch  settlers  and  the 
natives  held  good  for  ten  years.  The  breach  came,  as  so  often, 
Outbreak  from  an  isolated  outrage,  harshly  punished.  A 
in  1655."  settler,  lately  one  of  the  Company's  officials,  had  his 
garden  plundered  by  a  native  squaw.  He  brutally  put  her  to 
death.  In  an  instant  an  Indian  force  was  ready  to  take  the  field. 
Early  on  a  September  morning  sixty-four  canoes  carrying  some 
five  hundred  armed  savages  appeared  before  New  Amsterdam. 
The  Indians  landed  and  poured  into  the  streets.  Stuyvesant 
with  the  little  army  of  the  colony  was  away  on  service  against 
the  Swedes  by  the  Delaware,  and  the  enemy  reckoned  on  finding 
a  wholly  defenseless  town.  But  tidings  of  the  danger  reached 
the  Governor,  and  he  hurried  part  of  his  force  back  in  time  to 
meet  the  invader.  For  a  while  it  seemed  as  if  the  savages 
might  be  brought  to  terms,  but  in  the  evening  hostilities  broke 
out.  Van  Dyck,  the  author  of  the  act  which  had  brought  about 
the  war,  fell  pierced  by  an  Indian  arrow.  The  savages  were 
soon  driven  from  the  town.  Taking  to  their  canoes  they  turned 
to  the  south-west.  Staten  Island  and  the  cultivated  land  on  the 
south-west  bank  of  the  river  were  overrun,  and  in  three  days  a 
hundred  settlers  were  killed  and  a  hundred  and  fifty  more  taken 
prisoners.  From  the  settlements  on  Long  Island  and  from  the 
highlands  of  the  Hudson  fugitives,  leaving  their  farms  in  terror, 
trooped  for  safety  into  New  Amsterdam.  Again  the  enemy 
seemed  to  threaten  the  capital.  But  before  the  blow  fell 
Stuyvesant  and  the  rest  of  his  troop  were  back  at  Manhattan. 
In  that  crisis  all  his  harshness,  his  arbitrary  temper,  his  un- 
genial  distrust  must  have  been  forgotten;  the  self-reliance  and 
sobriety  of  the  soldier  and  the  ruler  atoned  for  all.  All 

1  An  account  of  this,  with  references  to  the  original  French  authorities,  will 
be  found  in  Parkman's  Frontenac,  pp.   140-2. 
1  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  pp.  606-8. 


52  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

straggling  was  forbidden;  every  available  man,  whether  in  the 
town  or  on  the  ships  in  the  harbor,  was  put  under  arms.  The 
wall  of  the  town  was  hastily  fortified,  and  parties  were  sent  out 
to  relieve  and  garrison  the  threatened  villages. 

The  enemy  at  once  fell  back,  terror-struck.  Stuyvesant's 
moderation  in  using  his  victory  was  as  conspicuous  as  his 
courage  and  promptitude  in  winning  it.  Van  Tienhoven, 
trained  in  the  school  of  Kief t,  was  for  a  war  of  retaliation.  The 
Governor  stood  firm:  he  had  shown  the  enemy  that  he  did  not 
and  need  not  fear  them.  He  now  showed  them  that  he  only 
wanted  safety,  not  vengeance.  The  captives  were  ransomed, 
save  a  certain  number,  detained  among  the  tribes  along  the 
Hudson  as  pledges  for  peace. 

Three  years  later  trouble  again  seemed  in  store  for  the  settlers 
on  the  upper  Hudson.  The  natives,  debauched  by  the  traders 
Further  who  sold  them  brandy,  were  becoming  at  once 
in  1658.*  familiar  and  vindictive ;  the  Dutch  dwelt  in  scattered 
settlements,  open  to  attack,  incapable  of  concentration  or  mutual 
support.  The  settlers  in  their  fear  called  on  Stuyvesant  for  aid. 
He  not  only  sent  the  force  asked  for,  but  went  in  command. 
Not  without  difficulty  he  constrained  the  inhabitants  to  gather 
themselves  into  a  compact  settlement  in  a  bend  of  the  river, 
guarded  on  the  landward  side  by  a  palisade. 

He  then  held  a  conference  with  the  Indians.  In  answer  to 
his  complaint  of  their  outrages,  they  pleaded  that  such  acts  were 
Peace  the  work  of  the  young  chiefs  debauched  by  the  drink 

made-  sold  to  them  by  the  white  men,  and  that  the  one 

murder  had  been  committed  by  an  Indian  from  a  distant  tribe. 
Stuyvesant  told  them  plainly  that  their  excuses  could  not  be 
entertained,  that  if  they  could  they  must  apprehend  the  mur 
derer,  and  make  restitution  for  the  damage  they  had  wrought. 
If  this  was  not  done,  speedy  and  severe  retaliation  would 
follow. 

The  Indians  knew  that,  though  Stuyvesant  would  not  strike 
wantonly,  he  could  strike  heavily.  A  few  days  afterwards  they 
returned.  They  had  come,  they  said,  to  give  a  piece  of  land  for 
the  village,  a  present  to  the  great  Dutch  sachem  to  reward  him 
for  his  long  and  toilsome  journey. 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  pp.  647-9.  His  account  is  apparently  taken  from  the 
Albany  Records. 


THE  DUTCH  AND    THE  FIVE  NATIONS.  53 

Stuyvesant's  efforts  to  secure  peace  for  his  settlers  on  the 
upper  Hudson  were  in  part  frustrated  by  their  own  imbecile 
The  brutality.  A  farmer  near  Esopus,  for  whom  some 

attack8  Indians  worked,  foolishly  gave  them  a  cask  of  brandy. 
Esopus.  Qne  Of  them  m  his  CUpS  iet  off  his  gun  and  caused  an 
alarm.  The  officer  in  command  of  the  garrison  did  his  best  to 
prevent  a  panic,  but  a  party  of  settlers,  defying  his  orders,  rushed 
out  and  fired  upon  the  savages. 

The  Indians  were  at  once  up  in  arms.  But  for  Stuyvesant's 
forethought,  in  forcing  the  settlers  to  palisade  their  village,  the 
whole  settlement  would  in  all  likelihood  have  been  cut  off.  As 
it  was,  a  party  sent  to  fetch  help  from  New  Amsterdam  were  in 
tercepted  and  several  of  them  burnt  at  the  stake.  One  survivor 
made  his  way  to  New  Amsterdam.  There  was  sickness  in  the 
town,  and  it  was  with  difficulty  that  a  force  was  raised.  At 
length  two  hundred  men  were  dispatched,  but  before  they  could 
reach  the  threatened  settlement  the  besiegers  had  dispersed  and 
were  in  the  woods. 

The  one  inestimable  benefit  which  New  York  owed  to  its 
Dutch  founders,  a  benefit  shared  by  the  whole  body  of  English- 
Dealings  speaking  colonists,  was  the  secure  alliance  of  the  Five 
^ive the  Nations.  They  alone  of  the  nations  seem  to  have 
Nations.  been  capable  of  a  continuous  policy  dictated  by  intelli 
gent  self-interest.  Holding  as  they  did  the  highway  between 
French  Canada  and  the  middle  colonies,  they  were  both  to  French 
and  English  allies  of  supreme  importance.  The  advances  of 
French  missionary-diplomatists  had  no  lasting  effect  on  that  reso 
lute,  compact,  and  self-reliant  polity.  The  foundations  of  peace 
with  the  Dutch  were  laid,  as  we  have  seen,  at  the  Tawasentha, 
before  the  West  India  Company  existed. 

The  conditions  under  which  the  colony  lived  all  tended  to 
confirm  the  alliance.  Between  the  Mohawks  and  the  tribes 
along  the  Hudson,  and  the  coast,  there  was  continual  ill-feeling. 
Over  those  tribes  the  Mohawks  claimed  a  certain  supremacy, 
and  put  it  in  force  by  a  levy  of  tribute.  The  Dutch  were  com 
pelled  in  self-defense  to  be  chary  in  selling  munitions  of  war  to 
the  Indians  immediately  about  New  Amsterdam.  In  the  case  of 
the  Mohawks  there  was  not  the  same  need  for  caution,  and 
Rensselaerwyck  became  a  mart  for  guns  and  powder.  Thus 
it  was  in  a  great  measure  through  the  Dutch  alliance  that  the 


54  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

Mohawks  could  maintain  their  authority  over  the  dependent 
tribes  to  the  east.  As  we  have  seen,  in  1645,  just  as  the  horrors 
of  the  long  Indian  war  were  abating,  Kieft  thought  it  well  to 
confirm  the  friendship  of  the  Mohawks  by  a  fresh  treaty.1  Five 
years  later  an  alarm,  due  probably  in  part  to  the  mischief-making 
jealousy  of  the  tribes  on  the  Hudson,  in  part  to  that  perpetual 
source  of  danger  the  unauthorized  traders,  made  it  needful  for 
Stuyvesant  to  pacify  the  Mohawks  with  a  subsidy.2 

In  1660,  when  the  neighboring  savages  threatened  the  out 
lying  settlement  at  Esopus  with  destruction,  the  Company  were 
anxious  that  Stuyvesant  should  enter  into  an  offensive  alliance 
with  the  Mohawks.  Stuyvesant  at  once  pointed  out  the  folly  of 
a  policy  which  would  have  taught  the  Mohawks  to  regard  them 
selves  as  necessary  to  the  Dutch.3 

Nothing  can  illustrate  more  emphatically  the  difference  be 
tween  Dutch  and  English  colonization  than  the  early  history  of 
The  Swed-  tne  Swedish  colonies  which  grew  up  in  the  neighbor- 
ish  colony,  hood  of  the  Dutcn  settlements,  and  in  rivalry  with 
them.  We  cannot  imagine  Gilbert  and  Smith,  let  them  have 
been  never  so  much  baffled  and  neglected,  taking  service  under 
France  and  helping  to  advance  her  colonial  empire.  But  the 
two  men  who  did  most  to  establish  the  Swedish  colony  were 
Netherlanders,  men  who  had  urged  and  furthered  Dutch 
colonial  schemes,  one  a  man  who  had  actually  borne  a  hand  in 
the  work  of  colonization.  Yet  it  would  be  unfair  to  attribute 
this  to  a  lack  of  patriotism  in  the  Dutch  character.  Rather  it 
shows  how  little  the  schemes  of  colonization  concerned  or  repre 
sented  the  whole  country.  In  helping  another  nation  to  en 
croach  on  the  territory  and  thwart  the  policy  of  the  West  India 
Company,  they  were  not  interfering  with  a  national  enterprise, 
they  were  only  hindering  the  schemes  of  a  body  of  commercial 
monopolists. 

Though  Usselinx  had  no  share  in  the  successes,  such  as  they 
were,  of  the  Dutch  West  India  Company,  though  he  finally 
wniiam  appeared  as  its  rival  and  opponent,  yet  he  might  fairly 
Usselinx.  claim  to  have  done  something  towards  calling  it  into 
being.  It  is  scarcely  possible  to  say  how  far  the  attitude  of 

1  P.  24.  2  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  523. 

3  Ib  p.  677.  Mr.  Brodhead  quotes  Stuyvesant's  actual  words,  or  at  least  a 
translation  of  them,  from  the  Albany  Records. 


USSELINX  AND  HIS  SCHEMES.  55 

Usselinx  towards  Dutch  colonization  was  dictated  by  patriotic, 
how  far  by  selfish,  motives.  When  the  charter  of  the  West 
India  Company  was  under  discussion  he  drafted  a  scheme  differ 
ing  in  various  important  points  from  that  actually  adopted. 
The  scheme  proposed  by  Usselinx  would  have  given  the  stock 
holders  in  the  Company  much  fuller  rights  of  representation. 
Each  province  was  to  have  its  own  chamber  in  the  Company. 
The  directors  in  each  chamber  were  not  to  be  a  fixed  number, 
but  were  to  vary  in  proportion  to  the  amount  of  stock  held  by 
the  members  of  the  chamber,  and  were  to  be  elected  by  these 
members. 

There  was  moreover  to  be  a  dual  system  of  government. 
Commerce  was  to  be  left  to  the  Directors.  But  what  one  may 
call  the  political  and  diplomatic  affairs  of  the  Company  were  to 
be  administered  by  a  council  elected  by  the  whole  body  of  stock 
holders.  That  council  was  to  make  regulations  for  the  manage 
ment  of  the  Company,  to  appoint  governors,  and  to  control  its 
alliances  and  its  declarations  of  war.  At  the  same  time  the 
actual  task  of  legislating  for  the  colony  was  to  be  vested  in  the 
colonists  themselves. 

Such  a  scheme  might  probably  have  stimulated  the  financial 
prosperity  of  the  Company.  By  giving  shareholders  a  more 
direct  control  over  its  affairs  it  would  in  all  likelihood 
have  increased  their  number,  and  made  the  undertaking 
more  attractive.  But  there  its  advantages  would  have 
ended.  Under  such  a  system,  as  under  that  which 
existed,  the  permanent  welfare  of  the  settlers  was  al 
most  certain  to  be  sacrificed  to  the  financial  interests  of  the 
shareholders.  Nor  can  it  be  thought  that  the  system  of  dual 
government  would  have  worked  smoothly.  It  would  have  been 
impossible  to  define  the  spheres  of  business  assigned  to  each 
body.  That  the  board  of  Directors  should  have  no  voice  in 
the  appointment  of  a  governor  would  have  been  practically 
fatal  to  harmony.  Moreover  in  all  dealings  with  the  sav 
ages  trade  and  defense  were  so  inextricably  mixed,  that  it 
would  have  been  fatal  to  place  each  under  a  separate  depart 
ment. 

The  best  side  of  Usselinx's  proposal  beyond  doubt  was  that 
for  giving  certain  legislative  rights  to  the  colonists  themselves. 
That  we  may  well  believe  would  have  made  the  colony  more 


56  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

attractive  to  the  better  sort  of  emigrants.  It  might  have 
gained  a  degree  of  stability  and  life  which  were  denied  it  under 
the  rule  of  the  Company.  On  the  other  hand  it  would  have 
multiplied  administrative  difficulties  and  possibilities  of  dispute. 
A  conflict  between  the  Company  and  the  local  legislature  would 
have  been  inevitable.  Selfish  and  negligent  as  the  Company's. 
rule  was,  we  may  well  believe  that  New  Netherlands  would 
have  fared  worse,  racked  by  the  opposing  interests  of  directors, 
shareholders,  and  colonists. 

Though  Usselinx's  scheme  failed  of  acceptance  he  did  not 
at  once  turn  his  back  on  the  Company.  He  was  willing  to  act 
as  its  agent,  to  do  his  best  in  collecting  subscriptions  on  which  he 
should  secure  a  percentage,  and  to  press  its  claims  on  the  Gov 
ernment  of  the  United  Provinces.  He  had,  in  fact,  so  identified 
himself  with  American  colonization,  that  he  had  learnt  to  regard 
his  counsel  and  support  as  needful  to  any  such  scheme.  To 
dispense  with  him  was  in  his  eyes  at  once  a  hopeless  and  an  un 
grateful  attempt. 

At  length,  in  1623,  Usselinx  found  that  he  could  not  get 
what  he  asked  from  the  Directors  of  the  Company,  and  that  the 
Usselinx  States-General  showed  no  inclination  to  interfere. 
Gustavus  His  own  republic  had  failed  him;  he  might  fare 
Adoiphus.  better  with  a  foreign  kingdom,  under  a  monarch  of 
resolute  will  and  far-reaching  schemes.  In  1624  Usselinx  be 
took  himself  to  Sweden  and  at  once  found  a  favorable  hearing 
from  Gustavus  Adoiphus.  Usselinx  laid  before  the  King  a 
scheme  closely  resembling  that  which  he  had  drafted  for  the 
Dutch  Company.  A  joint-stock  company  was  to  be  created,  its. 
affairs  managed  in  part  by  a  board  of  directors  elected  by  the 
shareholders,  in  part  by  a  council  nominated  by  the  King.  Colo 
nization  was  not  to  be  the  sole  or  even  the  main  object,  and  con 
sequently  the  company  was  not  to  have  any  specified  territory  as 
signed  to  it.  Rather  it  was  to  be  a  vast  department,  superin 
tending  all  the  European  trade  and  all  the  colonization  of  the 
country.  It  does  not  appear  whether  it  was  to  be  granted  a 
monopoly  of  foreign  trade,  or  whether  the  promoters  trusted  to 
the  resources  of  the  company  to  drive  all  competitors  out  of  the 
field.1 

•  *  A  translation  of  the  proposed  Charter  of  the  Company  is  published  in  the 
N.  Y.  Documents,  vol.  xii. 


SWEDISH  COLONIZATION.  57 

The  difficulties  which  Usselinx  encountered  in  Sweden  were- 
wholly  different  from  those  which  had  baffled  him  in  his. 
Hin-  own  country.  There  he  was  hampered  by  the  eager- 

drances  to  ..      .       ,  .      ..  0         .  .         ,._       , 

Swedish  ness  or  rival  capitalists :  in  bweden  the  difficulty  was 
ti°on.mz  to  awake  zeal  and  to  find  capital.  The  resources  of 
Sweden  were  wholly  unequal  to  setting  on  foot  such  a  scheme  as 
Usselinx  projected.  The  Thirty  Years'  War  and  the  death  of 
Gustavus  were  bars  even  to  the  achievement  of  any  smaller 
project.  It  was  not  till  five  years  after  the  death  of  Gustavus 
that  a  scheme  was  set  on  foot,  due,  no  doubt,  to  the  suggestive 
proposals  and  impetuous  energy  of  Usselinx,  but  falling  far 
short  of  his  ideal.  The  Swedish  colony  in  America  was  but  a 
scanty  and  imperfect  fulfillment  of  Usselinx's  scheme ;  it  held  out 
no  hopes  of  that  personal  reward  which  was  a  large  element  in 
all  those  schemes;  he  plays  no  part  in  its  accomplishment,  his 
connection  with  it  is  but  remote  and  indirect. 

Such  as  the  scheme  of  Swedish  colonization  was,  it  was  largely 
due  to  the  energy  of  Oxenstierna. 

The  settle-  The  influence  of  Usselinx  had  brought  Swedes  and 
swanen-  Hollanders  interested  in  American  colonization 
daei.i  mto  communication.  In  1630  certain  members  of 

the  Dutch  West  India  Company  had  bought  from  the  natives  a 
tract  of  land  on  the  banks  of  the  Delaware.  A  settlement  was 
formed  at  a  spot  named  by  the  patentees  Swanendael,  now 
Lewiston  in  the  State  of  Delaware.  Isolated  from  the  colony 
at  Manhattan,  the  Swanendael  settlement  formed  no  integral 
member  of  New  Netherlands.  For  a  while  it  prospered,  and  in 
the  second  year  of  its  existence  one  of  its  founders,  De  Vries, 
sailed  from  Holland  intending  to  winter  among  the  settlers. 
He  touched  at  Manhattan  and  heard  evil  tidings.  His  settle 
ment  had  been  attacked  and  cut  off  by  the  Indians.  He  pur 
sued  his  voyage,  and  we  are  reminded  of  that  gloomy  day  when 
Grenville  sailed  in  quest  of  Raleigh's  settlers  and  found  a  row 
of  desolate  cabins.  When  De  Vries  landed  he  found  the  fort  a 
ruin,  nothing  of  its  palisade  left  but  charred  remains,  and  the 
skeletons  of  his  countrymen  strewn  among  the  bones  of  their 
slaughtered  cattle.  From  an  Indian  he  gleaned  some  account  of 
the  tragedy.  It  had  begun,  as  such  feuds  usually  did,  with  a 
paltry  theft  by  a  savage.  He  had  pulled  down  a  tin  plate  bear- 

1  De  Vries,  p.  32,  &c. 


58  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

ing  the  arms  of  the  Republic  and  melted  it  for  tobacco  pipes. 
The  wrath  of  the  Dutch  commandant  was  such  that  the  Indians 
to  pacify  him  put  to  death  the  offender.  The  settlers  saw  the 
danger  of  this  over-ready  compliance  and  remonstrated,  but  too 
late.  While  the  settlers  were  most  of  them  working  in  the 
fields,  the  friends  of  the  slain  man  attacked  the  fort.  The 
commandant  who  chanced  to  be  within  was  cut  down  with  a 
tomahawk;  the  rest  were  surprised,  and  in  the  slaughter  that 
followed  not  one  escaped.  The  disheartened  proprietors  made 
no  attempt  to  renew  their  settlement,  and  sold  the  territory  to 
the  West  India  Company. 

When  Oxenstierna  definitely  took  up  the  scheme  of  American 
colonization,  among  those  to  whom  he  turned  for  advice  and 
Formation  help  was  one  of  the  Swanendael  proprietors,  Samuel 
Swedish  Blomaert.  That  led  to  intercourse  with  the  suspended 
company.  Governor  of  New  Netherlands,  Peter  Minuit.  A 
scheme  of  colonization  was  set  on  foot  which  could  hardly  fail  to 
bring  its  promoters  into  conflict  with  the  Dutch  West  India 
Company,  yet  which  was  supported  not  only  by  Minuit  and 
Blomaert,  but  by  other  shareholders  from  Amsterdam.  Their 
subscriptions  amounted  to  twelve  thousand  florins,  half  the  esti 
mated  capital  of  the  new  company. 

In  1637  a  company  was  embodied  by  charter.  Unlike  that 
designed  by  Usselinx,  it  was  distinctly  a  colonizing  body ;  trade 
only  followed  so  far  as  it  was  a  necessary  consequence.  The 
company  had  a  grant  of  land  on  the  shores  of  Delaware  Bay  of 
undefined  amount.  The  company  was  to  appoint  magistrates  for 
the  colony,  from  whom  there  was  to  be  an  appeal  to  the  home 
government.  There  was  to  be  civil  equality  between  all 
Christian  denominations.  For  ten  years  there  were  to  be  no 
duties,  afterwards  a  tax  of  five  per  cent,  on  all  imports  and 
exports.  All  trade  was  restricted  to  Swedish  ports  and  to 
vessels  built  in  the  colony  itself.  The  second  condition  must 
for  the  first  few  years  at  least  have  been  a  dead  letter.1 

In  the  winter  of  1637  Minuit  was  dispatched  with  two  ships 
to  lay  the  foundation  of  the  colony.  In  March  he  landed,  and 
Swedish  bought  a  tract  of  land  from  the  natives  near  the 
settlement  mouth  of  the  Schuylkill,  where  Wilmington  now 
Schuyikiii.  stands.  As  might  have  been  expected,  the  intrusion 

1  Acrelius  in  N.  Y.  Hist.  Coll.  2nd  series,  vol.  i.  pp.  408-9. 


SWEDISH  SETTLEMENT  ON   THE   SCHUYLKILL.        59 

on  Dutch  territory  did  not  pass  unchallenged.  Only  three  years 
before  Fort  Nassau  had  been  rescued  by  the  strong  hand  from 
English  encroachment.  If  Minuit  was  allowed  to  carry  out  his 
scheme  and  thus  to  command  the  river,  Fort  Nassau  might  be 
rendered  useless  as  a  trading  station.  A  protest  was  sent  to 
Minuit;1  it  was  met  at  first  with  subterfuges.  No  colony  was 
intended,  the  ships  were  bound  for  the  West  Indies,  and  had 
only  touched  for  wood  and  water.2  The  mask  was  soon  thrown 
off.  A  fort  was  built  and  named  Christina,  after  the  Queen  of 
Sweden.3  It  could  hardly  be  called  the  foundation  of  a  colony: 
it  was  rather  the  assertion  of  a  territorial  claim,  and  the  estab 
lishment  of  a  garrison  under  the  shadow  of  which  a  colony  might 
grow  up. 

As  a  trading  station  the  new  venture  was  a  success,  and  the 
Dutch  trade  in  the  Delaware  was  reported  as  "wholly  ruined."4 
But  such  success  left  no  time  for  agriculture,  and  the  colony  was 
dependent  on  the  mother  country  for  supplies.  There  was 
neglect  at  home;  through  the  winter  of  1639  no  food  was  sent 
out,  and  in  the  following  spring  the  settlers  were  about  to 
abandon  their  settlement.  Their  design  was  changed  by  succor 
as  unlocked  for  as  that  which  in  such  another  crisis  saved  Vir 
ginia  from  desertion.  In  April  1640  a  ship  arrived  with  sup 
plies,  and  brought  a  fresh  body  of  emigrants.5 

The  colony,  however,  was  not  exclusively,  probably  not  even 
in  the  main,  composed  of  Swedes,  since  the  opening  clause  of  the 
charter  gives  permission  to  the  intended  settlers  to  depart  from 
Holland.  Sweden,  however,  was  to  have  a  monopoly  of  their 
export  trade.  The  severe  restrictions  on  popular  rights  under 
which  the  Dutch  colonists  lived  must  have  been  emphasized 
when  contrasted  with  the  privileges  granted  by  the  Swedish 
patent.  That  allowed  the  settlers  to  elect  their  own  magistrates 
and  officers.  At  the  same  time  there  was  to  be  a  governor  ap 
pointed  by  the  Crown,  who  might  veto  the  orders  of  the  local 
courts,  and  to  whom  appeals  lay  in  judicial  matters. 

1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  xii.  p.  19. 

2  Vertoogh,   p.   282. 

3  Report  by  Andrew  Hudde;  published  in  the  N.    Y.  Hist.   Coll.   2nd  series, 
vol.  ii.  p.  429;  cf.  Acrelius,  p.  409.     This  is  also  mentioned  in  a  letter  written 
from    Jamestown     to     Secretary     Windebank,     May     8,     1638.       Pennsylvania 
Archives,  2nd  series,  vol.  v.  p.  56. 

4  Brodhead,   vol.    i.   p.    320. 

5  Archives  at  Stockholm,  quoted  by  Ferris,  p.   52. 


60  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

It  was  not  only  in  civil  matters  that  the  Swedish  colony  en 
joyed  liberty  denied  to  their  neighbors.  The  two  rival  forms, 
of  Protestantism,  the  Augsburg  Confession  and  "the  pretended 
reformed  religion" — i.e.  Calvinism  and  Lutheranism — were  both 
to  be  admitted. 

How  curiously  entwined  were  the  colonial  interests  of  Hol 
land  and  Sweden,  how  little  the  Dutch  regarded  the  matter  with 
Relations  any  national  exclusiveness,  was  shown  when  in  1640 

of  Swedes  .  ,    ,     .  ,  . 

and  Dutch,  a  settlement,  modeled  on  the  patroonships  of  New 
Netherlands,  was  established  on  the  Delaware  under  a  title 
granted  by  Queen  Christina.1 

One  cause,  no  doubt,  which  made  the  Dutch  tolerant  of  these 
intrusions  was  the  presence  of  a  common  enemy.  It  might  be 
impossible  for  the  Dutch  to  check  the  tide  of  English  en 
croachment  on  Long  Island  or  on  the  banks  of  the  Connecticut.. 
But  it  was  different  with  outlying  stations  for  trade,  such  as- 
the  Newhaven  merchants  were  striving  to  establish  on  the  Dela 
ware,  and  Kieft  was  glad  to  form  an  alliance  whereby  he  secured 
the  aid  of  the  Swedes  against  these  intruders.2 

In  the  summer  of  1642  the  Swedish  Company  was  enlarged- 
Fresh  capital  was  subscribed,  and  a  monopoly  of  the  tobacco 
Progress  of  trade  with  Sweden  and  Finland  was  granted.8  More 

the  Swed-  ,  ,  .  . 

ish  colony,  settlers  were  sent  out,  among  them  a  number  of 
skilled  woodcutters  from  Finland,  and  the  colony  was  placed 
under  the  command  of  an  experienced  soldier,  John  Printz.4 

His  instructions  are  interesting  as  showing  the  purpose  and 
hopes  of  the  Swedish  Government.  The  necessity  for  armed 
resistance  to  the  Dutch  was  contemplated,  and  provision  made 
accordingly.  It  is  clear  that  the  colony  was  to  be  regarded  as, 
created  for  the  commercial  benefit  of  the  mother  country,  not 
as  a  self-supporting  community  existing  for  itself.  Printz  is  to 
encourage  mining  and  the  production  of  timber,  wool,  silk,  and 
tobacco.  A  monopoly  of  the  last-named  commodity  was  to  be 
granted  to  the  Company.  The  attitude  of  the  Swedish  Govern 
ment  towards  this  matter  was  not  unlike  that  of  James  I.  to  the 


1  Ferris  (pp.  53-54)  gives  an  account  of  this  colony,  quoting  original  docu 
ments;  cf.  Hazard,  p.  66.  The  patent  itself  is  in  the  Pennsylvania  Archives, 
vol.  v.  p.  759. 

3  Ferris,  p.  59. 

*  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  xii.  p.  21. 

*  Acrelius  in  N.  Y.  Hist.  Soc.  Coll.  and  series,  vol.  L  p.  411.. 


SWEDISH  COLONY.  61 

Virginia  Company.  Tobacco  was  an  obnoxious  luxury.  But  if 
men  will  use  it,  let  the  colonial  company  get  the  benefit  of  it. 
Unhappily  there  was  another  point  of  likeness  between  the 
Swedish  colony  and  Virginia.  In  neither  case  did  the  founders 
see  that  a  young  colony  will,  at  least  at  the  outset,  need  all  its 
labor  to  establish  and  support  itself,  and  that  all  thought  of  ex 
portation  must  be  postponed  till  the  primary  needs  of  the  settlers 
have  been  satisfied.1 

Printz  shifted  the  headquarters  of  the  Governor  to  Tinicum, 
some  fifteen  miles  above  Fort  Christina  and  twelve  below  the 
site  of  Philadelphia.  Log  huts  clustered  round  the  fort,  forming 
the  village  of  New  Gottenburg.  Another  fort,  called  Elsen- 
burg,  was  built  and  garrisoned  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the  river, 
near  what  is  now  Salem  in  New  Jersey.2  By  this  policy  the 
tables  were  completely  turned  upon  the  Dutch.  Fort  Nassau 
instead  of  being  a  check  on  the  Swedish  colony  was  cut  off  from 
the  mouth  of  the  river,  and  rendered  little  better  than  a  useless 
encumbrance. 

By  1645  the  whole  number  of  male  emigrants  amounted  to 
ninety,  beside  women  and  children.  There  were  also  a  few 
English  who  had  been  suffered  to  remain  on  submitting  to  the 
Swedish  Governor.  The  little  community  had  not  reached  the 
stage  when  there  is  any  need  for  definite  constitutional  ma- 
•chinery.  The  Governor  was,  in  theory,  responsible  only  to  the 
home  authorities.  In  fact  it  can  never  have  been  a  matter  of  any 
difficulty  for  the  whole  body  of  freemen  to  express  their  wishes 
and  opinions. 

The  social  life  of  the  settlers  seems  to  have  resembled  that  of 
New  England  rather  than  New  Netherlands.  They  were  gath- 
sociai  and  ered  together  in  the  two  villages  of  Christina  and 
"re  ofthe  Gottenburg. *  There  were  beside  three  detached  to- 
coiony.  bacco  plantations.  The  relations  of  the  settlers  to  the 
Indians  were  friendly,  and  the  worst  calamities  that  befell  the 
•colony  during  its  first  ten  years  of  existence  were  the  neglect  of 
the  home  authorities  to  send  adequate  supplies,  and  the  destruc 
tion  of  New  Gottenburg  by  fire  in  the  dead  of  winter.  The 

1 A  translation  of  the  Instructions  is  published  in  Hazard's  Register  of 
Pennsylvania,  vol.  iv.  pp.  64-8. 

3  De  Vries,  p.  181.  Hudde  in  N.  Y.  Hist.  Coll.  and  series,  vol.  i.  pp. 
428-9. 

3  There  may  have  been  a  third  village  at  Elsenburg. 


6 2  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

Lutheran  religion  was  publicly  recognized.  Religious  service 
indeed  was  celebrated  with  a  frequency  and  regularity  which 
distinguished  New  Sweden  alike  from  Dutch  and  English 
neighbors.  Full  service  was  said  on  Sundays  and  high  days, 
there  was  preaching  on  Wednesdays  and  Fridays,  and  daily 
prayers  were  read,  at  New  Gottenburg  by  an  ordained  clergy 
man,  at  the  smaller  settlements  by  lay  readers  especially  ap 
pointed  to  that  end.  It  is  plain  that  this  was  a  side  of  colonial 
life  to  which  no  small  importance  was  attached  by  the  authorities 
in  Sweden.  Thus  we  find  Peter  Brahe,  the  President  of  the 
Royal  Council,  in  one  of  his  dispatches,  admonishing  Printz  to 
let  no  leaven  of  Calvinistic  faith  or  practice  creep  in  from  his 
Dutch  or  English  neighbors.  The  established  faith  of  the 
settlers  in  New  Netherlands  sat  so  lightly  upon  them,  that  this 
difference  could  do  little  to  affect  the  relations  between  the  two 
colonies.  But  it  may  have  had  some  influence  on  a  strenuous  and 
narrow-minded  Calvinist  such  as  Stuyvesant.1 

Indeed  the  whole  character  of  that  Governor  made  it  certain 
that  he  would  deal  in  a  very  different  temper  from  that  of  his 
Hostility  predecessors  with  any  encroachment  on  Dutch  ter- 
ritory  or  Dutch  privileges.  Moreover  the  disappear- 
ance  of  the  comrnon  enemy,  the  English,  from  the  dis 
puted  territory  removed  a  guarantee,  if  not  for  friendship,  at 
least  for  peace.  During  the  early  days  of  the  Swedish  settlement 
the  Government  of  the  United  Provinces  had  done  its  best  to 
prevent  any  collision.  A  Swedish  vessel  returning  from 
America  with  a  heavy  cargo  was  arrested  by  the  command  of  the 
East  India  Company.  The  Swedish  Ambassador  at  The  Hague 
at  once  protested,  and  by  an  order  of  the  States-General  the 
vessel  was  set  free.2 

Gradually  and  inevitably  causes  for  discord  multiplied  them 
selves.  The  position  of  Fort  Nassau  could  not  but  give  rise  to 
trouble.  Since  the  Swedes  commanded  each  bank  of  the  river 
the  Dutch  could  only  enjoy  on  sufferance  any  trade  in  the  upper 
waters  of  the  Delaware.  In  the  summer  of  1646  a  sloop  from 
New  Amsterdam  laden  with  goods  for  the  Indian  trade  touched 
at  Fort  Nassau,  and  by  the  order  of  the  commander  there  sailed 
into  the  Schuylkill.  But  Printz  at  once  forbade  the  voyage  in 

1  Brahe's  letter  (Anglicized)  is  quoted  in  Winsor's  Memorial  History,  vol. 
iv.  p.  459.  *  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  i.  it.  116. 


DISPUTES  BETWEEN  DUTCH  AND   SWEDES.        63 

terms  so  determined  and  threatening  that  it  was  abandoned.  So, 
too,  when  the  Dutch  arms  were  set  up  some  twelve  miles  above 
Tinicum,  on  the  western  bank  of  the  Delaware,  they  were  in 
sultingly  pulled  down  by  the  order  of  Printz.  An  envoy  sent  by 
Hudde,  the  commander  of  Fort  Nassau,  to  remonstrate  was  re 
ceived  by  the  Swedish  Governor  with  scoffs  and  threats  of  vio 
lence.1  The  arrogance  and  self-confidence  of  Printz  seems  to 
have  effectually  awed  Kieft  and  his  underlings.  In  Kieft's 
successor  the  Swedish  Governor  had  to  deal  with  an  opponent  of 
his  own  metal.  One  of  Stuyvesant's  first  acts  was  to  send 
Printz  a  protest  against  his  encroachments.  Printz  seems  to 
have  ignored  this.  There  is  no  proof  of  any  hostility  between 
the  Swedes  and  the  Indians;  if  there  had  been  such,  it  would 
almost  certainly  have  been  recorded.  It  is  clear,  however,  that 
the  savages  looked  with  some  suspicion  on  the  Swedes  as  in 
truders,  and  sympathized  with  the  Dutch  in  that  rivalry  which 
was  now  plainly  manifest.  The  Dutch  were  occasional  visitors, 
who  brought  brandy  and  guns  and  gunpowder,  and  did  not 
threaten  any  territorial  encroachment.  The  Swedes  were  neces 
sarily  more  guarded  in  their  dealings;  the  savage  may  have 
already  suspected  that  his  hunting  grounds  were  doomed  before 
the  ax  and  plow  of  the  white  man.  Invited  by  the  Indians  on 
the  Schuylkill,  Hudde  built  a  wooden  fort  and,  as  it  would  seem, 
made  preparations  for  a  settlement.  While  the  work  was  going 
on  a  party  of  twenty-four  Swedes  appeared,  and,  after  ineffectu 
ally  threatening  Hudde,  cut  down  all  the  trees  around  the  fort, 
probably  to  enable  troops  to  act  more  readily  against  it.  What 
ever  may  have  been  the  object,  it  is  clear  from  the  way  in  which 
this  is  reported  that  the  Dutch  viewed  it  as  an  outrage.  During 
the  whole  autumn  the  same  style  of  warfare  was  waged :  houses 
were  built  by  Dutch  settlers  on  the  Schuylkill  and  pulled  down 
by  the  Swedes.2 

Stuyvesant  plainly  saw  that  nothing  could  be  done  by  main 
taining  detached  outposts  against  the  enemy.  If  the  Dutch  were 
Policy  of  to  keep  their  hold  on  the  Delaware,  it  must  be  done 

Stuy  ve-  ,  i  i  •  i  •  ••  •  i     •»  * 

sant.  by  establishing  a  secure  communication  with  Man- 


1  Official  Report  in  the  New  York  Documents,  vol.  i.  p.   537,  &c.     This  w 
received  in  January   1656.      It   is  entitled   Secret.      There  is  nothing  to  she 


This  was 

„    .,       how 

who  drafted  it. 

*  Hudde   (referred  to  on  p.  61)  gives  a  very  full  account  of  these  transac 
tions. 


•64  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

hattan.  To  this  end  he  abandoned  and  demolished  Fort  Nas 
sau,  and  built  in  its  place  Fort  Casimir,  four  miles  below  Fort 
Christina.1  The  sound  strategy  of  this  was  obvious.  Ships 
from  Manhattan  could  now  support  the  Dutch  in  the  Delaware 
without  having  to  run  under  the  enemy's  guns.  The  position 
was  reversed,  the  Swedes  were  now  cut  off  from  the  mouth  of 
the  river.  As  a  further  measure  towards  strengthening  his 
position,  Stuyvesant  purchased  from  the  Indians  the  frontage 
along  the  west  bank  of  the  river  for  about  twenty-five  miles 
below  Fort  Christina.2 

How  well  judged  was  Stuyvesant's  policy  was  shown  by  its 
effect  on  the  Swedish  settlers.  In  1653  we  find  Printz  writing  to 
his  own  Government  that  it  was  useless  for  him  to  attempt  the 
expulsion  of  the  Dutch  from  the  river  unless  he  was  re-enforced. 
Some  of  his  settlers  wished  to  withdraw  and  place  themselves 
under  the  Government  of  New  Netherlands;  they  were  only 
withheld  because  Stuyvesant  declined  to  take  them  without  per 
mission  from  his  own  Government. 

Meanwhile  the  Swedish  Government  was  doing  little  to 
Further  strengthen  or  encourage  its  settlers.  Such  efforts  as 
thfe'part'of  ^  did  make  were  unfortunate.  In  1649  a  vessel,  sent 
Sweden.  out  w{th  seventy  emigrants  and  large  supplies,  was 
cast  away  near  Porto  Rico. 

In  1653  Printz's  appeal  for  help  became  so  urgent  that  the 
authorities  at  home  saw  the  need  for  resolute  action.  The 
Company  by  its  own  voluntary  act  placed  itself  under  the  con 
trol  of  the  Swedish  Board  of  Trade.  The  conclusion  of  the 
Thirty  Years'  War  had  left  Sweden  encumbered  with  a  number 
of  unemployed  soldiers.  Those  who  directed  her  colonial  policy 
decided  to  make  use  of  these  colonists  on  the  Roman  model; 
they  were  at  once  to  till  and  to  garrison  the  land.  Three  hun 
dred  emigrants  were  chosen,  of  whom  fifty  were  to  be  of  this 
class.  At  the  head  of  the  party  the  Board  placed  their  own 
Secretary,  John  Rising,  with  a  commission  as  Deputy-Governor 
under  Printz.  Two  vessels  were  chartered  for  the  voyage. 
They  met  with  that  persistent  ill-fortune  which  followed 
Swedish  emigrant  ships.  One  vessel  could  not  be  got  ready  for 
sea  in  time  and  a  number  of  the  emigrants  had  to  be  left  behind. 
In  the  meantime  Printz,  worn  out  by  old  age,  and  disheartened 

1  Report,  p.  590.  *  Ib. 


FURTHER   SWEDISH  EFFORTS.  65 

by  the  failure  of  the  authorities  at  home  to  send  succor,  think 
ing  too,  as  it  would  seem,  that  he  could  do  more  for  the  colony 
by  a  personal  appeal  than  by  his  dispatches,  had  sailed  for 
Sweden.  Before  doing  so  he  had  abandoned  Fort  Elsenburg. 
On  May  21  the  fleet  under  Rising  touched  at  that  point. 
Though  it  was  no  longer  in  military  occupation,  in  all  likeli 
hood  there  were  settlers  in  the  neighborhood,  and  from  them  the 
new-comers  would  hear  of  Printz's  departure.  This  left  Rising 
in  supreme  command.  His  orders  were  to  do  his  best  to  secure 
each  side  of  the  Delaware,  and  if  he  could  to  persuade  the  Dutch 
to  abandon  Fort  Casimir,  while  he  was  himself  to  fortify  nearer 
the  mouth  of  the  river.  But  all  this  was  to  be  done  by  peaceable 
means.  It  was  better,  so  his  orders  said,  to  leave  the  Dutch  in 
possession  than  to  run  any  risk  of  letting  in  the  English.  Such 
were  Rising's  written  instructions.1  But  it  is  almost  certain 
that  there  was  a  party  in  the  Company  who  were  for  bolder 
measures,2  and  it  is  plain  that  Rising's  own  wishes  went  that 
way.  Before  landing  or  holding  any  communication  with  the 
tipper  settlements  he  bore  down  on  Fort  Casimir  and  summoned 
it  to  surrender.  Defense  was  rendered  impossible  by  want  of 
ammunition.  This  was  due,  it  was  said,  to  the  dishonesty  of  the 
commander,  Gerrit  Bikker,  who  had  traded  away  his  powder 
to  the  Indians.3  No  attempt  was  made  to  hold  the  place ;  Ris 
ing  took  possession,  changed  the  name  to  Fort  Trinity,  and  left  a 
skilled  engineer  who  had  come  with  him  to  strengthen  the  de 
fenses.  All  these  proceedings  he  reported  in  a  dispatch  to  Stuy- 
vesant,  mentioning  at  the  same  time  that  certain  Dutch  settlers 
\vhom  he  had  found  near  Fort  Christina  had  taken  the  oath  of 
allegiance  to  Sweden. 

Disputes  with  the  English,  which  but  for  the  fortunate,  but 
unscrupulous,  policy  of  Massachusetts  must  have  resulted  in 
Opposition  war,  now  fully  occupied  Stuyvesant,  and  for  twelve 
Dutch.  months  no  attempt  was  made  to  recover  Fort  Casimir 
or  to  contest  the  possession  of  the  Delaware.  Stuyvesant,  how 
ever,  was  not  the  man  to  sit  down  quietly  under  such  an  en 
croachment.  It  is  clear  too  that  his  superiors  in  Holland, 

1  A  translation  of  these  instructions  is  in  the  Pennsylvania  Register,  vol.  iv. 
P-    143- 

2  Otherwise  it  would   have  been  impossible   for   Printz   and   Rising  to   adopt 
the  aggressive  policy  which  they  did. 

4  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  i.  p.  605. 


66  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

neglectful  as  they  often  were  of  the  welfare  of  the  colony, 
would  resent  anything  which  touched  their  own  dignity  and 
their  own  interests.  In  November  1654  the  Governor  re 
ceived  orders  to  "avenge  the  infamous  surrender"  of  Fort 
Casimir  by  driving  the  Swedes  out  of  the  country,  and  to  ar 
rest  Bikker,  the  commander,  who  had  so  tamely  surrendered  the 
fort.1 

Stuyvesant  had  somewhat  strangely  chosen  this  time  for  a 
voyage  to  the  West  Indies,  and  nothing  could  be  done  till  his 
return.2  His  whole  conduct  towards  Indians,  English,  and 
Swedes  showed  that  he  was  no  lover  of  war,  nor  anxious  for 
small  advantages  of  little  value,  but  that  when  he  did  strike  he 
struck  decisively.  It  was  not  till  July  1655  that  Stuyvesant  re 
turned.  He  at  once  resolved  to  carry  out  the  policy  suggested 
by  the  Company,  though  an  attack  of  illness  compelled  him  to 
depute  some  share  in  the  task  of  preparing  the  expedition." 

By  the  first  week  in  September  a  squadron  of  seven  vessels 
was  ready.  Between  six  and  seven  hundred  men  were  embarked, 
Stuyvesant  and  Stuyvesant  himself  took  the  command.  The 
SwedfsV11"  fleet  sailed  up  the  Delaware  and  were  suffered  with- 

colony.  QUt   opposition    to   lan(J    fifty   men>    who   cut   o£f    port 

Casimir  from  the  upper  settlements.  Schute,  the  commander  of 
Fort  Casimir,  finding  himself  thus  isolated,  surrendered  at  the 
first  summons. 

Thence  Stuyvesant  sailed  on  to  Fort  Christina.  There  again 
he  was  suffered  to  land  and  erect  his  batteries.  The  first  sum 
mons  to  surrender  was  met  with  refusal.  Stuyvesant  did  not 
open  fire,  but  contented  himself  with  investing  the  fort  while  his 
troops  pillaged  the  surrounding  country.  In  nine  days  symp 
toms  of  mutiny  within  the  fort  compelled  Rising  to  surrender. 
The  Swedish  garrison  marched  out  with  the  honors  of  war,  and 
the  Dutch  flag  floated  over  the  fort.4 

In  spite  of  the  bloodless  nature  of  the  conquest  and  the  leni 
ency  shown  to  the  Swedish  settlers,  certain  measures  of  force 
were  needed  to  secure  the  new  territory.  A  Swedish  vessel  with 
a  hundred  and  thirty  emigrants  on  board  was  not  allowed  to 
touch  within  the  Delaware,  and  certain  Swedes  who  were  found 

1  N.   Y.   Docs.   vol.   xii.   p.   85.  *  Ib.   p.   go.  *  Ib.   p.   91. 

*  The  authorities  for  the  Dutch  conquest  are  to  be  found  in  the  first  and  the 
twelfth  volumes  of  the  N.   Y.  Documents. 


THE   SETTLEMENT  OF   THE    WALDENSES.  67 

intriguing  with  the  Indians  were  arrested  and  sent  to  New 
Amsterdam. 

A  population  so  motley  as  that  of  New  Netherlands  could 
easily  absorb  and  assimilate  a  fresh  element.  It  was,  too,  for  the 
Effects  temporary  peace  of  the  colony  to  have  converted  a 
conquest.  neighbor  separated  by  no  definite  or  easily  kept 
boundary  from  a  rival  into  a  dependency.  Yet  if  the  lands  on 
the  Delaware  could  have  become  once  more  a  mere  hunting- 
ground  for  savages,  New  Netherlands  would  have  been  stronger 
and  safer.  On  each  side  English  colonies  were  closing  in:  a 
longer  sea-board  only  made  the  Dutch  colony  an  object  of 
greater  suspicion  and  jealousy.  In  case  of  an  attack,  too,  the  re 
sources  of  the  colony  would  be  divided.  There  were  now  two 
points  too  far  apart  for  mutual  help,  at  which  a  maritime  in 
vader  might  strike. 

In  another  way  also  the  conquest  of  New  Sweden  was  in  the 
long  run  a  danger  to  New  Netherlands.  The  complaints  of 
the  Swedish  Government  were  unheeded  at  The  Hague.  The 
attitude  of  the  Dutch  was  a  practical  declaration  that  title 
based  on  discovery — a  form  of  title  which  gave  scope  for  endless 
dispute  and  litigation — was  to  take  precedence  of  title  based  on 
the  plain  and  obvious  fact  of  occupation.  Stuyvesant  and  his 
employers  set  up  a  principle  which  only  six  years  later  was 
turned  against  them  to  their  own  destruction.  Financially,  too, 
the  expedition  against  New  Sweden  was  a  heavy — events 
showed,  a  fatal — blow  to  the  Company.  The  deficit  created  by 
the  cost  of  the  expedition  had  to  be  met  by  borrowing  twenty- 
four  thousand  guilders  from  the  city  of  Amsterdam.  Thus  the 
colony  tied  round  its  neck  a  load  of  debt,  which  crippled  its 
military  resources,  and  forced  it  to  deal  with  its  territory  on  com 
mercial  rather  than  military  and  political  grounds,  in  the 
cheapest,  not  the  most  efficient,  fashion. 

The  whole  administrative  history  of  the  colony  showed  that 
its  weakest  point  was  lack  of  centralization.  The  patroonships, 
The  city  of  the  half-independent  municipalities  founded  by  colo- 
da^VoVms  nists  irom  New  England,  were  sources  of  discord  and 
a  colony.  weakness.  Yet  in  dealing  with  its  newly  acquired 
territory  the  Company  brought  in  a  further  element  of  variance. 
The  city  of  Amsterdam  proposed  to  find  a  home  for  a  number  of 
Waldenses,  the  survivors  of  the  "slaughtered  saints,"  "slain  by 


68  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

the  bloody  Piedmontese."  In  the  Old  World  Holland  was  the 
one  consecrated  asylum  for  the  victims  of  religious  tyranny. 
Gradually  a  wider  refuge  beyond  the  Atlantic  was  being  opened 
also;  that  process  was  beginning  which,  as  it  has  been  said, 
makes  the  history  of  American  colonization  the  history  of  the 
persecutions  of  Europe.  The  conquest  of  New  Sweden  enabled 
the  Government  to  find  a  refuge  for  these  outcasts.  By  sur 
rendering  Fort  Casimir  and  the  territory  for  about  twenty-five 
miles  below  it,  on  the  south-west  bank  of  the  river,1  the  West 
India  Company  was  able  to  liquidate  its  debt  to  the  city  of 
Amsterdam.  This  was  the  more  necessary  since  the  Company 
was  embarrassed  by  recent  losses  in  Guiana  and  Brazil.  They 
acted,  in  fact,  like  a  landlord  who  sells  a  portion  of  his  estates 
to  free  the  rest  from  encumbrances.  Financially  this  was  no 
doubt  sound  policy,  but  a  government  in  dealing  with  its  terri 
tory  cannot  limit  its  view  to  finance.  The  cession  was  a  con 
fession  of  administrative  incapacity.  The  Company  did  not, 
however,  wholly  divest  themselves  of  their  tenantry  on  the  Dela 
ware.  The  Swedes  had  built  a  solid  log  fort  on  Tinicum  Island, 
about  twelve  miles  below  the  spot  now  occupied  by  the  city  of 
Philadelphia.  This  remained  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Com 
pany;  so  also  did  Fort  Christina,  of  which  the  name  was  now 
changed  to  Altona.2  Since  there  was  to  be  a  division  it  would 
have  been  far  better  if  that  had  gone  too,  and  if  the  responsibility 
of  maintaining  order  on  the  Delaware,  and  of  protecting  the 
settlers  against  the  Indians,  and  holding  the  territory  against 
English  encroachment  had  been  laid  undivided  on  the  city  gov 
ernment  of  Amsterdam. 

The  city  at  once  took  in  hand  the  task  of  dealing  with  the 
newly  acquired  territory.  The  management  of  the  colony  was 
vested  in  a  committee  of  six,  chosen  by  the  burgomasters  from 
among  themselves.  Specific  conditions  were  drawn  up  to  at 
tract  emigrants.  They  were  to  be  carried  out  without  payment, 
the  site  for  a  house  was  to  be  given  them,  and  they 
were  to  be  clothed  and  fed  for  one  year  at  the  expense 


1  The    south-east    boundary    was    the    now    called    Boomtjes    (corrupted    into 
Bombay)   Hook.     Mr.   Keen  in  his  map  places  this  at  the  northern  extremity 
01   .Boomtjes  Hook  Island.     It  does  not  appear  to  me  quite  clear  that  it  may 
not  have  been  at  the  southern  end.     In  the  latter  case  the  territory  would  be 
about  thirty  miles. 

2  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  631. 


THE   SETTLEMENT  OF   THE  WALDENSES.  69 

of  the  city.  Whether  any  labor  on  behalf  of  the  colony  in  gen 
eral  was  required  in  return  does  not  appear.  We  may  be  sure, 
however,  that  the  promoters  of  the  colony  did  not  intend  it  to 
be  what,  if  these  conditions  had  stood  alone  it  might  become — a 
home  for  idle  paupers.  After  the  first  year  the  colonists  were  to 
be  supplied  with  the  necessaries  of  life  and  with  seeds  out  of  a 
public  magazine,  at  a  rate  not  higher  than  that  current  in  the 
mother  country.  For  ten  years  the  colony  was  to  be  free  of 
taxes;  after  that  the  settlers  were  to  be  taxed  at  the  minimum 
rate  imposed  on  any  inhabitants  of  New  Netherlands.  There 
was  to  be  a  municipal  government  modeled  on  that  of  Amster 
dam  itself.  No  regular  clergy  were  appointed,  but  there  was 
to  be  a  schoolmaster  who  should  conduct  a  simple  religious 
service.  In  most  of  these  conditions  there  is  a  certain  vagueness, 
something  which  suggests  an  anxiety  to  frame  attractive  con 
ditions,  with  no  very  definite  ideas  how  they  were  to  be  fulfilled. 
The  relations  between  the  government  of  the  new  municipality 
and  that  of  the  West  India  Company  were  arranged  with  a 
laxity  which  could  not  fail  to  give  rise  to  dispute.  The  city  of 
Amsterdam  was  to  have  "high,  middle,  and  low  jurisdiction," 
while  at  the  same  time  the  sovereignty  and  supreme  authority 
was  to  remain  vested  in  the  Company.  More  definite  ex 
pression  was  given  to  this  by  the  provision  that  the  council  of 
the  new  town  should  have  final  jurisdiction  in  small  cases,  but 
where  the  matter  at  issue  exceeded  one  hundred  guilders,  there 
should  be  an  appeal  to  the  Director  and  Council  of  New  Nether 
lands.1 

The  best  part  of  the  policy  adopted  by  the  city  was  their 
choice  of  a  Governor,  Jacob  Alrichs.  Portions  of  a  dispatch  are 
Jacob  extant  from  which  we  learn  the  condition  in  which 

appointed  ne  found  things  on  his  arrival,  and  the  policy  which 
Governor.  ^e  ac|Opted.  Fort  Casimir  was  occupied  by  a  gar 
rison.  Round  the  fort  were  grouped  about  a  dozen  families, 
living  under  a  system  which  was  a  combination  of  municipal 
government  and  martial  law.  Any  disputes  that  arose  were 
settled  by  the  Commander  in  concert  with  two  schepens  and  a 
secretary  appointed  by  the  Company. 

This  government  Alrichs  suffered  to  remain  in  force  for  a 

1  There  is  a  translation  of  these  conditions  in  the  N.  Y.  Hist.  Soc.  Coll.  vol. 
i.  p.  291.  The.y  are  also  in  the  Documents,  vol.  i.  p.  630. 


70  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

71 

while,  pending  a  definite  settlement,  and  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
secure  the  rights  of  the  existing  inhabitants.  Finally  it  was 
superseded,  as  it  would  seem  peacefully,  and  with  the  approval 
of  the  settlers,  by  a  Council  of  seven,  from  whom  were  chosen 
three  schepens,  a  secretary,  and  a  schout.  The  spiritual  wants  of 
the  community  were  provided  for  by  the  appointment  of  two 
elders  and  two  deacons. 

The  colony  was  laid  out  precisely  on  the  model  of  a  New 
England  village.  The  land  was  apportioned  as  far  as  might  be 
Founda-  at  the  choice  of  the  settlers  themselves,  and  every 
Amstei.  e  "  man  fenced  his  own  lot.  But  this  was  not  allowed  to 
cause  straggling.  The  settlers  were  grouped  in  a  town  of  a 
hundred  and  ten  houses,  built  round  a  square,  with  a  public 
storehouse  and  a  barrack  for  the  garrison.  One  may  say  in  fact 
that  Alrichs  transformed  a  fort  into  a  village.1  In  accordance 
with  a  principle  accepted  alike  by  Dutch,  English,  and  Swedish 
settlers,  the  town  was  named,  after  a  suburb  of  the  parent  city, 
New  Amstei. 

As  might  have  been  foreseen,  the  system  of  government  soon 
gave  rise  to  disputes.  The  authorities  of  the  city  of  Amsterdam 
Hin-  held  that  Alrichs  and  his  settlers  were  responsible 

the  colony,  only  to  them.  Stuyvesant  appears  to  have  contended 
that  the  city  was  only  in  the  position  of  a  territorial  proprietor, 
and  that  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Company  was  intact.  Alrichs, 
he  complained,  did  not,  in  the  oath  of  allegiance  which  he  ad 
ministered  to  the  settlers,  make  any  mention  of  the  Company, 
and  the  restrictions  in  trade  were  disregarded.2 

Yet  though  Stuyvesant  may  have  fallen  short  of  the  standard 
of  moderation  aimed  at  by  Alrichs,  he  went  far  enough  in  that 
direction  to  earn  the  disapproval  of  his  inferiors.  We  find  the 
Council  remonstrating  with  him  for  keeping  Swedes  in  office, 
and  also  for  a  promise  that  in  the  event  of  any  dispute  between 
Holland  and  Sweden  they  might  remain  neutral.* 

The  fair  hopes  with  which  New  Amstei  began  soon  came  to 
nought.  Heavy  sickness  fell  upon  the  colony,*  and  those  who 
were  well  were  too  busy  in  building  and  fencing  to  till  the  land. 

1  For  these  details  see  Alrichs's  dispatches  in  Hazard's  Pennsylvania  Archives, 
2nd  series,  vol.  v. 

2  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  ii.  p.  68. 

3  Penn.  Archives,  2nd  series,  vol.  vii.  p.   553. 

4  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  xii.  pp.  225,  227. 


TROUBLES  AT  NEW  AMSTEL.  71 

Those  in  Holland  who  should  have  supplied  provisions  were 
negligent,  and  the  colony  had  to  depend  for  its  food  on  Man 
hattan.1 

Indifferent  though  the  West  India  Company  might  have  been 
as  to  the  welfare  of  its  settlers,  the  emigrants  at  New  Amstel 
had  no  reason  to  congratulate  themselves  on  being  under  dif 
ferent  authority.  Disheartened  at  the  unprofitable  aspect  of 
their  venture,  the  Town  Council  of  Amsterdam  with  shameless 
and  cruel  indifference  threw  to  the  winds  their  agreement  with 
their  settlers.  The  colonists  who  went  out  had  been  promised 
a  supply  of  provisions:  that  was  now  limited  to  those  who  had 
left  Holland  before  December  1658.  The  exemption  from  taxes 
was  to  expire  before  the  time  originally  named,  and  all  goods 
exported  were  to  be  sent  to  Amsterdam.  By  the  strenuous  pro 
test  of  their  colonists,  and  by  the  more  liberal  example  of  the 
West  India  Company,  the  Council  were  shamed  into  abandoning 
the  last  measure. 

To  the  other  troubles  of  these  unhappy  settlers  were  added 
rumors  of  an  attack  from  Maryland.  We  cannot  wonder  that 
men  turned  their  backs  on  the  colony.  Alrichs  made  vain 
attempts  to  detain  them,  urging  that  they  were  bound  for  a  fixed 
term  by  their  covenants.  In  such  a  country  it  was  a  hopeless 
task  to  keep  unwilling  inhabitants.  Some  fled  to  Manhattan, 
others,  including  soldiers  from  the  garrison,  to  Maryland  and 
Virginia.2  Alrichs  himself  died.*  Yet  even  in  its  weakened 
condition  the  colony  was  capable  of  giving  trouble  to  New 
Amsterdam.  Alrichs'  successor,  Alexander  D'Hinoyossa,  was 
self-willed  and  turbulent.  He  practically  claimed  to  be  inde 
pendent  of  the  Company's  authority,  and  to  control  the  whole 
trade  and  navigation  of  the  Delaware.4  At  the  same  time  he 
showed  no  respect  for  the  civic  authority  of  Amsterdam  which  he 
was  supposed  to  represent,  and  he  was  even  charged  with  declar 
ing  that,  unless  he  met  with  due  support,  he  would  follow  in  the 
steps  of  Minuit  and  transfer  his  services  to  a  foreign  Power.5 

1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  xii.  p.  236. 

2  Alrichs's  dispatches  in  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  ii.  pp.   54,  64,  70. 

3  Letter  from  William  Beckman,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  xii.  p.  289.     Beckman  was 
appointed  by  Stuyvesant  to  represent  him  on  the  Delaware. 

*  Beckman  to  Stuyvesant,  N.  Y.   Docs.  vol.  xii.  pp.  363-5,  368. 

8  This  charge  was  supported  by  several  depositions,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  xii.  p. 
376.  It  was  evidently  believed  by  Beckman,  who  does  not  seem  to  have  started 
•with  any  prejudice  against  Hinoyossa. 


72  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  the  Town  Council  of  Amsterdam 
should  have  wished  to  throw  back  their  unhappy  venture  on  the 
West  India  Company,  nor  more  surprising  that  the  latter  would 
have  nothing  to  say  to  the  proposed  transfer. 

In  1 66 1  the  Government  of  Amsterdam  resolved  to  make  one 
further  attempt  for  the  success  of  their  colony.  A  fresh  agree- 
New  condi-  ment  was  drawn  up  by  the  West  India  Company  and 
emigrants,  approved  by  the  States-General,  under  which  the 
colony  was  to  be  not  so  much  replenished  as  settled  afresh  on  a 
new  footing.  Emigrants  were  to  be  exempt  from  all  dues  to  the 
Company ;  they  were  to  have  free  rights  of  mining,  fishing,  and 
trawling,  and  might  even,  if  dissatisfied  with  the  Director, 
choose  his  successor.  It  does  not  seem  clear — perhaps  those  who 
drafted  the  document  did  not  wish  to  make  it  clear — how  far 
these  conditions  were  to  apply  to  the  existing  inhabitants.1 

Such  changes  might  do  a  little  to  lighten  some  of  the  burdens 
under  which  the  colonists  suffered ;  they  might  add  something  to 
the  material  prosperity  of  the  colony.  They  could  not  in  them 
selves  do  anything  to  cure  what  was  probably  the  most  deeply 
seated  of  her  troubles,  that  exaggerated  cosmopolitanism  which 
had  prevented  the  development  of  any  national  life,  and  made 
civic  unity  well-nigh  impossible. 

How  far  those  who  controlled  the  destinies  of  the  colony  were 
from  understanding  their  needs  and  deficiencies  was  strikingly 
Proposed  shown  in  the  same  year.  The  men  of  New  Haven, 
fromNe™  the  entertainers  of  the  regicides,  of  all  the  New  Eng- 
Haven.  land  colonies  the  narrowest  and  most  exclusive  in 
their  ecclesiastical  system,  were  beginning  to  dread  what  the 
Restoration  might  have  in  store  for  them,  and  what  encroach 
ments  they  might  have  to  expect  from  their  more  compliant 
neighbors  in  Connecticut.  Some  of  them  already  began  to  con 
template  that  policy  of  migration  which  a  few  years  later  bore 
such  singular  fruits,  and  a  deputation  of  four  leading  men 
waited  on  Stuyvesant,  proposing  to  avail  themselves  of  the  newly 
granted  privileges.  They  asked  for  a  grant  of  land,  to  which  the 
Indian  title  should  be  extinguished  by  the  Dutch  Government. 
The  townsmen  were  to  elect  their  own  magistrates  and  officers 
and  to  exclude  and  admit  settlers  at  their  own  discretion.  The 
township  was  to  be,  as  in  New  England,  identical  with  the  Con- 

1  For  the  conditions  see  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  696. 


THE  MENNONISTS.  73 

gregational  Church.  Lastly,  there  was  to  be  a  synod  of  all  the 
English  Churches  in  New  Netherlands.  Such  an  arrangement 
could  have  only  one  effect.  It  would  consolidate  the  Englishry, 
as  we  call  those  of  New  Netherlands,  into  a  well-defined  and 
homogeneous  body,  and  enormously  increase  the  danger  of 
English  encroachment. 

It  was,  however,  only  at  rare  intervals  and  under  the  pressure 
of  some  exceptional  excitement  that  the  rulers  of  New  Nether 
lands  awoke  to  a  sense  of  that  danger.  Stuyvesant  was  pre 
pared  to  grant  all  that  the  deputies  from  New  Haven  asked 
for,  the  right  of  self-government  only  excepted. 

The  States-General,  however,  were  prepared  to  grant  even 
that  with  certain  restrictions.  The  Director  and  Council  of 
New  Netherlands  were  to  have  a  veto  in  the  election  of  officers. 
The  local  court  might  not  pass  sentence  of  death,  except  where 
the  criminal  confessed  his  guilt,  and  the  penal  code  was  not  to 
apply  to  any  Dutch  who  might  settle  within  the  township. 

In  the  meantime,  however,  the  applicants  themselves  seemed 
to  have  abandoned  their  scheme,  and  the  concessions  bore  no 
fruit.1 

Another  attempt  to  form  a  small  imperium  in  imperio  was 
more  successful.  Among  the  strange  ramifications  of  Protes- 
The  Men-  tantism  to  which  the  Reformation  in  Germany  gave 
nomsts.a  birth  was  the  sect  of  the  Mennonists.  The  members 
of  the  sect  claimed  for  it  a  continuous  descent  from  the  primitive 
Church  and  a  share  in  that  war  of  persecution  which,  at  the 
opening  of  the  thirteenth  century,  swept  over  the  south  of 
France  and  made  itself  felt,  though  less  widely  and  less  fiercely, 
in  the  Low  Countries.  It  is  impossible  to  say  what  currents  may 
have  been  flowing  below  the  surface  during  the  centuries  which 
separated  Luther  from  Henry  the  Deacon.  Practically  we  may 
look  on  the  Mennonists  as  a  religious  society  called  into  life 
about  1520  by  Simon  Menno.  He  appears  to  have  been  a 
Dutchman  who  migrated  to  Germany.  Their  repudiation  of 
infant  baptism  caused  them  to  be  included  in  the  comprehensive 
title  of  Anabaptists,  but  they  seem  never  to  have  been  even  sus- 

1  For  these  negotiations  with  New  Haven  see  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  pp.  695, 
708. 

a  For  the  Mennonist  settlement  see  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  698.  A  good  ac 
count  of  the  sect,  its  origin  and  early  history,  is  given  in  an  Appendix  to. 
Proud's  History  of  Pennsylvania. 


74  FOUNDATION  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

pected  of  any  share  in  the  profligacy  and  lawlessness  commonly 
associated  with  the  name.  Like  the  Quakers,  they  denied  the 
lawfulness  of  oaths  and  of  war,  and  dispensed  with  an  ordained 
clergy.  Isolated  members  of  the  sect,  possibly  small  congrega 
tions,  seem  to  have  found  their  way  into  New  Netherlands  be 
fore  1640,  since  they  are  mentioned  in  Father  Jogues'  enumera 
tion  of  the  numerous  sects  and  authorities  to  be  seen  at  New 
Amsterdam.1  They  are  also  mentioned  in  1657  in  a  formal  re 
port  by  two  of  the  Dutch  Calvinist  ministers  in  the  colony.  But 
:as  they  speak  of  "Mennonites"  at  Gravesend,  a  settlement 
founded  from  New  England,  it  is  probable  that  they  used  the 
name  vaguely  as  a  synonym  for  Baptist. 

At  all  events  these  were  at  most  isolated  and  inorganic 
movements.  But  when  the  city  of  Amsterdam  was  casting  in 
every  direction  for  methods  of  reviving  and  replenishing  the 
•colony  it  entered  into  negotiations  with  a  Mennonist  community. 
They  obtained  a  grant  of  land  at  the  Hoarkill,  near  the  mouth 
of  the  Delaware  where  Lewiston  now  stands.  Thus  they  were 
•effectually  separated  from  the  main  body  of  the  colony  at  New 
Amsterdam,  an  arrangement  probably  acceptable  to  both  parties. 
The  community  was  to  consist  of  married  couples  and  single 
men  not  under  twenty-four,  and  free  from  debt.  There  were  to 
lie  simple  religious  exercises,  but  no  clergy.  The  officials  of  the 
community  were  to  be  in  the  first  instance  nominated  by  the 
•community;  a  further  selection  was  to  be  made  by  the  burgo 
masters  of  Amsterdam.  There  was  to  be  a  primary  assembly  of 
the  whole  body  of  settlers;  a  majority  of  two-thirds  was  re- 
•quired  for  legislative  purposes,  and  their  enactments  had  to  be 
ratified  at  Amsterdam  by  the  municipal  government.  A  similar 
majority  of  two-thirds  might  expel  any  person  of  objectionable 
•character.  Property  was  at  the  outset  to  be  held  in  common. 
But  it  is  clear  that  the  Mennonists,  or  at  least  this  section  of 
them,  did  not  hold  the  Anabaptist  tenets  of  community  of  goods, 
since  at  the  end  of  five  years  there  was  to  be  a  division  of 
property. 

Like  the  Plymouth  pilgrims  the  Mennonists  started  their  en 
terprise  on  borrowed  capital.  Twenty-five  hundred  guilders 
(a  little  over  two  hundred  and  sixty  pounds  in  English  money) 

1  See  p.  15. 


GENERAL    VIEW  OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS,  75 

•was  advanced  by  the  city  of  Amsterdam,  and  the  whole  com 
munity  of  emigrants  was  liable  for  repayment. 

The  Mennonist  settlement  on  the  Delaware  was  virtually  the 
expiring  effort  of  Dutch  colonization.  Before  we  pass  to  the 
app^rance  next  phase  m  the  historv  °*  New  York,  the  English 
AiMt«  conquest,  it  may  not  be  amiss  to  see  what  was  the  out- 
dam.i  ward  aspect  of  the  territory  which  changed  masters. 

The  only  portion  of  the  colony  outside  the  capital  where  a 
traveler  would  have  found  signs  of  continuous  habitation  was 
Long  Island.  There  were  to  be  seen  agricultural  communities 
having  their  origin  from  New  England,  and  closely  resembling 
the  villages  of  New  England  in  outer  aspect.  Their  history, 
however,  and  their  relations  to  the  government  of  the  Dutch 
colony  belong  in  reality  to  a  later  stage  of  our  history,  to  the 
transformation  of  the  Dutch  colony  of  New  Netherlands  into 
the  English  dependency  of  New  York,  and  will  be  more  fittingly 
dealt  with  hereafter. 

In  the  rest  of  the  colony  the  settled  parts  formed  detached 
bases  in  an  unreclaimed  wilderness.  Along  the  Hudson  were 
villages  of  two  sorts.  On  the  patroonships,  the  houses  of  the 
farmers  and  the  cabins  of  the  laborers  were  in  all  likelihood 
grouped  together  for  defense  against  the  Indian,  somewhat  like 
the  type  of  mediaeval  town  which  had  its  origin  in  a  manorial 
settlement.  Elsewhere  along  the  waterway  of  the  Hudson  and 
on  the  shores  of  the  Delaware  were  fortified  trading  stations, 
"with  a  wooden  palisade  and  a  few  cannon,  and  grouped  close 
to  them  for  protection  small  farmsteads  and  the  houses  of  the 
handicraftsmen,  such  as  the  smith  and  the  carpenter,  who  were 
needed  for  the  simple  life  of  such  a  community. 

The  patroon  was  often  a  merchant  as  well,  with  a  town  house 
in  New  Amsterdam.  In  the  city  there  is  nothing  to  show  the 
actual  amount  of  trade  done  in  the  colony,  or  the  number  of 
ships  touching  there  during  the  period  of  Dutch  rule.  But  there 
is  abundant  evidence  that  a  crowd  of  traders  of  divers  nation 
alities  continually  came  and  went;  as  early  as  1642  Kieft  found 
it  necessary  to  build  an  inn  for  their  accommodation.  Regu 
lations  were  framed  intended  to  confine  the  trade  of  the  colony 
to  bona-fide  residents  for  six  years;  seemingly,  however,  traders 

1  For  what  follows   I   have  relied  to  a  considerable  extent  on  Mr.   Tucker- 

man. 


7 6  FOUNDATION   OF  NEW  NETHERLANDS. 

in  foreign  vessels  might  land  their  cargoes  and  sell  them.  The 
prohibition  of  non-resident  traders  was  in  all  likelihood  to  check 
those  who  made  a  temporary  lodgment  in  the  colony  without 
any  of  the  rights  or  responsibilities  of  citizenship. 

The  resources  of  the  town  make  it  impossible  that  there  could 
be  anything  of  grandeur  in  its  outer  aspect.  The  majority  of 
the  houses  were  of  wood.  In  1655  Stuyvesant  passed  an  ordi 
nance  prohibiting  the  construction  of  wooden  chimneys,  and  two 
years  later  he  went  yet  further  and  ordered  those  which  were  in 
existence  to  be  pulled  down.  Only  a  few  of  the  streets  were 
paved,  and  those  only  with  cobble  stones,  and  the  only  drainage 
was  a  gutter  down  their  middle.  Yet  the  old  Dutch  town  must 
have  had  elements  of  beauty  which  its  successor,  with  all  its 
stateliness  and  regularity,  has  lost.  Many  of  the  houses  stood 
surrounded  by  orchards  and  gardens.  Trees  along  the  sides  of 
the  streets  must  have  recalled  to  the  Dutch  emigrant  the  towns- 
of  his  native  land.  That  likeness  was  increased  by  a  canal  filled 
in  in  1676,  and  running  where  now  is  Broad  Street.  Another 
impressive  feature  of  the  old  town  has  vanished.  Where  now  are 
the  Battery  and  the  Bowling  Green,  hemmed  in  and  dwarfed 
by  colossal  trading  houses,  there  stood  Fort  Amsterdam,  sepa 
rated  from  the  houses  of  the  city  by  an  open  space  of  green 
sward.1 

In  many  respects  New  York  cosmopolitanism,  lacking  in 
corporate  feeling  and  in  any  sense  of  civic  dignity  and  responsi- 
Education  bility,  was  ill-fitted  to  assimilate  with  those  English 
Nether-  colonies  to  which  its  geographical  position  specially 
lands.  attached  it.  But  New  Netherlands  and  New  Eng 

land  had  at  least  one  point  of  likeness.  Amid  all  their  keen 
pursuit  of  material  wealth,  the  rulers  and  citizens  of  New 
Netherlands  had  not  wholly  forgotten  the  claims  of  the  mind. 
Before  1664  there  were  nine  schools  in  existence  in  the  colony, 
and  amid  all  the  difficulty  and  distress  which  beset  the  colony  in 
1659  time  and  money  were  found  for  the  establishment  of  a 
High  School  with  a  Latin  class.  It  would  be  interesting  to 
know  how  after  the  English  conquest  the  rival  claims  of  the 
Dutch  and  English  tongues  in  education  were  adjusted.  But 

1  This  is  proved  by  an  ordinance  of  the  Council,  passed  in  1648,  which  pro 
hibited  the  pasturing  of  sheep  and  goats  between  Fort  Amsterdam  and  the 
"Fresh  Water,"  i.e.  evidently  the  Hudson  and  the  East  River. 


TRANSFER   OF   THE  DELAWARE    TERRITORY.        77 

we  may  be  sure  that  the  existence  of  an  educational  system  open 
to  each  nationality  must  have  done  not  a  little  to  obliterate  dis 
tinctions  and  promote  fusion. 

In  March  1663  a  change  was  made  which  might  well  have 
come  sooner.  The  Company  made  over  to  the  city  of  Amster- 
Transferof  dam  the  whole  of  their  territory  on  the  Delaware, 
ware'terri-  The  grantees  were  to  have  no  power  of  alienation, 
cttyof  Am-  anc^  tney  were  bound  to  garrison  the  country  suf- 
sterdam.  ficiently  and  to  send  out  four  hundred  emigrants 
each  year.  As  a  step  towards  fulfilling  these  promises  a  hundred 
and  fifty  emigrants  were  sent  out  during  the  summer. 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE    ENGLISH    CONQUEST.1 

AN  important  chapter  in  American  history  loses  all  its  meaning 
if  we  look  on  the  English  conquest  of  New  York  as  an  isolated 
NewNeth-  event.  An  English  King  and  his  advisers  decreed 
"racily  tnat  New  Netherlands  should  be  part  of  the  British 
Anglicized.  Empjre>  an(j  they  carried  through  their  purpose. 
Their  action  by  itself  could  not  have  enabled  the  Dutch  settle 
ment  to  take  its  place  in  the  English  group  of  colonies ;  for  that 
change  a  path  had  been  prepared  by  the  independent  action  of 
English  citizens. 

For  nearly  thirty  years  before  the  overthrow  of  the  Dutch 
power  on  the  Hudson  two  processes  had  been  at  work.  There 
had  been  hostile  and  aggressive  action  on  the  frontier,  a  tendency 
to  dispute  the  right  of  the  Dutch  to  a  particular  boundary,  and 
even  to  deny  altogether  their  territorial  title.  Besides  there  was 
the  process  of  peaceful  incursion  by  which  an  English  element  in 
troduced  and  established  itself  among  the  Dutch  population. 

The  territorial  struggle  was  practically  limited  to  the  north 
east  frontier.  The  debatable  land  was  the  valley  of  the  Con- 
EfthCt  necticut.  The  extension  of  the  English  settlements 

settlement  into  that  valley  was  indeed  in  two  ways  the  origin  of 
necticut.  the  contest.  For  one  thing  it  so  placed  the  Dutch 
and  English  settlers  that  disputes  were  sure  to  arise.  Further 
more  it  was  a  necessary  condition  for  the  formation  of  the  New 
England  confederacy.  Without  Connecticut  as  a  third  party 
there  could  have  been  no  union  between  the  unequally  balanced 
powers  of  Massachusetts  and  Plymouth.  The  creation  of  the 
confederacy  concentrated  the  resources  of  New  England,  and 
gave  it  a  machinery  with  which  to  contest  its  right. 

1  The  authorities  for  this,  and  the  following  three  chapters,  are  much  the 
same.  There  are  a  few  documents  among  the  English  Colonial  Papers  which 
bear  on  the  history  of  New  York,  and  which  are  not  included  either  in  Mr. 
Brodhead's  or  Mr.  O'Callaghan's  collections. 


THE    TREATY  OF  HARTFORD.  7^- 

The  first  ground  of  dispute  was  the  settlement  at  Hartford.. 
As  early  as  1639,  in  the  governorship  of  Kieft,  the  Dutch  had 
Disputes  at  cause  to  complain  of  encroachment  and  molesta- 
Hartford.  tjon  jn  that  quarter.  The  charges  were  met  not 
with  denial,  scarcely  with  justification,  but  with  counter 
charges  complaining  that  the  Dutch  monopolized  the  trade 
of  the  Hudson  and  the  Delaware,  to  the  total  exclusion  of  the 
English. 

Three  years  later  the  dispute  was  renewed.  The  English 
complained  of  isolated  acts  of  violence  by  the  Dutch  and  of  the 
illegal  detention  of  runaway  servants. 

In  1650  matters  were  temporarily  arranged  at  an  interview 
which  Stuyvesant  had  with  the  Federal  Commissioners  at  Hart- 
Treaty  of  ford.  A  boundary  line  was  drawn  which  was  to  hold 
Hartford.'  gOO(j  for  Long  Island  and  also  for  the  mainland.. 
This  boundary  was  to  be  made  more  effective  by  a  sort  of  neu 
tral  zone,  as  no  permanent  Dutch  settlement  was  to  be  formed 
within  six  miles  of  the  line.  The  question  as  to  runaway  servants 
was  to  be  settled  by  accepting  the  same  rule,  that  of  extradition,, 
which  regulated  the  intercolonial  dealings  of  the  New  England 
confederacy. 

The  difficulty,  however,  went  too  deep  to  be  thus  removed. 
Matters  were  being  complicated  by  the  second  process  of  which 
English  I  have  spoken,  that  by  which  an  English  element  was. 
l^oreen"*  being  infused  into  the  Dutch  population.  The  earliest 
wich.  English-speaking  community  which  formed  politi 

cally  a  portion  of  New  York  was  Greenwich,  on  Long  Island. 
It  was  settled  in  1640  by  that  Captain  Patrick  who  had  played 
so  unsatisfactory  and  discreditable  a  part  in  the  Pequod  war. 
He  and  his  associates  acquired  the  land  which  they  occupied  by 
purchase  from  the  Indians.  The  demand  that  they  should  sub 
mit  to  the  Dutch  Government  was  at  first  met  with  a  vague 
declaration  of  neutrality.  In  1642  they  took  the  oath  of  allegi 
ance  to  the  States-General,  with  the  understanding  that  the 
town  was  to  enjoy  the  same  rights  as  those  granted  to  a  patroon- 
ship.1 


1  The  negotiations  between  Stuyvesant  and  the  Commissioners  and  the  agree 
ment  are  in  Hazard,  vol.  ii.  pp.  154-70,  and  are  copied  in  the  N.  Y.  Hist.  Coll.. 
ist  series,  vol.  i. 

2  Records  in  Hazard  in  N.  Y.  Hist.  Coll.  as  above ;  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  296. 


8o  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST. 

In  the  same  year  two  more  parties  of  emigrants,  men  whose 
religious  opinions  made  New  England  an  unsafe  home  for  them, 
other  founded  settlements  on  like  terms  at  Newtown1  and 

?ettgie-sh  West  Chester.2  The  founder  of  the  first-named 
Lo"ts  °n  settlement  was  Francis  Doughty,  a  clergyman  ex- 
isiand.  pelled  from  New  England  for  a  somewhat  obscure 
expression  of  unorthodoxy.3  His  daughter  apparently  soon  after 
his  arrival  married  Adrian  Von  der  Donck,  a  leading  Dutch  col 
onist  who  held  office  under  Kieft  and  Stuyvesant.4 

In  the  same  year  a  more  distinguished  exile  from  New  Eng 
land,  Anne  Hutchinson,  took  refuge  with  her  family  near  New 
Rochelle.  She  only  escaped  from  her  Christian  persecutors  to 
fall  a  victim  to  the  savage.  In  1643  a  war  party  attacked 
Annie's  Hook,  as  the  settlement  was  called,  and  cut  off  every  liv 
ing  soul  save  one  young  girl.5  In  1644  another  English  settle 
ment  was  formed  at  Heemstede,6  and  in  1645  two  more  at 
Flushing  and  Gravesend.7  It  is  clear  that  at  the  latter  place 
there  were  also  Dutch  settlers,  and  the  relations  between  the 
two  sections  illustrate  the  dangers  of  this  state  of  things.  In 
!653,  when  matters  stood  so  that  war  might  at  any  time  break 
out,  the  English  settlers  at  Gravesend  changed  their  established 
mode  of  choosing  magistrates,  endeavoring,  it  is  said,  by  an 
electioneering  maneuver,  of  which  the  nature  is  somewhat 
obscure,  to  secure  a  magistracy  who  should  be  on  the  side  of  the 
English. 

The  Records  of  these  townships  show  to  what  an  extent  they 
had  brought  with  them  those  traditions  of  self-government 
which  were  so  essentianl  a  part  of  the  life  of  New  England.  We 
see  that  Southampton  elected  annually  three  magistrates  called 
Townsmen,  nor  is  there  anything  to  show  that  the  consent  of  the 
Governor  was  required  for  such  election.  The  town  meeting 
also  elected  constables,  it  passed  resolutions  dealing  not  only 
with  such  local  affairs  as  the  fencing  of  the  common  field  and 


Vertoogh,  pp.  301-3. 

Brodhead,  vol.  i.  pp.  334-5;  Winthrop. 

According  to   Mr.    Brodhead    (vol.   i.   p.    333)    his   offense  was   stating   that 
Abraham's  children  should  have  been  baptized. 

Brodhead  speaks  of  them  as  married  in  1646. 

Winthrop,  vol.  ii.  p.   136;   Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  366. 

The  grant  by  Kieft  of  territory  at  Heemstede  to  English  settlers  is  quoted 
by  Thompson,  vol.  ii.  p.   3. 
7  Ib.  vol.  ii.  pp.  68,  171. 


STUYVESANT  AND    THE  NEW  ENGLANDERS.        8 1 

the  preservation  of  highways,  but  with  a  question  of  such  general 
interest  as  the  selling  of  drink  and  ammunition  to  the  Indians.1 

Besides  these  actual  English  settlements  there  was  a  large 
English  element  among  the  population  of  the  colony,  especially 
English-  among  the  traders  at  Manhattan.  At  an  early  day 
™uebiic°ld  we  find  Englishmen  taking  a  share  in  the  public  life 
NeweNeth-  °^  t^le  c°l°ny  and  directly  infusing  English  ideas  and 
eriands.  establishing  English  influence. 

We  see  this  tendency  showing  itself  as  early  as  the  time  of 
Kieft.  In  1642  he  appointed  George  Baxter  as  "English  Secre 
tary" — a  post  which  in  all  likelihood  included  that  of  interpreter, 
and  which  he  retained  under  Stuyvesant.2  It  is  easy  to  under 
stand  the  selection  of  an  Englishman  for  such  a  post.  But  there 
could  be  no  such  explanation  of  what  happened  a  year  later. 
When  Kieft,  under  the  pressure  of  popular  discontent,  permitted 
the  election  of  a  council  of  eight,  two  of  those  chosen,  Isaac 
Allerton  and  Thomas  Hall,  were  immigrants  from  New  Eng 
land.8 

In  1650,  when  Stuyvesant  was  engaged  in  a  dispute  with  the 
confederation  of  the  New  England  colonies,  he  appointed  two 
men  of  English  name  and  blood  to  act  on  his  behalf  as  arbi 
trators.  One  of  them,  Thomas  Willett,  had  apparently  been 
born  and  brought  up  at  Leyden.  But  he  had  come  to  Plymouth 
in  1629,  and  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  he  had  any  connec 
tion  with  New  Netherlands,  except  that  in  the  course  of  a  some 
what  varied  commercial  career  he  had  traded  in  the  Hudson.4 

His  parents  were  in  all  likelihood  among  the  original  fugitives 
from  England  to  Holland.  During  the  early  part  of  his  career 
in  America  he  was  in  charge  of  one  of  the  Plymouth  factories 
on  the  Kennebec.  When  the  hostility  of  the  French,  and  the 
dread  of  an  Indian  attack,  put  an  end  to  that  enterprise  he  re 
turned  to  Plymouth,  and  we  soon  after  find  him  trading  both  on 
the  Delaware  and  on  the  Hudson.  From  1651  to  1655  he  held 
office  as  an  assistant  in  Plymouth. 

1  There  is  in  O'Callaghan's  Documentary  History,  vol.  i.  p.  457,  a  very  valu 
able  monograph  by  John  Lyon  Gardiner  written  in   1798,  on  the  early  history 
and  constitution  of  the  English  townships  on  Long  Island.     See  also  Bishop's 
History  of  Election  in  the  United  States. 

2  Mr.   Brodhead    (vol.  i.  p.   337)   calls   Baxter   "one  of  the  exiles  from   New 
England."     I  do  not  find  any  mention  of  him  either  in  Bradford  or  in  Win- 
throp.  s  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  365. 

4  All  that  is  known  about  Willett  is  brought  together  in  a  monograph  in  the 
American  Historical  Magazine,  vol.  xxiii.  p.  232. 


82  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST, 

Yet  only  a  year  before  Stuyvesant,  in  his  dispute  with  New 
England,  had  selected  Willett  to  act  as  an  arbitrator  on  his  be 
half.  This  is  all  the  more  noteworthy  because  his  other  arbi 
trator  was  also  an  Englishman,  that  George  Baxter  already  men 
tioned.  He,  however,  would  seem  to  have  been  a  refugee  from 
New  England. 

The  personal  prepossessions  of  Stuyvesant  did  much  to  in 
crease  the  influence  of  this  English  element.  To  his  temper  the 
Stuyvesant  stern  polity  of  New  England,  with  its  one  accepted 
English.  faith  and  its  rigid  moral  discipline,  was  far  more 
congenial  than  the  lax  cosmopolitanism  of  his  own  colony. 
Hence  he  was  even  reproached  with  sacrificing  the  interests  of 
his  own  colony  at  the  bidding  of  English  advisers.  Moreover, 
his  strong  sense  of  justice  and  his  steady  preference  for  peaceful 
counsels,  a  preference  sometimes  obscured  by  his  unconciliatory 
and  ungracious  temper,  inclined  Stuyvesant  in  all  dealings  with 
the  English  to  choose  Englishmen  settled  within  New  Nether 
lands  as  his  diplomatic  agents.  His  choice  may  have  made  the 
personal  relations  between  Stuyvesant  and  the  English  smoother. 
That  was  more  than  outweighed  by  the  lack  of  confidence  and 
the  sense  of  irritation  engendered  in  the  Dutch.  Thus  the  only 
props  by  which  the  autonomy  of  New  Netherlands  could  possi 
bly  have  been  stayed  up — independence,  self-reliance,  and  ex- 
clusiveness — were  being  steadily  undermined.  How  little  the 
West  India  Company  understood  the  danger,  how  the  real  con 
dition  of  their  colony  was  for  them  a  sealed  book,  is  illustrated 
by  their  conduct  in  1661.  By  that  time  there  was  no  room  for 
doubt  as  to  the  danger  of  English  rivalry  and  English  encroach 
ment.  Yet  the  Company,  anxious  to  populate  the  territory  on 
the  east  bank  of  the  Delaware,  held  out  special  inducements  to 
emigrants,  promising  among  other  things  that  they  should  if  they 
pleased  be  independent  of  the  Governor  of  New  Netherlands. 
This  invitation  was  more  expressly  addressed  to  "English  Chris 
tians,"  and  was  approved  by  the  States-General.1 

In  1653  a  fresh  dispute  broke  out  between  Stuyvesant  and  the 
Commissioners  of  the  New  England  confederacy.  Of  that  dis- 
Dispute  Pute  I  have  spoken  elsewhere.1  The  principal  feature 
in  1653.  of  it  was  the  attempt  to  accuse  the  Dutch  of  an  alli 
ance,  or  an  understanding  of  some  kind,  with  the  Indians,  to  the 

1  Brodhead,    vol.    i.    p.    688.          2  The  Puritan  Colonies,  vol.  i.  pp.  399-401. 


STUYVESANT  AND  ENGLISH  IMMIGRANTS.          83 

prejudice  of  the  English.  So  far  as  that  charge  rested  on  any 
evidence,  it  rested  on  the  vague  statement  of  Indian  witnesses. 
What  the  New  Englanders  thought  of  the  savage  is  plain.  The 
Commissioners  would  have  been  indignant  if  told  that  any 
charge  to  their  discredit  could  be  established  by  such  testimony. 
Yet  Englishmen  might  be  forgiven  if  the  thought  of  Amboyna 
haunted  their  mind,  and  if  the  memory  of  Pequod  outrages 
begat  morbid  and  irrational  suspicions. 

With  New  England,  jealous,  apprehensive,  and  arrogant, 
hostilities  always  lay  near  the  surface.  In  1653  they  seemed 
likely  to  be  kindled  by  the  action  of  the  mother  country.  Hol 
land  and  England  were  at  war.  The  Protector  sent  orders  to 
the  New  England  colonies  to  be  ready  to  act  against  New 
Netherlands.  At  the  same  time  a  fleet  of  four  vessels  was  dis 
patched  to  New  England,  with  instructions  to  consult  those  in 
power  there.  If  it  then  seemed  well,  the  fleet  was  to  attack 
first  Manhattan,  and  then  the  other  Dutch  settlements  on  the 
Hudson.  The  persistent  refusal  of  Massachusetts  to  act  with 
her  confederates  caused  delay,  and  before  that  difficulty  could  be 
overcome  England  and  Holland  were  at  peace. 

The  conduct  of  the  English  within  New  Netherlands  while 
war  was  impending  was  such  as  to  open  the  eyes  of  Stuyvesant 
Disaffection  and  the  Company.  Citizens  of  New  Amsterdam 
hshhfn^nu~  were  i°  correspondence  with  the  rulers  of  New  Eng- 
grants  in  ]and.  Newtown  and  Gravesend  were  openly  disaf- 

New  Neth 
erlands.'        fected.    The  latter  town  had  taken  the  opportunity  to 

claim  municipal  independence  by  electing  a  council  of  twelve  in 
dependent  of  New  Amsterdam.  In  November  1654  Stuyvesant 
himself  visited  the  place,  and  removed  two  of  the  most  conspicu 
ous  English  partisans  from  the  magistracy.  In  four  months'  time 
they  were  back  in  the  town,  declaring  it  to  be  subject  to  the 
English  Commonwealth.  This  time  they  were  imprisoned.  Yet 
the  English  party  there  seem  to  have  kept  their  ascendency,  and 
to  have  used  it  at  the  next  election  of  magistrates  with  tyrannical 
contempt  for  the  interests  of  their  Dutch  fellow-citizens.2 

As  we  have  seen,  in  1654  another  English  settlement  had  been 
established  at  West  Chester,  near  the  site  of  Anne  Hutchin- 
son's  ill-fated  colony.  In  the  spring  of  1656  it  was  reported  that 

1  Brodhead,  chap.  xvii.     He  quotes  local  records. 

2  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  pp.  596-8. 


84  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST. 

the  settlers  there  were  sheltering  criminals  and  carrying  on 
treasonable  correspondence  with  the  natives.  An  armed  force 
was  sent  against  them.  There  was  some  slight  resistance, 
which  was  soon  suppressed.  As  in  almost  every  other  like  case, 
Stuyvesant's  policy  was  one  of  extreme,  probably  of  erring, 
lenity.  A  few  of  the  offenders  were  banished;  the  main  body 
of  the  settlers  submitted,  demanding,  and  obtaining  as  the  price 
of  their  submission,  the  same  rights  as  the  other  rural  munici 
palities  of  the  colony.1 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  each  of  these  disaffected  settlements 
was  beyond  dispute  within  the  bounds  of  New  Netherlands  as 
fixed  by  the  treaty  of  Hartford.  Their  resistence,  therefore,  had 
not  strictly  and  technically  anything  to  do  with  New  England. 
The  inhabitants  were  acting  just  as  any  disaffected  Dutch  colo 
nists  might  in  resisting  the  authority  of  the  Company.  Practi 
cally,  however,  it  was  impossible  to  sever  the  action  of  English 
men  in  New  Netherlands  from  that  of  Englishmen  across  the 
border.  Moreover,  these  little  English  townships  contained  all 
that  was  most  vigorous  in  the  political  life  of  the  colony.  A 
community  thus  honeycombed  by  English  influence  would  to  a 
certainty  be  powerless  against  English  attack. 

Meanwhile  New  Netherlands  was  threatened  with  territorial 
encroachment  from  another  quarter.  The  peace  of  Hartford 
English  pledged  the  members  of  the  New  England  con- 
bM^Ton  federacy  to  respect  the  frontier  claimed  and  defined 
discovery.  for  ^g  Dutcli  colony.  But  that  treaty  was  binding 
only  on  those  who  made  it.  It  did  not  affect  the  mother  country, 
nor  any  of  her  colonies  save  New  England. 

If  a  claim  of  territorial  sovereignty,  asserted  by  a  grant  or 
patent,  though  not  followed  by  occupation,  be  a  title,  then  Eng 
land  beyond  question  had  such  a  title  to  the  valley  of  the  Hud 
son.  The  original  patents  of  the  Northern  Virginia  Company 
extended  to  a  point  somewhat  north  of  the  Merrimac.  The 
great  patent  of  New  England  in  1620  had  for  its  southern 
boundary  a  point  fifty  miles  south  of  Manhattan.  Lord  Balti 
more's  patent  of  1632  was  worded  with  distinct  reference  to  the 
New  England  patent.  His  territory  was  to  extend  northward 
till  it  reached  the  southern  boundary  of  New  England. 

It  may  be  said   these  are  trivial  technicalities,   that  it  was 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  628. 


DANGER  FROM  MARYLAND.  85 

absurd  to  suffer  the  sovereign  Powers  of  Europe,  on  the  strength 
of  vague,  uncertain,  and  disputable  claims  of  discovery,  to  parcel 
out  the  New  World;  to  allow  huge  tracts  to  lie  idle,  unless 
those  who  needed  them  and  could  turn  them  to  profit  would  con 
sent  to  be  denationalized.  The  New  England  colonies,  who  in 
such  a  matter  might  be  regarded  as  morally  if  not  legally  repre 
senting  England,  had  in  a  formal  document  acquiesced  in  the 
Dutch  occupation.  On  the  strength  of  that  implied  consent 
Dutch  colonists  had  invested  capital  and  labor,  had  given  up 
their  homes,  and  reshaped  their  whole  lives.  But,  pedantic  as 
the  view  was  under  which  they  were  dispossessed,  it  was  the 
very  view  which  the  Dutch  had  themselves  adopted  in  their 
dealings  with  the  Swedes. 

Retribution  for  once  assumed  a  direct  and  appropriate  form. 
Till  the  Dutch  had  shown  a  real  determination  by  the  conquest 
Maryland  of  New  Sweden  and  the  foundation  of  New  Amstel 
Delaware. i  to  make  a  settlement  on  Delaware  Bay,  the  Mary 
land  government  had  been  content  that  so  much  of  Baltimore's 
patent  should  be  a  dead  letter.  But  in  1659,  just  as  New 
Amstel  was  in  the  thick  of  its  troubles,  came  an  alarm  that  the 
Governor  of  Maryland  was  about  to  enforce  his  claim.  Soon 
after  an  envoy,  Colonel  Utie,  appeared  at  New  Amstel.  His 
instructions  were  to  warn  the  Dutch  Governor  to  withdraw, 
and  to  endeavor  to  win  over  the  settlers  peacefully  by  fair 
promises.  Utie  was  received  by  Alrichs  and  by  Beckman.  The 
latter  was  acting  for  the  Company  as  their  commissioner  in 
charge  of  that  portion  of  the  land  on  the  Delaware  which  they 
retained.  Utie  pleaded  the  Maryland  patent;  the  Dutch 
authorities  pleaded  their  own  undisturbed  possession;  both 
parties  stood  their  ground,  and  Utie  returned  to  his  own  colony. 

The  matter  was  laid  before  Stuyvesant,  and  he  decided  to 
send  two  representatives  to  Maryland  to  protest  against  the 
Dispute  threatened  encroachment.  The  Governor  and  Sec- 
Maryiand.  retary  of  Maryland  now  showed  a  lack  of  diplomatic 
skill  which  has  not  been  without  its  lasting  results.  Instead  of 
confining  themselves  to  the  claim  originally  made  by  Utie,  they 

'The  chief  authorities  for  these  disputes  are:  (i)  a  long  extract  from  the 
Maryland  Records,  in  the  N.  Y.  Hist.  Soc.  Coll.  ist  series,  vol.  iii.  p.  368,  and 
the  report  of  Alrichs,  the  representative  of  Stuyvesant  at  New  Amstel;  this  is 
quoted  by  Hazard,  p.  260,  &c.;  and  (2)  Heerman's  Journal  in  the  N.  Y.  Docs, 
vol.  ii.  p.  88. 


86  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST, 

pointed  out  that  Baltimore's  patent  included  the  whole  of  the 
Dutch  territory,  not  only  on  the  Delaware  but  on  the  Hudson. 
They  reminded  the  Dutch  envoys  that  Baltimore  was  expressly 
enpowered  to  extend  his  colony  as  far  as  the  southern  border  of 
New  England.  "Where,"  then  asked  the  Dutch  representatives, 
"is  New  Netherlands?"  Calvert's  answer,  "I  do  not  know," 
probably  satisfied  the  speaker  as  an  effective  statement  of  an  ex 
treme  view,  but  there  was  in  it  little  practical  wisdom.  Even  if 
the  two  claims  rested  legally  on  the  same  ground,  every  man  of 
common  sense  would  see  that  to  hand  over  Delaware  Bay  to  the 
English  and  to  hand  over  Long  Island  and  the  Hudson  to  them 
were  things  widely  different.  Nor  could  it  really  be  said  that 
each  claim  rested  on  the  same  legal  grounds.  At  the  time  when 
Baltimore's  patent  was  drawn  up,  the  banks  of  the  Delaware 
were  vacant  territory.  Manhattan  had  been  for  nine  years  a 
settled  colony.  The  very  words  of  the  patent  expressly  limited 
Baltimore's  rights  to  a  country  hitherto  uncultivated. 

This  tactical  error  on  the  side  of  Maryland  might  well  em 
bolden  the  two  Dutch  envoys  to  propose  that  the  boundary 
question  should  be  referred  to  arbitration.  Either  a  court  of  six 
commissioners,  chosen,  three  by  each  side,  or  the  two  home  Gov 
ernments  should  decide.  The  Governor  now  tried  to  change  his 
ground.  He  was  only  dealing,  he  said,  with  the  question  of 
Delaware  Bay.  But  the  false  step  was  one  which  could  hardly 
be  retraced.  It  was  clearly  the  interest  of  the  Dutch  to  pin  the 
Marylanders  to  their  claim  in  its  original  and  extreme  form. 

The  Governor  finally  contented  himself  with  a  general  denial 
of  the  validity  of  the  Dutch  title,  and  did  not  specify  whether 
his  denial  was  total  or  partial.  The  two  Dutch  envoys  with 
drew.  One  returned  to  New  Netherlands;  the  other  went  on 
to  Virginia  in  the  hope  of  enlisting  the  sympathies  of  Berkeley 
and  his  Council  against  Maryland.  The  relations  between  the 
Dutch  and  the  Virginians  had  always  been  friendly;  the  envoy 
was  received  with  general  expressions  of  good  will,  and  certain 
arrangements  were  made  for  trade  between  the  two  colonies. 
But  to  meddle  with  any  territorial  question  outside  his  own 
colony  was,  Berkeley  said,  wholly  beyond  his  power  and  that  of 
his  Council.1 

Nothing  was  done  by  Maryland,  probably  in  part  because  the 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  684. 


CHANGED   POLICY  OF  ENGLAND.  87 

colony  was  too  much  weakened  by  internal  dissensions  for  any 
effective  action.  The  diplomatic  victory  secured  by  the  Dutch 
envoys  did  little  for  the  profit  of  New  Netherlands.  Yet  it  had 
an  abiding  influence.  When,  thirty-six  years  later,  the  claim  of 
Maryland  to  the  Delaware  was  urged  against  an  English 
grantee,  the  negotiations  of  1659  were  held  to  have  an  important 
bearing  on  the  case. 

As  yet  the  English  Government  had  felt  but  little  motive  to 
press  their  alleged  right  to  the  territory  of  New  Netherlands, 
changed  For  whenever  that  question  had  presented  itself  the 
EnguTncf  practical  issue  had  been  not  the  claim  of  Maryland 
Rfestora-  to  t^le  Delaware,  but  the  claims  of  Connecticut 
tion.  |-o  the  territory  on  Long  Island  and  on  the  opposite 

mainland.  To  strengthen  the  hands  of  Connecticut  was  as 
suredly  a  policy  which  would  never  have  commended  itself 
to  Charles  I.  and  his  advisers.  They  were  not  likely  to  have 
discriminated  between  the  tempers  and  characters  of  the  New 
England  colonies.  To  them  the  whole  group  were  homes  of 
disaffection  and  Nonconformity.  The  attitude  of  the  Crown 
towards  New  England  was  based  on  a  vague  notion  of  re 
pression  ;  no  definite  and  constructive  principle  of  administration 
entered  into  it. 

But  with  the  Restoration  a  new  era  began.  The  navigation 
laws  were  to  be  methodically  and  stringently  administered,  and 
thus  the  whole  commercial  resources  of  the  plantations  were  to 
be  organized  for  the  good  of  the  mother  country.  This  alone 
furnished  a  strong  motive  for  the  annexation  of  New  Nether 
lands.  There  could  not  be  a  uniform  and  effective  system  of 
customs  as  long  as  the  Manhattan  Bay  and  mouth  of  the  Hud 
son  were  in  the  hands  of  a  foreign  Power. 

Moreover  the  aggrandisement  of  Connecticut  was  a  step  of 
prime  importance  in  the  colonial  policy  of  the  English  Govern- 
Position  ment.  That  colony  under  a  loyal  and  courtierlike  gov- 
necticut.  ernor,  and  propitiated  by  a  charter  which  confirmed 
its  existing  territorial  rights  and  conferred  fresh  ones,  was  to  be 
a  check  on  the  Roundheads  of  Massachusetts.  The  charter 
granted  to  Connecticut  in  May  1662  described  the  frontiers  of 
the  colony  with  an  obscurity  which  seemed  almost  designed  to 
create  litigation.  It  is  scarcely  possible  to  arrive  at  any  precise 
and  satisfactory  view  of  the  boundaries,  or  to  see  where  the 


88  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST. 

south-west  corner  of  the  colony  was.  But  plainly  it  was  under 
stood  on  all  hands  that  Connecticut  was  to  take  in  a  part  of 
Long  Island  and  certain  settlements  on  the  mainland  opposite 
which 'under  existing  arrangements  belonged  to  New  Nether 
lands.  In  fact  the  charter  wholly  overrode  the  treaty  of  Hart 
ford. 

The  government  of  Connecticut  lost  no  time  in  the  attempt  to 
enforce  their  newly  acquired  territorial  rights.  A  commissioner 
Territorial  was  sent  to  the  various  townships  hitherto  under 
conr?esc°f  Dutch  rule  to  notify  the  change  of  jurisdiction.1 
ticut.  'phg  effect  of  a  gradual  infusion  of  an  English  ele 

ment  now  made  itself  felt.  There  was  in  all  these  settlements  a 
Dutch  and  an  English  party.  The  dispute  which  followed  re 
sembled  in  many  respects  the  contest  between  Connecticut  and 
Newhaven.  There  was,  however,  this  difference.  The  men  of 
Newhaven  were  almost  unanimous  in  their  determination  not  to- 
be  absorbed  into  Connecticut.  On  the  other  hand  it  seems  pretty 
clear  that  in  this  case  the  resistance  came  from  the  government 
of  New  Netherlands,  while  the  greater  part  of  the  inhabitants 
desired  annexation. 

In  October  1663  two  Dutch  representatives  sent  by  Stuy- 
vesant  appeared  at  Hartford  to  protest  against  the  proceedings 
Attempted  of  Connecticut.  As  in  the  case  of  New  Haven,  the 

negotiation  .        .       ,      .        .        .      .  .     . 

in  1663.  very  man  who  had  obtained  the  instrument  tried  to 
modify  the  application  of  it.  Winthrop  declared  that  the  patent 
was  not  meant  to  encroach  in  any  way  on  New  Netherlands. 
The  three  commissioners  who  acted  for  the  Connecticut  govern 
ment  replied  with  good  sense  that  in  such  a  matter  the  Governor 
could  speak  for  himself  only ;  they  had  merely  to  deal  with  plain 
questions  of  fact.* 

The  negotiation  ended  much  as  that  between  New  Nether 
lands  and  Maryland  did.  Each  party  stood  its  ground  and  in 
sisted  on  the  rights  granted  by  charter.  Connecticut,  however, 
so  far  gave  way  as  to  propose  a  temporary  compromise.  They 
would  for  the  present  leave  the  settlements  towards  the  south  of 
Long  Island  unmolested,  if  the  Dutch  would  in  turn  abstain 
from  exercising  any  jurisdiction  on  the  rest  of  the  territory. 


1  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  719. 

2  Ib.  p.  720.     The  Journal  of  the  envoys  is  in  the  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  ii.  p.  383. 


JOHN  SCOTT.  89* 

This  compromise,  however,  satisfied  neither  party,  and  Stuy- 
vesant's  envoys  returned  to  New  Netherlands. 

Scarcely  had  they  returned  when  Stuyvesant  heard  that  cer 
tain  members  of  the  English  party  were  striving  to  settle  the 
English  question  by  force.  In  some  of  the  disputed  townships 
t°VL1Snips  on  Long  Island  they  had  proclaimed  the  King  of 
island  te  England,  changed  the  magistrates,  and  given  English 
authority. '  names  to  the  towns.  Stuyvesant  thereupon  wrote  to 
the  General  Court  of  Connecticut  offering  to  accept  those  terms 
of  neutrality  which  his  envoys  had  refused. 

Soon  after,  matters  were  complicated  by  the  appearance  on  the- 
scene  of  that  adventurer  who  played  so  disreputable  a  part  in 
John  scott  New  England  history,  John  Scott.2  In  this  instance - 
island.6  he  traded  with  shameless  and  successful  audacity  on 
the  conflicting  interests  of  different  parties.  From  Connecticut 
he  obtained  authority  to  act  as  a  commissioner  for  the  reduction 
of  certain  townships  on  the  northern  part  of  Long  Island.  At 
the  same  time  he  managed  to  win  the  favor  of  New  Haven,  then 
bitterly  exasperated  against  Connecticut  by  threats  of  annexa 
tion,  professing  himself  able  and  willing  to  secure  for  them  the 
territory  which  they  had  long  coveted  on  the  Delaware. 

Scott  soon  made  it  plain  that  he  had  not  the  slightest  intention 
of  using  the  authority  which  he  had  received  from  Connecticut 
for  the  good  of  that  colony.  Among  the  Long  Island  settlers 
there  was  a  party  favorable  neither  to  Dutch  rule  nor  to  that  of 
Connecticut.  Many  of  them  had  fled  from  religious  persecution 
in  New  England.  There  were  Baptists,  Quakers,  and  Anti- 
norriians.  At  the  same  time  Stuyvesant  had  taught  such  men 
that,  though  Dutch  rule  might  be  better  than  that  of  a  Puritan 
settlement,  it  fell  far  short  of  an  ideal  of  religious  freedom. 
The  existence  of  such  a  party  was  no  doubt  among  the  influences 
which  brought  about  the  easy  conquest  of  New  Netherlands. 

Scott  now  with  no  little  craft  turned  this  to  his  own  account. 


1  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  720. 

2  I  have  spoken  of  John  Scott  in  my  earlier  volume,  The  Puritan  Colonies. 
Mr.  Palfrey,  in  his  History  of  New  England,  has  brought  together  a  number  of 
facts  about    Scott's  career   (vol.   ii.   p.   564).      In    1682   a  certain   Colonel  John 
Scott   killed   a   hackney   coachman   on   Tower   Hill.      An   advertisement   for   his 
apprehension   appeared  in   the  London   Intelligencer.      It   describes   his  appear 
ance,  and  states  that  he  was  "a  great  vindicator  of  the  Salamanca  doctor."     It 
is  not   unlikely   that   this  man   was   identical   with   the   Captain  John    Scott   of: 
Long  Island. 


9°  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST. 

How  far  he  was  in  the  secret  counsels  of  the  King  and  his  ad 
visers  does  not  appear.  But  he  seems  to  have  had  some  means  of 
knowing  what  was  not  made  public  till  six  months  later.  Ad 
dressing  men  who  were,  as  he  knew,  ready  for  a  change  of 
master,  and  yet  adverse  to  the  claims  of  Connecticut,  he  an 
nounced  that  Long  Island  had  been  granted  to  the  Duke  of 
York,  and  he  seems  to  have  persuaded  the  inhabitants  that  he 
was  a  fit  person  to  act  as  President  pending  the  establishment  of 
a  proprietary  government.1 

Out  of  all  this  anarchy  and  confusion  there  seemed  no  way 
save  by  the  intervention  of  some  power  strong  enough  to  over- 
The  ride  all  the  conflicting  claims.  Such  intervention  was 

English         at  hand.    A  memorial  in  the  State  Papers  shows  that 

Govern-  ^ 

ment  before  the  end  of  1663  the  English  Government  was 

investi-  ...... 

gates  the  taking  measures  to  ascertain  in  detail  what  were  the 
NewUNeth-  military  resources  of  New  Netherlands,  and  what 
help  in  the  work  of  subjugation  might  be  looked  for 
from  the  English  colonies.  To  this  end  three  Commissioners — 
Sir  John  Berkeley,  Sir  George  Carteret,  and  Sir  William  Cov 
entry — were  appointed.  They  report  that  they  have  discoursed 
with  several  persons  well  acquainted  with  the  affairs  of  New 
England,  including  inhabitants  of  Long  Island.  Of  the  nineteen 
hundred  settlers  on  the  Island,  two-thirds  are  Dutch,  the  rest 
English.  From  Connecticut  and  New  Haven  they  could  reckon 
on  a  force  of  thirteen  or  fourteen  hundred  men.  The  other 
New  England  colonies  would  send  volunteers,  and  in  all  likeli 
hood  the  Crown  could  hire  an  auxiliary  body  of  Indians.  Such 
a  force,  aided  by  three  King's  ships  and  three  hundred  regular 
soldiers,  would  be  enough  to  reduce  the  Dutch  colony.2 

One  point  connected  with  the  memorial  is  worth  noticing. 
Two  of  the  Commissioners  who  were  urging  the  King  to  annex 
Policy  of  New  Netherlands  had  a  distinct  personal  interest  in 
Carteret  t^e  matten  Carteret  and  Berkeley  were  already  co- 
Berkeley  lonial  proprietors  since,  in  1663,  they  had,  in  con 
junction  with  others,  received  the  proprietary  grant  for  Caro 
lina.3  The  alacrity  with  which  they  secured  for  themselves  a 
reversionary  interest  in  the  territory  to  be  taken  from  the  Dutch 

1  For   Scott's  proceedings   see   N.   Y.   Docs.   ii.   pp.   393-410. 
1  Calendar  of  Col.  Papers,   1664,  Jan.  27. 
*  Ib.  1663,  March  24. 


PRETEXTS  FOR  ANNEXATION.  91 

showed  that  they  must  by  this  time  have  measured  the  profit 
which  might  accrue  from  annexation,  and  taints  their  advice 
with  some  suspicion  of  a  personal  motive.  They  in  fact  repre 
sented  the  better  side  of  a  movement  of  which  the  meaner  was 
represented  by  such  men  as  Scott.  After  the  Restoration  the 
impulse  which  carried  men  to  the  New  World  reawakened  with 
marvelous  force.  The  Civil  War  had  unsettled  men;  it  had 
cut  short  their  civil  careers,  and  deprived  them  of  the  training 
which  fitted  them  for  such  careers.  Home  ties  were  broken ;  to 
some  England  had  become  a  strange  country,  to  many  it  was 
filled  with  recollections  which  called  forth  only  sorrow  or  vin- 
dictiveness.  Impulses  were  at  work  akin  to  those  which  urged 
Gilbert  and  Smith  and  Gorges,  and  a  host  of  meaner  men,  to 
wards  the  New  World.  The  motives  of  the  new  generation 
were  on  a  lower  scale ;  the  dreams  of  the  crusader  and  the  gold- 
seeker  were  replaced  by  the  designs  of  the  land  speculator  and 
the  placeman.  We  may  be  sure  that,  beside  those  councilors 
whose  influence  is  recorded,  there  were  many  who  felt  that  it 
was  to  their  own  personal  interest  to  urge  the  Crown  to  a  policy 
of  annexation. 

Another  document  in  the  State  Papers  dating  from  the  same 
time  shows  us  the  kind  of  argument  which  was  used  to  encourage 
Calumnies  and  justify  the  annexation  of  New  Netherlands.  It 
NgewnNeth-  ^s  a  letter,  the  writer  and  the  recipient  of  which  are 
eriands."  neither  of  them  named.  One  would  fain  hope  that 
Scott  was  the  author.  It  lies  as  inventively  and  unblushingly  as 
his  acknowledged  writings,  and  one  would  wish  that  even  in 
that  corrupt  age  there  were  not  two  such  on  the  outskirts  of 
public  life.  It  urges  the  plea  of  occupation,  and  gives  a  most 
astounding  sketch  of  the  history  of  English  colonization. 
Troubles  in  Scotland  had  prevented  the  discoveries  of  Cabot 
being  followed.  But  towards  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  cen 
tury,  Captain  White  and  other  Englishmen  took  up  the  task 
with  such  energy  that  five  thousand  of  them  lost  their  lives. 
Hudson's  discoveries  were  not  made  for  the  Dutch,  but  in  the 
employment  of  Sir  John  Popham  and  two  English  merchants. 

Other  arguments  were  adduced :  isolated  acts  of  wrong  com 
mitted  by  the  Dutch  against  English  settlers,  and  against  those 
Indian  tribes  who  had  befriended  them.  Even  if  the  particular 

1  Cat.  Colonial  Papers,   1664,  p.   622. 


£2  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST, 

statements  were  true,  they  could  only  justify  the  English  Gov 
ernment  in  demanding  restitution.  The  annexation  of  a  colony 
was  strange  amends  to  claim  for  the  private  wrongs  of  two  dis 
possessed  farmers.  If  indeed  the  case  had  been  one  where  men's 
policy  was  likely  to  be  decided  by  argument,  such  lies  could  have 
done  nothing  but  harm.  Any  reasonable  man  would  see  that  the 
case  which  could  find  no  better  argument  must  be  indeed  a  weak 
one.  Most  of  all  might  the  Connecticut  settlers  who  had  real 
grievances,  and  who  could  bring  forward  arguments  which 
might  in  some  measure  justify  annexation,  feel  irritated  at  such  a 
travesty  of  their  case.  In  plain  truth  the  policy  of  annexation 
was  simply  one  of  expediency,  adopted  by  an  unscrupulous 
Cabinet.  The  wrongs  of  the  New  England  colonists,  the  plea 
of  discovery  were  pretexts,  meant  to  give  a  faint  show  of 
decency. 

In  March  1664  the  purpose  of  annexation  was  definitely  an 
nounced.  A  patent  was  granted  to  the  Duke  of  York  making 
The  Duke  over  to  him  two  tracts,  one  north  of  Massachusetts, 
patent.-  the  other  Long  Island  and  the  whole  territory  be 
tween  the  Connecticut  and  the  Delaware.  Over  these  provinces 
the  Duke  was  invested  with  sovereignty,  with  the  usual  reserva 
tion  that  his  proceedings  must  not  be  contrary  to  the  laws  of 
England.  Also  the  subjects  were  to  have  a  right  of  appeal  to 
the  Crown.  Nothing  was  said  as  to  the  conditions  or  limits  of 
such  appeal.  With  these  reservations  the  Duke  had  full  power 
to  appoint  judges  and  executive  officers,  and  either  to  exercise  in 
person  the  right  of  making  laws  and  ordinances,  or  to  delegate 
it  as  he  thought  fit. 

In  one  important  point  the  whole  document  had  a  trans 
parent  air  of  fiction.  It  spoke  throughout  as  if  the  whole  terri 
tory  in  question  was  vacant  soil,  now  to  be  dealt  with  for  the 
first  time.  Nothing  was  said  of  the  necessity  of  conquest,  noth 
ing  of  the  claims  of  the  United  Provinces  or  the  West  India 
Company,  nothing  of  the  status  or  the  liberties  of  the  existing 
settlers.  Their  civil  rights,  their  property,  their  freedom  of 
worship  were  placed  at  the  mercy  of  an  irresponsible  ruler,  with 
only  the  slight  and  shadowy  protection  of  an  appeal  to  what  was 
virtually  a  foreign  Power. 

1  The  patent  is  printed  in  full  in  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  265,  and  in  an  Ap 
pendix  by  Brodhead,  vol.  ii. 


MORAL   ASPECT  OF   THE   CONQUEST.  93 

Nor  was  that  all.  The  Duke's  grant  dealt  as  recklessly  with 
the  claims  of  Maryland  and  of  Connecticut  as  it  did  with  those 
of  New  Netherlands.  It  was  a  flat  contradiction  of  Baltimore's 
original  grant.  The  bounds  of  Connecticut  were  so  vaguely  de 
fined  by  the  charter  that  it  is  hard  to  say  what  did  and  what  did 
not  conflict  with  them.  But  at  least  the  new  instrument  raised 
difficulties  in  that  quarter  which  it  made  no  attempt  whatever  to 
settle. 

Nothing  can  be  said  in  defense  of  such  a  measure.  Yet,  how 
ever  much  we  may  condemn  the  actors,  there  is  little  to  be  in- 
Morai  as-  dignant  at  in  the  result.  The  transfer  of  New 
•conquest.  Netherlands  only  brought  about  at  one  blow  what 
would  otherwise  in  all  likelihood  have  been  done  by  a  weary  and 
wasteful  process,  culminating  in  war.  The  northern  part  of 
Long  Island  and  the  adjacent  mainland  was  becoming  more  and 
more  a  debatable  ground.  Connecticut,  now  the  most  independ 
ent,  if  not  the  most  influential,  of  the  New  England  colonies, 
would  have  been  constantly  on  the  watch  for  advantages,  able  to 
support  her  partisans  in  each  township,  offering  irresistible  in 
ducements  to  come  under  her  dominion.  New  Netherlands, 
crushed  by  debt,  and  harassed  by  the  claims  of  Maryland  on  the 
other  side,  could  do  nothing  for  the  defense  of  her  soil.  Piece 
meal  annexation  would  have  led  at  last  to  some  open  dispute, 
for  to  force  on  such  a  dispute  would  have  been  to  the  interests 
of  Connecticut.  New  Netherlands  would  have  passed  into  Eng 
lish  hands,  and  the  territory  placed  under  the  control  of  Andros 
in  1686  would  have  been  substantially  the  same,  though  he 
would  have  held  it  by  a  different  title. 

Nor  can  one  feel  that  any  real  wrong  was  done  to  the  Dutch. 
The  colony  was  not  a  national  undertaking;  it  was  not  the 
nation  which  lost.  The  blow  fell  on  the  Company,  which  had 
proved  itself  unworthy  of  its  trust.  The  real  loser  was  not  Hol 
land,  but  a  third  Power  which  looked  on  with  folded  hands, 
unconscious  of  the  great  stake  which  it  had  on  the  struggle.  To 
the  generation  of  Englishmen  who  conquered  New  Netherlands, 
the  gain  seemed  no  more  than  the  completion  of  a  continuous 
Atlantic  sea-board.  Its  real  value  was  that,  by  acquiring  the 
•control  over  the  valley  of  the  Hudson,  England  secured  for  her 
self  ascendency  over  the  Mohawk  country  and  the  tribes  that 
<lwelt  therein.  Thus,  and  thus  only,  could  England  check  her 


94  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST, 

rival  France  in  that  policy  which  aimed  at  connecting  the  upper 
waters  of  the  Hudson  and  those  of  the  Ohio  by  a  continuous  line 
of  outposts,  and  which  would  thus  make  impossible  the  extension, 
of  the  English  colonies  towards  the  Pacific. 

The  first  use  which  the  Duke  made  of  his  new  rights  argued 
ill  for  his  future  policy  as  a  colonial  proprietor,  and  illustrated 
The  Duke's  the  motives  of  those  who  had  advised  him.  By  an 

grant  to  .  • 

Berkeley  instrument,  dated  June  1004,  he  conveyed  to 
carteret.'  Berkeley  and  Carteret  all  that  part  of  his  province 
yet  to  be  won,  which  lay  between  the  Hudson  and  the  Dela 
ware.  There  was  a  certain  vagueness  in  the  instrument.  It 
was  in  form  an  ordinary  conveyance  of  land.  But  since  the 
Duke's  territorial  rights  were  combined  with  certain  political 
rights,  it  was  nearly  certain  that  an  attempt  would  be  made  to 
interpret  the  transfer  as  carrying  with  it  political  sovereignty. 
Berkeley  and  Carteret,  already  in  the  recognized  colonial  sense 
Proprietors  of  Carolina,  were  unlikely  to  accept  in  another  part 
of  America  the  position  of  ordinary  landholders. 

The  ease  with  which  the  conquest  was  achieved  may  be  held 
to  have  justified  this  prospective  sale  of  the  bear's  hide.  The 
Arrange-  attempt  was  to  be  combined  with  another  and,  as 
enforcing  it  proved,  a  decidedly  more  difficult  undertaking. 

the  Duke  8      ^    ^  '.     .  '  ,  XT    & 

claims.  T our  commissioners  were  appointed  to  reduce  New 
Netherlands,  and  at  the  same  time  to  visit  the  New  England 
colonies  and  report  upon  their  condition.  This  in  itself  showed 
that  the  reduction  of  New  Netherlands  was  designed  as  part  of 
a  comprehensive  scheme  for  dealing  with  the  colonies.  Of  the 
New  England  scheme,  and  of  the  three  Commissioners  to  whom 
that  part  of  the  work  was  mainly  intrusted,  I  have  already 
spoken.2  Happily  for  the  future  of  New  Netherlands,  their 
colleague  was  a  man  of  widely  different  stamp.  There  is  hardly 
a  character  in  history  which  presents  such  a  web  of  seemingly 
contradictory  impulses  and  principles  as  that  of  James  II.  The 
part  of  a  colonial  administrator  formed  an  important  portion  of 
his  career,  and  there  his  inconsistencies  are  seen  to  the  full.  We 


1  The  original  grant  does  not  appear  to  be  among  the  Colonial  Papers  in  the 
Record  Office.  It  is  printed  in  Learning  and  Spicer's  Collection,  not  as  a 
separate  document  but  as  cited  in  a  later  patent  of  the  date  of  Queen  Anne. 
L.  and  S.  3,  &c.  It  is  also  printed  in  the  New  Jersey  Archives  with  the  head 
ing  "From  the  New  Jersey  State  Library." 

1  Puritan  Colonies,  vol.  ii. 


RICHARD  N I  COLLS.  95 

see  him  always  painstaking,  at  times  generous  in  his  policy, 
granting  popular  rights  liberally  and  wisely,  again  withdrawing 
those  rights  as  it  would  seem  in  arbitrary  caprice,  imperiling, 
at  last  overthrowing,  his  own  position  by  willfully  refusing  to 
understand  the  motives  and  sentiments  of  those  whom  he  had 
to  govern.  But  in  one  respect — in  the  choice  of  officials — his 
conduct  towards  his  colonial  subjects  is  throughout  creditable. 
It  would  have  been  well  if  in  this  matter  the  house  of  Hanover 
had  imitated  the  last  Stuart  King.  Two  of  the  governors  whom 
he  appointed,  Nicolls  and  Dongan,  were  not  merely  men  of  high 
ability  and  character,  men  whose  political  principles  towered  far 
above  the  standard  of  their  contemporaries ;  they  were  men  who 
approached  colonial  questions  with  exceptional  width  of  view 
and  statesmanlike  foresight,  men  able  to  deal  with  questions 
which  could  only  be  settled  by  a  rare  union  of  strong  will  and 
conciliatory  patience.  Nicholson  fell  short  of  them  somewhat 
in  intelligence,  far  more  in  moral  character,  and  in  elevation 
and  steadiness  of  aim.  Lovelace  and  Andros  were  men  of  a 
meaner  stamp,  yet  it  was  distinctly  in  capacity  rather  than 
virtue  that  they  were  lacking.  Andros,  indeed,  failed  because 
being  a  second-rate  man  he  was  set  to  do  work  which  needed  a 
first-rate  one.  At  his  worst  James  never  launched  on  the 
colonies  any  of  those  butcherly  ruffians  or  those  greedy  and  self- 
seeking  adventurers  of  whom  scores  were  to  be  found  clamor 
ing  for  such  employment.  In  the  attacks  of  New  England 
pamphleteers,  Andros — a  man  it  is  true  of  arbitrary  temper 
and  without  a  particle  of  administrative  sagacity,  but  honest, 
religious,  and  in  the  main  humane  and  courteous — figures  as  a 
bloodthirsty  idolater.  What  would  they  have  said  had  the 
colony  fallen  under  the  yoke  of  Kirke  or  Tyrconnel  ? 

Richard  Nicolls,  who  by  the  terms  of  the  commission  was  in- 
vested  with  a  certain  supremacy  over  his  three  colleagues,  and* 
Richard  w^o  practically  enjoyed  supreme  control  over  the  ex- 
Nicoiis  pedition  against  New  Netherlands,  was  one  of  the 
few  Cavaliers  whose  character  and  intelligence  seem  to  have 
profited  by  his  experience  of  the  Civil  War.  An  Oxford" 
student  of  promise,  he  had  been  compelled  at  nineteen  to  "leave 
the  books  in  dust,  And  oil  the  unused  armor's  rust."  In  the 
Civil  War  he  commanded  a  troop  of  horse  in  the  royal  army. 
He  shared  the  exile  of  the  royal  family,  and  acted  as  groom  o£ 


•96  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST. 

the  bedchamber  to  the  Duke  of  York.1  It  is  said  that  he  was 
rspecially  fitted  for  his  task  in  America  by  a  knowledge  of  the 
Dutch  tongue.2  His  present  instructions  were  plain.  New 
York  was  not  to  be  merely  threatened,  nor  occupied  as  a  tempo 
rary  measure  with  a  view  to  extracting  any  concessions.  Dutch 
.authority  was  to  be  overthrown,  and  the  settlers  were  "to  be 
reduced  to  entire  submission."  At  the  same  time  there  was  to 
be  no  interference  with  private  property  or  with  freedom  of 
trade. 

Four  hundred  and  fifty  soldiers,   embarked  on   four  ships, 
formed  the  attacking  force."     In  the  middle  of  May  they  sailed 
Portsmouth,  and  before  the  end  of  July  Nicolls 


against         reached  Boston.4    Thence  after  a  short  stay  the  fleet 

New  Neth-  '.    . 

eriands.  went  on  to  Long  Island,  where  they  were  joined  by 
a  re-enforcement  from  New  Haven  commanded  by  Scott. 

Nothing  could  be  more  helpless  than  the  condition  of  New 
Netherlands.  For  years  the  colony  had  been  struggling  on  the 
Financial  edge  of  bankruptcy,  and  the  expedition  against  New 
New^eth-  Sweden  gave  the  final  blow.  So  straitened  was  the 
eriands.  colonial  exchequer  that  in  1663  Stuyvesant  had  to 
raise  the  money  needed  for  the  ordinary  purposes  of  government 
ty  borrowing  on  the  security  of  his  cannon." 

All  attempts  to  rouse  the  home  Government  were  useless. 
•Charles  and  his  advisers  befooled  the  Dutch  Ambassador,  and 
Apathy  of  Stuyvesant's  cry  for  help  was  frustrated  by  persistent 
•the  Dutch,  denials  of  any  hostile  intention.  The  Company 
vainly  flattered  themselves  that  the  Puritans  of  New  England 
would  take  no  part  in  a  policy  which  must  strengthen  the  hold 
•of  the  Crown  over  the  colonies.  The  English  envoy  indeed,  the 
apostate  Puritan,  George  Downing,  in  some  measure  disclosed 
what  was  intended  by  a  frank  declaration,  like  that  made  by 
Calvert,  that  New  Netherlands  had  no  real  legal  existence.' 

1  For  Nicolls's  antecedents  see  a  note  by  Mr.  C.  D.  O'Callaghan  to  Wooley's 
Journal  in  New  York,  being  the  second  volume  of  Gowan's  Bibliotheca  Ameri 
cana. 

1  This  is  stated  by  a  writer  in  the  American  Historical  Magazine,  vol.  xxi. 
p.  181,  but  no  authority  is  given.  It  is  not  unlikely  that  a  Royalist  should 
have  learnt  Dutch  during  his  exile. 

1  The  number  of  ships  is  repeatedly  stated  by  English  and  Dutch  authorities. 

•  Maverick  writes   from  Piscataway  on  July  20,   and  speaks  of   a  voyage  of 
nearly  ten  weeks.     N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  65. 

•  Brodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  720. 

•  In  a  memorial  addressed  to  the  States-General,  Downing  had  the  audacity 
4o  use  these  words:  "As  to  the  business  of  the  New  Netherlands  this  is  very 


STATE    OF  FORT  AMSTERDAM.  97 

But  even  if  those  who  guided  the  counsels  of  the  States-General 
suspected  mischief,  their  jealousy  of  the  West  India  Company 
kept  them  inactive.  The  colony  was,  in  fact,  overthrown  by 
that  narrow  and  short-sighted  policy  which  had  prevented  it 
from  being  in  any  real  sense  a  national  undertaking. 

Not  indeed  that,  as  things  were  now,  a  more  strenuous  policy 
on  the  part  of  the  States-General  or  the  Company  could  have 
Defense-  availed  much.  The  general  body  of  the  settlers, 

t?on  o°the~  even  so  *ar  as  tney  were  l°val  to  th6  Company,  had 
<oiony.  no  military  organization,  they  had  not  even  that  civic 
cohesion  which  may  serve  as  a  rough  and  imperfect  basis  for 
such  organization.  Moreover  the  whole  resources  of  the  colony 
were  centered  in  the  capital.  If  an  invader  had  seized  Boston, 
his  work  would  have  been  only  half  done.  It  would  have  been 
a  heavy  blow  to  the  trade  of  Massachusetts,  but  much  of  her 
civil  and  economical  life  would  have  been  left.  She  could  still 
have  harassed  an  enemy  in  a  guerrilla  war,  possibly  have  worn 
him  out.  In  New  Netherlands,  when  once  the  capital  was  gone, 
there  was  no  material  either  for  defense  or  even  for  retaliation. 

Fort  Amsterdam,  the  one  citadel  on  which  the  security  of  the 
town,  and  therefore  of  the  colony,  was  thus  staked,  was 
designed  for  defense  only  against  the  savages.  It  was  simply 
valueless  against  a  civilized  enemy,  with  ordnance.  Its  walls 
were  little  more  than  earth  mounds,  barely  ten  feet  high.  Not 
only  could  they  be  battered  from  the  sea,  but  even  with  the 
feeble  cannon  of  that  day  shot  could  be  dropped  into  the  heart 
of  the  town  from  rising  ground  close  to  the  walls  on  the  western 
side.  Private  houses  had  been  suffered  to  be  built  close  to  the 
walls,  and  it  would  have  been  necessary  to  destroy  these  as  a 
preliminary  to  any  scheme  of  defense,  otherwise  they  might  be 
seized  and  then  utilized  for  purposes  of  attack.  The  fort  had 
no  proper  supply  of  water.  Moreover  Stuyvesant  avowed  the 
Company  had  just  landed  four  hundred  negroes,  and  thereby 
created  an  exceptional  strain  on  the  resources  of  the  colony. 

When  after  all  was  over  Stuyvesant  pleaded  these  excuses, 


far  from  being  a  surprise  or  anything  of  that  nature,  it  being  notoriously 
known  that  that  spot  of  land  lies  within  the  limits,  and  is  part  of  the  posses 
sion  of  his  [the  King's]  subjects  of  New  England,  as  appears  most  evidently 
by  their  charter,  and  that  those  few  Dutch  that  have  lived  there  merely  upon 
tolerance  and  sufferance  and  not  as  having  any  rights  thereunto."  N.  Y.  Docs 
vol.  11.  p.  302. 


98  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST. 

the  Company  met  him  with  the  answer  that  he  might  have  pro 
cured  powder  from  private  traders,  and  that  he  had  neglected 
to  warn  his  employers  of  the  deficiencies  and  dangers  of  his  situ 
ation.  They  also  complained  that  he  had  listened  to  clergymen 
and  other  cowardly  people,  and  that  if  private  houses  were  in  the 
way  they  should  have  been  pulled  down.  In  other  words  Stuy- 
vesant  was  only  to  remember  that  he  was  a  military  commander, 
and  to  ignore  his  responsibilities  as  a  civil  governor.  He  was  to 
hold  the  fort  at  any  cost,  quite  regardless  of  what  might  happen 
to  the  inhabitants. 

In  June  1664  Stuyvesant,  having  been  warned  that  the  ex 
pedition  had  sailed  from  England,  called  the  attention  of  the 
Burgomasters  and  Schepens  to  the  impending  danger.  All  that 
he  got  in  return  was  the  singularly  discouraging  reply  that  they 
would  exert  themselves  as  much  as  they  had  done  heretofore.1 
A  little  later,  in  response  to  a  further  appeal  by  Stuyvesant,  they 
did  make  some  show  of  activity.  The  inhabitants  were  im 
pressed  to  work,  one-third  of  them  every  day,  at  the  fortifica 
tions;  a  civic  guard  was  formed  for  the  town;  to  increase  the 
supply  of  food  maltsters  were  forbidden  to  malt  any  grain,  and 
at  the  request  of  the  Town  Council  a  certain  quantity  of  arms 
and  ammunition  were  transferred  from  the  fort  to  the  town.2 
The  town  itself  on  its  landward  side  was  guarded  only  by  a 
decayed  palisade  which  might  possibly  keep  savages  at  bay,  but 
was  powerless  against  an  enemy  with  firearms.  To  hold  this,  a 
defense  of  fully  a  mile  in  extent,  there  were  available  a  hundred 
and  fifty  regular  soldiers  and  some  two  hundred  and  fifty  half- 
drilled  volunteers.  Even  had  the  strategical  frontier  been 
stronger  it  would  have  been  of  little  avail,  since  the  whole  stock 
of  powder  in  the  citadel  was  only  six  hundred  pounds.8  In  ad 
dition  to  its  own  essential  weakness  of  situation  and  lack  of  re 
sources,  the  town  had  no  outlying  forts  to  check  an  advancing 
enemy  either  by  land  or  sea.  Thus  the  land  force  advancing 
from  New  England  obtained  quiet  possession  of  the  whole  of 
Long  Island,  while  the  fleet  sailed  unchallenged  along  the  coast 
and  anchored  in  what  is  now  Jamaica  Bay,  some  ten  miles  north- 

1  Court  Minutes,  vol.  v.  p.  88.  '  Ib.  p.    105. 

1  For  the  state  ot  the  defenses  and  the  stock  of  powder,  see  Stuyvesant's  ex 
planation  and  a  deposition  of  four  inhabitants.  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  ii.  pp.  430, 
475.  For  what  follows  I  have  relied  mainly  on  Brodhead,  whose  account  is 
largely  based  on  manuscript  authorities. 


THE  ATTACK,  99 

east  of  the  mouth  of  the  harbor.  On  the  igth  of  August  Stuy- 
vesant  sent  a  message  to  Nicolls  asking  what  was  meant  by  his 
approach.  The  answer  was  sent  up  by  Cartwright,  one  of  the 
Assistant-Commissioners,  accompanied  by  three  of  Nicolls's  staff. 
It  demanded  a  complete  surrender  of  all  territory  held  by  the 
Dutch,  but  promised  security  of  life  and  property  to  all  private 
persons.  The  demand  was  met,  as  might  have  been  expected, 
with  a  flat  refusal  from  Stuyvesant;  thereupon  it  was  repeated, 
accompanied  by  the  threat  of  an  immediate  attack.1 

Nicolls,  however,  had  the  wisdom  to  see  that  in  such  a  case 
success  won  at  the  point  of  the  sword  would  go  far  to  frustrate 
Nicolls  its  own  purpose.  He  had  not  only  to  conquer,  but 
the  Dutch*  ^  ^  rnight  be  to  conquer  without  alienating.  That 
settlers.  process  by  which  the  Dutch  colony  had  been 
Anglicized  now  told  its  tale.  The  New  England  force  in  its 
march  down  Long  Island  must  have  had  ample  opportunities  of 
learning  how  matters  really  stood  within  the  walls  of  New 
Amsterdam.  Nicolls  must  have  known  by  this  time  that  there 
was  no  real  spirit  or  power  of  resistance,  that  if  he  were  but 
patient  the  prize  would  fall  into  his  hands.  He  took  counsel 
with  Winthrop.  From  him  he  learnt  that  the  one  thing  which 
might  provoke  the  Dutch  to  hold  out  was  the  dread  of  losing 
their  trade  with  Holland.  Let  him  only  guarantee  that,  and 
there  was  no  fear  of  resistance.  Nicolls  accepted  Winthrop's 
view  and  authorized  him  to  offer  an  assurance  that  there  should 
be  no  interference  with  the  trade  between  the  colony  and  Hol 
land.2  In  promising  a  special  dispensation  from  a  statute 
Nicolls  was  undoubtedly  going  beyond  his  powers  as  an  English 
officer;  in  making  a  stipulation  of  such  importance  without 
authority  from  his  principal  he  was  going  beyond  the  special 
terms  of  his  commission.  The  best  excuse  that  can  be  urged  is 
that  he  had  to  act  in  an  emergency  which  compelled  him  to  take 
upon  himself  responsibility,  and  that  his  anxiety  to  deal  fairly 
and  liberally  by  the  Dutch  made  it  certain  that  he  would  spare 
no  exertion  of  his  own  to  secure  the  fulfillment  of  his  pledge. 


'  X.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  ii.  pp.  410-14. 

*  Brodhead  (vol.  ii.  p.  28)  quotes  the  actual  text  of  Nicolls's  letter  to  Win 
throp.  The  freedom  of  trade  stipulated  for  was  granted  for  seven  years. 
Three  years  later  Stuyvesant  reminded  the  English  Government  of  this  pledge. 
This  may  be  taken  as  ample  proof  of  the  fact  that  such  a  pledge  had  been 
given. 


100  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST. 

With  this  authority  from  Nicolls,  Winthrop  wrote  to  Stuy- 
vesant.     He  pointed  out  that  resistance  would  only  bring  the 
whole  force  of  the  New  England  colonies  down  upon 


tweenthe  the  Dutch,  while  surrender  would  involve  no  more 
English.  than  a  nominal  transfer  of  authority.  There  would 
be  "little  alteration  but  submission  to  and  acknowledgment  of" 
the  King's  supremacy.  In  using  the  latter  argument  Winthrop 
showed  a  characteristic  incapacity  to  see  the  real  point  at  issue. 
It  might  be  a  very  good  reason  why  the  colonists  themselves 
should  be  willing  to  surrender:  it  could  be  no  justification  to 
Stuyvesant  for  abandoning  the  post  intrusted  to  him  by  his 
employers. 

Bearing  this  letter,  indorsed  by  Nicolls  and  his  colleagues, 
Winthrop  was  rowed  up  in  a  wherry  to  Manhattan  wharf. 
With  him  were  five  leading  representatives  of  the  New  England 
confederation  chosen  from  all  three  colonies.  Stuyvesant  and 
the  Town  Council  received  the  embassy  at  a  tavern  ;  formal  ex 
pressions  of  courtesy  were  exchanged  ;  then  Winthrop  handed  in 
the  letter  and  departed. 

Immediately  they  had  heard  the  letter,  the  Burgomasters 
demanded  that  a  town  meeting  should  be  called  and  Winthrop's 
obstinacy  dispatch  made  public.  This  Stuyvesant  refused  to 
sant.  do.  Nor  was  that  all;  so  determined  was  the  Gov 

ernor  to  keep  the  general  body  of  citizens  in  the  dark  that  he 
tore  Winthrop's  letter  to  pieces.  Later  tradition  has  represented 
this  as  an  act  of  petulant  wrath.  Overbearing  and  arbitrary 
though  Stuyvesant  was,  it  is  far  more  likely  that  his  own  version 
was  true,  and  that  he  deliberately  sought  to  prevent  the  citizens 
having  any  knowledge  of  the  terms  offered.1  We  must  re 
member  that  throughout  the  aims  of  the  citizens  and  those  of  the 
Governor  were  different.  It  was  enough  for  them  if  they  saved 
life,  property,  and  commercial  rights.  As  for  political  freedom, 
the  Company  had  left  them  little  ground  for  dreading  any 
change.  Stuyvesant,  on  the  other  hand,  had  to  consider  his  duty 
as  a  servant  of  the  Company,  and  his  honor  as  a  soldier.  We 
need  not  believe  that  he  was  indifferent  to  bloodshed,  or  that  he 
was  prepared  to  expose  the  city  to  pillage  and  the  garrison  to 

1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  ii.  p.  445.  Stuyvesant  here  implies  that  the  destruction 
of  the  letter  was  approved  of,  not  suggested,  by  the  whole  Council.  It  seems 
odd  that  it  should  not  have  been  burnt. 


STUYVESANT  REFUSES   TO    SURRENDER.          IOI 

destruction  in  a  hopeless  cause.  That  it  was  a  hopeless  cause 
he  must  have  known  well;  yet  he  may  have  believed  that  to 
stimulate  the  citizens  to  some  show  of  resistance  was  his  best 
chance  of  securing  honorable  terms. 

But  even  if  such  a  policy  were  expedient,  the  time  had  gone 
by  when  it  was  practicable.  It  was  plainly  impossible  to  keep 
the  general  body  of  citizens  in  the  dark  when  once  the  letter  had 
become  known  to  the  Burgomasters.  Stuyvesant's  only  hope 
now  would  have  been  to  throw  himself  frankly  on  popular  sup 
port,  to  make  one  last  bid  for  that  confidence  which  he  had  so 
fatally  disregarded.  Vague  rumors  of  the  promised  concessions 
got  abroad ;  the  work  of  palisading  the  town  ceased :  a  mob 
gathered  round  the  council  chambermaid  ^ntoted  for  alight  of 
Winthrop's  letter.  Stuyvesant's  attempts  to  pacify,  or  rather  to 
overawe,  them  failed ;  at  length  the  .•Secretly  $33&?<3:  'ftcbyjcred 
the  fragments  of  the  letter  and  handed  a  copy  to  the  Burgo 
masters,  to  be  disposed  of  as  they  pleased. 

Meanwhile  Stuyvesant,  with  calm  defiance  and  impracticable 
obstinacy  akin  to  his  Calvinistic  faith,  sent  Nicolls  an  elaborate 
protest,  pointing  out  the  soundness  of  the  Dutch  title,  based  as 
it  was  on  discovery  and  purchase  from  the  natives,  and  sanc 
tioned  by  continuous  possession.  It  had,  moreover,  as  he  pointed 
out,  been  recognized  in  the  treaty  of  Hartford  made  in  1650 
between  the  government  of  New  Netherlands  and  the  New 
England  confederacy.1 

Nicolls  at  once  waived  all  such  discussion.  The  question  had 
been  settled  for  him  by  the  Government  for  which  he  acted,  all 
he  had  to  do  was  to  carry  out  his  orders;  he  would  suspend 
operations  for  forty-eight  hours,  and  thus  give  time  for  consider 
ation.  If  the  city  was  not  then  surrendered,  he  must  attack.2 

The  delay  was  not  merely  humane  and  conciliatory;  it  was 
eminently  politic.  We  may  be  sure  that  Winthrop  and  his  col- 
The  con-  leagues  were  able  to  form  some  idea  how  matters 

vention  at  ,       ...       ...  _,.  , 

Gravcscnd.  stood  within  the  tort.  1  ime,  they  could  see,  was  sure 
to  fight  for  them.  In  another  way  Nicolls  was  able  to  turn  the 
interval  to  good  account.  It  was  most  important  to  him  to  iso 
late  New  Amsterdam,  to  emphasize  as  far  as  might  be  the  sub 
mission  of  the  outlying  settlements,  and  to  show  what  fair  terms 
he  was  ready  to  grant  He  summoned  all  the  settlers  on  Long 

1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  ii.  p.  411.  '  Ib.   p.  414. 


102  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST. 

Island  to  a  general  convention  at  Gravesend.  Most  of  them  at 
tended.  Some  of  the  townships  had  already  accepted  the  author 
ity  of  Connecticut.  Winthrop  with  characteristic  compliance, 
and  with  equally  characteristic  readiness  to  substitute  his  own 
personal  opinion  for  the  authoritative  voice  of  the  colony,  with 
drew  all  claim  to  this  territory.  Nicolls's  policy  in  dealing 
with  it  foreshadowed,  perhaps  designedly,  his  treatment  of  New 
Netherlands.  He  kept  in  power  all  the  officials  appointed  by 
Connecticut,  till  a  convention  of  deputies  could  be  held  to  settle 
a  scheme  of  government. 

The  townships  within  the  Dutch  border,  encouraged  as  we 
may  well  believe  by  thisy  submitted  at  once.  Volunteers  from 
the  newly  .acquired  :tfefmo?y  joined  the  New  England  troops, 
and  the  whole  force  advanced"  towards  New  Amsterdam  and  en- 


The  English  land  force  was  then  put  on  shore  at  Gravesend 

and  joined  the  troops  at  Brooklyn.     Two  of  the  ships  were 

stationed    at   Governor's    Island.     The    other    two 

sailed  up  the  Hudson  past  Fort  Amsterdam.     Thus 

the  inhabitants  were  effectually  cut  off  on  all  sides  alike  from 

succor  and  from  escape. 

Stuyvesant  had  his  guns  mounted  and  ready.  But  at  the  last 
moment  he  was  dissuaded  from  firing  on  the  enemy.  The 
English  fleet  lay  off  the  fort  and  suffered  discord  within  the  city 
to  fight  for  them.  The  conduct  of  the  garrison  soon  showed 
how  they  looked  on  themselves  as  the  servants  of  the  Company, 
bound  only  to  the  defense  of  the  fort,  with  no  responsibility  to 
wards  the  town  and  its  inhabitants.  When  Stuyvesant  with 
drew  his  troops  from  the  fort  to  the  town,  ominous  words  were 
heard  among  the  soldiers.  There  was  wealth,  they  said,  in  the 
houses  of  the  burgesses,  and  girls  there  who  could  afford  to  wear 
gold  ornaments.2  The  citizens  were  between  the  upper  and  the 
nether  millstone,  and  those  who  had  heard  of  Nicolls's  modera 
tion  might  well  feel  that  the  enemy  without  was  less  to  be  feared 
than  the  defender  within. 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  32. 

2  Stuyvesant's  report,  mentioned  above,  p.  98.     This  threat  was  accompanied 
by  another,  which  throws  a  curious  and  somewhat  prophetic  light  on  the  social 
and  economical  life  of  the  colony.     "We  now  hope  to  find  an  opportunity  to 
pepper  the  devilish   Chinese  who  have  made  us  smart  so  much."     In  all  like 
lihood  these  Chinese  were  petty  traders  and  money-lenders,  who  lived  on  the 
necessitous  and  extravagant. 


THE   SURRENDER.  103 

The  main  difficulty  was  to  persuade  Stuyvesant  to  yield.  To 
the  crowd  that  thronged  about  him  with  vague  entreaties  that 
Stuyvesant  ne  would  surrender  he  only  answered  that  he  would 
gives  way.  sooner  be  carried  out  dead.  But  on  the  5th,  a  formal 
remonstrance  was  handed  to  him  signed  by  the  Town  Council 
and  nearly  ninety  of  the  chief  inhabitants,  among  them  Stuy- 
vesant's  own  son.1  Unless  Stuyvesant's  intention  on  leaving  the 
fort  was  to  make  one  last  appeal  to  the  patriotism  of  the  citizens, 
it  is  difficult  to  see  his  object.  Within  the  fort  the  garrison 
might  at  least  have  died  hard,  or  even  won  honorable  terms. 
In  the  town,  with  no  defense  but  a  wretched  wood  paling,  and 
cumbered  by  a  defenseless  and  disloyal  mob  of  civilians,  their 
case  was  utterly  hopeless.  At  length  Stuyvesant  was  brought 
to  see  this  and  sent  a  message  to  Nicolls.  A  conference  was 
agreed  on  and  commissioners  were  appointed,  six  from  each  side, 
who  met  at  Stuyvesant's  house.  The  English  were  represented 
by  the  two  Assistant-Commissioners,  Carr  and  Cartwright,  two 
representatives  from  Connecticut  and  two  from  Massachusetts.2 

When  Stuyvesant  sent  commissioners  it  was  practically  an  ad 
mission  of  defeat.  There  was  little  difficulty  in  settling  the  con 
ditions  of  surrender.  The  garrison  was  to  march  out  with  the 
honors  of  war.  The  general  principle  of  the  surrender  as  ap 
plied  to  civil  inhabitants  was  to  leave  everything  unaltered. 
The  new  Proprietor  stepped  into  the  rights  and  the  responsi 
bilities  of  the  Company.  Dutch  emigrants  might  come  in  as  be 
fore,  and  there  was  to  be  free  trade  with  Holland.  The  existing 
laws  which  controlled  religious  affairs  and  inheritances  were  to 
remain  as  before,  and  there  was  to  be  no  change  in  the  municipal 
constitution.  If  in  spite  of  these  concessions  any  Dutch  settler 
wished  to  leave  the  colony,  he  should  meet  with  no  hindrance.1 

The  ease  with  which  the  transfer  was  effected  is  best  shown 
by  the  fact  that  on  the  day  after  the  surrender  the  Town 
Effect  Council,4  met  as  though  there  had  been  no  inter- 

conquest,  ruption  to  their  proceedings.  Beyond  doubt  the  con 
quest  was  an  unrighteous  outrage,  but  for  the  citizens  it  meant 
gaining  masters  who  had  shown  themselves  moderate,  com 
pliant,  and  sympathetic,  in  place  of  those  whose  coldness,  greed, 

1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  ii.  p.  248. 

*  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  35. 

8  The  articles  are  in  the   N.   Y.   Docs.  vol.   ii.   pp.   250-3. 

*  Court  Minutes,  vol.  v.  p.  107. 


104  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST. 

and  neglect  had  well-nigh  brought  the  colony  to  ruin.  Formal 
documents  addressed  to  those  in  authority  cannot  be  taken  as 
speaking  with  absolute  truth.  But  the  memorial  which  the 
citizens  within  two  months  of  the  conquest  presented  to  the  Pro 
prietor  was  in  substance  a  fair  expression  of  their  views.  It 
described  Nicolls  as  "gentle,  wise,  and  intelligent,"  and  it  looked 
forward  to  the  time  when  the  city,  if  not  hampered  by  foolish 
restrictions  on  commerce,  should  count  its  inhabitants  by 
thousands,  and  should  carry  on  with  the  whole  world  a  trade 
which  should  yield  a  vast  revenue  to  its  Proprietor  and  still 
leave  its  citizens  wealthy.1 

Only  one  difficulty  arose.  Three  weeks  after  the  surrender 
Nicolls  required  from  the  settlers  who  chose  to  remain  an  oath 
binding  them  as  long  as  they  stayed  within  the  English  do 
minions  to  obey  the  King,  the  Proprietor,  and  their  officers. 
The  settlers  thought  seemingly  that  this  was  inconsistent  with 
the  terms  of  surrender.  On  this  point  they  were  reassured  by 
Nicolls.  He  declared  that  the  articles  of  surrender  were  not  in 
the  least  broken,  or  intended  to  be  broken,  by  the  words  of  the 
said  oath.  Thereupon  two  hundred  and  fifty  Dutch  citizens 
took  the  oath,  among  them  Stuyvesant  himself.  There  was 
nothing  in  this  which  need  create  any  difficulty  if  the  States- 
General  ever  succeeded  in  reasserting  their  authority.  For  the 
oath  only  bound  those  who  took  it  to  obedience  so  long  as  they 
were  in  British  dominions.  They  might  fairly  argue  that  New 
Netherlands  was  not  so  de  jure,  and  that  the  obligation  wholly 
fell  through  if  it  ceased  to  be  so  de  facto.  That  may  have  rec 
onciled  Stuyvesant  and  members  of  the  old  official  party  to  their 
position.  No  such  motive  for  acquiescence  was  needed  by  the 
main  body  of  citizens.8 

The  overthrow  of  the  capital  shattered  at  once  what  little 
power  of  resistance  there  was  in  the  colony.  The  conquest  of 
The  rest  of  the  rest  followed  as  a  matter  of  course,  with  equal 
submits.  ease  and  equal  completeness.  On  the  2Qth  of  August 
Stuyvesant  evacuated  New  Netherlands.*  Nicolls  at  once  di 
vided  his  available  forces.  Part  were  sent  to  reduce  the  settle 
ments  up  the  valley  of  the  Hudson,  part  to  gain  possession  of  the 


1  Court  Minutes,  vol.  v.  p.  160. 

•  Jb.  pp.  143-5:  Brodhead.  vol.  ii.  pp.  47. 

*  Brodhead,  vol.  iii.  p.  42. 


[CONQUEST  OF   THE   OUTLYING  DISTRICTS.         105 

territory  on  the  Delaware.  The  former  expedition  was  placed 
under  the  command  of  Cartwright.  He  was  preceded  at  Fort 
Orange  by  a  member  of  Stuyvesant's  official  staff,  De  Decker, 
who  had  hurried  thither  in  the  hope  of  rallying  his  countrymen 
to  resist.  The  attempt  was  useless.  The  settlers  at  Fort 
Orange  and  those  at  Esopus  yielded  as  easily  as  the  inhabitants 
of  Long  Island.  All  private  rights  were  secured  and  no  civil 
officers  were  dismissed.  The  only  measure  of  force  needed  was 
the  banishment  of  De  Decker.  As  at  New  Netherlands,  the 
new  government  at  once  stepped  into  all  the  position  and  the  lia 
bilities  of  its  predecessor.1 

This  had  one  important  effect.  Certain  Iroquois  chiefs  ap 
peared  at  Fort  Orange,  and  entered  into  friendship  with  the 
English.  Cartwright  granted  the  same  rights  of  trade  which  the 
Indians  had  before  enjoyed  from  the  Dutch,  and  promised  assist 
ance  if  the  Iroquois  were  attacked  by  the  tribes  on  their  eastern 
frontier.  The  Five  Nations  had  already  entered  into  friendly 
relations  with  the  colonists  in  Massachusetts,  but  this  was  their 
first  formal  recognition  as  allies  by  any  English  colony.2 

While  Cartwright  was  thus  completing  the  English  conquests 
on  the  upper  Hudson,  Carr  was  dispatched  with  two  ships  and 
a  military  force  to  the  Delaware.  In  touching  the  Dutch  colo 
nists  on  the  west  bank  Nicolls  was  clearly  going  beyond  his  com 
mission.  The  territory  of  the  Duke  of  York  was  definitely 
bounded  by  the  Delaware  river.  At  the  same  time  if  the  plea  of 
discovery,  on  which  alone  the  conquest  of  New  Netherlands 
could  be  justified,  was  good  for  Long  Island,  it  was  also  good 
for  the  territory  on  the  Delaware.  On  that  theory  the  Dutch 
were  intruders;  the  claims  of  Maryland  might  be  dealt  with 
hereafter.  Accordingly  Carr  was  to  explain  to  such  of  the 
Maryland  officials  as  he  might  meet  that  the  Dutch  were  being 
evicted  as  intruders,  but  that  the  Duke  of  York  laid  no  claim  to 
the  territory,  that  inquiry  should  be  made  into  the  territorial 
rights  of  Maryland,  and  that  in  the  meantime  the  land  was  to 
be  held  for  the  King. 

Nicolls's  instructions  to  Carr  all  made  for  moderation  and 
forbearance.  If  the  Swedes  would  make  unqualified  submission 
and  take  the  oaths  of  allegiance  and  fidelity,  they  were  to  be  un 
molested  in  person  and  estate,  to  enjoy  freedom  of  conscience 

*  Brodhead,    vol.    ii.    pp.   45-7.  *  Ib, 


106  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST. 

•and  equal  rights  of  trade  with  English  subjects;  magistrates  then 
in  office  were  to  remain  so  for  at  least  six  months.1  But  on  the 
loth  of  October  the  English  fleet  anchored  off  New  Amstel. 
There  things  took  much  the  same  turn  that  they  had  at  New 
Amsterdam.  The  civil  population  at  once  accepted  the  English 
supremacy.  But  the  commander  of  the  fort,  Hinoyossa,  played 
the  same  part  as  Stuyvesant,  and  even  carried  it  further.  He 
refused  to  surrender.  The  ships  opened  a  broadside,  and  a  land 
force  headed  by  Carr's  son  attacked  the  fort.  One  cannot  blame 
the  Dutch  soldiers  for  failing  to  hold  against  a  civilized  enemy 
with  firearms  a  wooden  palisade  only  designed  to  stop  savages. 
But  their  musketry  must  have  been  sadly  at  fault,  since  they 
lost  thirteen  men  without  a  single  casualty  on  the  side  of  the 
assailants.2 

Hinoyossa's  resistance  gave  Carr  a  pretext  for  severity  of 
which  he  was  not  slow  to  avail  himself.  The  Dutch  garrison 
Carr's  mis-  were  sold  as  slaves  into  Virginia.1  Not  only  was  the 
•onntheCt  public  property  belonging  to  the  corporation  of  Am- 
Deiaware.  sterdam  plundered,  but  private  goods  were  not  re 
spected.  Without  regard  for  Nicolls's  authority  or  for  the 
Duke's  proprietary  rights,  Carr  appropriated  the  choicest  pieces 
of  reclaimed  land  for  himself,  his  son,  and  one  of  his  chief 
followers.4  Nor  was  the  pillage  confined  to  those  who  might  by 
a  strained  construction  be  held  as  implicated  in  Hinoyossa's  re 
sistance.  The  unhappy  community  of  Mennonites  were  cruelly 
plundered  by  a  boat's  crew  sent  thither  by  Carr  to  take  posses 
sion.6  The  men  of  that  age,  familiar  with  the  horrors  of  the 
Thirty  Years'  War,  did  not  think  as  we  do  of  such  atrocities. 
The  Civil  War,  too,  had  done  something  to  demoralize  English 
men,  and  one  should  feel  that  Nicolls  rose  above  the  standard  of 
his  own  day  rather  than  that  Carr  fell  below  it.  Happily  for 
the  settlers  on  the  Delaware,  matters  were  so  far  peacefully 
settled  at  New  Amsterdam,  that  Nicolls  was  able  to  visit  his 
new  conquest  in  person,  and  in  some  measure  to  exact  restitution 
from  his  subordinate.  Had  New  Netherlands  been  a  more 


1  Pennsylvania  Archives,  vol.  v.  p.   547. 
1  Carr's  report  to  Nicolls,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  83. 

8  Van   Schweringen's   account  in   N.    Y.   Docs.  vol.   iii.  p.  342.     Van   Schwe- 
.ringen  was  the  Dutch  Schout  at  New  Amstel. 

*  Xicolls  to  Arlington,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  115. 

*  Van   Schweringen  as  above. 


NICOLLS'S  POLICY.  107 

united  community,  Carr  would  have  done  much  to  prevent  a 
peaceful  settlement.  But  constituted  as  the  colony  was,  a  blow 
which  fell  on  the  Swedes  and  Mennonites  on  the  Delaware  was 
of  little  concern  to  the  Dutch  at  Amsterdam,  of  none  at  all  to 
the  half-English  villages  on  Long  Island. 

This  state  of  things  did  much  to  lighten  Nicolls's  task.  The 
colony  was  in  fact  little  more  than  a  tabula  rasa  on  which 
TJtcoiis's  he  could  impress  such  political  principles  as  he 
policy.  thought  best.  By  giving  the  colony  a  government 
really  capable  of  the  task  of  administration  and  defense,  by 
binding  together  the  loose  and  imperfectly  jointed  members 
of  the  community  into  a  coherent  whole,  it  was  possible  for 
Nicolls  to  bring  home  to  the  colonists  that  the  English  conquest 
was  the  real  beginning  of  their  national  life. 

To  this  task  Nicolls  betook  himself  strenuously  and  soberly. 
One  of  his  first  steps  was  to  make  the  colony  English  in  outward 
appearance  by  a  thorough  change  of  names.  The  province  itself 
and  its  capital,  New  Amsterdam,  each  became  New  York. 
New  Amstel,  though  only  taken  from  the  Dutch  and  not  yet 
claimed  for  the  Proprietor,  became  Newcastle.  Fort  Orange 
and  the  adjacent  hamlet  of  Esopus  were  named  Albany.  Two 
other  local  names  were  given  in  honor  of  the  Proprietor.  Long 
Island  was  called  Yorkshire,  and  the  whole  territory  between 
the  Hudson  and  the  Delaware,  Albania,  a  title  which  was  soon 
forgotten  when  that  territory  came  to  be  settled  under  the  grant 
to  Berkeley  and  Carteret.1 

The  absence  of  any  fixed  representative  system  lightened 
Nicolls's  labors,  since  it  freed  him  from  any  necessity  of  sweep- 
Svstem  of  mg  away  or  even  curtailing  popular  rights.  He  and 
legislation,  jjis  council  stepped  by  a  perfectly  easy  process  into 
the  place  occupied  by  their  Dutch  predecessors.  The  supreme 
legislative  power  was  vested  in  a  newly  created  body.  The 
magistrates  of  each  township  were  to  meet  as  a  Court  of  Assize, 
which  was  to  make  laws  for  the  colony.  For  judicial  purposes 
there  were  to  be  intermediate  courts  composed  of  these  same  mag 
istrates,  and  held  triennially  in  each  of  the  three  divisions  called 
ridings  of  Long  Island.  This  Court  was  simply  the  Quarter 
Sessions  of  an  English  county.  The  magistrates  were  appointed 

:  For  these  changes  of  names  see  Nicolls  to  the  Duke  of  York,  N.  Y.  Docs, 
vol.  iii.  p.  105. 


108  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST. 

by  the  Governor,  and  held  office  during  his  pleasure.  Thus  in 
theory  the  Court  was  a  mere  channel  through  which  the  sover 
eign  power  of  the  Proprietor  was  exercised  Practically,  how 
ever,  it  was  sure  to  be  amenable  to  the  opinions  and  wishes  of 
those  from  whom  the  magistrates  were  chosen,  and  among  whom 
they  lived.  To  distribute  the  exercise  of  power,  though  that 
power  be  delegated,  has  in  practice  many  of  the  same  effects  as 
extending  power,  and  is  a  natural  and  appropriate  step  towards 
such  extension.1 

It  is  to  be  noticed  that  this  system  only  took  in  Long  Island. 
For  it  was  a  radical  principle  in  Nicolls's  policy  to  regard  the 
colony  as  consisting  of  two  distinct  halves,  the  English  and  semi- 
English  settlements  on  Long  Island  and  the  Dutch  settlements 
along  the  Hudson.  The  Court  of  Assize  was  chosen  only  from 
the  former;  it  had  to  deal  with  the  latter  only  so  far  as  in 
conjunction  with  the  Governor  and  Council  it  was  the  supreme 
legislative  body. 

This  distinction  was  more  emphatically  marked  in  Nicolls's 
legislative  policy.  He  summoned  a  convention,  which  met  in 
Convention  February  1665  at  Heemstede,  on  Long  Island.  Each 
of  the  towns  on  Long  Island  sent  two  delegates,  and 


two  also  attended  from  West  Chester  on  the  mainland.  The 
Dutch  settlements  on  the  mainland  were  unrepresented.  The 
convention  was  not  in  any  way  to  form  a  fixed  or  permanent 
element  in  the  constitutional  machinery  of  the  colony.  It  was 
the  counterpart  of  the  Landtag  which  had  been  summoned  in 
the  days  of  Stuyvesant  at  some  special  crisis  in  the  history  of  the 
colony.  Nor  was  its  function  to  legislate,  though  it  is  plain  that 
some  of  its  members  had  gone  there  with  that  expectation. 
Nicolls  clearly  saw  that  the  English  half  of  the  colony,  as  we 
may  call  it,  required  different  legislation  from  the  Dutch  half. 
Formed  as  they  largely  were  of  immigrants  from  New  England, 
he  could  not  do  better  than  give  them  a  system  modeled  as  far 
as  might  be  on  those  which  the  New  England  colonies  had 
framed  for  themselves.  To  this  end  he  obtained  copies  of  the 
codes  in  force  in  Massachusetts  and  New  Haven.  The  code  of 
Connecticut  existed  only  in  manuscript,  and  though  Nicolls 
asked  for  it,  no  copy  could  be  made  soon  enough. 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  64.  J  lb.  p.  67. 


CONVENTION  AT  HEEMSTEDE.  109 

From  these,  aided  by  his  council  and  certain  leading  men  act 
ing  as  magistrates,  he  fashioned  a  body  of  laws  to  be  laid  before 
Proceed-  the  convention.  Nicolls  was  no  doubt  a  man  in  ad- 
thl'con-  vance  of  his  age,  yet  the  whole  proceeding  may  be 
vention.  looked  upon  as  marking  a  definite  change  in  the  re 
lations  between  the  mother  country  and  her  colonies.  Twenty- 
five  years  earlier  such  a  proceeding  would  have  been  impossible. 
No  functionary  acting  virtually  as  the  servant  of  the  Crown 
would  have  dared  to  admit  that  he  could  be  indebted  to  a  colo 
nial  legislature  for  any  knowledge  of  the  needs  of  the  colonies  or 
of  the  principles  on  which  they  ought  to  be  governed,  least  of  all 
to  a  legislature  composed  of  disaffected  Puritans.  Nicolls's 
policy  was  an  admission  of  the  fundamental  principle  that  the 
colonists  themselves  best  understood  their  own  wants  and  their 
own  method  of  life.  At  the  same  time  Nicolls  clearly  showed 
that  he  accepted  that  only  as  a  guiding  principle,  and  that  he  was 
not  prepared  to  act  on  it  without  limitations,  or  to  follow  it 
wherever  it  might  carry  him.  When  the  code  drawn  up  by 
Nicolls  and  his  advisers  was  laid  before  the  convention,  the  dele 
gates  expressed  themselves  dissatisfied.  They  went  back  to  the 
promise  which  Nicolls  had  given  at  the  previous  meeting  at 
Gravesend,  that  the  newly  acquired  province  should  enjoy 
"equal  if  not  greater  freedom  and  immunities  than  any  of  his 
Majesty's  colonies  in  New  England."  This  they  interpreted  as 
promising  the  introduction  of  a  system  of  municipal  self-govern 
ment.  The  New  England  colonies,  they  urged,  chose  their  own 
magistrates;  if  Nicolls's  words  meant  anything,  they  themselves 
were  entitled  to  the  same  privilege.  One  township  indeed 
(Southold)  claimed  that  peculiar  and  unsatisfactory  right,  the 
nomination  of  military  officers  by  the  townsmen.  The  same 
township,  true  to  those  political  principles  which  had  hitherto 
guided  New  England,  and  which  a  hundred  years  later  were  to 
be  the  creed  of  the  whole  body  of  colonies,  demanded  that  all 
taxation  should  be  imposed  by  a  body  of  deputies,  and  that 
magistrates  should  be  dependent  for  their  salaries  on  the  free 
men. 

These  demands  were  met  by  Nicolls  with  that  tact  and  judg 
ment  which  marked  all  his  proceedings.  Certain  amendments 
in  detail  Nicolls  accepted.  He  further  gave  a  general  promise 
that  if  any  township  required  a  change  in  the  laws,  and  de- 


HO  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST. 

manded  it  at  the  General  Assize  through  its  own  magistrate,  the 
matter  should  be  considered.  That  well  illustrates  the  strength 
Nicoiis's  and  the  weakness  of  the  system  introduced  by  Nicolls. 
^th'the  Ifs  merits  were  in  a  measure  personal.  He  might 
convention,  administer  the  system  equitably  and  with  a  due 
regard  for  the  interest  of  all.  There  was  no  guarantee 
that  it  would  be  so  administered  by  his  successor.  Nor  could  a 
justice  nominated  by  the  Governor  be  regarded  on  any  constitu 
tional  theory  as  the  representative  of  the  commonalty.  Yet  it 
was  proved  by  events,  as  might  have  been  foreseen,  that  magis 
trates  chosen  from  the  settlers  among  whom  they  lived  were  in 
practice  exponents  of  popular  feeling.  That  view  underlay  the 
answer  which  Nicolls  made  to  the  demands  of  the  freemen.  He 
frankly  met  their  demands  for  self-government  by  telling  them 
that,  according  to  the  letter  of  his  instructions,  the  choice  of 
magistrates  was  vested  in  the  Governor.  Beyond  that  he  could 
not  go.  If  they  wanted  more  they  must  go  to  the  King  for  it. 
But  he  reminded  them  they  were  no  worse  off  than  men  in  Eng 
land,  where  all  judicial  authority  emanated  from  the  Crown. 

The  implied  reductio  ad  absurdum  was  not  as  effective  for 
men  living  in  1665  as  it  would  be  to-day.  But  underlying  it  was 
the  sound  doctrine  that,  when  power  is  widely  diffused,  it  is  sure 
to  fall  under  the  actual,  though  perhaps  informal,  control  of 
public  opinion.  Whether  that  control  is  efficient  will  depend 
rather  on  the  elements  of  which  public  opinion  is  made  up,  than 
on  the  machinery  through  which  it  finds  expression. 

Confidence  in  their  capacity  for  resisting  any  abuse  of  arbi 
trary  power,  together  with  gratitude  and  good  will  towards 
influence  Nicolls  himself,  led  the  settlers  to  accept  a  settlement 
England.  which  in  theory  fell  far  short  of  their  demands.  An 
other  reconciling — or  perhaps  one  should  rather  say  restraining 
— influence  was  at  work.  The  reduction  of  New  Netherlands 
was  but  a  part  of  the  work  intrusted  to  Nicolls  by  his  commis 
sion.  It  also  gave  him  almost  unlimited  administrative  power 
in  the  New  England  colonies.  The  settlers  on  Long  Island  were 
connected  by  origin  and  interest  with  New  England,  and  we 
may  be  sure  that  they  were  sufficiently  influenced  by  those  ties 
to  feel  the  need  for  dealing  in  a  spirit  of  conciliation  with  Nicolls 
and  his  colleagues.  The  Long  Island  settlers,  too,  looked  for 
guidance  to  Connecticut,  and  that  was  the  very  colony  which 


THE  DUKE'S  LAWS,  lit 

had  most  inducement  to  take  a  moderate  and  friendly  attitude 
towards  the  Commissioners.  One  of  Nicolls's  measures  after 
the  conquest  had  been  to  settle  the  boundary  with  Connecticut. 
As  we  have  seen,  the  southern  portion  of  that  colony  was  very 
loosely  defined  by  its  new  patent.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  if 
Nicolls  had  rigidly  insisted  on  the  Duke's  legal  rights  to  all  the 
territory  to  which  the  Dutch  could  plead  a  title,  he  might  have 
very  seriously  embarrassed  Connecticut.  Nicolls  wisely  saw 
that  the  same  policy  which  had  granted  Connecticut  such  favor 
able  terms,  detaching  her  from  Massachusetts  and  annihilating 
New  Haven,  made  it  expedient  now  to  deal  liberally  in  the  in 
terpretation  of  those  terms.  He  accordingly  assented  to  an  ar 
rangement  by  which  five  townships,  lying  strictly  within  the 
limits  of  the  Duke's  patent,  were  ceded  to  Connecticut.1  It  was 
at  the  same  time  arranged  that  a  boundary  line  should  be  drawn 
running  at  a  uniform  distance  of  twenty  miles  from  the  Hudson. 
Either  through  incapable  surveying  or  through  deliberate  fraud 
on  the  part  of  those  who  acted  for  Connecticut,  the  line  was 
drawn  some  miles  too  far  to  the  south-east,  and  thus  a  question 
was  left  open  which  gave  rise  to  much  future  dispute  and  litiga 
tion.2 

For  the  present,  however,  the  point  seemed  to  be  settled  on 
terms  peculiarly  favorable  to  Connecticut.  In  winning  the  good 
graces  of  that  colony,  Nicolls  was  doing  much  to  put  himself  on 
a  friendly  footing  with  the  English  part  of  his  own  province, 
while  the  liberality  of  the  Connecticut  charter  and  the  spirit  in 
which  it  had  been  interpreted  were  an  earnest  of  the  good  results- 
of  loyalty. 

The  Duke's  laws,  as  the  body  of  enactments  drawn  up  by 
Nicolls  and  ratified  by  the  convention  was  called,  were  a  code, 
The  Duke's  not  a  constitution.  Yet  in  one  or  two  matters  it  may 
laws.  be  said  to  have  defined  constitutional  relations.  It 

did  not  create  a  complete  system  of  self-governing  townships 
such  as  existed  in  New  England,  but  it  did  invest  the  townships 
with  certain  rights.  Each  town  was  to  choose  from  its  own  free 
men  eight  overseers.  Of  these,  four  were  to  retire  each  year. 
The  eight  were  to  choose  a  constable  from  among  their  own 
number.  This  body  might  act  as  a  court  for  the  trial  of  civil 

1  Nicolls  to  the  Duke  of  York,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  106. 

2  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.   556. 


112  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST. 

cases  concerning  sums  under  five  pounds,  and  might  pass  by-laws 
for  their  towns.  Each  township,  too,  was  to  assess  its  own  rates. 

In  New  England  the  township  carried  with  it  a  necessary  in 
cident,  the  church;  we  may  almost  say  that  the  township  and 
Ecciesi-  the  church  were  the  same  body  looked  at  from  dif- 
system.  ferent  points  of  view.  The  Duke's  laws  followed 
this  as  closely  as  was  possible  in  a  community  where  the  various 
religions  of  the  settlers  made  any  common  ecclesiastical  system 
impossible.  There  was  to  be  in  every  township  a  church,  the 
denomination  of  which  should  be  settled  by  the  majority  of  the 
householders.  They  were  to  elect  a  minister,  but  he  could  not 
be  instituted  unless  he  had  received  ordination  in  England  or  in 
some  recognized  Protestant  country.  Moreover  ministers  were 
so  far  to  conform  to  the  usages  of  the  Church  of  England  that 
they  were  to  pray  for  the  royal  family,  and  to  preach  not  only 
on  Sundays  and  on  the  5th  of  November,  but  on  the  anniversa 
ries  of  the  execution  of  Charles  I.  and  of  the  Restoration.  They 
were  also  required  to  baptize  the  children  of  all  Christian 
parents,  and  to  marry  all  persons  who  offered  themselves,  and 
who  complied  with  the  needful  legal  formalities.  Each  town 
ship  was  to  maintain  its  church  and  pay  its  minister,  and  this 
responsibility  was  to  be  enforced  by  church-wardens,  appointed 
by  the  overseers.  Though  the  obligation  of  contributing  fell 
upon  all,  yet  no  professing  Christian  was  to  suffer  in  any  way 
for  his  religious  opinions. 

Such  a  system  would  have  been  thoroughly  odious  in  the  eyes 
of  such  a  one  as  Endicott  or  Dudley.  It  left  the  heretic  at 
large;  it  required  from  the  ministry  an  open  acknowledgment 
that  they  were  within  certain  limits  the  servants  of  the  Crown. 
Above  all  it  introduced  that  "polypiety"  which  was  abhorred  by 
the  Massachusetts  Puritan.  Nor  did  it  only  in  theory  make  it 
possible.  Composed  as  New  York  was,  it  was  certain  that  the 
Calvinist,  the  Lutheran,  and  the  Baptist  would  all  be  strong 
enough  to  form  churches.  Yet  in  real  truth  such  practice  came 
nearer  the  theory  on  which  New  England  started,  that  of  inde 
pendent  religious  societies,  than  the  actual  practice  of  Massa 
chusetts,  where  each  church  was  independent  in  name  only,  in 
fact  was  under  the  control  of  a  vague  public  opinion. 

The  penal  portion  of  the  code  showed  something  of  the 
stringency  of  Puritan  legislation.  The  clause  protecting  the 


PENAL   CODE.  "3 

Christian  of  whatever  creed  from  persecution  was  in  practice  an 
ample  guarantee  for  toleration.  The  theory  of  freedom  of 
Penal  opinion  was  completely  set  at  defiance  by  a  clause 

system.  which  made  it  a  capital  crime  to  deny  the  true  God. 
But  the  clause  which  granted  toleration  within  the  field  of  Chris 
tianity  no  doubt  did  all  that  was  practically  needed. 

A  clause  which  made  it  a  capital  crime  to  strike  a  parent 
showed  plain  traces  of  its  Puritan  origin.  The  laws  con 
tained  certain  restrictions  on  servitude;  these,  however,  do  not 
seem  to  contemplate  the  case  of  the  negro,  but  of  the  hired  la 
borer,  or  the  indented  servant,  bound  for  a  fixed  time. 

One  restriction  imposed  on  the  first  class  was  that  they  were 
bound  to  take  their  wages  if  their  master  pleases  in  merchanta 
ble  corn.  Indented  servants  might  not  trade  on  their  own  ac 
count,  but  might  not  be  transferred  from  one  service  to  another 
for  more  than  a  year  without  their  own  consent. 

The  code  contemplated  a  somewhat  parental  attitude  on  the 
part  of  the  government  towards  master  and  servant.  The  over 
seers  were  empowered  if  a  master  "abused  his  servant  tyrannic 
ally  and  cruelly"  to  admonish  him,  and  on  the  second  offense  to 
interfere.  If  the  injury  amounted  to  maiming  the  servant  be 
came  free.  On  the  other  hand,  if  a  servant  complained  un 
reasonably  he  might  be  punished  by  the  addition  of  three  months 
to  his  term  of  service. 

Trade  with  the  Indians  in  arms,  ammunition,  and  drink  was 
not  absolutely  forbidden,  but  could  only  be  carried  on  under  a 
license  from  the  Governor,  and  all  purchases  of  land  from  them 
had  to  be  formally  entered  in  a  public  register. 

On  one  important  point  the  Duke's  laws  throw  light  on  the 
social  and  economical  condition  of  the  colony.  They  clearly 
contemplate  the  existence  of  a  common  arable  field,  to  be  pas 
tured  by  the  different  commoners  after  the  corn  harvest/ 

Though  the  Governor  refused  to  accept  that  part  of  the  mili 
tary  system  of  New  England  by  which  each  company  elected  its 
own  officers,  yet,  as  there,  the  inhabitants  were  organized  into 
a  militia,  with  divisions  corresponding  to  the  shire  and  the 
township.  There  were  to  be  four  trainings  a  year  in  each  town 
ship,  one  joint  one  in  each  riding,  and  one  every  second  year  for 
the  whole  militia  of  the  colony.  All  males  over  sixteen  unless 

1  This  is  noticed  in  Mr.   Elkmg's  monograph  "The  Dutch  Village." 


H4  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST. 

specially  exempted  were  liable  for  duty.  This  obligation,  how 
ever,  did  not  bind  them  to  serve  outside  the  colony.  For  any 
external  service,  such  as  assisting  the  New  England  colonies- 
against  the  Indians,  a  volunteer  force  might  be  raised.1 

It  is  plain  that  this  code  was  intended  to  apply  at  once  and 
entirely  only  to  the  half-Anglicized  colonies  on  Long  Island- 
It  is  not  altogether  clear  what  was  in  the  meantime  the  position 
of  the  Dutch. 

The  motives  which  withheld  Nicolls  from  forcing  the  new 
code  on  the  Dutch  settlers  made  themselves  felt  in  his  whole 
Nicoiis's  policy.  It  had  been  made  a  matter  of  reproach 

treatment  .  .  . 

of  the  against  Stuyvesant  that  in  disputes  between  his  own 

Dutch  iiT-i-iTiii  i- 

settlers.  countrymen  and  the  Lnglish  he  had  shown  a  readi 
ness  to  lean  towards  the  latter,  and  to  be  guided  by  their 
counsels.  The  English  settlers  on  Long  Island  might  with  some 
show  of  reason  have  brought  a  like  charge  against  Nicolls.  His 
administrative  policy  was  equitable  towards  all.  But  towards 
the  Dutch  it  showed  a  special  anxiety  to  smooth  over  difficulties. 
This  was  conspicuously  illustrated  in  the  matter  of  titles  to  land. 
The  code  decreed  that  all  landholders  must  take  out  a  patent  in 
regular  form  from  the  new  Proprietor.  Under  an  unjust  gov 
ernor  this  might  easily  have  been  made  the  pretext  for  a  whole 
sale  process  of  spoliation.  As  it  was,  it  involved  the  payment  of 
a  quit  rent  and  a  fee  to  an  official.  This  demand  was  at  first 
disregarded.  The  Court  of  Assize  found  it  necessary  to  call  at 
tention  to  this  at  its  first  meeting  in  1665,  a°d  again  more 
stringently  in  i666.2  In  Long  Island  and  among  the  English 
settlements  on  the  mainland  it  was  strictly  enforced.  But  in  the 
city  of  New  York,  where  the  inhabitants  held  patents  from  the 
Dutch  Company,  the  fees  were  lightened,  and  at  Albany  a  cer 
tain  amount  of  indulgence  was  shown  in  granting  time  for  pay 
ment." 

The  history  of  Albany  during  the  years  which  immediately 
followed  the  conquest  furnishes  a  good  illustration  of  the  tact 
Affairs  at  an(^  judgment  which  Nicolls  brought  to  bear  upon 
Albany.  his  task.  From  the  outset  the  English  troops  there, 
removed  like  those  at  Delaware  from  under  the  eye  of  their 


1The  Duke's  laws  are  to  be  found  in  the  N.  Y.  Hist.  Coll.  ist  series,  vol. 
'  N.   Y.  Hist.  Coll.  ist  series,  vol.  i.  pp.  410-8. 
*  Brodhead,  vol.   ii.   pp.    109-10. 


AFFAIRS  AT  ALBANY.  115 

commander,  had  been  a  source  of  annoyance  to  the  Dutch  popu 
lation.  The  existing  civil  officers  were  all  retained.  The  mili 
tary  authority  of  the  conqueror  and  the  civil  authority  of  the 
conquered,  face  to  face,  could  hardly  fail  to  breed  ill  blood. 
We  find  Nicolls  anxiously  charging  his  chief  commander  in 
these  parts,  Brodhead,  to  restrain  his  soldiers  from  annoying  the 
settlers  in  any  way,  to  turn  a  deaf  ear  to  all  whispered  slanders 
against  the  Dutch,  not  to  become  the  head  of  a  party,  but  to 
govern  equitably  in  the  interests  of  all. 

Brodhead's  conduct  soon  showed  how  Nicolls's  admonitions 
were  needed.  In  the  winter  of  1666  the  settlers  at  Esopus, 
sixty-four  miles  below  Albany,  showed  a  disaffected  spirit. 
When  Brodhead  went  out  in  quest  of  recruits,  men  withheld 
their  neighbors  from  joining.  They  might  have  to  fight  for 
their  enemies  against  their  own  friends. 

Brodhead  showed  no  anxiety  to  profit  by  Nicolls's  advice  and 
example.  He  was  fool  enough  to  imprison  a  settler  who  insisted 
on  keeping  Christmas  on  the  25th  of  December  according  to  the 
New  Style,  not  yet  adopted  by  England.  He  had  an  undignified 
quarrel  with  a  person,  throwing  a  dish  at  his  opponent's  head 
and  then  arresting  him. 

The  Dutch  civil  magistrate  insisted  that  the  prisoner  should 
be  handed  over  to  him.  This  Brodhead  refused.  Thereupon  a 
mob  of  sixty  villagers  gathered  together  and  attempted  a  rescue, 
and  in  the  tumult  which  followed  one  was  killed.1 

As  soon  as  the  news  reached  New  York,  Nicolls  sent  three 
commissioners  to  hold  an  inquiry  and  to  deal  with  the  offenders. 
His  choice  of  agents,  one  English  and  two  Dutch,  was  sig 
nificant.  There  was,  however,  little  room  for  national  par 
tiality,  since  they  were  closely  tied  down  by  instructions  from  the 
Governor.  They  were  to  suspend  Brodhead.  He  had  neglected 
his  instructions,  and  had  broken  the  law  in  disregarding  the  ap 
plication  of  the  magistrates.  The  ringleaders  were  to  be  sent 
to  New  York  for  trial ;  the  rest  were  to  be  pardoned,  but  in  such 
a  manner  as  to  show  that  in  future  authority  would  be  strictly 
enforced.  The  settlers  were  to  learn  that  henceforth  any  man 
who  should  take  up  arms  against  the  soldiers  was  a  rebel.2 

1  Brodhead,  vol.   ii.  p.   122. 

"  The  names  of  the  commissioners  and  their  instructions  are  in  the  N.   Y. 
Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.   149. 


Il6  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST. 

Four  of  the  chief  offenders  were  singled  out  and  sent  down 
as  ordered  to  the  capital.  Nicolls's  mode  of  dealing  with  them 
was  characteristic.  Their  case  came  before  the  council.  In 
theory  Nicolls  was  no  more  than  president,  and  had  no  superi 
ority  but  that  given  by  a  casting  vote.  We  may  be  sure,  how 
ever,  that  the  sentence  to  be  passed  depended  very  largely  on  his 
personal  wishes.  A  rigorous  sentence  would  have  been  probably 
unjust,  certainly  impolitic.  Nicolls,  however,  saw  that  it  was 
better  for  him  individually  to  have  a  reputation  for  firmness 
than  for  clemency.  He  expressed  his  opinion  that  all  four  had 
been  guilty  of  a  capital  crime.  The  council  backed  by  the 
principal  settlers  interceded,  and  Nicolls  commuted  the  sen 
tence  to  banishment.  The  form  of  the  sentence  shows  how  com 
pletely  and  definitely  the  Dutch  and  English  sections  of  the 
colony  were  treated  as  distinct.  Heymans,  the  chief  offender, 
was  excluded  from  every  part  of  the  colony.  The  other  three 
were  only  banished  from  Albany,  with  its  suburb  of  Esopus,  and 
from  New  York.1  The  sentence  was  soon  relaxed,  and  within 
two  years  we  find  Heymans  holding  a  civil  office. 

It  is  not  difficult  to  see  the  guiding  principles  which  through 
out  underlay  Nicolls's  policy.  His  experience  as  a  commissioner 
New  York  m  Massachusetts  must  have  shown  him  that  self- 

to  be  a 

check  on  governing  townships  of  the  New  England  pattern 
England.  were  not  the  material  out  of  which  to  build  a  colony 
loyal  to  the  Proprietor.  On  the  other  hand,  the  alien  colony 
might  by  wise  policy  be  made  an  instrument  for  curbing  the  dis 
affection  of  Massachusetts.  Nicolls's  views  on  this  point  are 
clearly  set  forth  in  a  letter  written  to  Arlington  in  the  spring 
of  1666.  He  has  begun  "to  set  up  a  school  of  better  religion 
and  obedience  to  God  and  the  King  than  were  to  be  found  in 
New  England."  With  good  administration  New  York  will  in 
time  rival  and  ultimately  overthrow  the  commercial  prosperity 
of  Boston.  Nicolls  had  been  willing  to  use  the  English  settlers 
on  Long  Island  and  their  kinsmen  in  New  England  as  an  instru 
ment  for  the  reduction  of  the  Dutch  colony.  But  a  passage  in 
the  very  same  letter  shows  that  he  had  no  real  faith  in  that  alli 
ance.  He  had  seen,  he  says,  that  he  cannot  depend  on  Con 
necticut.  For  the  defense  of  the  colony  he  must  rely  on  the 
troops  whom  he  brought  with  him  from  England.2 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  143.  2N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  pp.   113-5. 


DUTCH  NOT  DISAFFECTED.  n? 

The  general  principles  set  forth  in  this  letter  were  the  same 
which  had  led  Nicolls  a  year  before  to  buy  from  the  savages  a 
tract  on  the  west  bank  of  the  river  below  Albany,  and  to  issue 
invitations  to  emigrants  calling  their  attention  to  this  territory. 
It  was  his  policy  to  build  up  on  the  foundation  of  the  Dutch 
settlement  in  the  valley  of  the  Hudson  a  colony  dissociated  from 
New  England,  to  serve  as  a  stronghold  of  the  royal  power. 

How  little  of  real  national  feeling  there  was  among  the  Dutch 
settlers  was  plainly  shown  by  the  history  of  the  years  1666  and 
Nodis-  1667.  All  through  the  first-named  year  the  settlers 
among°the  must  have  known  how  things  stood  in  Europe.  Some 
Dutch.  tidings  must  have  reached  them  of  those  terrible 
days  in  the  summer  of  1667,  when  news  came  to  London  that 
the  Dutch  fleet  had  broken  the  chain  at  Chatham  and  that  the 
flower  of  the  English  navy  were  seized  or  burnt;  when  men  at 
Greenwich  or  Wapping  lay  down  each  night  believing  that 
the  morning  would  bring  De  Ruyter's  ships  in  full  sail  before 
their  eyes,  and  when  citizens  were  sending  their  hoards  into  the 
country  to  be  buried  in  the  ground.  All  the  resources  that 
Nicolls  had  at  his  command  were  the  regular  troops  whom  he 
had  brought  out  with  him,  a  force  of  four  hundred  and  fifty 
men,  weakened  by  the  loss  of  the  detachments  drawn  off  to  gar 
rison  Albany  and  Newcastle.  At  the  same  time  Dutch  pri 
vateers  were  threatening  Virginia  and  making  the  American 
coast  unsafe  for  English  merchantmen.  If  the  settlers  in  New 
York  really  felt  the  English  yoke  irksome,  if  they  had  any  wish 
to  return  to  their  allegiance  to  Holland,  can  we  doubt  that  they 
would  at  once  have  seized  the  opportunity  and  struck  a  blow? 
Yet  while  Nicolls  was  eagerly  expecting  news  from  Europe 
with  a  foreboding  of  some  fearful  calamity  to  England,  and 
while  he  was  apprehensive  what  the  Dutch  ships  might  do  off 
the  American  coast,  it  is  plain  that  a  rising  of  the  Dutch  settlers 
never  entered  into  his  calculations.  It  is  clear  from  his  dis 
patches  that  he  is  far  more  anxious  for  the  arrival  of  stores  from 
England  than  he  is  about  the  threats  of  the  Dutch  West  India 
Company.  How  secure  he  felt  on  that  head  we  can  best  judge 
from  a  letter  of  November  1667,  where  he  reports  that  he  is 
organizing  a  part  of  the  colonial  militia  as  horse  and  dragoons 
to  guard  the  north-west  frontier  against  the  French.1 

1  Nicolls  to  Arlington,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  167. 


Il8  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST. 

In  the  autumn  of  1667  the  treaty  of  Breda  gave  England  se 
cure  possession  of  her  new  province.  The  principle  of  that 
Treaty  of  treaty  was  that  each  country  should  retain  all  terri- 
Breda.  tory  tjjat  jt  ha(j  captured  during  the  present  war. 
When  an  abortive  negotiation  was  opened  in  1665  the  States 
protested  that  New  Netherlands  should  not  be  included  in  any 
such  compact.  That,  they  averred,  had  been  taken  from  them 
in  peace  and  ought,  therefore,  to  be  given  back  without  any 
equivalent.1  They,  however,  now  abandoned  that  claim. 
Surinam  and  Poleron  in  the  Nutmeg  group  of  islands  had  been 
taken  by  the  Dutch  arms  and  were  retained.  The  whole  policy 
of  the  Dutch  taught  them  to  value  such  possessions  far  more 
than  the  comparatively  unprofitable  tract  on  the  American  coast, 
with  its  contentious  inhabitants,  ever  vexing  the  Government 
with  appeals  against  the  Company,  ever  liable  to  be  embroiled 
with  New  England  or  the  savage  tribes.  The  protestations  of 
the  West  India  Company  were  of  no  effect.  They  in  vain 
pointed  out  that  the  possession  of  New  Netherlands  by  England 
meant  her  supremacy  over  Northern  America.  France  never 
could  hold  Canada  against  such  odds ;  England  would  thus  gain 
an  addition  to  her  resources  which  could  confirm  her  empire 
over  the  seas.2 

One  may  doubt  whether  either  of  the  negotiating  parties  could 
see  the  full  force  of  such  reasoning.  In  England  public  opinion 
was  not  altogether  satisfied  that  the  change  was  a  gain.  It  was 
good  hap,  far  more  than  any  far-sighted  wisdom,  which  at  this 
juncture  gave  England  what  was  really  the  keystone  of  her 
American  Empire. 

Yet  even  while  negotiations  were  going  on,  events  must  have 
been  forcing  a  perception  of  the  truth  on  Nicolls ;  he  must  have 
Altered  begun  to  see  that  any  dispute  with  Holland  was  only 
towaVds8  important  as  it  bore  upon  that  mighty  struggle  which 
France.  was  drawing  near,  and  which  his  own  success  was 
doing  so  much  to  hasten.  To  the  Dutch  colony  the  Mohawk 
alliance  had  been  a  needful  condition  for  safe  trade,  for  security 
from  invasion  by  savages,  and  by  a  civilized  enemy  as  ruthless 
as  the  savages.  To  the  English  who  replaced  the  Dutch  it 


1  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  93. 

2  Memorial   of   the  West    India   Company  to  the   States-General,   March   25, 
1667.     N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  ii.  pp.  511-3. 


NEW  YORK  AND   CANADA.  1 19 

was  all  this  and  more.  With  the  Mohawks  hostile  there  must 
be  perpetual  dread  of  invasion  not  only  for  the  dwellers  on 
the  Hudson,  but  for  the  whole  body  of  the  New  England  colo 
nies.  To  detach  the  Mohawks  from  their  old  alliance  would  be 
the  first  step  for  France  in  that  policy  of  aggression,  which  if  it 
succeeded  must  be  a  lasting  bar  to  the  union  of  the  English  colo 
nies.  Henceforth  the  history  of  French  Canada  and  the 
history  of  the  British  colonies  are  inseparably  connected,  and 
in  all  their  relations  New  Netherlands  is  the  chief  meeting- 
point. 

If  the  King  of  France  and  his  advisers  failed  to  understand 
the  situation,  it  was  not  so  with  the  French  rulers  of  Canada; 
that  can  be  seen  from  a  dispatch  sent  by  Talon,  an  important 
official  in  the  colony,  to  Colbert.  Let  the  King,  he  says,  arrange 
for  the  restitution  of  New  Netherlands  by  the  English,  and  then 
purchase  it  from  the  States-General.  Thereby  France  would 
have  two  entrances  into  Canada,  and  would  gain  a  monopoly  of 
the  Northern  fur  trade,  the  Five  Nations  would  be  at  their 
mercy,  and  New  England  would  be  kept  within  bounds.1  The 
whole  situation  could  not  be  summed  up  more  clearly  and  ef 
fectively. 

The  conquest  of  New  Netherlands  at  once  brought  the  Eng 
lish  into  direct  relations  with  the  Mohawks.  Within  a  month 
Dealings  of  the  time  that  Cartwright  took  the  command  at 
J'/ve  the  Albany,  the  chiefs  of  the  Mohawks  and  the  Senecas 
Nations.  appeared  there  and  confirmed  by  treaty  that  alliance 
which  had  hitherto  bound  them  to  the  Dutch.  There  was  to  be 
peace  and  trade  between  the  two  nations,  and  the  English  were 
to  aid  the  Mohawks  if  necessary  against  the  tribes  on  the  lower 
waters  of  the  Hudson.2 

This  alliance,  however,  was  only  binding  on  the  Mohawks 
and  the  Senecas.  There  would  seem  at  this  time  to  have  been 
Adminis-  a  certain  absence  of  unity  in  the  action  of  the  Iro- 
chsmges  in  quois  confederacy.  The  occasion  was  a  critical  one. 
Canada.  'pjje  transfer  of  the  Hudson  valley  to  the  English  was 
accompanied  by  a  change  in  the  administration  of  Canada. 
Hitherto  the  French  colony  had  been  virtually  no  more  than  a 


1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  ix.  p.   57. 

*  The  treaty,  with  facsimiles  of  the  marks  which  were  the  equivalents  for  the 
Indian  signatures,  is  in  the  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  67. 


120  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST. 

station  for  trade  and  missionary  work.  The  relations  with  the 
savages  had  been  mainly  controlled  by  the  Jesuit,  the  trapper, 
and  the  hunter.  The  executive  had  been  perpetually  hampered 
by  disputes  with  the  ecclesiastical  authority.  But  in  1664  a  gov 
ernor  was  appointed  of  comprehensive  views,  and  of  resolute 
and  aggressive  temper,  and  he  was  furnished  with  military  re 
sources  equal  to  carrying  out  a  vigorous  policy.  Though  the 
Marquis  of  Tracy  was  seventy,  yet  it  is  clear  that  age  had  done 
nothing  to  weaken  his  will  or  his  mind.  He  had  under  his 
command  a  regiment  of  twelve  hundred  men,  raised  originally 
in  Savoy.  It  had  done  good  service  in  Eastern  Europe,  and 
bore  the  name  of  its  original  commander,  the  Prince  of  Cari- 
gnan.1 

Tracy's  first  military  measure  was  to  secure  the  connection 
between  the  St.  Lawrence  and  the  Hudson.  To  this  end  three 
Tracy  forts  were  built  along  the  valley  of  the  Richelieu, 

fortifies  .  .  _     ,        — .f  .    .  .  ,  ' 

the  frontier,  the  stream  connecting  Lake  Champlain  with  the 
great  river  of  Canada.  On  the  3Oth  of  June  Tracy  landed  at 
Quebec.  By  the  end  of  July  his  engineers  were  at  work  upon 
the  forts,  and  before  the  summer  was  out  the  work  was  com 
plete.  Next  year  the  same  policy  was  carried  further,  and  an 
island  on  Lake  Champlain  was  occupied  and  fortified.2 

The  wisdom  of  this  measure  was  at  once  seen.  Through  the 
autumn  the  Hurons,  the  allies  of  the  French,  took  refuge  under 
Effect  on  cover  of  the  new  forts  from  the  attacks  of  the  Iro- 
Nations.  quois.  The  Iroquois  saw,  too,  that  they  could  no 
longer  count  on  their  woods  and  streams  for  safety.  Chiefs  of 
the  Oneidas  and  Onondagas  came  to  Quebec  and  asked  humbly 
for  peace.  Henceforth  they  were  to  be  the  vassals  and  allies  of 
France.  Such  at  least  was  the  interpretation  which  the  French 
put  on  the  treaty,  yet  it  must  be  remembered  that  in  dealings- 
between  civilized  men  and  savages  a  strict  interpretation  of 
language  is  hardly  possible.  But  at  least  the  savages  promised  in 
their  own  figurative  language,  as  interpreted  by  the  French,  to- 
clasp  their  new  allies  by  the  waist,  not  merely  to  hold  them 'by 
their  skirts.  The  Iroquois  were  to  plant  villages  within  the 

1  For  the  Carignan  regiment  see  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  ix.  p.  32,  with  editor's- 
note. 

*  "Fort  Anne,  recently  constructed  by  Sieur  de  la  Mothe  on  an  island  in 
Lake  Champlain."  Report  in  French  Archives,  translated,  O'Callaghan,  vol. 
i.  p.  48. 


THE  FRENCH  AND    THE  FIVE  NATIONS.  121 

French  territory,  and  the  French  were  to  send  among  them 
traders  and  missionaries.1 

It  is  scarcely  possible  to  estimate  what  might  have  been  the; 
effects  of  this  treaty  on  the  whole  future  of  America  had  it  been 
carried  out  fully  and  loyally.  Though  the  Indian  spokesmen 
were  taken  only  from  the  Oneidas  and  Onondagas,  yet  they 
claimed  to  speak  for  the  Senecas  and  Cayugas,  or  at  least  for  a 
section  of  each  tribe  as  well.2  Of  the  Five  Nations  only  the 
Mohawks  held  back.  Their  late  dealings  with  the  English  had 
shown  a  certain  disposition  on  their  part  for  separate  action. 
Unluckily  for  the  French  the  Mohawks  were  in  fighting  power 
the  backbone  of  the  savage  confederacy.  Since  they  could  not  be; 
won  they  must  be  intimidated. 

In  January  1666  one  of  Tracy's  lieutenants,  De  Courcelles, 
was  dispatched  into  the  Mohawk  country  at  the  head  of  five 
Tracy  in-  hundred  men.  In  the  dead  of  winter  a  force  of  civi- 
Maoh!wlkC  lize(J  men  set  forth  on  a  march  of  nine  hundred  miles 
country. *  through  the  wilderness.  In  one  way  the  season  was 
favorable  to  the  enterprise.  When  the  forests  were  bare  of 
leaves  the  savages  had  not  the  same  opportunities  for  attacking - 
from  ambush.  Moreover  the  treaty  with  the  four  tribes  had 
secured  the  approaches  to  the  Mohawk  country.  The  Hurons,. 
who  were  to  have  shown  the  French  the  way,  shrank  back  and 
failed  them.  With  no  guide  save  the  sun  in  the  heavens,  in 
snowshoes,  carrying  their  blankets  and  their  food,  the  gallant 
little  troop  forced  its  way  through  the  Mohawk  country.  Their 
scheme  seems  to  have  been  to  strike  terror  by  devastating  the 
Mohawk  villages.  It  is  hardly  surprising  that  they  should 
have  failed  to  find  their  goal.  They  overshot  the  mark,  and  in 
less  than  three  weeks  after  they  left  Quebec  reached  a  point  two- 
miles  from  the  Dutch  settlement  of  Schenectady.  Here  for  the 
first  time  they  heard  of  a  hostile  Indian  force  in  their  neighbor 
hood.  A  detachment  was  sent  against  them ;  a  portion  of  them 
fell  into  an  ambush,  and  the  Mohawks  appeared  at  Schenectady 

1  An   English   translation   of   the  treaty   is  in   the  N.   Y.   Docs.   vol.   Hi.   p. . 
121,  etc. 

J  I  infer  this  from  the  language  of  the  treaty. 

*  Probably  the   best  authority   for  this  expedition  is  an  unsigned  report  by 
an   Englishman   in   O'Callaghan,  vol.   i.   p.   50.     This   is  preceded   by  a   French 
report,  apparently  official.     This  is  very  bald,  and  is  conveniently  silent  about 
the    discomfiture    by   the    Mohawks    and   the   interview   with    the   settlers    from. 
Albany. 


122  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST. 

with  the  scalps  of  four  of  their  victims.  The  surviving  French 
were  met  by  a  deputation  of  three  Dutch  settlers  protesting 
against  the  invasion  of  the  dominion  of  the  King  of  England. 
Courcelles  replied  that  he  had  only  come  against  the  Mohawks, 
and  added,  whether  truly  or  not  one  can  hardly  judge,  that  he 
had  not  heard  of  the  English  occupation.  He  knew,  however, 
that  France  and  Holland  were  now  allied  against  England,  and 
for  a  moment  he  thought  of  striking  a  blow  at  Albany.  But  he 
gave  up  the  scheme  when  he  learned  that  the  place  was  gar 
risoned  and  had  artillery.  The  Dutch  settlers,  relieved  from  the 
fear  of  invasion,  received  the  strangers  kindly ;  food  was  supplied 
and  quarters  offered,  but  De  Courcelles  thought  that  discipline 
might  suffer  if  his  men  entered  the  village,  and  that  the  com 
forts  of  Dutch  firesides  might  disincline  them  from  the  home 
ward  march.  Seven,  however,  of  his  wounded  men  were  left  to 
be  cared  for  at  Albany.  De  Courcelles  then  turned  towards  the 
frontier.  The  force  reached  Quebec  some  sixty  short  of  its  full 
numbers,  but  most  of  the  missing  men  had  only  straggled,  and 
save  a  few  they  reached  home  in  safety. 

Now  that  war  was  declared  between  England  and  France,  the 
attitude  of  the  savages  assumed  an  importance  which  it  had  never 
had  before.  The  Mohawk  alliance  was  what  the  Afghan  alli 
ance  has  been  in  later  days  to  England  and  Russia. 

The  English  flattered  themselves  that  the  aggressive  policy  of 
Tracy  had  failed,  and  that  the  Mohawks  would  look  on  the 
Negotia-  French  invasion  as  mere  wild  fire,  without  substance 
thenFive  or  danger.  The  events  of  the  following  summer 
wfthThe  showed  that  the  calculation  was  too  sanguine,  and 
French.  \hat  the  Mohawks  were  wavering.  Even  more  than 
before  they  saw  themselves  isolated  and  threatened.  The  Sen- 
ecas  sent  an  embassy  to  Quebec  to  confirm  the  treaty  made  in  their 
name,1  and  the  erection  of  the  island  fort  on  Lake  Champlain 
was  a  further  source  of  terror.  In  June  a  second  force,  this  time 
of  four  hundred  men,  was  made  ready  to  invade  the  Mohawk 
country.2  But  before  it  started  news  came  which  seemed  to 
make  it  needless.  The  English  commander  at  Albany,  hardly 
understanding  what  was  at  stake,  advised  the  Mohawks  to  make 

1  An  account  of  this  treaty,  taken  from  the  French  Archives  and  translated 
into  English,  is  in  the  N.  Y.   Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.    125. 

2  Tracy  to  the  commissaries  at  Albany,  July  19,  1666,  translated,  N.  Y.  Docs, 
vol.  iii.  p.  131. 


FRENCH  EXPEDITION  AGAINST   THE  MOHAWKS.      123 

terms  with  the  French,  and  sent  a  dispatch  to  Tracy  telling  what 
counsel  he  had  given.1  The  letter  was  brought  by  the  chiefs  of 
the  Oneidas.  A  representative  of  that  tribe  had  joined  in  the 
treaty  of  1665,  but  it  seems  doubtful  whether  the  whole  tribe  re 
garded  themselves  as  bound  by  his  action.  The  letter  from 
Albany  was  taken  by  Tracy  as  a  guarantee  for  the  peaceful  in 
tentions  of  the  Mohawks,  one  may  almost  say  as  a  formal  sur 
render  by  the  English  of  the  alliance.  Negotiations  were  at 
once  opened;  instead  of  an  invading  force  envoys  were  sent  to 
treat  with  the  Mohawks  at  Albany;  if  they  preferred  it  they 
might  come  in  safety  to  Quebec.2 

Just  as  the  prize  seemed  won,  an  attack  on  a  French  hunting 
party  by  the  Mohawks  changed  all.  Some  were  captured,  others 
Failure  of  killed.  Among  the  latter  was  Tracy's  nephew,  De 
nations.  Chazy.  The  Governor  at  once  recalled  the  envoys 
and  reverted  to  his  original  scheme  of  an  invasion.  But  when 
the  invading  force  was  on  its  march  it  was  met  by  a  Mohawk 
embassy.  The  conduct  of  the  Mohawks  makes  one  think  that 
this  was  no  more  than  a  feint  to  secure  time.  The  envoys  went 
on  to  Quebec  and  began  dealings  for  peace.  Before  long  one  of 
them,  in  an  outbreak  of  passion,  avowed  himself  the  murderer 
of  De  Chazy.  He  was  at  once  put  to  death,  and  his  principal 
colleagues  thrown  into  prison.8  The  death  of  that  one  savage 
counted  for  much  in  the  future  fortunes  of  England  and  France. 

Accordingly  in  the  autumn  of  1666  another  expedition  was  ar 
ranged  against  the  Mohawks.  This  time  Tracy  himself  took 
the  command  with  six  hundred  regulars  and  as  many  militia. 
The  force  penetrated  about  a  hundred  miles  south  of  Lake 
Champlain,  and  three  Mohawk  villages  were  destroyed  with 
their  granaries,  containing  a  two  years'  store  of  corn.  But  noth 
ing  was  done  in  the  way  of  permanent  occupation,  and  Tracy 
was  content  to  trust  to  the  terror  inspired  by  the  raid.  Mean 
while  Nicolls  had  become  fully  alive  to  the  need  of  encouraging 
and  supporting  the  Mohawks.  His  wish  that  the  whole  body  of 
English  colonists  should  give  them  active  support  was  hindered 
by  Connecticut.  Unfortunately  the  Mohawks  were  at  enmity 
with  the  Mohicans,  who  were,  alone  of  the  New  England  tribes, 
the  constant  allies  of  the  English.  Possibly  in  consequence  of 

1  Commissaries  of  Albany  to  Tracy.     N.  Y.   Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.   164. 

*lb.  vol.  ix.  p.  44.  » Ib.  vol.  iii.  p.   135. 


124  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST. 

this,  Nicolls  somewhat  modified  the  support  given  to  the  Mo 
hawks.  They  were  advised  to  seek  a  good  peace  with  the 
French,  but  to  seek  it,  if  needs  were,  by  a  show  of  force.  They 
should  insist  on  the  demolition  of  the  newly  built  chain  of  forts, 
and  should  tell  the  French  that  the  Mohawk  country  was  within 
the  dominions  of  the  King  of  England,  and  that  the  inhabitants 
of  it  owed  him  allegiance.1 

In  spite  of  this  advice  the  Mohawks  sent  an  embassy  to  Que 
bec  in  1667,  asking  that  missionaries  should  be  sent  into  their 
country,  and  making  no  stipulations,  but  offering  to  give  hos 
tages  for  good  behavior.2  Immediately  after  this  Tracy  had 
been  recalled,  as  his  services  were  needed  for  the  campaign  in 
Europe.  His  successor  (Courcelles)  had  direct  instructions  ta 
make  another  raid  into  the  Mohawk  country  and  to  intimidate 
— even  as  far  as  might  be  to  annihilate — that  stubborn  tribe." 
But  the  submissive  attitude  of  the  Mohawks  seemed  to  make- 
such  policy  unnecessary.  Instead  of  an  armed  force,  the  Gov 
ernor  sent  a  band  of  Jesuit  missionaries,  escorted  by  the  Mo 
hawks  who  had  come  to  Quebec. 

Nicolls  saw  that  he  had  no  ground  for  opposing  this  peaceful 
invasion.  When  the  Jesuits,  in  their  eagerness  to  check  the  trade 
in  spirits  among  their  new  converts,  begged  for  an  interview 
with  the  English  authorities,  Nicolls  acceded,  and  sailing  up  the 
Hudson  to  Schenectady  gave  them  an  audience  there.4 

Simultaneously  with  the  treaty  of  Breda  peace  was  made  be 
tween  France  and  England.  The  terms  of  the  peace  guaranteed 
to  the  French  Crown  secure  possession  of  the  disputed  territory 
of  Acadia.  But  nothing  was  said  of  the  country  between 
Canada  and  the  upper  waters  of  the  Hudson,  and  though  Nicolls 
might  acquiesce  in  the  advance  of  the  French  missionaries,  yet 
he  and  every  other  thoughtful  Englishman  must  have  seen  that 
in  that  region  the  American  battle  of  the  two  great  nations 
would  be  fought  out. 


1  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.   120. 

2  Brodhead   (vol.  ii.  p.   128)   says  that  the  Indian  emissaries  came  just  after 
Tracy's   departure.     But   Tracy  in   a  dispatch,    dated    Quebec,   April    30,    1667, 
says:   "I  have  granted  conditions  so  reasonable  to  the  Mohawks  that   I  doubt 
not  they  will  accept  peace."    The  dispatch  (translated)  is  in  the  N.  Y.  Docs, 
vol.  iii.  p.   151. 

8  Ib.   p.    130. 

4 1   can   find  no  particulars  of  this  affair  beyond  those  given   in   Brodhead,. 
vol.  ii.  p.  130.     He  refers  to  the  Jesuit  relation  in  a  report  for  1668. 


CARTERET'S  GRANT.  125 

The  hostility  of  France  and  Holland  was  not  the  only  danger 
-which  Nicolls  saw  threatening  his  province.  The  reckless  pro- 
The  grant  fusion  of  the  Proprietor  and  the  unscrupulous  greed 
ley^Tnd6"  °f  Berkeley  and  Carteret  had  dismembered  the  terri- 
Carteret.  tory  almost  before  it  was  acquired.  Before  his 
authority  over  the  conquered  province  was  a  year  old,  Nicolls 
heard  of  its  partial  alienation.  The  territory  on  the  Delaware 
might  have  been  spared.  It  lay  at  a  distance  from  the  seat  of 
government,  and  the  rival  claims  of  Maryland  lessened  its  value. 
But  to  lose  the  land  on  the  West  of  Manhattan  Bay  practically 
reduced  the  colony  to  Long  Island  and  the  valley  of  the  Hud 
son.  With  the  intermediate  land  gone,  the  Proprietor  could 
never  exercise  any  official  control  over  the  territory  on  the  Dela 
ware.  Let  the  grantees,  Nicolls  at  once  proposed,  consent  to 
an  exchange.1  On  the  Delaware  they  might  have  a  hundred 
thousand  acres,  "a  noble  tract."  With  courtier-like  tact, 
Nicolls  assumes  that  neither  Berkeley  nor  Carteret  would  have 
dreamt  of  asking  for  such  a  grant  if  they  had  known  what  it 
really  cost  the  Duke:  it  must  have  been  the  work  of  that  agent 
of  evil,  Scott.  Scott's  whole  career  from  the  day  when  he 
figured  as  a  rebel  on  Long  Island  showed  that  he  might  plausi 
bly  be  saddled  with  any  misdeeds.  But  that  shrewd  observer 
Pepys  had  ample  opportunities  for  forming  a  judgment  of  Car 
teret.  It  is  clear  that  he  in  no  way  rose  superior  to  the  average 
standard  of  public  men  in  that  scheming  and  self-seeking  age, 
and  he  was  not  likely  to  care  how  much  he  damaged  the  Duke's 
province.  The  man,  too,  of  whom  Pepys  said  that  "of  all  about 
the  court,  he  gave  himself  most  to  business  without  any  desire  of 
pleasure  or  divertisement,"  was  sure  not  to  be  slothful  in  turn 
ing  his  privileges  to  practical  account.  The  first  answer  which 
Nicolls  got  to  his  protest  was  the  arrival,  in  July  1665,  at  New 
York  of  an  agent  with  full  authority  and  material  for  establish 
ing  a  settlement.2  The  Proprietor's  choice  had  fallen  on  the 
grantee's  own  kinsman,  that  Philip  Carteret  whose  marriage 
forms  such  a  conspicuous  and  characteristic  incident  in  the  pages 
•of  Pepys. 

That  sound  sense  and  business-like  capacity  which  were  rec 
ognized  even  by  Carteret's  enemies  were  fully  shown  in  his 

1  Nicolls's  letter,  incomplete  and  undated,  is  in  the  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  105. 
*  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  85. 


126  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST. 

dealings  with  his  newly  acquired  territory.  He  at  once  set  on 
foot  a  practical  working  constitution.  This  was  embodied  in  a 
The  New  document  entitled  "the  Concessions  and  Agreements 

Jersey  con-         <•     i        T         i      T-«  •  -^T 

cessions.1  of  the  Lords  Proprietors  of  New  Jersey  to  and  with 
all  and  every  of  the  adventurers  and  all  such  as  settle  and  plant 
there."  The  constitution  was  of  the  usual  pattern — a  governor 
and  council,  and  an  elected  body  of  representatives.  Laws 
passed  by  two  chambers  were  to  be  in  force  provisionally  for  one 
year,  pending  the  approval  of  the  Proprietors.  No  tax  was  to 
be  levied  without  the  consent  of  the  representatives.  The  right 
of  laying  out  and  granting  land  was  vested  in  the  council.  All 
settlers  must  swear  allegiance  to  the  King,  and  fidelity  to  the 
Proprietors.  The  country  was  to  be  laid  out  in  parishes,  each 
with  a  glebe  of  two  hundred  acres,  and  with  beside  a  rate  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  minister.  The  recognized  religion  was  ap 
parently  that  of  the  Church  of  England,  but  freedom  of  con 
science  was  to  be  granted  to  all  individuals.  Every  emigrant 
who  equipped  himself  with  a  proper  firearm  and  food  for  six 
months  was  to  have  a  hundred  and  fifty  acres  of  land,  and  as 
much  more  for  every  man-servant  that  he  brought  out,  with  half 
that  quantity  for  every  female  over  fourteen  years.  Hired 
servants  also  were  to  receive  seventy-five  acres  at  the  end  of  their 
term. 

The  whole  body  of  emigrants  who  accompanied  Philip  Car- 
teret  numbered  only  thirty,  most  of  them  German  salt-refiners. 
Settlement  The  Proprietors,  however,  did  not  rely  exclusively  or 

of  New  .    .  ..  .  !          ,  J  J     . 

jersey.  mainly  on  direct  emigration  from  England.  1  heir 
invitation  was  addressed  not  merely  to  those  who  should  accom 
pany,  but  to  those  who  should  meet,  their  agent.  The  Proprie 
tors  counted  on  incorporating  miscellaneous  populations  of 
Dutch,  Swedes,  and  Finns,  who  were  already  to  be  found 
scattered  over  their  territory.  Nor  was  that  all.  The  conces 
sions  were  distributed  in  New  England.  Influences  were  at 
work  there  which  were  likely  enough  to  set  on  foot  a  tide  of 
emigration.  The  authority  exercised  by  Nicolls  and  his  col 
leagues  must  already  have  made  citizens  of  Massachusetts  sus 
pect  that  their  old  days  of  virtual  independence  were  coming  to 
an  end.  The  inhabitants  of  New  Haven  had  even  stronger  mo 
tives  for  change.  They  saw  themselves  forced  into  a  detested 

1  Learning  and  Spicer,  pp.   12-31. 


EMIGRATION  TO  NEW  JERSEY.  127 

union  with  a  colony,  lax  as  they  must  have  deemed  it  in  its  reli 
gious  system,  and  polluted  by  its  recent  alliance  with  the  restored 
monarchy.  Hitherto  such  emigration  as  there  had  been  from 
New  England  had  found  a  natural  and  ready  retreat  in  Long 
Island  and  the  adjacent  mainland.  That  was  likely  to  be  checked 
now  that  the  territory  in  question  had  come  under  the  au 
thority  of  a  Papist,  the  heir  to  the  Crown.  From  early  days  the 
enterprising  traders  of  New  Haven  had  been  only  withheld  by 
Dutch  vigilance  from  forcing  their  way  into  the  upper  waters  of 
the  Delaware.  Now  that  it  was  secured  and  thrown  open  to 
them  with  special  inducements,  they  naturally  turned  thither. 
It  was  within  the  territory  of  Carteret  and  Berkeley  that  the 
settlers  of  Brainford  found  the  new  home,  whither  they  bore 
their  church  records,  the  most  effective  symbol  of  their  past  cor 
porate  life.1 

Before  the  tidings  of  the  Proprietor's  grant  to  Carteret  and 
Berkeley  had  reached  Nicolls,  he  had  taken  some  measures  to 
wards  asserting  his  authority  over  the  tract  in  question.  He  had 
sanctioned  the  proceedings  of  isolated  settlers  who  had  estab 
lished  themselves  there  on  the  land  purchased  from  the  Indians.2 
But  he  saw  when  Carteret  landed  that  the  Duke's  surrender  had 
been  too  complete  to  be  redeemed  or  contested.  Nor  was  it  a 
time  to  introduce  anything  like  disunion  among  the  English 
settlements.  Philip  Carteret  was  received  with  courtesy.  From 
New  York  he  went  on  to  his  territory  by  the  Delaware,  where 
according  to  his  orders  he  called  together  the  settlers  and  laid 
the  foundation  of  a  settlement,  named,  in  honor  of  Lady  Car 
teret,  Elizabethtown.  Henceforth  the  colony  of  New  Jersey  has 
a  history  of  its  own,  apart  from  that  of  New  York. 

The  establishment  of  Carteret's  colony  made  the  conquered 
territory  on  the  south  bank  of  the  Delaware  even  more  than  be- 
Condition  fore  an  outlying  dependency,  nowise  integrally  con- 
Duke's  nected  with  New  York.  It  was  seemingly  left  under 
onr"hery  t^ie  control  of  Carr,  acting  upon  general  instructions 
Delaware,  from  Nicolls.  A  complaint  that  the  delay  in  forming 
any  fixed  plan  about  the  territory  made  it  difficult  for  him  to 
deal  with  it,3  certain  notes  as  to  the  transfer  of  land  from 

1  The  Puritan  Colonies,  vol.  ii.  p.  125. 

2  In  the  fragmentary  letter  just  referred  to  Nicolls   says:    "Upon   this  tract 
of  land  several  new  purchases  are  made  from  the  Indians  since  my  coming,  and 
three  towns  beginning."  3  N.   Y.   Docs.  vol.   iii.  p.    113. 


'128  THE  ENGLISH  CONQUEST. 

Dutch  officials,  who  had  departed,  to  their  English  successors — 
these  are  all  the  information  that  our  records  contain  as  to  the 
state  of  this  territory  during  Nicolls's  period  of  office. 

In  1668  Nicolls  resigned  his  office  and  never  again  bore  any 
part  in  American  politics.  His  retirement  marks  an  evil  feature 
Retirement  m  tne  administrative  system  which  was  just  begin- 
of  Nicoiis.  ning.  Henceforth  there  is  scarcely  an  instance  of  an 
official  devoting  his  life  to  the  service  of  a  single  colony,  nor  in 
deed  with  one  or  two  exceptions  to  the  colonial  service  generally. 
For  the  future,  the  governor  was  not  to  be  a  man  whose  perma 
nent  home  and  whose  hopes  of  a  career  were  in  the  colony.  He 
was  an  official,  having  a  temporary  and  limited  interest  in  the 
province  which  he  governed. 

The  comparatively  small  sphere  in  which  Nicolls  worked  and 
the  short  period  over  which  his  labors  extend  forbid  one  to 
His  official  speak  of  him  as  a  great  man.  But  we  may  at  least  say 
•career.  ^^  j^  succee(je(j  where  men  who  have  a  fair  claim  to 
be  called  great  would  have  failed.  Mere  administrative  power 
may  not  be  a  gift  of  the  highest  order.  But  such  as  it  is  Nicolls 
assuredly  possessed  it  to  the  very  full.  He  was  not  one  of  those 
decorously  blameless  officials  who  escaped  all  active  errors  by 
shirking  difficulties  and  transferring  responsibilities.  Nor  was 
he  one  of  those  whose  character  is  built  up  on  the  efficiency  of 
well-selected  colleagues.  Both  in  New  England  and  New 
Netherlands  his  work  suffered  in  proportion  as  it  was  delegated. 

The  personal  character  of  the  man  is  less  easy  to  grasp. 
Many  of  his  colonial  contemporaries  who  played  a  far  less  con- 
His  spicuous  and  less  worthy  part  have  left  a  more  defi- 

persanal  .        .  ....  ,.,,  ,       .  ,   ,  . 

character,  nite  impression  in  history.  Ihe  eulogies  or  him  are 
unanimous  and  obviously  sincere,  but  they  are  somewhat  con 
ventional.  Nor  does  the  man  himself  stand  out  very  clearly  and 
vividly  in  his  dispatches.  As  business-like  statements  they  are 
admirable;  if  we  look  at  them  as  revelations  of  character,  per 
haps  their  most  conspicuous  feature  is  their  desponding  and  even 
somber  tone.  Such  rapid  success  as  Nicolls  achieved  in  his  prin 
cipal  work  would  have  filled  many  men  with  light-hearted  con 
fidence.  Of  that  his  dispatches  do  not  show  a  trace.  He  saw 
clearly  that  if  the  conquest  of  New  Netherlands  had  added  to 
the  greatness  and  to  the  opportunities  of  England  it  had  added, 
too,  to  her  responsibilities.  Not  less  clearly  did  he  see  all  the 


RICHARD  N I  COLLS.  129 

hindrances  which  lay  in  the  path.  He  saw  that  England  and 
France  were  brought  face  to  face  in  America,  each  with  aims 
and  ambitions  which  could  not  stand  together.  He  saw  that  co 
lonial  union  was  needed,  and  he  saw,  too,  how  far  off  it  lay. 
His  experience  in  New  England  had  shown  how  little  zeal  and 
loyalty  might  be  expected  from  the  subjects;  the  dismemberment 
of  New  Netherlands  taught  him  how  little  foresight  and  delib 
erate  policy  might  be  looked  for  in  the  rulers. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE   DUTCH   RECONQUEST. 

LIKE  Nicolls,  his  successor,  Francis  Lovelace,  had  served  with 
distinction  for  the  cause  of  which  his  better-known  brother  was 
Lovelace  the  soldier  and  the  poet.1  In  energy  and  capacity  he 

becomes  .,  .     e        .  .  .  - ,       . 

Governor,  was  assuredly  no  match  for  his  predecessor.  Yet  it 
is  no  slight  praise  that  he  did  not  alienate  or  disappoint  the  men 
who  had  become  accustomed  to  Nicolls,  and  that  he  did  not 
create  any  sense  of  a  loss  of  administrative  power.  In  one  re 
spect  fortune  dealt  kindly  with  him.  The  great  calamity  of  his 
governorship,  the  recapture  of  his  province  by  the  Dutch,  may 
not  have  been  due  to  any  culpable  misconduct  on  his  part.  But, 
as  we  shall  see,  it  is  impossible  wholly  to  acquit  him  of  blame 
either  for  his  own  conduct  or  still  more  for  his  choice  of  a  subor 
dinate  in  a  place  of  special  trust.  Circumstances  for  which  he 
could  claim  no  credit  prevented  the  calamity  from  becoming  seri 
ous.  But  for  that  Lovelace  would  undoubtedly  have  gone  down 
to  posterity  as  one  of  those  who  have  played  on  a  small  stage 
the  part  of  Galba,  and  who  would  have  been  deemed  fit  for 
command  if  they  had  never  commanded. 

The  general  attitude  of  the  colony  goes  far  to  excuse  Lovelace 
for  any  lack  of  watchfulness.  As  under  Nicolls,  such  symptoms 
pisaffec-  of  disaffection  as  were  to  be  seen  made  themselves 
Long*"  felt  not  among  the  conquered  Hollanders,  but  among 
island.  the  English  on  Long  Island.  In  the  autumn  of  1669 
they  addressed  a  petition  to  the  Court  of  Assize.  They  de 
manded,  as  a  right  enjoyed  by  all  other  subjects  of  the  King  in 
the  colonies,  to  appoint  deputies  representing  the  freemen  of  each 
township  who  should  advise  and  approve  of  the  laws  enacted  by 
the  Governor  and  Council.2  They  did  not  rest  this  claim  on  any 


1  The  genealogy  of  the  Lovelace  family  is  set  forth  by  Mr.  Grant  Wilson  in 
a  monograph  published  in  the  papers  of  the  American  Historical  Association 
for  1892. 

2Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  160. 


DISAFFECTION  ON  LONG  ISLAND.  13 J 

general  constitutional  principle,  but  on  a  specific  promise  made 
by  Nicolls.  To  prove  a  negative  is  hard,  and  it  is  not  impossible 
that  Nicolls's  eagerness  to  conciliate  may  have  made  him  hold 
out  some  vague  hopes  of  representation  in  the  future.  But  it  is 
very  certain  that  there  was  no  promise  which  could  serve  as  a 
basis  for  a  demand.  The  answer  was  that  the  settlers  must  for 
the  present  be  content  with  the  Court  of  Assize  and  the  existing 
laws. 

A  general  demand  for  constitutional  rights  is  seldom  effective. 
It  was  followed  in  this  case  by  that  which  is  far  more  likely  to> 
be  productive  of  good,  a  dispute  on  a  practical  detail.  Resist 
ance  to  arbitrary  taxation  was,  as  usual,  the  first  standing  ground 
from  which  the  subject  could  press  his  claims  A  rate  was  levied 
on  the  Long  Island  towns  for  the  repairing  of  the  citadel  at 
New  York,  now  called,  in  honor  of  the  Proprietor,  Fort  James. 
In  the  days  of  Dutch  supremacy  the  citizens  had  protested 
against  being  taxed  for  a  like  purpose.  Their  protest,  however, 
was  based  on  the  contention  that  the  fort  existed  only  for  the 
good  of  the  Company.  That  plea  no  longer  existed.  The  re 
fusal  now  was  on  the  ground  that  the  precedent  would  be 
dangerous.  On  the  same  principle  they  might  be  required  to 
maintain  the  garrison.  There  was  a  lack  of  absolute  unanimity 
in  the  attitude  of  the  settlers.  Three  towns — Heemstede,  or  as 
it  was  now  called  Hempstead,  Flushing,  and  Jamaica — con 
tented  themselves  with  a  protest.  The  demand,  they  said,  was 
unconstitutional,  but  they  would  accede  and  appeal  to  the  King. 
Three  other  towns — Southold,  Southampton,  and  Easthampton 
— consented  to  pay,  but  with  the  vague  stipulation  that  they 
must  enjoy  the  same  privileges  as  the  townships  of  New  Eng 
land.  The  men  of  Huntington,  Hampden-like,  met  the  demand 
with  flat  refusal.  Though  this  want  of  unanimity  may  have 
made  the  protest  less  effectual,  yet  it  was  a  healthy  sign.  It 
showed  that  there  was  an  independence  and  spontaneity  about 
the  resistance,  that  it  had  in  it  nothing  mechanical. 

The  Council  regarded  the  refusal  as  a  declaration  of  seditious 
intentions,  and  ordered  that  the  resolutions  in  which  it  was  em 
bodied  should  be  burnt.  Inquiry  was  to  be  made  and  the  prin 
cipal  offenders  to  be  punished.  There  is  no  trace,  however,  of 
any  penal  proceedings.1 

Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  pp.  171-3. 


132  THE  DUTCH  RECONQUEST. 

As  so  often  happens,  the  spirit  of  resistance  thus  kindled 
quickly  found  a  fresh  field.  Nicolls  had  adopted,  and  in  a  great 
Disputes  measure  enforced,  the  principle  that  the  conquest  an- 
to°and!»  e  nihilated  all  pre-existing  rights  in  the  soil,  and  that 
all  settlers  must  get  a  title  by  a  fresh  patent  from  the  Duke.  In 
the  case  of  the  Hollanders  Nicolls  had,  as  we  have  seen,  relaxed 
this  provision.  But  it  was  rigidly  enforced  by  him  against  the 
Long  Island  settlers.  One  of  those  townships,  however,  South 
ampton,  had  either  evaded  the  demand  or,  more  probably,  owing 
to  an  influx  of  settlers,  required  an  extensive  enlargement  of  ter 
ritory.  The  settlers  there  pleaded  a  title  based  on  the  obsolete 
grant  from  Lord  Stirling  in  1640;  when  that  claim  was  disal 
lowed,  and  the  town  was  again  commanded  to  take  out  a  fresh 
patent,  some  fifty  of  the  citizens,  those  not  improbably  whose  ar 
rival  and  consequent  need  for  land  had  raised  the  question,  sent 
a  written  protest.  Unwisely  they  did  not  confine  themselves  to 
the  matter  in  hand,  but  referred  to  certain  vague  and  unfulfilled 
promises  made  to  them  by  Nicolls  and  his  colleagues  at  the  time 
of  the  conquest.  Lovelace,  in  a  timid  and  compromising  spirit, 
gave  the  remonstrants  some  excellent  moral  advice,  backed  by  a 
text  on  obedience,  and  appointed  a  commission  of  inquiry.  The 
appointment  of  the  commission  meant,  as  it  is  apt  to  mean,  an 
indefinite  delay. 

The  men  of  Southold  were  not  content  with  that.  Two  years 
later  they,  in  conjunction  with  the  townships  of  Southampton 
and  Easthampton,  lodged  a  complaint  with  the  King.  They 
were,  they  said,  heavily  taxed  and  unrepresented;  their  enjoy 
ment  of  the  soil  was  restricted,  as  the  government  claimed  the 
right  to  cut  timber.  To  free  themselves  from  the  claims  of  the 
Proprietor,  they  were  willing  to  be  annexed  to  Connecticut  or 
to  be  an  independent  corporation  under  the  King.  It  is  strange 
to  find  townships  which  had  their  origin  in  New  England  turn 
ing  to  the  sovereign  for  redress,  and  still  stranger  to  find  them 
voluntarily  offering  to  become  a  Crown  colony.  To  revoke  or 
curtail  a  grant  of  land  made  only  eight  years  before  would  have 
been  manifestly  both  unjust  and  a  hopeless  confession  of  weak 
ness,  and,  as  might  have  been  expected,  the  three  townships  had 
to  be  content  with  having  asserted  their  alleged  rights,  and 

1  Brodhead,  vol.   ii.   p.   173. 


AFFAIRS  IN  NEW  JERSEY.  133 

thereby  done  something  to  create  a  precedent  in  their  own 
favor.1 

The  policy  of  James  as  Proprietor  of  New  York  was  in  some 
measure  an  anticipation  of  his  policy  in  England.  As  a  whole  it 
General  was  far  better.  As  a  colonial  administrator  all  his 
the' Pro*/  Dest  points  stood  out,  all  his  faults  were  toned  down, 
prietor.  pje  cnose  business-like,  capable,  and,  as  times  went, 
honest  officials.  If  he  claimed  arbitrary  power  he  did  not  en 
force  it  cruelly,  nor,  in  his  early  days  as  a  Proprietor,  wantonly. 
At  the  same  time  in  the  colonies,  as  in  England,  he  never  dreamt 
of  granting  to  the  governed  any  systematic  check  over  the  gov 
ernor  ;  he  could  not  in  the  least  understand  the  spirit  which  de 
manded  such  a  check.'  Yet  in  his  colony,  as  afterwards  in  the 
mother  country,  he  blundered  by  some  strange  and  inexplicable 
inconsistency  into  a  policy  of  toleration.  And  in  the  colony  it 
was  not  necessary  as  in  England  to  carry  out  a  policy  of  tolera 
tion  by  a  glaring  disregard  of  civil  rights.  Under  Lovelace 
Calvinist,  Lutheran,  and  Independent  lived  together  in  harmony. 
The  Presbyterian  Church  of  New  York  remained  in  dependence 
on  the  Classis,  the  governing  body  at  Amsterdam.  At  the  same 
time  Lovelace  used  his  personal  influence  with  the  Council  to 
secure  the  minister  of  that  Church  an  annual  grant  from  the 
exchequer  of  the  colony  of  a  thousand  guilders,  a  little  over  a 
hundred  pounds  in  English  money.2  Whenever  Lovelace  did 
interfere  in  religious  matters,  it  was  to  check  some  display  of 
ecclesiastical  tyranny.  When  an  Independent  minister  from 
New  England  refused  to  baptize  a  man's  children,  and  yet  after 
wards  distrained  on  that  same  man  for  payment  of  his  salary, 
Lovelace  reminded  him  that  he  held  his  own  position  only  by 
sufferance.3  When  the  Calvinist  sexton  at  Albany  claimed  to 
bury  and  to  be  paid  for  burying  all  who  died,  whether  members 
of  his  own  sect  or  not,  an  order  was  passed  in  Council  authoriz 
ing  the  Lutheran  minister  to  bury  his  own  dead. 

Meanwhile  the  grant  to  Carteret  and  Berkeley  was  breeding 
results  which  justified  Nicolls's  protests.  At  one  time  it  seemed 
Affairs  as  if  the  exchange  which  Nicolls  recommended  would 
jersey.  be  carried  through.  Carteret  and  Berkeley  both  pro- 

1  The  Order  in  Council  dealing  with  this  petition  is  in  the  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol. 
iii.  p.  197.  The  substance  of  the  petition  is  set  forth  in  this  document. 

^Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  175.  Mr.  Brodhead  quotes  the  text  of  Lovelace's 
order.  3  Letter  from  Lovelace,  published  in  O'Callaghan,  vol.  iii.  p.  209. 


134  THE  DUTCH  RECONQUEST. 

fessed  themselves  willing  to  exchange  their  grant  for  a  tract  on 
the  Delaware.  That  this  was  not  effected  may  have  been  in  part 
due  to  the  claims  of  Maryland  to  the  Delaware  territory.  But 
there  was  an  even  more  serious  difficulty.  The  new  settlement 
soon  fell  into  anarchy,  a  result  partly  due  in  all  likelihood  to  the 
incompetence  of  Philip  Carteret.  The  settlers  there  had  pre 
cisely  the  same  grievance  as  those  on  Long  Island.  The  Proprie 
tors  required  that  those  who  had  been  already  established  there, 
Swedes  and  others,  some  who  had  purchased  their  land  from  the 
Indians,  others  who  had  grants  from  Nicolls,  should  take  out 
fresh  patents.  Just  as  discontent  was  making  itself  felt,  one  ap 
peared  on  the  scene  who  saw  his  chance  of  turning  it  to  ac 
count.  In  that  grotesque  constitution  which  Locke  had 
fashioned  for  Carolina,  a  place  as  landgrave  had  been  given 
to  James  Carteret,  a  younger  son  of  Sir  George.  Instead 
of  going  straight  to  his  own  colony  he  touched  at  Elizabeth- 
town.  The  malcontents  held  a  convention,  deposed  Philip 
Carteret,  who  fled  back  to  England,  and  replaced  him  by  his 
cousin.1 

A  like  spirit  of  disaffection  had  already  extended  to  the 
southern  side  of  the  peninsula.  Carr's  incompetence,  his  greed, 
insurrec-  and  in  all  likelihood  the  looseness  of  his  private  life, 
Delaware,  had  disgusted  the  settlers  on  the  Delaware.  In  1669 
an  insurrection  broke  out  headed  by  an  impostor,  who  passed  him 
self  off  as  a  son  of  Count  Konigsmark,  and  who  went  commonly 
by  the  name  of  the  Long  Finn  or  the  Long  Swede.  The  advice 
which  Lovelace  gave  Carr  at  this  juncture  is  as  full  a  proof  as 
could  be  wished  of  the  loss  which  the  colony  had  sustained  in  the 
retirement  of  Nicolls.  "Follow,"  he  says,  virtually,  "the  policy 
of  the  Swedish  Government  when  it  administered  the  depend 
ency.  Keep  the  people  down  by  such  taxes  as  shall  keep  them 
hard  at  work  and  give  them  no  time  for  political  agitation." 
Such  instructions  given  to  an  arbitrary  and  unpopular  subordi 
nate  show  that  it  was  good  nature  and  rule-of-thumb  shrewdness 
rather  than  any  real  spirit  of  statesmanship  which  kept  Lovelace 
within  the  paths  of  moderation  and  common  sense.  The  disturb 
ance  was  quelled  without  difficulty.  The  pseudo-Konigsmark 
was  whipped,  branded,  and  sold  as  a  slave  to  Barbadoes ;  his  chief 

1 0'Callaghan,  vol.  iii.  p.   525;   Brodhead,  vol.  ii.   p.   189. 


ATTACK  FROM  MARYLAND.  135 

accomplice,  Henry  Coleman,  took  refuge  among  the  Indians,  and 
at  a  later  day  figured  as  a  landholder  in  Penn's  colony.1 

Disaffection  within  was  not  the  only  trouble  which  beset  the 
colony  or,  as  one  might  rather  call  it,  the  outpost  on  the  Dela- 
Attack  ware.  In  1669  an  attempt  was  made  on  behalf  of 
Maryland.  Lord  Baltimore  to  assert  authority  over  the  settlers 
there,  and  three  years  later  they  were  attacked  and  pillaged  by 
a  party  of  raiders  from  Maryland.2  They  plundered  the  un 
happy  settlers  on  the  Hoarkill,  and  destroyed  their  crops,  reduc 
ing  them,  if  we  may  believe  an  almost  contemporary  witness,  to 
such  straits  that,  as  in  Samaria  in  the  days  of  Joram,  women  ate 
their  own  children. 

A  document  is  extant  which  shows  that  there  was  no  desire 
among  the  inhabitants  of  Newcastle  to  detach  themselves  from 
New  York,  while  at  the  same  time  it  illustrates  the  difficulties 
which  ensued  from  the  position  of  the  settlement  on  the  Dela 
ware  as  a  detached  dependency  of  New  York.  In  1671  the 
settlers  at  Newcastle  petitioned  Lovelace  to  allow  them  to  erect 
a  blockhouse  at  Newcastle  for  the  defense  of  the  town.  They 
also  petitioned  that  no  ships  should  be  allowed  to  go  up  the 
river  above  Newcastle,  so  that  the  town  might  practically  enjoy 
a  monopoly  of  the  trade  in  corn  and  fur.  They  also  petition 
for  restrictions  on  the  distilling  and  selling  of  strong  drink; 
they  wish  the  authority  of  the  constables  to  be  strengthened  by 
furnishing  them  with  staves  bearing  the  King's  arms,  and  in  the 
same  spirit  they  ask  to  be  allowed  to  put  up  the  King's  arms  in 
the  courts  of  law.  They  propose  the  appointment  of  a  public 
inspector  of  grain  so  that  the  colony  may  not  be  discredited  by 
the  exportation  of  foul  corn.  It  would  seem  that  the  feud  be 
tween  Maryland  and  the  settlers  on  the  Delaware  was  now  at 
rest,  since  the  former  colony  has  offered  to  make  one  half  of  a 
road  connecting  the  two  districts  if  their  neighbors  will  make 
the  other  half.  Lovelace  is  asked  to  enforce  this  arrangement. 

All  these  requests  were  favorably  received.  The  interest  of 
the  matter  lies  in  the  picture  which  it  gives  us  of  the  condition 
of  things  on  the  Delaware.  We  have  at  Newcastle  a  coherent 
community,  anxious  to  enforce  order  and  to  secure  material 


1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  xii.  pp.  463-71;  Council  Minutes,  vol.  ii. 
z  This  raid  is  referred  to  in  the  travels  of  Bankers  and  Sluyter,  the  Laba- 
•dists. 


136  THE  DUTCH  RECONQUEST. 

prosperity  among  a  scattered  rural  population,  and  unable  to  do 
so  for  lack  of  administrative  authority,  and  obliged  to  turn  for 
help  to  a  distant  superior.1 

Another  illustrative  incident  occurred  soon  after.  An  Indian 
murdered  a  white  settler  on  the  Delaware.  A  council  was  held 
at  New  York  to  consider  what  steps  should  be  taken,  and  the 
two  Carterets,  Philip  and  James,  both  attended.2  In  short,  at  a 
special  emergency  a  sort  of  federal  system  for  the  Delaware  and 
Hudson  settlements  had  to  be  extemporized. 

All  these  events  must  have  impressed  on  colonial  adminis 
trators  the  need  for  some  common  control.  As  Lovelace  said  in 
his  remonstrance  addressed  to  Calvert,  "these  portending  trou 
blous  times,  wherein  all  true-hearted  Englishmen  are  buckling 
on  their  armour,  were  no  seasons  for  such  disputes."3 

Lovelace's  words  were  soon  to  be  verified.  In  the  summer  of 
1672  the  colonists  learnt  that  England  and  Holland  were  again 
Outbreak  at  war.  If  anything  were  needed  to  prove  how  little 

of  war  with          .......  i       T^         i          i 

Holland.  spirit  of  nationality  there  was  among  the  Dutch  colo 
nists,  the  policy  now  adopted  by  Lovelace  would  show  it.  He 
plainly  had  no  dread  of  internal  dissensions.  In  his  arrange 
ments  for  strengthening  the  defenses  of  the  colony,  Dutch  of 
ficers  were  without  fear  placed  in  positions  of  trust.  All  that 
Lovelace  dreaded  was  invasion  from  the  sea.  That  he  saw  must 
be  guarded  against  by  acting  in  concert  with  New  England,  and 
to  that  end  he  applied  himself  to  establishing  a  post  between 
New  York  and  Boston.  His  proceedings  and  intentions  in  this 
matter  are  described  in  a  dispatch  sent  to  Winthrop  of  Connecti 
cut,  somewhat  wordy  and  ornate  after  the  manner  of  Lovelace's 
letters.4  The  New  Englanders  will,  he  trusts,  enter  into  the 
scheme  with  the  same  "ardent  inclinations"  as  he  does.  He  has 
secured  a  postman,  "active,  stout,  and  indefatigable."  But  if  his 
language  strikes  one  as  somewhat  out  of  place  on  such  a  plain 
question  of  business,  he  was  beyond  doubt  right  in  thinking  that 
his  scheme  was  "the  most  compendious  means  to  beget  a  mutual 
understanding."  Unfortunately  his  anxiety  to  carry  out  the 
scheme  led  him  to  leave  his  post  at  this  crisis,  placing  the  garri- 

1  The  petition  and  the  answer  are  in  the  Pennsylvania  Archives,  ad  series, 
vol.  v. 

2  This  also  is  told  in  the  Pennsylvania  Archives,  same  volume. 

3  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.   190. 

4  Ib.  pp.   196-8.     Mr.   Brodhead  quotes  the  letter  textually. 


A   DUTCH  FLEET   THREATENS  NEW  YORK.         137 

son  of  New  York  under  a  subordinate,  one  Manning,  in  whom 
it  was  plain  he  had  but  little  confidence.  In  July  1673  Love 
lace  was  at  Hutchinson  Bay,  near  the  Connecticut  frontier,  mak 
ing  arrangements  for  his  postal  scheme.  A  messenger  came  from 
Manning  to  tell  him  that  a  Dutch  squadron  was  off  the  coast, 
and  that  his  presence  was  needed.  So  little  faith  had  Lovelace 
in  the  deputy  whom  he  had  appointed  that  he  treated  the  report 
as  a  false  alarm,  and  instead  of  returning,  actually  went  on  to 
Connecticut.  Though  Manning's  alarm  was  fully  justified,  and 
though  Lovelace  showed  gross  carelessness,  yet  one  may  well 
doubt  whether  his  presence  could  have  availed  anything. 

In  the  winter  of  1672  a  Dutch  fleet  of  fifteen  vessels  with 
troops  on  board  was  sent  to  attack  the  English  shipping  in  the 
A  Dutch  West  Indies.  It  was  joined  by  a  force  of  four  more 
threatens  sail  under  a  separate  command.  After  doing  much 
the  colony. i  damage  to  English  merchantmen  off  Jamestown  they 
fell  in  with  a  New  York  vessel.  They  captured  her,  and  ex 
amined  the  captain  as  to  the  defenses  of  the  colony.  He  must 
have  rated  their  local  knowledge  exceedingly  low  when  he  as 
sured  them  that  Lovelace  could  at  any  moment  raise  five  thou 
sand  men,  and  that  the  fort  was  guarded  by  a  hundred  and  fifty 
guns.  Unluckily  there  was  on  board  one  Samuel  Hopkins,  of 
Elizabethtown.  He,  being  anxious  to  secure  the  friendship  of 
the  Dutch,  mercilessly  knocked  over  this  noble  fabric  of  inven 
tion.  The  garrison  of  the  fort,  he  said,  numbered  seventy,  and 
it  would  take  Lovelace  three  or  four  days  to  raise  as  many 
hundred  men.  The  Dutch  commanders  at  once  decided  on  their 
course.  Such  opposition  was  nothing  to  a  fleet  of  over  twenty 
sail,  with  sixteen  hundred  men  on  board.  Moreover  they  might 
reckon  on  the  inhabitants,  if  not  for  support,  at  least  for  benevo 
lent  neutrality.  In  less  than  a  fortnight  the  Dutch  fleet  was  rid 
ing  at  anchor  off  Staten  Island,  and  was  in  active  communication 
with  the  adjacent  Dutch  settlements. 

Manning  seems  to  have  done  his  best  under  the  circumstances. 
He  hurried  off  a  messenger  to  Lovelace,  but  a  governor  who  was 
in  New  England  could  be  of  little  use  when  a  few  hours'  sail 

1  Basnage,  Hist,  of  the  Netherlands,  vol.  ii.  p.  456.  Statement  of  Nathan 
Gould  and  affidavit  of  William  Hayes,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  pp.  200,  213.  Ind 
well  (Secretary  of  Virginia)  to  Arlington,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  364.  Re 
port  of  Amsterdam  Board  of  Admiralty  to  States-General,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol. 
iii.  p.  527- 


138  THE  DUTCH  RECONQUEST. 

would  bring  the  enemy  within  gunshot  of  the  fort.  The  one 
•chance  had  been  lost  when  the  first  alarm  had  failed  to  collect  a 
strong  land  force  from  New  England  and  from  the  English 
towns  on  Long  Island. 

Bloodless  captures  seemed  destined  to  recur  in  the  history  of 
New  Netherlands,  to  use  the  name  which  had  once  again  become 
capture  of  appropriate.  On  August  9  the  Dutch  fleet  anchored 
NewYork.i  off  New  York,  as  Nicolls's  fleet  had  anchored  nine 
years  before.  The  whole  drama  reproduced  itself  with  one  im 
portant  exception.  Manning,  unlike  Stuyvesant,  did  not  even 
make  show  of  a  determination  to  die  at  his  post.  Practically, 
however,  he  did  as  much  as  the  Dutch  commander  in  the  way  of 
•defense :  when  the  enemy  opened  fire,  the  fort  replied  and  riddled 
the  enemy's  flagship.  But  the  captains  of  the  invading  force,  fol 
lowing  the  precedent  of  Nicqlls,  had  detached  the  civil  popula 
tion  by  a  promise  of  immunity. 

As  before,  too,  a  land  force  was  threatening  the  town  from 
the  north.  Resistance  would  have  been  a  wanton  and  culpable 
waste  of  life.  Manning  showed  a  flag  of  truce  and  demanded  a 
parley.  His  second  in  command,  John  Carr,  a  son  of  Sir  Robert, 
on  his  own  responsibility,  as  it  would  seem,  lowered  the  English 
colors.  Practically  he  did  only  what  Manning  would  have  been 
forced  to  do.  The  garrison  marched  out  with  military  honors, 
and  the  town  peacefully  submitted. 

Lovelace  was  now  on  his  way  home,  and  had  reached  New 
Haven  when  he  heard  that  his  colony  was  lost.  His  first 
thought  was  to  raise  a  force  on  Long  Island,  and  to  strike  a  blow 
for  the  recovery  of  the  town.  A  Dutch  clergyman  was  sent  to 
him,  apparently  in  a  semi-official  capacity,  and  induced  him  to 
visit  the  town  and  have  an  interview  with  the  commanders  of  the 
invading  fleet.  The  result  was  creditable  neither  to  the  dignity 
and  wisdom  of  Lovelace  nor  to  the  generosity  of  the  conquerors. 
He  was  arrested  for  debt.  This  was  made  more  serious  by  the 
policy  of  the  Dutch  commanders,  who  had  excepted  English 
officials  from  the  general  protection  granted  to  private  property. 
The  arrest  does  not  seem  to  have  been  pressed,  but  the  unfor 
tunate  Governor  left  the  colony  a  beggar.2 

1  As  authorities  for  the  capture  of  New  York,  we  have  various  unofficial  re 
ports  in  the  New  York  Documents. 

2  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  213.     Mr.   Brodhead  quotes  a  le*pf/"-  written  by  Love 
lace,  but  does  not  say  to  whom  it  was  addressed,  nor  where  it  comes  from. 


ACTION  OF   THE  DUTCH  COMMANDERS.  139 

The  conditions  of  the  conquest  left  the  Dutch  officials  a  free 
hand.  They  had  been  merely  sent  out  with  general  instructions 
Action  of  to  annoy  the  English  settlements ;  they  had  not,  like 
«om?utch  Nicolls,  any  specific  orders  for  the  reduction  of  New 
manders.i  York,  and  as  a  necessary  consequence  in  dealing  with 
it  they  could  only  consult  their  own  discretion.  They  were  at 
least  justified  in  assuming  that  the  two  conquests  annihilated  all 
the  right  of  the  West  India  Company.  Henceforth,  as  long  as 
the  colony  was  Dutch  territory,  it  would  be  in  direct  dependence 
on  the  United  Provinces. 

Clearly,  then,  any  constitutional  arrangements  made  by  the 
Dutch  commanders  could  only  be  of  a  provisional  nature.  They 
showed,  however,  no  fear  of  responsibility.  The  two  com 
manders,  Evertsen  and  Birkes,  together  with  three  captains 
named  by  themselves,  sat  as  a  temporary  council.  But  the  fleet 
could  not  stay  locked  up  in  Manhattan  harbor,  and  it  was  need 
ful  to  organize  a  government  which  should  act  after  the  ships 
had  sailed,  and  till  the  home  authorities  took  measures  for  the 
management  of  their  recovered  dependency.  The  council  con 
ferred  the  office  of  governor  on  one  of  the  three  co-opted  coun 
cilors,  Anthony  Colve.  To  grant  representative  government  as 
part  of  a  mere  temporary  arrangement  would  have  been  absurd. 
But  the  method  of  choosing  an  executive  showed  a  want  of  con- 
iidence  in  the  inhabitants  which  can  hardly  have  been  necessary, 
and  if  unnecessary  was  certainly  impolitic.  Six  of  the  principal 
inhabitants  were  instructed  to  prepare  a  list  of  eligible  citizens, 
wealthy  and  of  the  Reformed  Christian  religion.  Out  of  these 
the  council  chose  three  burgomasters  and  four  schepens." 

The  conquest  of  the  capital  was  followed  by  the  reduction  of 
the  outlying  portions  of  the  settlement.  Albany  at  once  yielded. 
As  New  York  was  renamed  Fort  Orange,  so  Albany  in  honor 
of  the  young  stadtholder  became  Willelmstadt.'  The  inhab 
itants  of  New  Jersey  had  not  so  fared  under  the  Proprietors  as 
to  give  them  any  interest  in  resisting  the  assertion  of  Dutch  rule, 
and  the  new  supremacy  was  at  once  accepted.  Courts  of  justice 
were  established,  officials  were  appointed  or  formally  approved, 
and  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  republic  administered  to  the 


1  The  Minutes  of  the  Council,  translated  into  English,  are  in  the  N.  Y.  Docs, 
vol.  ii.  pp.  569-730. 

2  Minutes,  p.  574.  *  Ib.  p.  593. 


140  THE  DUTCH  RECONQUEST. 

citizens.  The  outlying  settlements  on  the  Delaware  were  dealt 
with  in  a  like  manner,  and  placed  under  the  control  of  Peter 
Alrich  as  schout  or  commandant.1 

Hopkins's  treachery  was  rewarded  by  his  being  appointed 
clerk  of  the  court  at  Elizabethtown.2 

One  article  in  the  instructions  given  to  Alrich  might  have 
furnished  a  basis  for  religious  persecution.  The  pure,  true 
Christian  religion  according  to  the  Synod  of  Dort  is  to  be  taught 
and  maintained  in  every  proper  manner,  without  suffering  any 
thing  to  be  attempted  contrary  thereunto  by  any  sectaries. 

In  September  the  fleet  sailed  away.  The  inhabitants  pleaded 
urgently  their  defenseless  condition  and  the  likelihood  of  an  at- 
The  colony  tack.  Not  only  had  the  English  Crown  an  interest 

under  .  ,     .  .  .  . 

Coive.  m  the  recovery  of  the  colony,  but  that  interest  was 

shared  by  the  Proprietors,  by  those  who  had  claims  on  New 
Jersey,  and  by  the  New  England  settlers.  Accordingly  two 
ships  were  left  to  guard  against  invasion.8 

In  two  matters  the  system  of  government  adopted  by  Colve 
must  have  contrasted  unfavorably  with  that  of  the  late  Proprie 
tor.  The  municipality  of  New  York  was  no  longer  a  corpora 
tion,  kept  continuously  alive  by  self-election.  Colve  reverted  to 
the  earlier  Dutch  method,  and  required  the  outgoing  magistrates 
to  frame  a  list,  of  which  one  half  were  nominated  by  the  Gov 
ernor.4  Moreover,  Colve  at  once  swept  away  that  freedom  of 
worship  which  Nicolls  had  established  and  Lovelace  continued. 
The  Reformed  Christian  religion  as  established  by  the  Synod  of 
Dort  was  to  be  maintained  in  every  township,  and  no  other  sect 
was  to  be  permitted  to  attempt  anything  to  the  contrary.0  By  a 
special  indulgence  the  Lutherans  at  Albany  were  allowed  to  keep 
their  church  and  their  worship.6  But  at  the  capital,  the  destruc 
tion  of  the  Lutheran  Church,  though  defended  by  the  plea  that 
the  ground  was  needed  for  fortification,  was  a  melancholy  evi 
dence  of  the  changed  system.7 

Amongst  the  purely  Dutch  settlements  on  Long  Island  and 
the  opposite  coast,  the  change  of  sovereignty  was  accepted  not 
with  any  special  enthusiasm,  but  with  acquiescence.  Among  the 

1  Minutes,  pp.  604-5,  607. 

2  Mr.   Brodhead  states  this  in  a  note  to  Hayes's  affidavit  referred  to  above. 

3  Minutes,  pp.   598-600. 

*  Ib.  p.  680.  B/b.  pp.  618,  620. 

•  Ib.  p.  622.  'Court  Minutes,  vol.  vii.  p.   13. 


NEW  NETHERLANDS  AND    CONNECTICUT.         14* 

towns  of  New  England  origin  it  was  different.  There,  it  was 
soon  manifest,  the  conquest  would  have  to  be  carried  through 
pisaffec-  step  by  step  if  it  was  to  be  effectual.  In  the  autumn 
tion  among  Q{  j^  Colve  sent  a.  commission  to  those  parts  to  en- 
fplf  king  force  the  oath  of  obedience,  and  to  remind  the  inhab- 
settiers.  itants  that  resistance  would  bring  with  it  con 
fiscation  of  property.1  Some  of  the  settlements  acceded.  East- 
hampton  and  Southold  temporized,  while  Southampton,  trained 
in  stubbornness  by  its  dealings  with  Lovelace,  stood  fast  and  re 
fused  its  allegiance  to  a  foreign  Power.2 

Colve's  first  impulse  was  to  send  an  armed  force  and  punish 
the  recalcitrant  towns  as  rebels.  His  advisers,  however,  bore 
in  mind  what  he,  a  new  comer  to  the  colony,  not  unnaturally 
overlooked.  The  men  of  Southold  and  Southampton  did  not 
stand  alone.  There  was  even  reason  to  think  that  their  action 
was  not  wholly  spontaneous,  but  that  they  were  incited  to  resist 
ance  by  emissaries  from  Connecticut.  That  colony,  ever  aggres 
sive,  energetic  and  self-reliant,  was  certain  to  seize  such  an  op 
portunity  of  pursuing  its  territorial  claims.  Harsh  dealings  with 
the  Long  Island  townships  would  in  all  likelihood  be  the  signal 
for  war  with  New  England.  This  view  prevailed,  and  a  second 
commission  was  sent  to  bring  about  if  it  might  be  a  peaceful 
settlement.3 

While  these  second  commissioners  were  sailing  for  Long 
Island  the  government  of  Connecticut  was  giving  the  English 
Dealings  township  something  more  than  secret  encouragement. 

with  Con-        T-,  -cii  111 

necticut.  Representatives  from  the  three  towns  had  openly 
visited  Hartford  and  been  received  with  favor.1  The  govern 
ment  of  Connecticut  wrote  to  Massachusetts  to  enlist  that 
colony  in  a  scheme  for  recovering  the  Long  Island  towns.5  The 
traditions  of  Massachusetts  were  all  against  a  policy  which  could 
strengthen  Connecticut  or  extend  her  territory  southward. 
Moreover  the  Court  of  Massachusetts  had  just  shown  how  in 
different  they  were  to  any  question  of  Dutch  or  English  su 
premacy.  In  September  1673  Clayborne,  the  commander  of  an 
English  frigate,  touched  at  Boston  and  asked  for  men  and  sup 
plies  with  which  to  make  an  attack  on  New  Netherlands.  The 

1  Minutes,  pp.  620,  626. 

2  The  respective  answers  of  the  three  colonies  are  in  the  Minutes,  pp.  639- 
40.  3  Minutes,  pp.  642,  648. 

*  Connect.  Records,  1665-77,  P-  2I2-         6J&- 


M2  THE  DUTCH  RECONQUEST. 

Court  might  reasonably  have  refused  on  the  ground  that  the  en 
terprise  was  too  serious  for  the  commander  of  a  single  ship  acting 
on  his  own  responsibility.  They  took  a  less  intelligible  and  less 
creditable  position.  They  would  lend  a  hand  if  Clayborne 
would  guarantee  them  the  possession  of  the  captured  territory. 
But  they  did  not  care  to  win  it  back  for  the  Proprietor.  Rather 
than  see  it  again  under  Lovelace  they  would  prefer  that  it  re 
mained  in  Dutch  hands.1  When  we  condemn  the  policy  of 
Charles  II.  and  his  successor  towards  Massachusetts  we  must 
not  forget  that  incident.  It  not  only  showed  in  the  colony  a  lack 
of  any  patriotic  sentiment  on  behalf  of  the  mother  country;  it 
showed,  what  was  far  more  dangerous,  an  inability  to  understand 
the  need  for  connected  action  against  a  foreign  Power. 

The  backwardness  of  Massachusetts  did  not  hinder  Connecti 
cut  from  taking  prompt  measures.  A  dispatch  was  sent  to- 
Colve,  telling  him  that  if  he  pressed  the  oath  of  allegiance  on 
the  Long  Island  towns,  Connecticut  would  interfere.  Colve 
was  not  to  be  turned  aside  by  vague  threats.  The  bearer  of  the 
letter  was  at  first  detained,  and  then  sent  back  to  Hartford  with 
an  answer  which  was  virtually  a  defiance.  A  paper,  Colve  said, 
had  been  handed  to  him  by  a  man  who  called  himself  John 
Bankes.  It  was  signed  by  one  John  Allen,  claiming  to  be  Secre 
tary  for  the  colony  of  Connecticut.  But  Colve  cannot  believe 
that  such  an  impertinent  and  absurd  writing  emanated  from  per 
sons  bearing  the  name  of  Governor  and  General  Court,  and  he 
has  therefore  deemed  it  unworthy  of  an  answer.  Nor  did  Colve 
confine  himself  to  this:  in  his  interview  with  the  English  emis 
sary  he  plainly  met  threats  by  counter-threats,  warning  him  that 
re-enforcements  were  expected  from  Holland,  and  that  the 
citizens  of  Hartford  might  find  that  it  was  not  a  question  of 
winning  back  Long  Island,  but  of  holding  their  own  territory.2 

At  the  same  time  that  they  sent  this  message,  Connecticut  dis 
patched  two  commissioners  to  the  threatened  townships  to  watch 
the  interests  of  the  colony,  and  to  see  that  the  Dutch  officials 
took  no  prejudicial  steps.  The  two  parties,  the  commissioners 
from  Connecticut  and  those  sent  by  Colve,  met  at  sea  near  the 
coast  of  Long  Island.  After  an  exchange  of  civilities  they  went 

1  Resolution  of  the  General  Court  of  Massachusetts  quoted  textually  by  Mr. 
Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  229. 

1  The  letter  is  in  the  Minutes  together  with  Colve's  reply.  Bankes's  report 
of  his  interview  is  in  the  Connecticut  Records,  1665-77,  P-  565. 


NEW  ENGLAND  AND    THE  DUTCH. 

together  to  Southold.  The  inhabitants  were  already  in  arms. 
The  Dutch  officials  soon  saw  that  the  current  of  feeling  ran  dead 
against  them,  and  they  went  straight  back  to  New  York  without 
even  visiting  any  of  the  other  townships.1 

A  month  later,  in  November  1673,  Connecticut  sent  a  volun 
teer  force  under  Winthrop's  son,  Fitz-John,  to  help  the  settlers 
The  Dutch  of  Southold.  Bankes  on  his  return  from  his  embassy 
reduce  described  Colve  as  "a  man  of  resolute  and  passionate 
Southold.  spirit."  His  career  as  a  whole  may  justify  the  de 
scription,  but  his  dealings  with  Southold  hardly  deserve  the  praise 
of  resolution.  Three  times  did  he  take  measures  just  decided 
enough  to  irritate,  and  so  ineffective  as  to  give  every  encourage 
ment  to  resistance.  At  the  end  of  February  he  dispatched  a. 
fleet  of  four  vessels2  to  collect  stores  from  Long  Island  for  the 
use  of  his  troops,  and  to  summon  Southold  to  sumbit  to  Dutch 
authority.  The  fleet  anchored  off  Southold,  and  the  commander,, 
Nathaniel  Sylvester,  called  on  the  town  to  surrender.  If  not,, 
it  must  prepare  for  an  immediate  attack.  All  he  got  for  answer 
was  a  command  not  to  interfere  with  English  subjects.  Shots; 
were  exchanged  without  effect,  then  Sylvester  came  to  the  con 
clusion  that  his  force  was  not  equal  to  the  task  in  hand,  and  he 
returned  to  New  York. 

During  the  winter  trifling  hostilities  were  carried  on  at  sea. 
But  it  was  clear  that  neither  New  England  nor  New  Nether- 
Motives  for  lands  had  the  will  or  power  for  any  serious  opera- 
tionrofCNew  tions.  The  battle  for  the  possession  of  Long  Island 
lamisfby  anc^  ^e  Hudson  valley  was  to  be  fought  out  not  on 
the  Dutch.  tne  coast  of  America,  but  in  the  council  rooms  of 
Europe.  The  Dutch  Government  had  stronger  motives  now 
for  making  an  effort  to  retain  the  colony  than  in  the  days  when 
it  had  been  so  cheaply  won  by  Nicolls.  The  title  of  the  Com 
pany  was  extinct,  and  whatever  was  acquired  now  was  acquired 
for  and  by  the  whole  nation.  The  gain  which  the  colony  might 
thus  be,  had  been  strongly  set  forth  in  a  letter  sent  by  the  mu 
nicipal  authorities  of  New  York  to  the  States-General  im- 


1  A  very  full  report,  in  the  form  of  a  journal,  by  the  commissioners  is  in 
the  Minutes,  pp.  654-8. 

2  A  man-of-war,   a  ketch,   and  two   sloops.     This   is   stated   in   a   letter   from 
Fitz-John   Winthrop   to  Allen.     This  letter  is  the  chief  authority   for   the   ex 
pedition.     Winthrop   speaks   of   Sylvester's    "great   civility"   in  a   manner   which 
suggests  that,  while  nominally  serving  the  Dutch,  his  sympathies  were  English.. 


144  THE  DUTCH  RECONQUEST. 

mediately  after  the  capture.  The  place  had,  they  pointed  out, 
both  military  and  commerical  value.  In  Holland  thousands  of 
homes  had  been  laid  desolate  by  the  late  French  invasion;  the 
outcasts  might  find  a  refuge  in  Dutch  territory  beyond  the  At 
lantic.  Beside  the  profit  of  the  fur  and  tobacco  trade,  the 
colony  would  supply  grain  to  the  Dutch  settlements  in  the  West 
India  Islands.  Placed  in  the  midst  of  English  territory  it  would 
serve  as  a  constant  check  on  England  and  on  any  sudden  exten 
sion  of  English  naval  power. 

Before  that  letter  could  reach  Holland,  before  the  Dutch  even 
knew  that  their  colony  had  been  won  back,  the  fate  of  New 
Final  ces-  York  had  been  settled  by  diplomacy.  In  August 
Holland.  1673,  Spain  intervening  on  behalf  of  the  States- 
General  laid  down  as  a  condition  of  agreement  that  all  terri 
torial  conquests  made  during  the  war  should  be  restored.  The 
treaty  was  not  finally  accepted  and  signed  till  the  following 
February.  In  the  meantime  the  States-General  made  certain 
provisional  arrangements  for  the  government  of  the  colony.  But 
in  doing  so  they  can  have  been  merely  reckoning  on  the  bare 
chance  of  negotiations  falling  through.  In  truth  Dutch  states 
men  must  have  seen  this  time  how  untenable  was  the  isolated 
province  on  the  Hudson.  Surrounded  by  English  settlements  it 
could  only  be  held  at  a  cost  which  it  could  in  no  way  repay.  If, 
too,  they  wished  to  see  France  held  in  check,  that  could  be  done 
far  more  efficiently  when  the  valley  of  the  Hudson  formed  part 
of  a  continuous  English  territory.  That  may  have  done  some 
thing  to  reconcile  Holland  to  the  sacrifice.  To  thwart  France 
was  the  one  supreme  motive  which  dominated  William's  policy, 
and  she  could  best  be  thwarted  by  the  union  of  New  Nether 
lands  with  the  English  colonies.  To  perceive  and  act  on  that 
view  was  in  no  way  beyond  the  clear  foresight  and  steady  pur 
pose  of  the  young  Stadtholder. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

NEW   YORK    UNDER   ANDROS   AND   DONGAN/ 

As  between  England  and  Holland  the  treaty  of  Westminster 
simply  restored  existing  relations.  But  it  did  not  leave  things 
Altered  as  they  had  been  between  England  and  the  recovered 

positionof       .  .  T  i        T-       i-  i  r /• 

New  York,  dependency.  Just  as  the  Lnglisn  conquest  in  1664 
wiped  out  the  claim  of  the  Dutch  West  India  Company,  so  did 
the  loss  and  recovery  of  New  York  wipe  out  the  Proprietor's 
title.  Just  as  New  York  when  reconquered  by  the  Dutch 
passed  at  once  under  the  direct  dominion  of  the  States-General, 
so  after  the  treaty  of  Westminster  it  at  once  returned  to  the 
English  Crown. 

There  was  nothing  in  that  theory  at  variance  with  equity. 
The  officials  appointed  by  the  Proprietor  had  lost  the  colony. 
When  it  was  recovered,  the  recovery  was  simply  part  of  an  ar 
rangement  to  indemnify  the  nation  for  what  it  had  spent  on 
the  war.  In  this  case  the  theory  was  acceptable  not  only  to 
grantor,  but  to  grantee.  There  was  no  fear  that  the  reconquest 
would  be  used  as  a  pretext  for  any  substantial  interference  with 
the  Duke's  proprietary  rights.  All  that  was  taken  could  be  and 
was  sure  to  be  at  once  re-granted.  And  there  were  reasons 
which  made  it  distinctly  to  the  interest  of  the  Duke  to  accept 
this  view.  If  it  wiped  out  his  existing  rights,  it  also  wiped  out 
his  existing  obligations.  He  was  sure  of  the  recovery  of  the 
former,  the  restoration  of  the  latter  was  at  his  own  pleasure. 
The  annihilation  of  the  Duke's  title  would  effectually  undo  that 
alienation  of  territory  to  Berkeley  and  Carteret  which  had 

1  For  this  period  we  have  two  fresh  authorities  of  value.  In  1679  two  Dutch 
men,  members  of  the  French  Protestant  sect  the  Labadists,  so  called  after  their 
founder  Jean  Labadie,  visited  New  York  and  New  Jersey,  and  left  a  very 
clear  and  valuable  record  of  what  they  saw.  A  translation  of  this  journal, 
with  a  preface  and  notes  made  by  Mr.  H.  C.  Murphy,  was  printed  in  1867 
by  the  New  York  Historical  Society.  It  is  of  special  value  for  New  Jersey 
affairs,  and  for  the  dealings  of  the  rulers  of  New  York  with  that  colony. 

Another  authority  is  the  Rev.  Charles  Wooley,  who  went  to  New  York  in 
1678  as  chaplain  to  Andros.  His  journal  with  notes  by  Mr.  O'Callaghan  was 
published  in  1860  in  Gowan's  Biblioiheca  Americana. 


146       NEW    YORK   UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DONG  AN. 

so  vexed  Nicolls.  It  might  even  enable  the  Duke  to  reopen  the 
boundary  question  with  Connecticut.  Not,  indeed,  that  the 
two  matters  were  on  the  same  footing.  The  proprietors  of  New 
Jersey  enjoyed  their  rights  under  a  concession  from  the  Duke. 
The  claims  of  Connecticut  as  against  the  Duke  were  decided  by 
the  interpretation  of  a  legal  instrument,  the  charter  of  the 
colony,  and  it  could  not  be  pretended  that  either  the  Dutch  con 
quest  or  the  treaty  of  Westminster  affected  that  instrument. 
It  might  be  urged,  however,  that  there  was  a  taint  of  fraud  in 
the  process  by  which  Connecticut  had  obtained  her  existing 
boundary.  The  question  might  be  regarded  not  as  one  of  legal 
right,  but  as  an  open  question  to  be  settled  by  diplomacy,  and  if 
so  the  change  no  doubt  put  the  Proprietor  in  a  stronger  position. 
The  extinction  of  Berkeley's  and  Carteret's  rights  could  not  be 
regarded  as  in  any  way  inequitable.  Just  as  much  as  the  Pro 
prietor  himself  they  were  responsible  for  the  loss  of  the  terri 
tory.  The  real  hardship  would  fall  on  private  persons  who  had 
titles  to  land  dependent  on  the  territorial  rights  either  of  the 
Duke  of  York  or  of  the  New  Jersey  proprietors. 

In  June  1674  a  new  grant  was  issued  to  the  Duke.  The  ex 
tent  of  territory  and  the  political  privileges  conceded  were  iden- 
Fresh  tical  with  those  given  by  the  earlier  instrument.  But 

grant  to  the      .  .  .  t     •         • 

Proprietor,  the  one  instrument  was  in  no  sense  a  prolongation  or 
a  confirmation  of  the  other.  The  second  grant  ignored  any  ter 
ritorial  title  of  English  Proprietors  as  completely  as  the  first 
overlooked  the  rights  of  Dutch  inhabitants.1 

It  might  have  been  expected  that  the  warnings  given  by 
Nicolls  would  at  least  have  saved  the  Proprietor  from  repeat- 
Position  of  ing  his  error,  and  again  dismembering  his  province. 
andteret  But  the  same  deliberate  forethought  which  had  led 
Berkeley.  Carteret  nine  years  before  to  secure  a  contingent 
interest  in  the  province  yet  to  be  won  did  not  now  desert  him. 
Between  the  treaty  of  Westminster  and  the  second  grant  to  the 
Duke  of  York,  Berkeley  and  Carteret  had  each  of  them  taken 
steps  for  saving  their  rights.  Each  had  practically  asserted  the 
view  that  the  Dutch  conquest  had  left  their  grants  unimpaired. 
In  March  1674  Berkeley  transferred  his  interest  to  two 
Quakers,  Bylling  and  Fenwick.  He  must  have  known  at  the 
very  time  that  he  made  the  grant  that  the  treaty  of  Westminster 

1  Col.   Papers,    1667-74,  p.    1308. 


BERKELEY  AND    CARTERET.  147 

imperiled,  if  it  did  not  annihilate,  his  title.  We  can  hardly 
doubt  that  he  was  simply  getting  out  of  an  unsafe  investment, 
and  leaving  to  the  purchasers  and  his  partners  the  risks  of  liti 
gation  or  the  cost  and  trouble  of  securing  a  fresh  title.  We  may 
reasonably  believe,  too,  that  the  troubles  in  the  colony  had  their 
share  in  disgusting  Berkeley  with  his  speculation. 

Carteret  adopted  the  bolder  policy  of  holding  on  to  his  prop 
erty  and  securing  it  in  the  face  of  the  Duke's  interest.  In  June 
Carteret  he  obtained  a  letter  from  the  King  which  estab- 
fresh  grant,  lished  his  claims  to  the  territory  of  New  Jersey.  The 
form  of  it  was  peculiar  and  ingenious.  It  did  not  confer  a  grant 
of  land  on  Carteret.  It  was  an  injunction  to  the  inhabitants  of 
the  province,  ordering  them  to  obey  Carteret.  His  authority 
was  assumed  as  a  pre-existing  condition.  Nothing  was  said  of  its 
origin.  The  letter  only  stated  that  "the  said  Sir  George  Car 
teret"  "hath  the  sole  power  under  us  to  settle  and  dispose  of 
the  said  country,  upon  such  terms  and  conditions  as  he  shall 
think  fit."1  This  was  practically  a  grant,  not  indeed  made  in 
legal  form  nor  fenced  in  with  the  necessary  precautions,  but  one 
which  an  astute  and  resolute  man  could  convert  into  an  efficient 
basis  for  something  more  valuable.  Within  a  fortnight  of  the 
day  when  this  letter  was  written  the  grant  was  issued  to  the 
Duke  of  York.  Thus,  within  three  months,  three  distinct  and 
incompatible  titles  had  been  called  into  existence.  The  Duke's 
patent  vested  the  soil  of  the  whole  province  absolutely  in  him; 
the  King's  letter  to  Carteret  gave  him  at  least  an  equitable  title 
which  vested  a  portion  of  the  soil  absolutely  in  him ;  the  convey 
ance  made  by  Berkeley  gave  the  purchasers  an  undefined  interest 
in  Carteret's  estate. 

The  question  between  the  Duke  and  Carteret  was  soon  settled. 
The  Duke,  heedless  of  Nicolls's  warnings,  and  regardless  of  the 
legitimate  means  of  escape  offered  to  him,  fell  again  into  pre 
cisely  the  same  trap.  In  July  he  issued  a  grant,  setting  forth  his 
own  title  under  the  fresh  patent,  and  then  by  virtue  of  that  title 
granting  to  Carteret  and  his  heirs  the  eastern  moiety  of  New 
Jersey.2 

The  multiplication  of  territorial  titles  was  not  the  only  com- 


1  Col.  Papers,  1669-74,  P-   13°S- 

2  The  warrant  for  the  preparation  of  this  grant  is  in  the  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii. 
p.  223. 


148       NEW    YORK   UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DONG  AN. 

plication  to  which  this  gave  rise.  There  was  a  further  matter  of 
dispute.  How  far  were  the  Duke's  rights  of  political  sover 
eignty  over  his  territory  transferred  to  his  grantees,  and  how  far 
again  transferred  by  Berkeley  to  the  Quaker  purchasers?  The 
difficulty  was  precisely  like  that  which  constantly  arose  in  the 
Middle  Ages  when  territorial  grants  carried  with  them  certain 
limited  rights  of  sovereignty.  The  further  course  of  that  dispute 
belongs  to  the  history  of  New  Jersey,  and  will  be  better  dealt 
with  hereafter. 

The  Governor  to  whom  the  Proprietor  now  intrusted  the 
colony  had  none  of  the  administrative  ability  of  Nicolls.  He  had 
Andros  not  even  the  lower  merits,  the  activity  and  enterprise 
Governor,  of  Lovelace.  He  was  a  mere  soldier  of  a  respectable 
type,  whose  idea  of  government  was  to  perform  certain  pre 
scribed  acts  and  to  enforce  discipline,  observing  as  far  as  might 
be  courtesy  and  humanity.  That  phase  of  his  career  by  which  he 
is  best  known  to  the  world  is  his  governorship  of  New  Eng 
land  at  the  time  of  the  Restoration.  There  we  see  him  at  his 
worst,  enforcing  a  crude  despotism,  which  abounded  with  un 
necessarily  irritating  incidents.  At  Boston  the  merits  of  Andros 
as  well  as  his  faults  made  against  him.  He  was  too  loyal  and 
conscientious  a  servant  to  shirk  the  duties  assigned  to  him;  he 
had  not  the  sympathy  or  the  adroitness  by  which  another  man 
might  have  made  the  system  of  government  tolerable.  But  if  he 
had  never  returned  to  America  after  his  first  governorship  of 
New  York,  he  would  have  taken  rank  as  a  highly  respectable, 
commonplace,  and  somewhat  hardly  used  official. 

In  October  1674  the  ship  which  brought  out  Andros  anchored 
off  Staten  Island.1  According  to  the  treaty  of  Westminster, 
He  arrives  Colve  had  no  duty  nor  option  but  to  hand  over  the 

at  New  .  T  ,  .  .  . 

York.  territory.    He  was,  however,  determined  so  to  use  his 

position  as  to  secure,  if  might  be,  the  rights  of  his  fellow- 
countrymen  against  any  possible  encroachment.  On  no  con 
ceivable  ground  had  Colve  any  -claim  to  stipulate.  Under  the 
treaty  of  Westminster  he  was  but  a  private  Dutch  citizen.  But 
a  quick  and  resolute  man  was  dealing  with  a  slow  and  irresolute 
one.  Nothing  is  more  marked  throughout  the  career  of  Andros 
than  his  lack  of  resource  in  any  unlooked-for  emergency. 

1  See  Andres's  letter  to  Colve,  dated  October  22,  1674,  in  O'Callaghan,  vol. 
iii.  p.  45- 


THE   SURRENDER   COMPLETED.  149 

Colve  drew  up  and  submitted  to  Andros  what  may  be  called  a 
treaty  or  surrender  under  eleven  heads.1  He  asked  that  there 
Negotia-  should  be  no  hindrance  to  the  settlement  of  any  un- 
CoiveT'  fulfilled  contracts  between  officials  and  private  citi 
zens;  that  Andros  should  accept  as  valid  all  the  judicial  acts 
of  the  late  Dutch  government;  that  private  property  should  be 
respected ;  that  certain  Dutch  usages  as  to  poor  rates  and  inherit 
ance  should  be  maintained ;  that  the  Dutch  should  retain  their 
rights  to  freedom  of  worship;  that  the  system  of  excise  and  of 
public-house  licenses  in  force  should  be  continued ;  and  that  the 
existing  arrangements  for  paying  off  a  debt  on  the  fortification 
should  not  be  altered. 

The  letters,  if  any,  which  accompanied  these  demands  of 
Colve  do  not  seem  to  be  extant,  and  we  can  only  judge  of  them 
by  the  tone  of  Andres's  answers.  From  those  one  would  cer 
tainly  not  infer  that  Colve  asked  Andros  to  grant  these  con 
ditions  as  an  act  of  grace.  Yet  he  was  in  no  position  to  negoti 
ate.  He  might  name  conditions,  but  if  Andros  refused  them, 
how  could  they  be  enforced?  But  every  incident  in  the  career 
of  Andros  showed  that  he  was  unequal  to  such  a  crisis.  His  dis 
patches,  too,  show  that  incapacity  for  clear  and  decided  expres 
sion  which  often  accompanies  indecision  in  action.  Hesitating 
and  rambling  answers  to  Colve's  demands  were  the  prelude  to 
complete  concession.  The  conduct  and  temper  of  Andros  were 
always  better  than  his  judgment,  and  even  at  his  worst  in  New 
England  he  always  showed  personal  courtesy  to  his  opponents. 
It  is  not  a  little  to  his  credit  that  during  these  negotiations,  when 
some  English  soldiers  were  arrested  by  Colve  for  being  drunk 
in  the  streets,  Andros  made  no  protest,  but  civilly  asked  that 
they  might  be  pardoned.2 

On  November  10  the  final  surrender  was  made,  and  the  long- 
debated  land  became  finally  a  British  province.3  The  peaceful 
reassertion  of  the  Proprietor's  authority  at  Albany  followed  as  a 
matter  of  necessity.  On  November  9  Andros  in  anticipation  of 
the  formal  surrender  declared  the  constitution  of  the  province. 
The  Duke's  laws  were  to  be  in  force,  and  all  grants  and  estates 
which  had  existed  before  the  Dutch  conquest  were  to  revive. 

1  O'Callaghan,  vol.  iii.  p.  49. 

2  Letter  of  Andros,   October   28,    1674,   given  by  Mr.    Brodhead   in   an   Ap 
pendix,  vol.  ii.  p.  655. 

3  O'Callaghan,  vol.  iii.  p.   51. 


15°       NEW    YORK"   UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DONG  AN. 

At  the  same  time  legal  proceedings  during  the  Dutch  occupation 
were  not  to  be  invalidated.1  One  important  change,  however, 
was  introduced.  Henceforth  the  Records  of  the  Town  Council 
were  to  be  kept  in  English,  and  as  far  as  might  be  its  judicial 
proceedings  were  to  be  carried  on  in  that  tongue.2 

Though  an  indemnity  was  granted  to  all  Dutch  subjects  for 
what  had  been  done  during  the  late  occupation,  one  English 
Court-  offender  did  not  escape.  A  court-martial  was  held 

Manning,  on  Manning.  He  pleaded  guilty  to  neglect  of  duty, 
urging  as  an  extenuation  a  "broken  head  and  disquieted  spirit." 
He  was  deprived  of  his  commission,  and  declared  incapable  of 
military  service  or  of  civil  employment  within  the  colony.3 

But  for  his  plea  there  would  be  little  in  the  case,  as  it  comes 
before  us  now,  to  condemn  Manning.  He  may  have  been  guilty 
of  errors  in  detail,  but  it  is  not  easy  to  see,  with  such  resources  as 
he  had,  what  could  have  resulted  from  resistance  but  wholly 
profitless  bloodshed.  And  it  is  certainly  surprising  that  no 
punishment  should  have  overtaken  Carr.  If  Manning  was  to 
blame  for  surrendering  at  his  own  discretion,  Carr  was  assuredly 
far  more  to  blame  for  hauling  down  the  flag  in  defiance  of 
orders. 

Nicolls  in  his  short  colonial  career  had  shown  powers  of 
administrative  statesmanship.  So,  too,  had  Lovelace,  on  a 
Demand  smaller  scale  and  with  less  satisfactory  results.  An- 
sentative  dros  showed  himself  nothing  more  than  a  docile  and 
institutions.  respectable  servant  of  the  Proprietor.  Yet,  to  do 
him  justice,  he  seems  in  one  important  matter  to  have  had  views 
of  his  own  at  variance  with  those  of  his  employer.  The  demand 
for  a  system  of  representative  government  which  had  been  made 
to  Lovelace  was  renewed  almost  immediately  on  the  arrival  of 
his  successor.  The  demand  was  communicated  by  Andros  to  the 
Duke.4  The  Duke's  reply  formed  one  of  those  many  links  by 
which  his  policy  as  a  colonial  ruler  is  instructively  connected 
with  his  later  policy  as  a  King.  He  shows  an  honest  wish  to 
understand  the  matter  fully.  Andros  has  not  told  him  "what 
qualifications  are  usual  and  proper  to  such  Assemblies" — that  is, 

1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.   227. 

z  Rrodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  274. 

3  For  the  details  of  Manning's  trial  see  O'Callaghan,  vol.  iii.  pp.   52-65. 

*  The  letter  or  letters  of  Andros  on  this  point  do  not  seem  to  be  extant. 
Their  general  tenor  may  be  inferred  from  the  Duke's  answer.  N.  Y.  Docs, 
vol.  iii.  p.  235. 


DEMAND  FOR  REPRESENTATIVE    GOVERNMENT.      151 

we  must  suppose,  how  the  system  worked  in  other  proprietary 
colonies,  and  what  safeguards  were  there  imposed.  However,  if 
Andros  thinks  the  matter  worth  further  discussion  the  Duke 
will  give  him  a  fair  hearing.  But  without  fuller  details  he  can 
not  approve  of  the  demand.  His  refusal  is  supported  by  most 
characteristic  reasoning.  An  Assembly  would  probably  en 
croach  on  the  rights  of  the  existing  government.  Besides  what 
do  the  settlers  want  that  they  have  not  got?  Even  if  the 
council  fail  to  govern  according  to  the  laws  established,  there 
is  an  appeal  to  the  Proprietor.  And  what  difference  would 
there  be  between  the  General  Court  of  Assize  as  established 
and  a  representative  Assembly?  There  "the  same  persons  are 
usually  present,  who  in  all  probability  would  be  their  repre 
sentatives  if  another  constitution  were  allowed."  That  men 
should  feel  safer  if  their  affairs  were  in  some  measure  in  their 
own  hands  seems  never  to  have  occurred  to  James.  It  is  not  fair 
to  call  him  an  unscrupulous  ruler  as  his  brother  was.  He 
would  have  admitted  as  readily  as  any  member  of  the  Long 
Parliament  or  of  the  Convention  of  1688  that  a  king  was  bound 
by  moral  obligations  to  his  subjects.  It  seems  strange  that  the 
brother  of  Charles  could  not  see  that  a  king  may  be  an  un 
principled  self-seeker.  It  is  perhaps  less  strange  that  he  should 
not  have  seen  that  he  might  be  a  fanatic,  with  a  narrow  brain 
and  a  distorted  conscience.  It  is  at  all  events  certain  that 
neither  as  proprietor  nor  as  king  did  James  show  the  slightest 
power  of  understanding  that  men  could  reasonably  demand  any 
security  for  their  political  rights  beyond  the  personal  good-will 
and  upright  intentions  of  the  ruler.  The  practical  result  of 
James's  government  is  the  best  comment  upon  the  fancies  of  the 
Patriot  King. 

One  thing  we  must  not  forget  in  estimating  the  amount  of 
freedom  enjoyed  by  the  Duke  of  York's  colony,  and  the  motives 
which  led  the  citizens  to  acquiesce  in  so  arbitrary  a  system.  As 
freemen  of  their  various  townships  they  enjoyed  that  liberty  and 
those  rights  of  self-government  which  were  withheld  from  them 
as  citizens  of  New  York. 

The  views  here  expressed  by  James  are  reaffirmed  in  a  letter 
written  to  Andros  in  the  following  January.  The  Proprietor 
evidently  suspects  his  deputy  of  viewing  the  popular  demand  for 
representation  with  too  much  tenderness.  "Unless  you  had 


I52       NEW    YORK   UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DONG  AN. 

offered  what  qualifications  are  usual  and  proper  to  such  As 
semblies,  I  cannot  but  suspect  they  would  be  of  dangerous  con 
sequence;  nothing  being  more  known  than  the  aptness  of  such 
bodies  to  assume  to  themselves  many  privileges  which  prove 
destructive  to,  or  very  often  disturb  the  peace  of,  the  govern 
ment  wherein  they  are  allowed.  Neither  do  I  see  any  use  of 
them  which  is  not  as  well  provided  for  whilst  you  and  your  Coun 
cil  govern  according  to  the  laws  established  (thereby  preserving 
every  man's  property  inviolate),  and  whilst  all  things  that  need 
redress  may  be  sure  of  finding  it  either  at  the  Quarter  Sessions 
or  by  other  legal  and  ordinary  ways;  or,  lastly,  by  appeals  to 
myself.  But  howsoever,  if  you  continue  of  the  same  opinion,  I 
shall  be  ready  to  consider  of  any  proposals  you  shall  send  for 
that  purpose."  In  the  same  letter  the  Proprietor  approves  the 
action  of  Andros  in  allowing  American  goods  to  enter  the  colony 
duty-free  for  three  years.  He  also  asks  for  a  more  exact  account 
of  the  finances  of  the  colony.  Andros,  he  says,  has  held  out 
hopes  that  it  may  be  at  least  self-supporting,  not  a  burden  as 
hitherto.1  A  few  days  later  we  find  the  Duke's  secretary, 
Werden,  remonstrating  with  Andros  for  deviating  from  the 
practice  of  his  predecessors,  and  allowing  goods  to  be  carried 
past  New  York  and  sold  at  Albany.2  In  other  words  Andros 
is  to  uphold  a  system  which  should  make  Albany  dependent  on 
New  York,  and  thus  give  the  latter  a  monopoly  of  the  rich  trade 
of  the  Hudson.  So  rigidly  was  this  monopoly  fenced  in  that  it 
was  only  after  three  years'  residence  apparently  that  a  New 
York  merchant  was  allowed  a  share  in  the  trade  with  Albany.* 

One  important  assertion  of  the  proprietary  authority  Andros 
did  effect.  The  townships  of  Southold  and  Southampton  yielded 
Dealings  to  the  demand  made  ten  vears  before  and  took  out 

with  New  ,  i     •      i        i         n         •         *  i 

England.  patents  for  their  land,  rsut  by  far  the  most  im 
portant  part  of  his  official  career,  that  which  had  the  most  abid 
ing  influence  on  colonial  history,  was  his  dealing  with  New 
England.  As  we  have  seen,  the  boundary  between  the  Duke's 
territory  and  Connecticut  had  been  drawn  by  mutual  consent  in 
1664.  Owing  to  an  error  or  a  fraud  in  surveying,  that  line  had 
been  drawn  in  a  fashion  more  favorable  to  Connecticut  than 
was  intended.  Andros  now  contended  that  the  Duke's  new 

1  Col.  Papers,   1675-6,  p.   513.  2  Ib.  p.  803. 

8  Travels  of  the  Labadists,  p.  284. 


ANDROS'S  DEALINGS  WITH  CONNECTICUT.         15$ 

patent  wiped  out  the  settlement  made  by  Nicolls.  The  new 
grant  had  for  its  eastern  boundary  the  Connecticut  river.  If 
strictly  interpreted  that  would  have  dismembered  Connecticut. 
The  Connecticut  charter  was  in  its  geographical  provisions  a 
vague  document.  But  we  may  be  at  least  sure  that  it  meant  to 
give  the  colony  secure  possession  of  the  townships  on  the  western 
bank  of  the  Connecticut,  to  say  nothing  of  Guildford  and  New 
Haven.  No  court  of  equity  would  have  given  effect  to  a  docu 
ment  by  which  the  grantor  tacitly  revoked  that  grant.  On  the 
other  hand,  there  is  no  doubt  that  when  the  frontier  line  was 
drawn  Nicolls  and  his  colleagues  were  imposed  on ;  nor  would 
Andros  have  been  doing  his  duty  by  his  principal  if  he  had  not 
striven  to  put  that  right.  Andros,  however,  without  attempt 
ing  to  negotiate  or  to  invite  a  compromise,  made  in  person  a 
crude  assertion  of  the  Duke's  alleged  rights,  in  a  form  so  un 
qualified  and  impracticable  that  it  was  impossible  for  the  colony 
to  acknowledge  them  without  danger,  and  without  a  total  loss 
of  self-respect.  I  have  told  elsewhere  the  details  of  the  dis 
pute.1  It  had  no  immediate  practical  result.  But  it  did  this: 
it  taught  Connecticut  what  manner  of  man  Andros  was,  and 
when  his  time  of  authority  over  them  came  thirteen  years  later 
the  lesson  was  not  forgotten.  They  must  have  seen  that  he  was 
a  man  withheld  from  being  formidable  alike  by  his  merits  and 
his  failings.  He  was  no  tyrant,  but  a  fairly  good-humored  Eng 
lish  gentleman,  carrying  out  a  harsh  measure  ungraciously,  but 
not  roughly  or  brutally.  In  caution,  in  diplomatic  tact,  in  all 
that  could  really  make  him  dangerous,  Andros  was  wholly  want 
ing,  and  the  dispute  with  Connecticut  displayed  that  want  to 
the  full. 

At  the  same  time  Andros  was  learning  something  of  the 
character  of  New  England,  not  only  in  his  dealings  with  Con 
necticut,  but  also  from  the  conduct  of  Massachusetts  in  relation 
to  the  Indian  war.  There  he  saw  the  Puritan  polity  on  one  of 
its  weak  sides,  weak,  too,  in  a  way  which  to  a  practical  soldier 
and  an  English  official  was  peculiarly  offensive.  He  saw  their 
hesitation,  their  inability  to  co-operate  readily,  their  suspicious 
jealousy  of  English  interference.  He  had  not  before  his  eyes, 
nor,  if  he  had,  could  a  professional  soldier  estimate  at  its  due 
worth,  that  stubborn  spirit  of  local  resistance,  whose  isolated 

1  The  Puritan  Colonies,  vol.  ii.  pp.  183-186. 


154       NEW    YORK   UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DONGAN. 

efforts  were  the  brightest  feature  of  the  war.  That  hostility  be 
tween  Andros  and  the  people  of  New  England  which  at  a  later 
day  had  such  important  effects  was  in  no  small  measure  due  to 
the  events  of  his  first  term  of  office. 

In  the  opposite  direction  Andros  was  entangled  in  disputes 
with  the  patentees  of  New  Jersey.  Those  disputes  will  come 
before  us  as  part  of  the  history  of  that  colony.  For  the 
present  it  is  enough  to  say  that  Andros  asserted  certain  unde 
fined  rights  of  sovereignty  over  the  territories  which  the 
Duke  had  alienated,  and  that  he  attempted  to  put  in  force  his 
claims  by  deposing  Carteret  and  issuing  writs  for  the  election 
of  an  Assembly,  and  by  so  doing  raised  the  whole  question  as  to 
the  completeness  of  the  Duke's  surrender  of  his  rights  over  New 
Jersey. 

One  of  the  most  important  features  of  Andres's  administra 
tion  was  that  the  ecclesiastical  constitution  of  the  colony  began 
Ecciesi-  to  take  on  that  form  which  gave  it  so  singular  and 
matters.  anomalous  a  character.  In  none  of  the  colonies  was 
the  system  of  a  State  Church  dependent  on  that  of  the  mother 
country  less  adapted  to  the  origin  and  composition  of  the  com 
munity.  In  none  except  South  Carolina  was  it  carried  out  so 
rigidly. 

The  ecclesiastical  constitution  introduced  by  Nicolls  after  the 
conquest  was  obviously  one  which  contemplated  a  system  of 
concurrent  endowment.  At  the  same  time  it  had  none  of  that 
definiteness  and  that  precision  which  were  absolutely  necessary 
to  secure  permanence  for  a  system  so  complex  and  so  unfamiliar. 

The  Duke's  code  of  laws  assumed  the  existence  of  parishes. 
It  provided  for  the  building  of  a  church  in  every  parish,  and  the 
maintenance  of  a  minister  by  a  public  rate.  The  minister  was 
to  be  chosen  by  the  freeholders,  and  inducted  by  the  Governors. 
It  was  further  provided  that  he  must  have  received  ordination 
from  some  Protestant  bishop  or  minister  within  the  British 
dominions,  or  within  the  dominions  of  some  foreign  prince  of  the 
Reformed  religion. 

In  1675  Andros,  regardless  of  the  stipulation,  introduced  one 
Nicolaus  van  Rensselaer  to  share  the  ministry  of  the  Reformed 
Church  at  Albany  with  Dominie  Schaats,  the  minister  who  al 
ready  held  office  there. 

Van  Rensselaer  was  by  birth  a  Dutchman  and  an  ordained 


ECCLESIASTICAL  MATTERS.  155 

minister  of  the  Lutheran  Church  of  Amsterdam.  But  circum 
stances  had  associated  him  with  England.  It  is  said  that  when 
Charles  II.  was  a  fugitive  Van  Rensselaer,  preaching  before  him 
at  Brussels,  had  assured  him  of  his  impending  restoration.  The 
preacher  came  over  to  England,  was  ordained  deacon  and  priest 
in  the  diocese  of  Salisbury,  and  was  then  placed  in  charge  of  the 
Dutch  church  at  Westminster.  His  appointment  at  Albany 
was  protested  against  by  Van  Niewenhuysen,  the  Lutheran  min 
ister  at  New  York.  He  could  not  deny  that  Van  Rensselaer 
was  an  ordained  minister  in  the  Dutch  Church.  But  he  ap 
parently  took  the  view  that  Van  Rensselaer's  ordination  in  the 
Church  of  England  vitiated  his  Lutheran  orders,  and  that  he 
was  ineligible  for  a  ministry  in  New  Netherlands  since  he  was 
no  longer  amenable  to  the  Classis  at  Amsterdam.  The  matter 
was  brought  before  the  Council.  They  with  singular  compli 
ance  accepted  this  view,  and  Van  Rensselaer  was  allowed  to  re 
tain  his  office  on  condition  that  he  conducted  his  ministry  "con 
formably  to  the  public  church  service  of  the  Reformed  Church 
of  Holland."  The  chief  historical  value  of  the  incident  is  the 
moderation  shown  by  Andros. 

The  next  incident  in  the  career  of  Van  Rensselaer  is  also  of  in 
terest  as  throwing  light  on  the  character  of  two  conspicuous 
figures  in  New  York  history.  For  certain  words  used  by  Van 
Rensselaer  in  a  sermon  at  Albany  he  was  charged  before  the 
Albany  magistrates  of  "false  preaching."  His  accusers  were 
Jacob  Leisler,  a  German  brewer,  then  a  deacon  in  the  church  of 
New  York,  and  Leisler's  son-in-law,  Jacob  Millborne,  an  Eng 
lishman.  The  Albany  magistrates  found  Van  Rensselaer  guilty 
and  imprisoned  him.  He  appealed  to  a  court  composed  of  tht 
Governor,  Council,  Mayor,  Aldermen,  and  Ministers  of  New 
York.  They  referred  the  matter  back  to  Albany.  The  magis 
trates,  therefore,  after  further  deliberation  withdrew  their  con 
demnation,  and  ordered  mutual  forbearance.  All  differences 
were  to  be  consumed  in  the  fire  of  love.  Thereupon  the  Court 
at  New  York  which  had  previously  dealt  with  the  question 
showed  their  view  of  the  merits  of  the  case  by  ordering  Leisler 
and  Millborne  to  pay  all  costs,  "as  giving  the  first  occasion  of 
difference."1 

1  All  the  authorities  on  these  questions  are  brought  together  by  Mr.  Brod- 
head,  vol.  ii.  pp.  288,  360.  Mr.  Brodhead  takes  the  view  that  the  right  of  the 


156       NEW    YORK   UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DONG  AN. 

By  his  good  measures  and  his  bad  alike,  Andros  had  incurred 
unpopularity  wirn  the  colonists.  He  was  charged  with  favoring 
Grievances  Dutch  traders,  at  the  expense  of  English,  and  the 
colonists  Duke  was  told  that  he  might  by  farming  the  revenue 
Aifdro».i  of  the  colony  make  more  of  it  than  was  made  by  his 
present  representative.  The  Governor  also  set  his  face  against 
that  unfair  and  wasteful  system,  whereby  favored  capitalists 
were  allowed  to  occupy  large  tracts  of  land  and  leave  them  un 
reclaimed. 

In  other  matters  Andros  had  more  justly  earned  his  unpopu 
larity.  He  was  charged  with  setting  aside  the  verdicts  of  juries. 
Especially  had  he  offended  the  trading  classes  by  ill-judged  in 
terference,  if  nothing  worse.  He  himself,  it  was  alleged,  kept 
a  store  and  thus  became  a  rival  to  the  New  York  traders.  He 
anticipated  in  a  crude  fashion  the  mercantile  policy  of  the  next 
generation  which  fettered  colonial  industry  in  the  interests  of 
the  English  manufacturer.  Tanning  was  an  important  business 
in  the  colony.  The  shoemakers,  thinking  themselves  over 
charged,  were  foolish  enough  to  invoke  the  help  of  Andros 
against  the  alleged  monopoly  of  the  tanners.  He  thereupon  en 
tirely  prohibited  tanning.  Henceforth  all  hides  had  to  be  sent 
to  England  and  tanned  leather  re-imported.  It  can  hardly  have 
been  the  same  motive,  but  rather  a  belief  that  government  could 
better  trade,  which  led  Andros  to  the  most  unpopular  of  all  his 
measures — interference  with  the  staple  product  of  the  country, 
grain.  He  prohibited  distilling  within  the  colony.  This  had 
two  effects.  It  led  the  settlers  to  import  Barbadoes  rum.  This 
was  at  first  brought  by  way  of  Boston  That,  however,  Andros 
prohibited,  thinking  probably  that  the  resources  of  the  Duke's 
colony  ought  not  to  go  to  enrich  disloyal  New  Englanders. 
The  increase  in  the  price  of  spirits  was  not  the  worst  effect  of 
Andres's  legislation.  The  demand  for  grain  was  lessened,  and 
the  farmer  could  only  find  a  market  for  it  abroad.  Andros  then 
proceeded  to  fence  in  the  export  trade  with  vexatious  restric 
tions.  He  prohibited  all  exportation  except  from  New  York 


Amsterdam  Classis  to  control  clerical  appointments  in  the  colony  was  secured 
by  the  eighth  article  in  the  capitulation  to  Nicolls.  I  can  see  no  evidence  of 
this.  The  article  simply  says:  "The  Dutch  here  shall  enjoy  the  liberty  of 
their  consciences  in  Divine  worship  and  Church  discipline."  Col.  Docs.  vol. 
ii.  p.  251. 

1  All  these  are  set  forth  by  the  Labadists  in  their  account  of  their  travels. 


DISPUTE  ABOUT  CUSTOMS.  157 

itself,  and  he  insisted  that  the  grain  before  exportation  should 
be  assayed  lest  the  colony  should  be  discredited  by  an  inferior 
article.  The  state  of  things  in  the  colony  may  have  made  this 
needful.  But  it  was  sure  to  be  unpopular,  and  Andros  had  no 
gift  for  lightening  such  administrative  difficulties. 

The  questions  in  dispute  between  Andros  and  the  patentees  of 
New  Jersey  made  his  presence  in  England  necessary.  In  the 
Dispute  autumn  of  1680  he  left  the  colony.  He  intrusted 
customs.  affairs  to  his  military  subordinate  Brockholls,  under 
the  title  of  Commander-in-chief  and  with  the  powers  of  Deputy 
Governor.  A  strange  administrative  oversight  of  which  An 
dros  was  guilty  had  an  important  effect  on  the  constitutional 
history  of  the  colony.  The  customs  duties  fixed  by  the  Governor 
in  1677  expired  after  a  term  of  three  years,  and  Andros  neg 
lected  to  make  an  order  continuing  them.1  The  collector  of 
customs  assumed  that  the  renewal  took  effect  as  a  matter  of 
course.  The  New  York  merchants  held  that  the  obligation  to 
pay  was  suspended.  A  test  case  soon  arose.  In  May  1681  the 
consignees  of  an  incoming  vessel  refused  to  pay  the  duty  de 
manded,  whereupon  the  custom-house  officials  seized  the  goods. 
The  matter  was  brought  before  the  Council,  who  gave  it  as 
their  opinion  that  no  duty  could  be  exacted  by  any  official  with 
out  the  express  approval  of  the  Proprietor.  Thereupon  a  civil 
action  was  brought  against  the  collector  of  customs,  and  a 
verdict  given  which  compelled  him  to  yield  the  goods. 

The  merchants  were  not  content  to  stand  merely  on  the  de 
fensive.  Dyer  was  indicted  for  high  treason  on  the  plea  that  he 
had  illegally  exercised  authority  over  the  King's  subjects.  His 
position  increased  the  moral  effect,  if  not  the  constitutional  im 
portance,  of  the  attack.  Dyer  was  not  only  collector  of  customs, 
but  also  mayor  of  New  York.  Proceedings  were  taken  in  due 
form,  a  jury  was  empaneled,  and  witnesses  examined.  But 
after  putting  in  a  plea  of  not  guilty,  Dyer  demurred  to  the  juris 
diction  of  the  Court.  It  had  no  power,  he  said,  to  try  an  official 
acting  under  a  commission  from  the  Crown.  The  Court  accepted 
that  view.  Dyer  was  sent  to  England  and  his  case  referred  to 
the  Privy  Council.  At  the  same  time  the  merchant  who  had 
prosecuted  him  was  bound  in  a  surety  of  five  thousand  pounds  to 
follow  up  the  matter  in  England.2  On  Dyer's  reaching  Eng- 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  351.  *  N.  V.  Docs.  vol.  in.  pp.  287-9. 


158       NEW    YORK   UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DONG  AN. 

land  the  case  was  brought  before  the  Privy  Council,  and  after, 
as  it  would  seem,  a  perfunctory  inquiry  was  suffered  to  drop.1 

The  personal  aspect  of  the  case  was  the  least  important  part 
of  it.  The  impulse  that  has  prompted  resistance  to  an  isolated 
Demand  exercise  of  arbitrary  power  seldom  stops  there.  If 
sentation.  the  community  has  had  no  political  training,  if  resist 
ance  cannot  fasten  on  certain  specified  constitutional  remedies 
and  demand  them,  then  follows  a  mere  destructive  revolution. 
Wat  Tyler  begins  by  resisting  the  tax-gatherer,  and  ends  as  the 
leader  of  purposeless  and  predatory  rebellion.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  community  has  already  traveled  some  way  in  the  path 
of  self-government,  if  its  traditions  and  its  associations  enable  it 
easily  and  naturally  to  adopt  fresh  institutions,  then  isolated 
resistance  will  be  the  signal  for  constitutional  reform.  The 
protest  against  the  Stamp  Act  lays  the  foundation  of  the  Ameri 
can  confederacy. 

The  drama  now  enacted  on  the  small  field  of  New  York  fol 
lowed  the- latter  course.  Brockholls,  Andres's  deputy,  a  man 
neither  firm  enough  to  control  the  people,  nor  intelligent  enough 
to  sympathize  with  them,  sent  home  deplorable  accounts  of  the 
prevailing  anarchy,  of  his  inability  to  get  any  duties  paid,  and 
of  the  seditious  temper  which  pervaded  the  colony.2  The  sole 
justification,  as  it  would  seem,  for  his  outcry  was  that  the 
settlers  were  demanding,  in  no  intemperate  or  dangerous  fashion, 
an  extension  of  their  rights  of  self-government.  On  every  side 
of  them  they  saw  communities  enjoying  a  system  modeled  on 
that  of  the  mother  country.  The  oligarchy  of  Massachusetts, 
factious  and  disloyal,  enjoyed  a  system  harsh  indeed  as  against 
those  whom  it  excluded,  but  which  made  it  in  all  but  name  in 
dependent  of  the  Crown.  The  line  which  separated  New  York 
from  Connecticut  was  even  still  a  matter  of  dispute.  Yet  on  one 
side  of  that  line  men  enjoyed  the  full  privileges  of  English  citi 
zens,  but  lately  confirmed  in  express  terms  by  royal  charter. 
How  could  the  freemen  of  Southold  and  Southampton  be  ex 
pected  to  acquiesce  in  a  system  which  placed  them  under  the  arbi 
trary  control  of  the  Proprietor?  The  peaceful  loyalty  with 
which  they  had  accepted  English  supremacy  deserved  some  rec 
ognition.  By  slow,  faltering,  and  imperfect  steps  the  colony  had 

1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  pp.  318-21. 

*  Brockholls's  letter  is  quoted  by  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  355. 


DEMAND  FOR  REPRESENTATIVE   GOVERNMENT.      159 

been  working  its  way  under  Dutch  and  English  rule  towards 
self-government.  The  oversight  of  Andros  in  the  matter  of  the 
customs  gave  the  final  impulse  that  was  needed. 

The  connection  between  the  attack  on  Dyer  and  the  demand 
which  it  suggested  was  direct.  The  same  grand  jury  which  in 
dicted  him  called  the  attention  of  the  Court  of  Assize  to  the 
absence  of  a  representative  Assembly.1  The  conduct  of  the 
Court  shows  that  there  was  a  certain  rough  truth  in  James's 
view,  that  the  magistrates  were  really  effective  guardians  of 
popular  rights.  It  assuredly  proves  that  the  mere  distribution  of 
political  power  is  in  itself  a  gain  to  popular  liberties.  The 
Court  presented  to  the  Duke  a  petition  setting  forth  in  strong 
language  the  grievance  which  the  colony  suffered  from  the  want 
of  a  representative  Assembly.  They  were  taxed  by  arbitrary 
and  absolute  power,  while  all  about  them  they  saw  communities 
flourishing  under  systems  of  government  modeled  on  that  of  the 
mother  country.2 

Happily  for  the  colony  the  Proprietor  was  not  left  to  the 
vague  and  inactive  policy  of  Brockholls,  nor  to  that  of  a  respect- 
Probable  able  disciplinarian  such  as  Andros.  Among  the 

influence          „     .     ,        ,  .    ..       .    .  .  .  . 

of  Penn.  JJuke  s  chief  advisers  was  one  whose  counsel  at  such 
a  time  was  sure  to  make  for  peace  and  moderation.  In  later 
times  the  influence  of  William  Penn  over  James  may  have  been 
an  evil  one.  The  political  theory  and  sentiments  of  the  two 
men  had  too  much  in  common.  Penn,  like  James,  was  too 
ready  to  measure  a  political  system  by  its  immediate  application, 
without  taking  into  account  the  abuses  of  it  which  were  possible. 
But  so  far  his  own  views  on  colonial  government  plainly  were 
that  concessions  such  as  those  asked  for  by  the  Court  of  Assize 
were  safe  and  expedient.  That  he  was  soon  to  show  by  his 
treatment  of  his  own  colony,  Pennsylvania.  We  can  hardly  err 
in  believing  that  it  was  in  no  small  measure  due  to  him  that  the 
Duke  received  the  petition  of  the  Court  of  Assize  with  approval, 
and  with  a  promise  that  their  demand  should  be  speedily  re 
garded.  The  intention  was  notified  to  the  colonists  through 
Brockholls.  They  were  told  at  the  same  time  that  funds  must 
be  provided  by  the  colony  for  the  maintenance  of  the  government 
and  for  military  purposes. 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  h.  p.  354. 

*  The  petition  is  given  by  Mr.  Brodhead  in  an  Appendix,  vol.  ii.  p.  658. 


160      NEW   YORK  UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DONG  AN. 

The  change  of  system  brought  with  it,  almost  of  necessity,  a 
change  of  governor.  It  could  hardly  be  said  that  the  relations 
between  Andros  and  the  settlers  were  hostile,  but  he  had  neither 
the  breadth  of  mind  to  carry  out  a  policy  of  reform,  nor  the 
temper  to  work  cordially  with  a  popular  body.  A  post  was 
found  for  him  in  the  Island  of  Jersey,  and  the  governorship  of 
the  newly  enfranchised  colony  was  bestowed  on  an  Irish  soldier, 
Thomas  Dongan. 

When  appointed  Governor  of  New  York,  Dongan  was  forty- 
eight  years  old.  He  in  all  likelihood  owed  his  preferment  at  the 
Thomas  outset  to  the  fact  that  he  was  the  nephew  of  Richard 
Dongan.  Talbot,  Earl  of  Tyrconnel.  In  those  traits  of  char 
acter  by  which  Tyrconnel  is  best  known  in  history,  Dongan  had 
no  share.  He  had  nothing  in  common  with  the  boisterous  liber 
tine  who  figures  in  the  pages  of  Grammont,  or  with  the  unre 
strained  and  truculent  partisan  whose  Irish  administration  dis 
graced  the  Jacobite  cause.  Yet  in  one  or  two  important  fea 
tures  Dongan  was  a  decorous  copy  of  his  kinsman.  He  did  not 
fly  into  the  frenzies  of  a  spoilt  child  and  vent  his  fury  on  his 
own  wig.  But  his  diplomatic  correspondence  plainly  shows 
traces  of  a  sharp  and  arbitrary  temper.  Compared  not  merely 
with  Tyrconnel,  but  with  the  average  public  men  of  that  day, 
Dongan  was  honest  and  disinterested.  Assuredly  he  was  not 
wholly  and  absolutely  indifferent  to  personal  gain.  Such  indif 
ference  was  almost  unknown  among  the  public  men  of  that 
generation.  Dongan  would  serve  his  master  faithfully,  but  if  a 
chance  of  profit  offered  itself  as  an  incident  of  good  service  it 
would  not  be  neglected.  As  usual  mammon  worship  proved  as 
incompatible  with  civil  as  with  spiritual  obligations,  and  Dongan 
found  himself  exposed  to  charges  and  involved  in  difficulties 
which  a  purely  disinterested  man  would  have  escaped.  But  in 
spite  of  such  drawbacks  the  New  York  settlers  had  good  reason 
to  be  thankful  for  James's  choice.  The  difficulty  would  have 
been  to  find  among  James's  followers  not  one  free  from  Don- 
gan's  faults,  but  one  in  whom  they  were  so  slightly  developed. 
Taking  them  at  their  very  worst  they  were  far  outweighed  by 
his  merits,  his  common  sense,  and  his  clear  perception  of  what 
was  practicable,  his  energy,  ubiquitous  yet  not  meddlesome,  and 
persistent  without  being  obstinate.  His  nationality,  too,  and 
even  in  some  measure  his  religion,  were  in  his  favor.  The  his- 


THOMAS  DONGAN.  161 

tory  of  India  and  of  the  British  colonies  has  shown  by  many 
instances  that  in  the  task  of  ruling  alien  nations  all  the  best 
faculties  of  the  Irishman  come  into  play.  The  presence  of  a  vio 
lent  Papist  in  high  office  would  no  doubt  have  been  a  source  of 
discord  and  danger.  But  it  is  clear  that  Dongan's  Romanism 
was  of  a  sober  and  somewhat  conventional  kind.  Beside,  it  was 
no  small  matter  to  have  a  man  who  was  bound  by  no  ties  of  con 
nection  or  sentiment  to  the  settlements  of  New  England 
origin.  One  fear  no  doubt  there  was :  a  Papist,  the  nominee  of 
James,  was  in  danger  of  being  amenable  to  French  influence. 
In  the  coming  struggle  for  the  supremacy  of  America,  the 
Jesuit  missionaries  were  the  advanced  guard  of  France,  New 
York  the  key  of  the  frontier  to  be  held  by  England.  Luckily 
Dongan's  experience  had  qualified  him  to  understand  the  designs 
of  France  and  had  taught  him  to  distrust  them.  He  had  been 
colonel  of  an  Irish  regiment  which  was  transferred  by  Charles 
II.  to  the  service  of  the  French  Crown.  Strange  to  say,  he  does 
not  seem  during  his  service  to  have  acquired  enough  knowledge 
of  the  French  language  to  embolden  him  to  correspond  in  it. 
But  we  may  be  sure  that  he  had  studied  the  policy  and  the  re 
sources  of  France.  Moreover,  though  not  actually  dismissed 
from  the  French  service,  his  career  there  was  brought  to  an  end 
in  a  manner  which  he  plainly  felt  a  grievance.  When  in  1678, 
after  the  treaty  of  Nimeguen,  all  British  subjects  in  the  French 
.service  were  ordered  by  the  English  Government  to  return  to 
England,  the  French  King  endeavored  by  liberal  offers  to  retain 
Dongan.  He  refused  and,  as  he  stated,  in  consequence  never  re 
ceived  his  arrears  of  pay,  sixty-five  thousand  livres — in  English 
money  upwards  of  five  thousand  pounds.1  He  set  sail  for  his 
province  in  a  frame  of  mind  no  wise  trustful  of  French  promises 
nor  tolerant  of  French  pretensions. 

Such  was  the  Governor  to  whom  was  assigned  the  task  of  in 
troducing  representative  government  into  New  York.  His  in- 
Dongan-s  structions  were  a  complete  fulfillment  of  the  pledges 
t?onsU3C~  which  the  Proprietor  had  given  to  the  colonists. 
Dongan  on  his  arrival  was  to  issue  writs  for  the  election  of  a 
representative  Assembly,  to  be  chosen  by  the  freeholders.  The 

1  See  a  letter  by  Dongan  quoted  by  Mr.  Grant  Wilson  in  his  Memorial  His 
tory  of  New  York,  vol.  i.  p.  399. 
2N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  in.  p.  369. 


162       NEW    YORK    UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DONG  AN. 

number  of  representatives  was  limited  to  eighteen.  Apparently 
the  apportionment  of  these  members  was  left  to  the  discretion 
of  Dongan  and  his  Council.  All  Acts  passed  by  the  Assembly 
and  confirmed  by  the  Governor  and  the  Council  became  law 
provisionally,  pending  the  approval  of  the  Proprietor.  The 
power  of  levying  rates  was  exclusively  vested  in  the  Assembly. 

The  same  instructions  clearly  defined  the  functions  of  the 
Governor.  He  might  establish  law  courts  and  custom-houses, 
and  grant  lands.  He  was  to  have  military  authority  for  defen 
sive  purposes  such  as  fortification  and  the  control  of  the  militia, 
but  he  had  no  power  to  make  war  except  by  command  of  the  Pro 
prietor. 

There  was  plainly  no  absolute  security  that  the  system  of 
representation,  thus  granted,  was  to  be  permanent.  It  was  con 
ceded  as  a  favor,  not  a  right.  Practically,  however,  when 
representative  machinery  has  once  been  established,  it  contains 
within  itself,  if  there  be  in  the  community  the  needful  instincts 
and  conditions  for  freedom,  a  power  of  self-preservation.  It 
was  a  great  matter,  too,  that  the  Proprietor  should  recognize 
and  approve  a  representative  Assembly  not  as  a  special  arrange 
ment  to  meet  an  emergency,  but  as  part  of  the  every-day  work 
ing  system  of  the  community. 

In  August  1683  Dongan  reached  New  York.1  In  less  than 
three  weeks  from  his  arrival  the  freeholders  were  apprised  of 
The  first  their  privileges  and  were  instructed  to  prepare  for  an 
summoned.  election.2  The  announcement  was  received  with  a 
somewhat  florid  declaration  of  gratitude  by  the  Court  of  Assize. 
Their  sense  of  the  Duke's  benevolence  was  "larger  and  more 
grateful"  than  they  could  express.  They  would  "always  be 
ready  to  offer  up  their  lives  and  fortunes"  against  all  enemies, 
whether  for  the  King  or  the  Proprietor.* 

This  spirit,  however,  was  not  universal.  One  township 
(Easthampton)  regarded  the  change  not  as  a  concession  on  the 
part  of  James,  but  as  an  encroachment  by  him  upon  their  con 
stitutional  rights.  They  elected  representatives,  but  they  pro 
tested  against  the  issue  of  any  writ  in  the  Proprietor's  name.  It 
might  seem  an  illogical  proceeding  to  elect  representatives  and 
then  to  deny  the  efficiency  of  the  instrument  under  wrhich  they 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  375.  2  Ib 

*  Ib.   p.  380.     Mr.   Brodhead,  as  usual,  gives  the  actual   text. 


THE   CHARTER   OF  LIBERTIES.  163 

were  elected.1  But  to  guard  against  this  argument  the  represent 
atives  were  expressly  to  declare  that  the  town  had  elected  not 
in  obedience  to  the  Proprietor's  command,  but  because  the  free 
men  would  not  lose  an  opportunity  of  defending  their  own 
rights. 

It  is  difficult  to  see  what  ground  the  freemen  of  Easthampton 
had  for  their  contention.  The  Proprietor's  patent  distinctly 
gave  him  power  "to  govern  and  rule,"  terms  amply  wide  enough 
to  cover  the  issue  of  the  writ.  Yet  the  temper  which  made  the 
men  of  Easthampton  scrutinize  a  concession  instead  of  accepting; 
it  eagerly  and  unquestioningly  had  its  good  side.  It  was  an  ex 
aggerated  and  ill-judging  display  of  the  same  spirit  which  five 
years  later  made  the  wiser  Nonconformists  reject  the  Declara 
tion  of  Indulgence. 

In  October  1683  the  deputies,  eighteen  in  number,  met.  It 
is  to  be  noticed  that  the  Dutch  part  of  the  colony  was  repre- 
Composi-  sented  out  of  proportion  to  its  population.  The 
Assembly.8  capital  alone  returned  four,  Esopus  two,  Albany, 
with  which  was  joined  the  adjacent  hamlet  of  Rensselaerwyck, 
the  same  number,  Schenectady  and  Staten  Island  one  each.  Thus 
every  one  of  the  Dutch  townships  on  the  Hudson  was  repre 
sented.  Long  Island,  on  the  other  hand,  was  represented  not  by 
towns  but  by  its  three  ridings,  two  members  to  each.  Each  of 
the  three  outlying  dependencies,  as  we  may  call  them,  Pemaquid, 
Nantucket,  and  Martha's  Vineyard  sent  a  representative.  If 
any  question  should  arise  affecting  the  rival  interests  of  the  two 
nationalities,  it  is  plain  that  the  Dutch  side  of  the  house,  as  one 
may  call  it,  would  both  outnumber  the  English  and  be  bound  to 
gether  by  a  stronger  principle  of  cohesion. 

The  first  proceeding  of  the  Assembly  was  to  pass  a  measure 
analogous  to  a  Bill  of  Rights.  This  was  entitled  "The  Charter 
The  of  Liberties  and  Privileges,  granted  by  his  Royal 

Liberties.3  Highness  to  the  inhabitants  of  New  York  and  its 
dependencies."  This  settled  the  future  constitution  of  the 
colony.  The  executive  power,  however,  was  still  to  be  vested 
in  the  Governor  and  his  Council.  There  was  to  be  an  Assembly 


1  Brodhead,   vol.    ii.    pp.    381-2.     Here   again   our    author   quotes    the   actual 
text. 

1  Ib.  p.  382. 
*  This  is  given  by  Mr.  Brodhead  in  an  Appendix  to  vol.  i.  659. 


164       NEW    YORK   UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DONG  AN. 

which  must  meet  not  less  than  once  in  three  years,  to  which 
every  freeholder  and  every  freeman  of  a  town  corporation  should 
vote  for  a  member.  The  colony  was  arranged  in  electoral  dis 
tricts,  corresponding  closely  to  those  which  had  returned  members 
to  the  extant  House.  The  only  noteworthy  changes  were  that 
Martha's  Vineyard  and  Nantucket  were  combined  into  a  single 
constituency,  and  that  the  representation  of  the  Dutch  part  of 
the  colony  was  increased  by  two.  The  scheme  for  the  distribu 
tion  of  representatives  was  confirmed  by  another  Act,  passed  in 
the  same  Assembly,  dividing  the  colony  into  twelve  counties. 
General  principles  were  laid  down  as  to  procedure  and  as  to  the 
privileges  of  members,  substantially  identical  with  those  which 
apply  to  Parliament. 

The  Assembly  did  not  limit  itself  to  framing  a  representative 
system.  It  also  declared  certain  general  constitutional  principles. 
No  tax  of  any  kind  was  to  be  levied  except  by  the  Governor, 
Council,  and  deputies  sitting  as  the  general  Assembly.  No 
man  was  to  be  punished  arbitrarily  or  otherwise  than  by  due 
course  of  law.  Trial  by  jury  was  provided  for,  and  it  was  also 
enacted  that  the  English  law  of  real  property  should  be  in 
force. 

Not  the  least  important  clause  was  the  last.  It  provided  that 
no  one  who  professed  his  faith  in  Jesus  Christ  and  abstained 
from  disturbing  the  peace  of  his  neighbors  should  be  molested 
for  his  religion.  This,  however,  was  not  to  exempt  Dissenters 
from  the  payment  of  ecclesiastical  dues,  nor  to  interfere  with  the 
existing  arrangement  whereby  in  every  township  a  minister, 
chosen  by  two-thirds  of  the  freemen,  was  maintained  by  a  gen 
eral  rate. 

The  clause  which  claimed  for  the  Assembly  the  right  of  taxa 
tion  was  not  left  a  mere  abstract  resolution.  On  October  30  an 
Revenue  Act  was  passed  granting  to  the  Proprietor  certain 
Act-  specified  duties.  The  very  next  day  the  representa 

tives  formally  communicated  to  their  constituents  the  victory, 
as  they  considered  it,  which  had  been  won  for  them.  The 
people  were  summoned  by  sound  of  trumpet  to  the  town  hall, 
and  there  in  the  presence  of  those  officials  who  formed  the  gov 
ernment  of  the  colony  and  of  the  municipal  government  of  the 
city,  the  charter  of  liberties,  together  with  the  appended  Act  as 
signing  a  revenue  to  the  Proprietor,  was  formally  published. 


ACT  OF  NATURALIZATION.  165 

Immediately  afterwards  the  obligation  to  pay  such  duties  was 
notified  by  proclamation.1 

It  is  hardly  needful  to  point  out  these  enactments  were 
worthless  without  the  sanction  of  the  Proprietor.  Nor  did  the 
Assembly  pretend  that  it  was  otherwise.  The  liberties  specified 
by  the  charter  were  not  what  the  colonists  actually  claimed  as 
their  right,  they  were  only  what  they  hoped  the  Proprietor 
would  confer  on  them  as  an  act  of  grace. 

Perhaps  the  most  striking  feature  of  all  in  the  charter  is  its 
intensely  English  character.  There  is  nothing  in  it  abstract  or 
Growth  of  general,  not  a  line  of  it  that  is  not  distinctly  modeled 
feeHnghand  on  English  precedent.  The  whole  phraseology  is 
influence.  English,  it  implies  a  perfect  familiarity  with  Eng 
lish  constitutional  usage  in  those  who  drafted  it,  a  constant 
reference  to  English  law  in  those  who  were  to  use  it.  Yet,  as 
we  have  seen,  the  Assembly  which  drafted  it  was  one  in  which 
the  Dutch  portion  of  the  community  preponderated.  Nor  was 
that  all.  It  is  almost  certain  from  the  manner  in  which  the  Act 
was  proclaimed  that  the  Assembly  knew  that  it  would  be  re 
ceived  with  enthusiasm  among  the  Dutch  inhabitants  of  the 
capital.  Nothing  could  show  better  how  effectively  Nicolls  and 
his  successors  had  done  their  work,  with  what  almost  incom 
prehensible  speed  the  colony  was  becoming  Anglicized.  It  may 
seem  paradoxical  to  say  that  the  very  plurality  of  nationalities 
made  this  all  the  easier.  Yet  in  truth  it  was  so.  A  solid  Dutch 
nationality  might  have  held  its  own  against  English  influence. 
There  was  no  such  power  of  resistance  in  the  miscellaneous 
population  of  which  the  colony  was  made  up.  That  feature  was 
clearly  recognized,  probably  increased,  by  one  of  the  Acts  passed 
by  the  Assembly.  It  ordered  that  any  free  man,  who  was  ready 
to  profess  Christianity  and  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the 
King  and  fidelity  to  the  Proprietor,  might  without  any  further 
ceremony  become  a  naturalized  citizen.  Naturalization  did  not 
merely  carry  with  it  political  privileges.  The  unnaturalized 
foreigner  residing  in  New  York  labored  under  material  disad 
vantages.  He  might  only  deal  with  merchants  and  might  not 
carry  on  retail  trade.2 

One  practical  result  of  this  naturalization  Act  was  certain 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  iii.  p.  384.     I  rely  upon  the  same  authority  for  the  remain 
ing  enactments.  *  The  Labadists,  p.  260. 


166       NEW    YORK   UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DONG  AN. 

to  be  an  immigration  of  fugitive  Huguenots  whom  the  bigotry 
of  Lewis  was  driving  from  French  soil.  At  the  same  time  the 
colony  was  divided  into  counties,  and  courts  of  justice  were  insti 
tuted.  There  were  to  be  four  separate  tribunals  in  New  York : 
monthly  Town  Courts  to  decide  small  cases;  quarterly  or  half- 
yearly  County  Courts ;  a  General  Court  of  Oyer  and  Terminer, 
and  a  Court  of  Chancery.  From  all  these  an  appeal  was  to  lie 
to  the  Crown.1 

Hitherto  such  freedom  as  had  been  enjoyed  by  the  inhabitants 
of  New  York  had  rested  chiefly  on  the  municipal  privileges  of 
individual  townships.  Now  that  the  whole  community  had  at 
length,  as  it  seemed,  acquired  rights  of  self-government  the 
peculiar  privileges  of  the  city  were  not  overlooked.  Special 
The  city  of  attention  to  them  was  indeed  enjoined  on  Dongan  by 
to'be  in°-rk  n^s  instructions.  Henceforth  the  city  was  to  be  incor- 
corporated.  p0rated  by  charter  and  to  enjoy  an  elaborate  mu 
nicipal  constitution.  It  was  to  be  divided  into  six  wards,  each 
electing  one  alderman.  The  corporation,  however,  was  not  to  be 
wholly  self-governing,  since  all  officials  but  the  treasurer  were  to 
be  nominated  by  the  Governor  and  Council.2 

Dongan,  like  Nicolls,  clearly  saw  the  administrative  evils 
which  resulted  from  the  separation  of  New  Jersey.  His  re- 
Difficuities  monstrances,  however,  were  of  no  more  avail  than 
jersey.  those  of  his  predecessor.  Even  if  Carteret  had  been 
disposed  to  give  way,  there  were  now  so  many  vested  interests 
created  in  the  territory  that  it  was  wholly  impossible  for  the  Pro 
prietor  to  recover  his  rights.  The  situation,  with  its  tangle  of 
political  and  territorial  claims,  reminds  one  what  must  have 
been  the  practical  working  of  feudalism  under  a  liberal  and  easy 
going  sovereign. 

All  that  Dongan  could  effect  in  the  direction  of  New  Jersey 
Retention  was  to  thwart  an  unscrupulous  attempt  to  annex 
island.  Staten  Island.  The  history  of  that  dispute  belongs 
rather  to  New  Jersey  than  to  New  York. 

Dongan  was  equally  resolute  in  dealing  with  territorial  ag 
gression  in  the  opposite  quarter  and  equally  successful.  The 
The  Con-  fraudulent  encroachment,  as  one  may  not  unfairly  call 
boundary,  it,  made  by  Connecticut  had  hitherto  gone  unresisted. 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  386.  Cf.  Dongan's  report  in  March  1687.  Col. 
Papers,  1685-8,  1160.  2  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  390. 


BOUNDARY  DISPUTE  WITH  CONNECTICUT.        167 

But  Dongan  insisted  that  the  error  made  in  striking  the  line 
must  be  set  right,  and  that  they  must  go  back  to  the  original 
settlement  by  which  New  York  was  to  have  a  tract  of  twenty 
clear  miles  north  of  the  Hudson.  Connecticut  had  learnt  what 
might  be  gained  by  standing  well  with  the  Crown.  It  would 
have  been  a  violation  of  all  her  traditions  to  irritate  the  heir 
presumptive.  We  cannot  doubt  that  if  any  of  Dongan's  prede 
cessors  had  taken  as  firm  a  line  they  would  have  been  equally 
successful.  On  the  other  hand,  Dongan  saw  that  it  was  worth 
some  slight  sacrifice  of  the  Duke's  rights  to  secure  the  good  will 
of  Connecticut.  Moreover,  a  strict  adhesion  to  the  twenty  miles 
condition  would  have  incorporated  with  New  York  townships 
which  had  grown  up  as  part  of  Connecticut,  and  Dongan  was 
too  much  of  a  statesman  to  wish  for  such  a  measure.  In  No 
vember  1683  a  new  line  was  struck.  The  instructions  of  the 
Connecticut  Assembly  to  the  commissioners  who  acted  for  them 
in  the  matter  show  that  they  made  the  surrender  grudgingly. 
But  they  had  the  grace  to  acknowledge  to  their  fellow-citizens 
their  approval  of  Dongan's  own  conduct.  It  was  not  till  fifteen 
months  later  that  the  agreement  was  ratified  by  the  Governors 
of  the  respective  colonies,  nor  were  the  boundaries  formally  ac 
knowledged  by  the  English  Government  till  the  twelfth  year  of 
William's  reign.1 

The  instructions  given  to  Dongan  on  the  subject  of  commerce 
were  on  the  same  lines  as  the  policy  prescribed  for  Andros.  No 
pongan's  goods  were  to  be  allowed  to  pass  up  the  river  without 
4"onsUabout  Paymg  duty  at  New  York.  If  the  settlers  in  New 
trade.  Jersey  attempt  to  open  up  any  other  route  for  In 

dian  trade,  Dongan  must  do  his  best  to  prevent  it,  "as  I  wish 
to  preserve  the  Indian  trade  for  the  benefit  of  New  York  above 
all  others." 

The  Act  whereby  the  Assembly  declared,  and  as  far  as  it 
could  perpetuated,  its  own  existence  and  rights  met  with  a 
favorable  reception  from  the  Proprietor.  His  approval  was 
given,  and  there  seemed  every  reason  to  believe  that  New  York 
would  enjoy  a  system  of  representative  government  as  complete 
and  as  effectually  secured  to  it  as  that  of  Connecticut.  But, 


1  All  the  details  of  this  negotiation  are  to  be  found  in  the  Connecticut 
Records,  1678-89.  Dongan's  original  letter  of  demand  and  the  final  agreement 
•are  printed  in  an  Appendix,  pp.  329-32. 


1 68       NEW    YORK   UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DONG  AN. 

near  as  the  cup  was  to  the  lip,  the  slip  came.  Within  a  month 
of  the  accession  of  James,  Dongan  received  fresh  instructions. 
Effector  There  was  nothing  in  them  to  excite  any  apprehen- 
prfet^s  si°n  °f  change,  everything  to  make  the  colonists  he- 
accession.  jjeve  that  the  p0licy  of  granting  representative  institu 
tions  was  to  be  followed.  There  was  to  be  no  change  of  officials, 
and  Dongan  was  to  inform  the  settlers  that  their  proposals 
were  under  consideration  of  the  Privy  Council,  and  that  they 
might  "expect  a  gracious  and  suitable  return,  by  the  settlement 
of  fitting  privileges  and  confirmation  of  their  rights." 

The  Assembly  adjourned  in  October  1684,  intending  to 
meet  in  the  following  September.  It  was  held,  however,  that 
the  demise  of  the  Crown  ended  their  existence.  Dongan 
issueH  fresh  writs,  and  in  October  the  Assembly  met  again. 
This  time  eight  days  apparently  sufficed  for  all  its  legislative 
work.1 

There  was  nothing  in  the  policy  of  Dongan  to  excite  a  sus 
picion  that  the  altered  position  of  the  Proprietor  would  bring 
incorpora-  with  it  any  change  in  his  dealing  with  the  settlers. 
York°andew  The  municipal  privileges  of  New  York  were  con- 
Albany,  firmed  in  December  1686  by  charter.2  That  was  ob 
tained  or  it  might  perhaps  be  fairer  to  say  accompanied  by  pay 
ment  of  three  hundred  pounds  to  Dongan  as  an  official  due.* 
There  is  nothing  to  show  that  Dongan  was  ever  induced  by  any 
prospect  of  gain  to  betray  his  master's  interests  or  those  of  the 
provinces.  But  he  did  not  rise  above  the  morality  of  the  day, 
which  regarded  such  perquisities  as  part  of  the  natural  gain  of 
an  official  career. 

In  the  following  summer,  Albany  was  likewise  created  a  mu 
nicipality  with  a  mayor  and  seven  aldermen.  The  mayor, 
sheriff,  and  other  officials  were  to  be  nominated  by  the  Governor, 
the  aldermen  to  be  elected  by  the  freemen.  Here  again  Dongan 
was  to  receive  three  hundred  pounds,  a  transaction  which  was 
described  in  the  dispatch  of  a  Canadian  official  as  a  surrender  by 
the  Governor  of  the  chief  privilege  of  the  Crown,  that  of  nomi 
nating  magistrates.  The  Indian  trade  was  intrusted  to  the  city 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  427. 

'  Ib.  p.  438. 

8  Dongan  himself  admits  this  (N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  412).  He  also  says 
(p.  411)  that  he  was  promised  the  same  sum  in  connection  with  the  Charter 
of  Albany.  He  does  not  say  that  it  was  paid. 


FRESH  LAND  PATENTS  REQUIRED.  169 

government,  a  dangerous  measure  considering  all  that  was  in 
volved  in  the  Iroquois  alliance.1 

In  receiving  his  six  hundred  pounds  from  New  York  and 
Albany,  Dongan  no  doubt  felt  that  the  settlers  got  good  value 
Fresh  land  for  their  money,  and  that  his  patron  was  in  no  way 
quired.  prejudiced.  But  for  another  part  of  his  policy  we 
can  hardly  urge  that  excuse.  In  March  1684  an  order  was 
issued,  not  by  the  Proprietor,  but  by  the  Governor  or  Council, 
that  the  townships  in  the  colony  should  take  out  new  patents  for 
their  land.2  Bad  as  interference  with  established  titles  is  any 
where,  it  is  specially  so  in  a  new  country  where  security  of  title 
is  an  absolutely  needful  condition  of  improvement.  It  is  impos 
sible  to  acquit  Dongan  of  introducing  this  measure  to  put  fees  in 
his  own  pocket,  and  in  those  of  the  officials  about  him.  An  even 
worse  feature  of  the  transaction  was  the  fact  that,  in  two  cases, 
the  grant  of  the  patent  was  preceded  by  a  large  gift  of  land 
from  the  township  to  the  Governor. 

But  with  all  this  there  was  nothing  to  show  the  settlers  that 
a  wholesale  attack  on  their  privileges  was  at  hand.  The 
Massachusetts  patent  had  indeed  been  revoked.  But  from  its 
Change  of  veiT  outset,  that  document  had  been  tainted  by  a  sus- 
pohcy.  picion  of  misrepresentation  attaching  to  its  origin,  and 
for  nearly  twenty  years  there  had  been  a  smoldering  feud  be 
tween  the  colony  and  the  Crown.  The  constitutional  rights  of 
New  York  were  the  fresh  creation  of  the  King's  own  hands. 
Yet  in  the  summer  of  1686  a  new  commission  was  issued  to 
Dongan,  which,  coupled  with  the  instructions  accompanying  it, 
utterly  shattered  the  constitution  of  the  colony.  By  the  commis 
sion,  the  functions  which  the  Assembly  had  claimed,  and  had 
been  permitted  to  exercise,  were  transferred  to  the  Sovereign, 
and  a  council  of  seven  nominated  by  the  King.  They  were  to 
make  laws  subject  to  the  King's  approval,  to  impose  taxes,  and 
to  create  courts  of  justice. 

The  instructions  to  Dongan  added  various  details  as  to  the 
practical  administration  of  the  system  thus  created.  The  fate  of 
the  charter  was  virtually  sealed  by  the  commission,  but  the  in 
structions  explicitly  declared  it  null  and  void.  Henceforth,  the 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  439. 

3  Ib.  p.  437.  Here  again  we  have  Dongan's  own  admission,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol. 
iii.  p.  412. 


-170       NEW    YORK   UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DONG  AN. 

style  of  all  laws  was  to  be  "by  the  Governor  and  Council." 
Toleration  was  explicitly  continued  to  all  men  of  whatever  re- 
The  re  re  ^l&on  wno  abstained  from  disturbing  the  public 
tentative  peace,  or  molesting  those  of  other  denominations. 

system  an-  , 

nulled  by       Uut  instead  of  the  system  whereby  every  township 

Dongan's  .          ,  ••*./•*  •         •  i 

new  in-  appointed  a  minister  or  its  own  denomination,  the 
structions.*  Qm^  of  England  was  to  be  established  throughout 
the  colony,  and  no  minister  of  religion  nor  any  schoolmaster 
admitted  without  a  certificate  from  the  Archbishop  of  Canter 
bury,  stating  that  he  was  conformable  to  the  doctrine  and  dis- 
-cipline  of  the  Church  of  England.  Liberty  of  the  press  was 
strictly  fenced  in  by  a  system  of  licensing.  No  man  might  keep 
.a  printing  press,  nor  might  any  book,  pamphlet,  or  paper  be 
printed  without  the  approval  of  the  Governor. 

That  a  ruler  who  had  but  three  years  before  set  on  foot  a 
liberal  system  of  popular  government  should  thus,  without  rea 
son  or  provocation,  withdraw  all  the  privileges  then  granted 
seems  in  the  face  of  it  inexplicable.  One  is  tempted  to  fancy 
some  intrigue  under  the  surface,  or,  if  not,  to  set  down  the 
change  as  the  wayward  caprice  of  a  madman.  That  James  cer 
tainly  was  not,  nor  is  there  any  trace  of  secret  influence  at  work. 
In  real  truth  no  such  explanation  is  needed.  In  the  eyes  of 
James,  constitutional  government  was  but  a  method,  not  a 
principle.  That  men  should  value  it  for  anything  but  its  im 
mediate  and  tangible  results  was  to  him  unintelligible.  His  ob 
tuse  incapacity  for  entering  into  the  feelings  of  his  subjects  pre 
vented  him  from  seeing  that  his  previous  liberality  made  his 
present  policy  seem  all  the  harsher.  To  revoke  privileges  just 
granted  was  morally,  if  not  technically,  a  breach  of  faith.  De 
liberate  treachery  was  not  one  of  James's  failings.  But  a  man 
who  has  neither  the  power  nor  the  wish  to  understand  those 
with  whom  he  deals  is  almost  certain  to  expose  himself  to  such  a 
charge. 

No  doubt  another  motive  operated  with  James.  He  had  in  all 
likelihood  already  conceived  the  scheme  of  bringing  the  whole  of 
the  American  colonies  under  one  centralized  system  of  adminis 
tration.  Already  the  first  great  obstacle  to  that,  the  charter 

1  For  the  new  commission  see  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  pp.  377-82,  and  for  the 
instructions,  ib.  p.  369.  The  commission  is  dated  June  10,  the  instructions 
twelve  days  earlier. 


DONG  AN  S  ANTI-CANADIAN  POLICY.  171 

under  which  Massachusetts  enjoyed  the  privileges  of  self-gov 
ernment,  had  been  swept  away.  The  policy  of  Clarendon  had 
james  s  been  to  strengthen  the  loyal  colony  of  Connecticut  as 
xons^ida-  a  cneck  on  Massachusetts.  The  dealing  of  James 
tion.  vi\\h  the  colonies  went  on  an  entirely  different  prin 

ciple.  Local  rights  were  to  be  swept  away  to  make  room  for  a 
comprehensive  system  of  despotism.  Under  a  consolidating  sys 
tem  of  administration  such  as  James  now  aimed  at,  the  liberties 
just  granted  to  New  York  could  find  no  place. 

Such  an  attack  on  the  constitutional  rights  of  a  New  England 
colony  would  have  called  forth  a  whole  literature  of  pamphlets. 
The  citizens  of  New  York  seem  to  have  acquiesced  in  it  with 
that  tranquillity  with  which  they  bore  their  various  changes. 
Something  of  this  no  doubt  was  due  to  the  tact  and  capacity  of 
Dongan. 

We  may  well  believe  that  in  the  eyes  of  the  Governor  himself 
the  change  was  but  a  detail  of  administration,  trivial  in  com- 
Dongan's  parison  with  the  main  objects  which  he  had  in  view. 
Canadian  He  was  tne  ^rst  °^  English  public  men  who  clearly 
Policy.*  saw>  what  had  long  been  manifest  to  the  French 
rulers  of  Canada,  that  a  struggle  was  at  hand  in  which  the 
whole  future  cf  the  English  colonies  was  at  stake.  He  points 
out  the  importance  of  La  Salle's  ("Lassel's")  discovery.  "It 
will  prove  very  inconvenient  to  us,  as  the  river  runs  all  along 
from  our  lakes  by  the  back  of  Virginia  and  Carolina.  The  alli 
ance  of  the  Five  Nations  is  our  one  security."  He  saw,  too, 
that  a  merely  defensive  policy  would  not  suffice.  As  an  inevita 
ble  result  of  such  a  policy  the  French  would  deal  with  the  Five 
Nations  as  they  had  already  dealt  with  the  Algonquins:  Jesuits, 
hunters,  and  traders  would  permeate  the  country  with  French 
influence;  mission  stations  would  be  supplemented  by  forts; 
with  the  French  and  Mohawks  on  the  border  united  in  enmity, 
the  English  colonies  must  abandon  all  hope  of  peaceful  and  se 
cure  development.  To  meet  this  danger,  Dongan  clearly  saw, 
England  must  borrow  the  tactics  of  her  rival.  Missionaries 
must  be  sent  among  the  Indians ;  the  communication  between  the 

1  See  Dongan's  dispatch,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  pp.  389-415.  It  is  not  dated, 
but  evidently  belongs  to  the  latter  part  of  Dongan's  term  of  office.  The  editor 
of  the  Documents  assigns  it  to  February  22,  1687,  but  without  giving  any 
reason. 


l?2       NEW    YORK    UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DONG  AN. 

upper  waters  of  the  Hudson  and  the  Canadian  lakes  must  be 
secured  by  a  line  of  forts;  above  all  the  English  must  assume 
towards  the  Five  Nations  a  constant  attitude  of  friendship  and 
protection ;  the  savages  must  be  treated  as  the  dependents  of  the 
English  Crown;  it  must  be  understood  on  all  hands  that  they 
would  be  supported  against  invasion.  In  Dongan's  own  words, 
the  Five  Nations  were  to  be  the  bulwark  of  the  English  colo 
nies,  and  they  were  to  have  no  intercourse  with  any  Christians 
save  at  Albany,  and  that  by  license  of  the  English. 

Placed  as  the  various  parties  were,  the  policy  contemplated  by 
Dongan  was  quite  incompatible  with  the  maintenance  of  any  real 
friendship  with  France.  There  might  be  a  conventional  ex 
change  of  diplomatic  courtesies,  but  the  attitude  of  the  two 
nations  could  only  be  one  of  watchful  jealousy,  with  possibilities 
of  war  always  near  at  hand. 

One  of  the  first  difficulties  which  stood  in  the  way  of  Don 
gan's  policy  was  the  assumption  by  the  French  of  some  sort  of 
Relations  authority  over  the  Five  Nations  based  on  treaty.  In 

between  ,  . 

the  French  the  case  or  a  civilized  and  a  savage  nation,  an  attempt 
iroquois.  to  define  relations  in  precise  language  is  only  mis 
leading.  But  it  certainly  could  not  be  held  that  the  French  had 
by  the  negotiations  in  1666  and  1667  established  any  claim  over 
either  the  Iroquois  territory  or  its  inhabitants,  which  the  Eng 
lish  were  bound  to  respect.  This  was  practically  admitted  by 
the  French  Government  in  the  instructions  given  to  Frontenac 
upon  his  appointment  as  Governor  of  Canada  in  1673.  He  was 
to  hold  himself  in  readiness  to  repel,  and  if  need  be  to  attack, 
the  Iroquois — language  which  could  hardly  have  been  used  of  a 
nation  bound  by  treaty  obligations.  Frontenac's  abilities  might 
have  given  him  a  place  among  those  generals  who,  like  De 
mosthenes  and  Dundee,  Clive  and  Gordon,  have  employed  and 
controlled  with  unsparing  energy  and  clear  insight  the  military 
resources  of  barbarism.  For  such  work  needs  above  all  things 
a  free  hand,  and  Frontenac,  happily  for  England,  was  fettered 
at  every  turn.  His  colonists  were  animated  by  no  unity  of  pur 
pose,  no  steady  loyalty  to  a  common  cause.  He  labored  under  a 
cumbrous  system  of  dual  government.  He  as  Governor  was  re 
sponsible  for  the  general  administration  of  the  colony.  But  he 
had  at  his  right  hand  the  Intendant,  an  officer  appointed  to  pro 
tect  the  financial  interests  of  the  Crown,  and  to  act  as  a  check 


FRONTENAC  AND    THE  FIVE  NATIONS.  173 

and  a  spy  on  the  Governor.  As  a  writer,  who,  above  all  others, 
has  fathomed  the  inner  meaning  of  the  history  of  French  Can 
ada,  says,  the  relations  of  the  Governor  and  the  Intendant  "to 
each  other  were  so  critical,  and  perfect  harmony  so  rare,  that 
they  might  almost  be  described  as  natural  enemies."1  Even  the 
clergy,  who  virtually  formed  Frontenac's  staff  of  Indian  diplo 
matists,  were  not  allies  on  whom  he  could  reckon  with  certainty. 
The  indefatigable  zeal  and  energy  of  the  French  missionaries 
were  marred  by  the  jealousy  of  rival  orders  of  Jesuits,  Sulpicians, 
and  Recollects,  each  working  under  a  different  command,  and 
in  some  measure  on  different  systems. 

Frontenac  at  once  saw  that  in  the  inevitable  struggle  with 
England  the  Iroquois  country  was  the  key  of  the  situation,  and 
Policy  of  that  the  position  of  France  would  be  hopeless  unless 
Frontenac.  ^g  p{ve  Nations  could  be  cowed  or  propitiated. 
Luckily  for  the  Governor,  his  political  schemes  and  the  com 
mercial  interests  of  his  subjects  pointed  to  the  same  path.  The 
Iroquois  were  at  this  very  moment  threatening  those  Algonquin 
tribes  on  the  north-west  on  whom  the  French  depended  for 
their  supply  of  furs.  The  fur  trade  itself  was  a  Government 
monopoly,  but  the  profits  of  the  middleman  and  the  various  in 
direct  advantages  were  enough  to  give  the  whole  body  of  citizens 
an  interest  in  it. 

Frontenac  lost  no  time  in  establishing  his  influence  over  the 
Five  Nations,  and  in  impressing  them  with  a  sense  of  the  power 
of  France  to  punish  and  to  protect.  In  the  summer  of  1673  he 
made  a  progress  up  the  St.  Lawrence  and  visited  the  shores  of 
Lake  Erie.2  The  scanty  resources  of  the  colony  were  used  to 
bring  home  to  the  savage  the  material  splendor  and  strength  of 
civilization.  The  boats  which  bore  the  Governor  and  his  little 
force  were  gorgeously  painted  and  armed  with  cannon.  The 
Iroquois  at  first  proposed  that  the  Governor  should  visit  them 
in  their  own  woodland  fortresses.  Some  of  Frontenac's  coun 
selors  would  have  had  him  accede.  He  himself,  guided  both  by 
sense  of  personal  dignity  and  insight  into  the  savage  character, 
sent  back  word  that  the  Mohawks  were  the  children  of  the 
French  ruler,  and  that  it  behoved  the  father,  not  the  son,  to 

1  Parkman,  The  Old  Regime  in  Canada,  p.   266. 

*  The  journal   of   Frontenac's   expedition,   translated,   is   in   the   N.   Y.    Docs, 
vol.  ix.  pp.  95-114. 


174       NEW   YORK   UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DONG  AN. 

dictate  the  place  of  meeting.  He  prevailed,  and  the  envoys  of 
the  savage  confederacy  came  to  him  on  the  shores  of  Lake  Erie. 
Friendly  speeches  were  made,  and  gifts  exchanged.  Frontenac 
assumed  the  title  of  Father  of  the  savages.  The  claim  was  not 
merely  accepted  but  approved.  Other  French  governors,  so 
said  the  Indians,  had  claimed  to  be  their  brother,  none  had 
granted  them  a  title  so  honorable  as  that  of  children.  This 
may  in  itself  be  taken  as  proof  that  the  Indians  at  least  did 
not  look  on  the  relations  thus  asserted  as  one  of  sovereign  and 
subject. 

Frontenac  was  far  too  shrewd  and  resolute  to  rely  on  the  un 
supported  influence  of  friendly  words.  Before  his  interview 
with  the  Iroquois  the  foundation  of  a  French  fort  had  been  laid 
on  the  shores  of  Lake  Erie.  The  choice  of  a  site  had  been  made 
by  La  Salle,  not  yet  the  explorer  of  the  Mississippi  or  the  dis 
coverer  of  Louisiana,  but  already  a  daring  and  brilliant  pioneer 
in  the  Western  Wilderness.  In  him  Frontenac  saw  a  kindred 
spirit,  one  who  could  carry  out  with  patient  toil  schemes  con 
ceived  with  the  imaginative  enterprise  of  a  knight-errant.  Ad 
vised  by  him,  Frontenac  gave  orders  for  the  building  of  a  fort 
near  the  present  site  of  Kingston.  There  the  Algonquin  hunter 
might  bring  his  furs  and  meet  his  French  customers,  safe  from 
the  attack  of  the  Iroquois.  It  would  serve  too  as  a  visible 
symbol  of  the  French  advance,  and  as  a  protection  to  the  mission 
aries  who  were  carrying  their  spiritual  invasion  into  the  country 
of  the  confederated  tribes. 

By  July  1673  the  fort  was  built  and  garrisoned.  The  com 
mand  of  it  was  intrusted  by  Frontenac  to  La  Salle.  Two  years 
later  La  Salle's  position  was  confirmed  and  improved  by  a  grant 
from  the  King.  This  established  him  in  a  position  of  something 
like  sovereignty.  He  was  ennobled ;  the  fort  itself  and  a  tract 
of  land  round  it  were  granted  to  him ;  he  was  to  maintain  and 
garrison  the  fort,  and  to  establish  a  mission  station  there  at  his 
own  cost.  The  wooden  palisades  were  replaced  by  stone  walls, 
and  three  Franciscan  fathers  were  settled  there.  It  is  not  out 
of  place  to  dwell  on  the  establishment  of  Fort  Cataracouy,  or  as 
it  was  now  called  Fort  Frontenac,  in  connection  with  New 
York.  Fort,  factory,  and  mission  station  in  one,  it  represented 
the  various  influences  which  were  at  work  doing  battle  for 
France  in  the  coming  struggle. 


FRENCH  MISSIONS.  17$: 

In  other  quarters  French  missionaries  were  winning  a  hold  on 
the  Five  Nations.  In  1667  permanent  missions  were  established 
French  by  the  Jesuit  order  among  the  Mohawks  and  the 
amongnthe  Oneidas.  Within  the  next  five  years  as  many  more 
iroquois.  mission  stations  were  set  up  through  the  Iroquois. 
country.  There  were  marked  differences  in  the  readiness  with 
which  the  various  members  of  the  confederacy  accepted  the 
Gospel.  Among  the  Oneidas  a  leading  chief,  Garakanthie,  be 
came  a  zealous  convert,  and  in  that  tribe  the  labors  of  the  mis 
sionaries  bore  some  fruit.  So  also  they  did  among  the  Cayugas. 
and  the  Oneidas.  The  Senecas  and,  what  was  still  more  im 
portant,  the  Mohawks  were  for  the  most  part  obdurate.  But  in 
no  case  did  the  French  missionaries  obtain  such  a  hold  upon  any 
of  the  Five  Nations  as  to  be  able  materially  to  influence  their 
policy. 

There  may  have  been  isolated  cases  of  real  conversion.  But  if 
such  conversions  were  real,  their  very  reality  made  them  less 
valuable  as  instruments  of  French  political  aggression.  The 
Hurons  were  "converted  in  platoons  and  baptized  in  battalions." 
At  one  swoop  a  whole  village  became  nominal  converts  to  the 
faith  of  Christ,  very  real  converts  to  the  French  alliance.  The 
spectacle  of  the  isolated  Christian  among  the  Mohawks  would 
rather  tempt  his  brethren  to  suspect  and  dislike  those  who  had 
perverted  him  from  the  faith  of  his  fathers. 

At  length  the  French  had  in  the  case  of  the  Iroquois  to  be 
content  with  the  policy  adopted  by  the  New  England  mission 
aries,  and  to  withdraw  a  certain  number  of  converts  from  the  in 
fluence  of  the  surrounding  barbarism.  At  first  some  gave  ef 
fective  proof  of  the  reality  of  their  conversion  by  joining  a  Chris 
tian  village  in  the  country  of  their  enemies  the  Hurons.  In  1669 
a  separate  village  of  Iroquois  Christians  was  formed  on  the  south 
bank  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  opposite  Montreal.  This  was  after 
wards  moved  further  up  the  river.  Another  like  commu 
nity  sprang  up  on  the  shores  of  the  basin  north-west  of 
Montreal,  known  as  the  Lake  of  the  Two  Mountains,  while 
a  third  on  the  shores  of  Lake  Ontario  was  formed  of  Cayuga. 
converts. 

Such  a  system  instead  of  strengthening  French  political  influ 
ence  among  the  Iroquois  rather  alienated  and  exasperated 
the  chiefs,  who  saw  a  portion  of  their  subjects  thus  with- 


I?6       NEW    YORfT  UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DONG  AN. 

drawn.1  Far  more  could  have  been  done  by  the  presence  of  such 
a  one  as  Frontenac,  genial  in  his  sympathy,  yet  daring  and  mas- 
Frontenac  terful  in  his  self-assertion.  But  in  an  evil  hour  for 
replaced  by  prance)  a  happy  one  for  her  rival,  Frontenac  was  with- 
Barre.  drawn  for  a  while  from  Canada.  His  successor,  De  la 
Barre,  brought  out  with  him  a  good  reputation  as  a  soldier.  His 
policy  towards  the  Iroquois  was  from  the  outset  an  aggressive 
one,  yet  he  wholly  failed  to  strike  any  terror  or  to  inspire  his 
own  supporters  with  any  enthusiasm.  On  his  arrival  he  found 
the  Iroquois  at  war  with  the  Illinois  and  the  Miamis,  Algon 
quin  tribes  and  recognized  allies  of  France.  The  Senecas  and 
the  Cayugas,  too,  had  plundered  the  canoes  of  fur  traders  on  the 
St.  Lawrence  and  had  attacked  a  French  outpost.2  De  la 
Barre's  policy  was  to  divide  the  savage  confederacy,  and  deal  dif 
ferently  with  its  various  members.*  The  chief  offenders,  the 
Senecas  and  the  Cayugas,  were  to  be  at  once  attacked.  Jesuit 
missionaries  were  sent  to  enter  into  friendly  relations  with  the 
other  tribes.  The  English  Court  was  asked  to  bind  its  represent 
atives  to  a  policy  of  neutrality,  and  a  letter  was  sent  to  Dongan 
telling  him  what  was  intended,  and  asking  him  to  prevent  the 
sale  of  arms  and  ammunition  to  the  Iroquois.4 

Dongan's  answer  was  alike  guarded  and  firm.  The  Iroquois 
country,  he  affirmed,  was  English  territory,  its  inhabitants  Eng- 
Attitudeof  lisn  subjects.  He  would  be  responsible  for  their 
Dongan.  goO(j  behavior  towards  the  French.6  At  the  end  of 
July  1684  Dongan,  in  accordance  with  this  declaration,  met  the 
chiefs  of  the  confederacy  at  Albany.  With  him  was  Lord 
Effingham,  who  as  Governor  of  Virginia  had  separate  grievances 
of  his  own  against  the  Five  Nations.  These  were  satisfactorily 
settled.  It  was  then  arranged,  at  the  request  of  the  Iroquois 
themselves,  that  the  arms  of  the  Duke  of  York  should  be  set  up 
over  their  forts.  Furthermore  the  Senecas  claimed  that  Dongan 
promised  them  aid — four  hundred  horse  and  as  many  infantry — 
in  case  of  a  French  invasion.6 

1  Thus,  in   a  conference  with   Dongan  at   Albany  in    1687,   a  Mohawk   chief 
says,   "We  are   much   inclined  to   get  our   Christian   Indians  back   again   from 
Canada."     N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  444. 

2  Memorandum  by  De  la  Barre,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  ix.  p.  239. 
*Ib. 

*N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  447.  87t.   p.   448. 

*  This  was  stated  by  the  Senecas  to  De  la  Barre  in  a  conference  hereafter 
mentioned,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  ix.  p.  243. 


DE  LA    BARRELS  EXPEDITION.  1 77 

Dbngan  at  once  communicated  the  result  of  the  conference 
to  De  la  Barre.1  The  Senecas  were  to  be  considered  under  the 
protection  of  England.  All  territorial  disputes  were  to  be 
settled  by  the  two  home  Governments.  De  la  Barre  answered 
that  he  had  no  intention  of  allowing  territorial  conquest.  He  is 
only  concerned  with  the  Indians,  and  he  reaffirms  his  purpose  of 
attacking  the  Senecas  and  Cayugas.2 

Following  up  this  declaration  the  French  Governor  marched 
from  Quebec  with  a  force  of  twelve  hundred  men.  The  expe- 
DC  u  dition  did  not  get  beyond  Fort  Frontenac.  There 

«xpedition.  fever  broke  out  among  the  troops.  Alarmed  by  this, 
and  disheartened  by  the  reports  brought  in  by  his  Jesuit  emis 
saries,  De  la  Barre  gave  up  his  scheme.  Instead  of  a  military 
force,  a  peaceful  envoy  was  sent  to  bid  the  Seneca  chiefs  and 
their  confederates  to  a  conference. 

Meanwhile  Dongan  had  also  dispatched  an  envoy,  Arnout 
Viele,  to  secure  the  Indians  in  their  allegiance  to  the  English. 
In  the  Onondaga  village,  where  the  sachems  of  the  Oneidas  and 
Cayugas  had  come  to  hold  counsel,  Viele  met  the  French  agents. 
They  had  already  won  over  one  of  the  leading  chiefs  among  the 
Oneidas,  whose  reputed  eloquence  had  earned  him  a  name  trans 
lated  by  the  French  into  Grande  Gueule,  and  thence  corrupted 
into  Grangula.  In  a  speech  delivered  before  the  envoys  he  set 
forth  the  attitude  of  the  Iroquois  to  their  civilized  neighbors. 
His  words  are  noteworthy,  they  give  the  key  to  the  Iroquois 
policy,  and  they  show  the  difficulties  with  which  both  French 
and  English  had  to  contend.  According  to  recognized  customs 
he  personified  the  French  and  English  by  the  names  of  Onontio 
and  Corlaer.  Onontio  was  the  father  of  the  Five  Nations, 
Corlaer  their  brother.  When  the  father  and  one  of  the  sons 
came  to  blows  it  was  for  the  rest  of  the  family  to  interfere.  The 
Onondagas  must  stop  the  battle  between  Onontio  and  the 
Senecas.  If  Corlaer  was  true  to  his  brotherhood  he  would 
support  the  Onondagas.  But  though  Onontio  might  be  the 
father  of  the  Iroquois  and  Corlaer  his  brother,  neither  was  his 
master.  He  was  a  free  man,  the  land  in  which  he  lived  was 
his  own. 


1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  Hi.  p.  458. 
»/&.  p.  459- 


178       NEW    YORK   UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DONG  AN. 

If  the  Iroquois  did  not  accept  that  position  of  vassalage  in 
which  Dongan  would  fain  have  placed  them,  yet  he  had  in 
Policy  practice  no  cause  to  be  dissatisfied  with  their  attitude 
Iroquois.  towards  the  French.  While  these  negotiations  were 
going  on,  De  la  Barre's  force  was  encamped  at  Fort  Frontenac,. 
wasting  away  under  a  malarious  fever.  At  the  outset  Meules,. 
the  French  Intendant,  had  written  a  dispatch  to  the  colonial 
minister  at  home,  warning  him  that  De  la  Barre's  designs  would 
come  to  nothing.  He  would  journey  as  far  as  Fort  Frontenac 
and  then  make  peace  with  the  Senecas.  His  warlike  prepara 
tions  were  but  a  blind  to  deceive  the  Canadians  and  the  authori 
ties  in  France. 

Whatever  may  have  been  De  la  Barre's  original  intentions, 
Meules'  prophecy  was  more  than  fulfilled  in  fact.  Frontenac 
had  refused  to  treat  with  the  Indians  in  their  own  territory, 
deeming  that  he  would  thereby  lower  the  dignity  of  France.  De 
la  Barre  had  no  such  scruples.  He  crossed  Lake  Erie  and  met 
the  delegates  of  the  Five  Nations  at  Fort  Famine  on  the  far 
bank.  Bruyas,  a  missionary  acting  as  interpreter,  charged  the 
Iroquois  with  divers  wrongs  done  against  France.  They  had 
molested  Frenchmen  who  were  trading  among  the  Algonquins, 
and  had  introduced  English  merchants  as  their  rivals. 

The  answer  of  Grande  Gueule  was  an  open  defiance.  Taunt 
ing  De  la  Barre  with  the  condition  of  his  troops,  the  savage  told 
him  he  was  dreaming  in  a  camp  of  sick  men,  whom  the  Great 
Spirit  suffered  to  live  instead  of  slaying  them  by  the  sword.  It 
was  true  that  the  Iroquois  had  brought  English  traders  into  the 
Algonquin  country.  So  their  own  country  had  been  explored  by 
the  French.  Emphatically  did  Grande  Gueule  declare  again 
that  he  was  one  of  a  free  nation,  dependent  neither  on  Corlaer 
nor  on  Onontio.  So  long  as  they  themselves  were  unmolested, 
so  long  and  no  longer  would  they  keep  the  peace  with  both 
nations. 

The  interview  ended  better  than  might  have  been  expected 
from  the  beginning,  thanks  to  the  pacific  temper  of  De  la 
Barre.  He  withdrew  his  force,  having  received  from  the  Iro 
quois  a  pledge  that  in  their  attack  on  the  Illinois  they  would  not 
molest  the  French.1 

1  For  all  these  transactions  see  the  N.  Y.  Docs. ;  cf .  Golden,  History  of  Five- 
Nations  (ed.  1750);  also  Parkman's  Count  Frontenac  and  New  France. 


DONG  AN  AND  DENONVILLE.  179 

One  can  hardly  wonder  that  when  the  official  report  of  these 
proceedings  reached  France,  Seignelay,  the  colonial  minister, 
Deia  should  have  indorsed  it  with  the  words  "to  be  kept 

replaced  secret,"  and  that  De  la  Barre  should  have  been  re- 
vine."'  placed.  His  successor,  the  Marquis  de  Denonville, 
was  sent  out  to  carry  through  a  definitely  anti-English  policy.1 
The  English  must  be  excluded  from  the  Algonquin  territory. 
At  the  same  time  French  influence  was  to  be  used  with  James 
that  the  English  arms  should  be  removed  from  the  Iroquois 
forts.2 

The  first  dispatch  sent  home  by  Denonville  showed  that  he 
entered  thoroughly  into  the  policy  prescribed  for  him.  The  Five 
Policy  of  Nations  must  be  controlled  by  force  of  arms  and  by 
viiie.s  a  chain  of  forts  along  the  lakes,  and  English  traders 

who  were  already  visiting  the  Huron  country  must  be  expelled. 
Denonville  pointed  out,  too,  that  there  was  an  easy  communica 
tion  between  the  valley  of  the  Hudson  and  the  lakes.  Let  the 
English  only  secure  the  friendship  of  the  Iroquois,  and  they 
could  set  up  trading  houses  on  the  shore  of  Lake  Ontario.  He 
added  the  suggestion  that  the  King  should  buy  the  province  of 
New  York  from  England;  then  France  would  hold  the  whole 
Iroquois  country  and  its  fur  trade.  James  is  known  to  be 
necessitous.  That  he  may  be  held  back  from  such  a  sale  by  any 
patriotic  scruples  never  seems  to  occur  to  the  French  diplomatist. 

Meanwhile  Dongan  was  taking  effective  measures  to  neutral 
ize  French  influence  among  the  Iroquois.  In  the  autumn  of 
Dongan-s  1 686  the  confederate  tribes,  going  further  than  they 
with  the  nad  yet  done  in  the  direction  of  friendship  with  the 
Iroquois.  English,  sent  delegates  to  a  conference  at  New  York. 
Dongan  promised  them  English  missionaries  of  the  Romish  faith. 
He  exhorted  them  not  to  visit  Fort  Frontenac,  and  to  arrest 
and  send  to  New  York  any  Frenchmen  who  might  be  found  in 
their  country.  Most  important  of  all,  he  promised  that  if  the 
Iroquois  were  attacked  by  the  French,  help  from  New  York 
should  at  once  be  forthcoming.4 


xFor  his  instructions  see  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  ix.  p.  271. 

*  Seignelay  to   Barillon    (the  French   Ambassador  in   England),   ib.  p.   269. 

*Ib.    p.    280. 

4  This  conference  is  shortly  described  by  Dongan  in  his  Report  above  re 
ferred  to  (N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  395),  and  with  more  detail  in  a  letter  written 
t>y  Lamberville  to  his  colleague  Bruyas  (ib.  vol.  ix.  p.  489). 


l8o       NEW    YORK   UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DONG  AN. 

As  might  have  been  foreseen,  Dongan  and  Denonville  soon 
found  themselves  engaged  in  an  unfriendly  correspondence.  The 
outward  show  of  courtesy  was  maintained.  Dongan  promised 
to  do  his  best  for  the  safety  of  the  French  missionaries  among 
the  Iroquois.  When  Denonville  protested  against  the  English 
traders  who  debauched  the  natives  with  rum,  Dongan  contented 
himself  with  retorting  that  English  rum  was  at  least  not  more 
harmful  than  French  brandy.1 

But  there  was  no  real  attempt  to  conceal  or  ignore  the  an 
tagonism  of  the  two  on  vital  points.  Dongan's  attitude  was  per 
fectly  definite  and  simple.  The  Iroquois  were  English  subjects 
and  their  territory  English  territory.  Any  attack  on  the  one  or 
the  other  would  be  treated  as  a  casus  belli.  Any  dispute  arising 
to  this  claim  must  be  settled  by  the  two  home  Governments. 
Dongan's  duty  as  interpreted  by  himself  was  simply  to  accept 
and  guard  a  certain  frontier. 

It  was  no  light  task  to  impress  this  policy  on  a  King  with 
strong  French  prepossessions,  swayed  by  the  influence  of  astute 
Treaty  of  an^  unscrupulous  French  diplomatists.  For  a  while 
Whitehall.  jt  seemed  as  if  Lewis  and  Barillon  had  won  the  game. 
The  treaty  agreed  on  at  Whitehall  in  November  1686  seemed  to 
rob  Dongan  of  all  for  which  he  had  striven.  It  was  agreed 
that,  even  if  war  broke  out  between  England  and  France  in 
Europe,  peace  should  be  preserved  in  America.  Neither  nation 
was  to  fish  or  to  trade  within  the  territory  of  the  other,  and 
neither  was  to  assist  any  Indian  tribe  with  whom  the  other  might 
be  at  war.  In  accepting  those  terms  the  English  Government 
wholly  abandoned  the  policy  of  Dongan,  since  the  very  key 
stone  of  that  policy  was  a  defensive  alliance  with  the  Iroquois. 
It  was  well  for  England  that  her  representative  in  this  crisis  was 
something  more  than  a  mere  commonplace  official.  Fortunate 
in  that,  she  was  even  more  so  in  her  opponent.  Dongan  had 
clear  views  and  no  dread  of  responsibility.  But  his  resolute 
resistance  to  the  pretensions  of  France  might  have  availed  noth 
ing  against  a  wiser  opponent. 

I  have  alluded  elsewhere  to  the  folly,  at  once  a  crime  and  a 
blunder,  by  which  Denonville  threw  away  the  advantages  se 
cured  by  French  diplomacy.  Fifty  Iroquois  chiefs  were  invited 
to  a  conference,  and  were  then  kidnapped  and  sent  to  France  as 

1  For  this  correspondence  see  N.  Y.   Docs.  vol.  iii.  pp.  455-78. 


DONGAN  AND    THE  FIVE  NATIONS.  181 

galley-slaves.  Denonville's  folly  was  made  complete  by  his 
choice  of  an  agent.  It  was  Jacques  de  Lamberville,  a  French 
Dealings  of  Jesuit  missionary,  who,  himself  as  much  the  dupe  as 
wfth°thelle  anv  °f  tne  victims,  was  employed  to  lure  the  Iroquois 
iroquois.»  to  t}je  meeting.  The  Indians  acquitted  him  of 
guilt,  and  with  rare  forbearance  the  elders  of  the  tribe  escorted 
him  to  Fort  Frontenac  lest  he  should  fall  a  victim  to  the  vio 
lence  of  any  younger  warriors.  But  hitherto  trust  in  the  mis 
sionaries  had  been  the  strongest  agency  by  which  the  French 
could  work  upon  the  Iroquois,  and  that  spell  was  now  broken. 

In  July  1687  Denonville,  with  a  force  of  French  soldiers 
and  an  auxiliary  force  of  Indians,  marched  into  the  Iroquois 
lle  country.  One  skirmish  in  which  the  French  would 
.*6  probably  have  been  repulsed  but  for  their  Indian 
allies,  the  capture  of  a  few  bed-ridden  Senecas  who  could  not 
be  removed  and  who  were  handed  over  to  the  Hurons,  and  the 
destruction  of  much  corn,  a  loss,  however,  which  in  July  cannot 
have  been  irreparable — this  was  all  that  Denonville  could  show 
as  the  fruits  of  his  invasion. 

It  had,  moreover,  the  effect  of  bringing  him  into  collision 
with  the  English.  Two  English  parties  trading  on  the  borders 
Anti-  of  the  Algonquin  country  were  arrested  and  sent  as 

poficyhof  prisoners  to  Montreal.3  Dongan  at  once  had  a  con- 
Dongan.  ference  with  the  Iroquois  chiefs  at  Albany.  He  bade 
them  remember  that  they  were  the  subjects  of  the  English  King, 
and  that  they  must  have  no  dealings  with  the  French  without  the 
approval  of  Corlaer.  There  could  be  no  need  for  French  mission 
aries,  he  himself  would  send  them  English  priests ;  let  them  make 
peace  with  the  Algonquins,  and  let  them  recall  those  converts 
who  had  gone  to  live  in  Canada.  Of  all  Dongan's  declarations 
perhaps  the  most  important  was  his  offer  to  build  a  fort  on 
Lake  Ontario,  on  a  spot  to  be  chosen  by  the  Iroquois.4 

Abortive  as  had  been  the  warlike  operations  of  De  la  Barre 
and  Denonville,  yet  they  had  done  enough  to  make  the  Iroquois 

1  See  authorities  in  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  ix. ;  cf.  Parkman,  Count  Frontenac,  p. 
140;  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  476. 

2  Denonville's  own  report  of  the  expedition  is  in  the  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  ix.  pp. 
336-44.     He  does  not  mention  the  number  of  his  force. 

8  This  is  stated  by  Champigny  (the  Intendant)  in  a  letter  to  Seignelay,  N.  Y. 
Docs.  vol.  ix.  p.  332.  Denonville  also  refers  to  it. 

4  There  is  a  full  report  of  this  conference  drawn  up  by  Livingstone,  the  sec 
retary  to  the  colony,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  pp.  438-41. 


1 82       NEW    YORK    UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DONG  AN, 

feel  the  value  of  the  English  alliance.  Dongan's  appeal  was  re 
ceived  with  hearty  approval.  The  French  were  aiming,  so  the 
Iroquois  said,  at  the  total  destruction  of  the  Five  Nations,  and 
at  gaining  entire  control  of  the  beaver  trade.  Surely  the  great 
sachem  beyond  the  sea  would  not  suffer  the  Iroquois  to  be  extir 
pated,  and  their  lands  to  become  French  territory.  They  them 
selves  could  no  longer  receive  French  missionaries,  and  would  do 
their  best  to  withdraw  the  converts,  and  their  dealings  with  the 
French  should  be  subject  to  the  approval  of  Dongan. 

The  result  of  the  conference  did  not  end  in  mere  friendly 
words.  Dongan  furnished  the  Senecas  with  a  supply  of  arms  and 
ammunition.  In  so  doing  Dongan  was  undoubtedly  breaking 
the  treaty  of  Whitehall.  He  might  have  urged  with  a  good 
show  of  reason  that  it  was  impossible  by  any  other  means  to 
guard  his  own  frontier.  To  suffer  the  French  to  overpower 
the  Iroquois  was  to  lay  the  north-western  border  of  New  York 
open  to  invasion. 

The  soundness  of  Dongan's  policy  was  soon  illustrated.  A 
rumor  spread  abroad  that  Denonville  was  preparing  a  force  of 
fifteen  hundred  men  to  march  in  snowshoes  as  soon  as  winter 
came.  They  were  to  overrun  the  Mohawk  country,  and  then  to 
attack  and  extirpate  the  settlers  at  Albany.1  Thereupon  Albany 
and  Schenectady  were  palisaded,  Dongan  himself  took  up  his 
residence  at  the  former  place,  leaving  a  deputy  to  act  for  him  at 
New  York,  and  the  Iroquois  were  bidden  to  place  their  non- 
combatants  in  safety  within  the  English  border.2  While  Don 
gan  was  thus  acting  on  his  own  responsibility,  he  was  doing  his 
best  to  force  the  English  Government  to  accept  his  policy.  In 
the  autumn  of  1687  he  sent  home  an  officer,  Captain  Palmer,  to 
explain  to  the  English  Government  the  state  and  the  needs  of 
the  colony.  He  was  to  submit  a  scheme  for  a  complete  chain  of 
border  forts,  and  also  to  press  on  the  English  Government  the 
advantage  of  sending  missionaries,  and  the  need  for  some  scheme 
of  consolidation  which  should  bring  Connecticut,  New  York, 
and  New  Jersey  under  one  common  scheme  of  defense.' 

Dongan's  persuasions  were  not  wasted.    Barillon,  the  French 

1  Stated  in  a  letter  from  Schuyler  to   Dongan,    September   2,    1687.     N.   Y. 
Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  478. 

2  Council  Minutes  in  O'Callaghan,  vol.  i.  pp.   162,  166.     Dongan  to  Sunder- 
land,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  477. 

*  Palmer's  instructions  are  in  the  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  475. 


THE  KING  SUPPORTS  DONG  AN.  183 

Ambassador  in  London,  and  De  Bonrepos,  who  was  associated 
with  him  as  special  commissioner  for  negotiating  on  the  Ameri- 
james  can  question,  did  their  best  to  keep  the  advantage 

Dongan.  which  had  been  gained  and  to  persuade  James  to 
force  Dongan  to  a  neutral  policy.  Through  all  the  dealings 
of  James  with  France  ran  a  faint  spirit  of  independence,  way 
ward  indeed  and  uncertain,  yet  at  least  rising  higher  than  the 
deliberate  and  selfish  servility  of  his  brother.  Instructions  were 
now  sent  to  Dongan  adopting  his  policy  with  a  thoroughness 
which  must  have  surprised  its  proposer.  The  Iroquois  were  to 
be  distinctly  acknowledged  as  English  subjects,  and  as  such 
protected.  Dongan  was  furthermore  authorized  to  build  forts 
on  the  frontier  at  such  places  as  he  should  select,  and  to  require 
help  from  the  other  English  colonies.  The  Governors  and  Pro 
prietors  of  such  colonies  had  been  or  would  be  notified  of  this. 
In  fact  there  was  for  the  first  time  something  in  declaration  by 
the  English  Government  of  a  definite  anti-French  colonial 
policy.  At  the  same  time  the  French  commissioners  were  in 
formed  of  this  policy.  They  contented  themselves  with  a  some 
what  hesitating  protest  declaring  that  the  claim  now  made  by  the 
English  Crown  was  at  variance  with  previous  admissions,  and 
urging  that  the  Iroquois  had  repeatedly  acknowledged  French 
sovereignty.  With  this  protest  they  signed  an  agreement  of 
neutrality,  which  provided  that  no  commander  either  in  Canada 
or  in  the  English  colonies  should  invade  the  territory  of  the  rival 
nation.1 

One  cannot  doubt  that  the  course  which  James  thus  took  was 
for  the  good  of  the  English  colonies.  In  all  likelihood  it  saved 
them  from  irreparable  evil.  How  far  such  a  course  could  be 
reconciled  with  the  pledges  given  a  year  earlier  is  a  question 
perhaps  best  left  in  the  region  of  speculative  casuistry. 

Fortified  with  this  declaration  of  policy  Dongan  met  the  Iro 
quois  chiefs  at  Albany,  and  bade  them  henceforth  look  on  them 
selves  as  the  children  of  the  English  King.2  His  great  point 
seemed  gained.  Henceforth  he  might  use  the  confederate  tribes 
as  a  defensive  weapon  against  France  without  any  fear  that  his 
hands  would  be  fettered  by  the  timid  or  fickle  policy  of  the 

1  The  negotiations  with  the  French  Commissioners  are  to  be  found  in  the 
N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  pp.  505-10.  Dongan's  instructions  are  in  the  same  vol- 
-ume,  p.  503. 

*  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  533. 


184       NEW    YORK    UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DONG  AN, 

English  Court.  Emboldened  by  that  knowledge  he  demanded 
that  the  French  should  demolish  their  forts  at  Niagara  and  at 
Frontenac.1 

Dongan  was  not  fated,  however,  to  have  the  satisfaction  of 
himself  wielding  the  weapon  which  he  had  forged.  French 
diplomacy  failed  of  its  main  end,  but  it  at  least  had  the  satisfac 
tion  of  seeing  the  man  to  whom  it  owed  its  defeat  swept  out  of 
its  path.  Dongan's  removal  from  office  was  indeed  in  a  curious 
fashion  a  consequence  of  the  policy  which  he  had  himself  ad 
vocated.  It  would  probably  be  unjust  to  James  to  suppose  that 
he  would  have  sacrificed  a  faithful  servant  to  the  vindictiveness 
of  France.  But  among  the  measures  which  Dongan  had  urged 
was  a  consolidation  of  the  colonies  for  purposes  of  defense.  New 
York  was  to  be  strengthened  by  the  addition  of  Connecticut  on 
the  north  and  of  New  Jersey  on  the  south.2  In  this  proposal 
Dongan  did  but  give  definite  shape  to  views  which  were  floating 
through  the  mind  of  every  man  who  took  an  interest  in  colonial 
politics.  The  colonial  policy  of  Clarendon  by  strengthening  the 
administrative  control  of  the  mother  country  had  done  some 
thing  to  break  down  the  barriers  of  local  peculiarity  which 
severed  colony  from  colony.  The  aggression  of  France  had  done 
still  more  to  create  a  sense  of  common  interests  and  of  the  need 
for  joint  action.  In  these  days  the  occasion  would  have  called 
out  a  society  to  promote  colonial  union  with  an  organization  and 
literature  of  its  own.  As  it  was,  one  can  hardly  take  in  hand  a 
batch  of  Colonial  State  Papers  between  1690  and  1720  without 
lighting  on  some  trace  of  such  a  project. 

Beyond  doubt,  the  great  obstacle  to  such  schemes  lay  in  the 
mental  and  moral  isolation  of  New  England,  above  all  of 
Massachusetts.  Fortified  by  a  not  unfounded  confidence  in  her 
power  of  independent  action,  by  an  exaggerated  and  arrogant, 
but  not  wholly  erring,  sense  of  aims  and  principles  higher  than 
those  around  her,  the  Puritan  Sparta  was  as  yet  both  unwilling 
.and  unfit  to  join  in  corporate  life  with  colonies  which  were,  by 
comparison  with  herself,  but  temporal  unions,  living  for  material 
objects.  But  to  one  like  James  such  unfitness  and  such  unwill 
ingness  went  for  nothing.  The  ruled  were  mere  puppets  to  be 
ranked  and  marshaled  by  the  superior  wisdom  and  benevolence 

1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  ix.  p.  389. 

2  Col.   Papers,    1685-8,    1160,    1262. 


POLICY  OF  COLONIAL    UNION.  185 

of  the  ruler.  James  doubtless  believed  in  all  honesty  that  he  had 
taken  a  step  towards  accomplishing  the  policy  prescribed  by  Don- 
gan,  when  he  placed  the  whole  territory  which  had  made  up  the 
New  England  confederacy,  together  with  New  Hampshire  and 
Rhode  Island,  under  the  governorship  of  Andros.  It  was  a. 
mere  question  of  mechanical  convenience  to  extend  that  further, 
and  to  incorporate  New  York  with  that  province.  The  question 
then  rose,  was  New  England  to  be  attached  to  the  government 
of  Dongan,  or  New  York  to  that  of  Andros?  We  can  now  see 
how  that,  whereas  the  attempted  union  under  Andros  was  noth 
ing  but  a  source  of  irritation  and  disappointment,  union  under 
Dongan  might  at  least  have  fulfilled  the  main  object  to  be 
aimed  at,  and  might  have  erected  an  efficient  barrier  against 
France.  But  what  was  with  Dongan  the  supreme  motive  for 
colonial  union,  was  with  Dongan's  master  but  one  of  several 
motives  which  made  such  union  expedient.  To  bring  the  whole 
body  of  colonies  under  a  uniform  fiscal  system  was  a  perfectly 
legitimate  aim.  To  crush  out  that  spirit  of  isolation  and  inde 
pendence  which  by  its  good  and  its  evil  made  Massachusetts 
odious  to  men  like  Randolph  was  an  object,  not  perhaps  so  fully 
acknowledged  by  James  even  to  himself,  but  which  went  far  to 
determine  his  policy.  We  judge,  too,  of  Dongan  and  Andros 
by  fuller  light  than  was  enjoyed  by  James  and  his  advisers.  We 
know  the  result,  and  the  antipathy  of  New  England  to  Andros 
seems  wiser,  the  confidence  of  James  more  foolish,  than  each 
really  was.  We  measure  Andros  by  the  Boston  rebellion,  Don 
gan  by  the  events  of  the  next  half  century.  Those  who  had  to 
make  the  choice  could  not  see  the  policy  and  character  of  each 
man  as  a  whole. 

There  was,  moreover,  one  insuperable  objection  to  Dongan  as 
a  governor  for  New  England  in  his  religion.  Odious  as  Andros 
might  be,  he  would  be  far  less  so  than  a  governor  who  was  tak 
ing  measures  to  supply  the  Five  Nations  with  Jesuit  missionaries. 
To  choose  a  ruler  for  the  newly  combined  group  of  colonies  who 
should  be  at  once  efficient  and  acceptable  was  a  task  which  might 
have  baffled  a  wiser  king  than  James. 

In  March  1688  Dongan  was  recalled,  and  replaced  by  An 
dros.  There  is  no  reason  to  think  that  French  influence 
counted  for  anything  in  this  change.  But  the  temptation  to 
make  capital  out  of  it,  by  representing  it  as  a  measure  friendly 


1 86       NEW    YORK   UNDER  ANDROS  AND  DON  CAN. 

to  France,  was  irresistible.  We  find  Seignelay  writing  to 
Denonville  a  cheering  assurance  that  the  King  of  England 
would  no  longer  support  "the  chimerical  pretensions"  of  Don- 
gan.1  In  such  a  case  the  appearance  of  concession  was  almost  as 
bad  as  the  reality.  It  was  not  enough  to  resist  the  aggression  of 
France  and  her  savage  allies.  If  that  policy  was  to  be  effective 
the  intention  of  resistance  must  be  plainly  and  emphatically 
declared. 

1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  ix.  p.  373. 


CHAPTER  V. 

THE   REVOLUTION    IN    NEW   YORK/ 

THE  dismissal  of  Dongan  was  at  once  followed  by  the  appoint 
ment  of  Andros.  That  appointment  did  not  take  the  form  of 
Constitu-  a  separate  commission.  Andros  was  not  like  Bel- 
t  he"  new  lomont,  at  a  later  day,  simultaneously  Governor  of 
province."  New  yOrk  and  of  Massachusetts,  by  different  titles. 
The  whole  territory  from  the  west  bank  of  the  Delaware  to 
Pemaquid  was  formed  into  a  single  province,  called  New  Eng 
land.  One  may  almost  say  that  every  element  in  the  government 
of  the  various  members  of  the  new  province  was  uprooted.  The 
appointment  of  law  officers  was  vested  in  the  Governor  himself. 
The  work  of  legislation  and  taxation  was  intrusted  to  a  council 
of  forty-two,  chosen  from  the  whole  province.  Events  showed 
what  might  easily  have  been  anticipated,  that  such  a  system 
would  be  received  very  differently  in  New  York  and  in  New 
England.  To  the  former  the  change  was  a  mere  legislative  en- 

1  The  chief  authorities  for  Leisler's  rebellion: — i.  Letter  from  Stephen  Van 
Cortland  to  Andros,  July  9,  1689,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  590.  2.  "A  modest 
and  impartial  narrative  of  several  grievances  and  great  oppressions  that  the 
peaceable  inhabitants  of  New  York  lie  under  by  the  extravagant  and  arbi 
trary  proceedings  of  Jacob  Luysler  and  his  associates."  Printed  at  New  York 
and  reprinted  in  London,  1690.  N.  Y.  Docs.  iii.  665.  3.  A  memorial  signed 
by  Bayard,  entitled:  "A  brief  deduction  and  narrative  of  the  several  disorders, 
abuses  and  enormities  and  insolencies  lately  committed  by  Jacob  Leyseler  and 
several  of  his  associates  at  New  York  since  the  28th  of  April,  1689."  N.  Y. 
Docs.  iii.  636.  4.  A  short  memorial  in  French,  dated  from  The  Hague,  ad 
dressed  to  William  and  Mary,  and  signed  by  certain  adherents  of  Leisler, 
entitled:  "Memoir  and  relation  of  what  occurred  in  the  City  and  Province  of 
New  York,  in  America,  in  the  years  1690  and  1691,  which  the  relatives  and 
agents  of  the  good  people  of  that  city  residing  in  Holland  have  been  requested 
to  communicate  in  a  most  humble  address  by  all  possible  means  to  their  Maj 
esties  of  Great  Britain,  protectors  and  defenders  of  the  Faith."  This  last  is  a 
secondhand  ex  parte  statement.  O'Callaghan  also  publishes  in  his  Documentary 
History,  vol.  ii.,  a  number  of  documents,  including  the  minutes  of  the  Coun 
cil  during  Leisler's  usurpation.  There  are  also  documents  of  value  in  the  Col. 
Hist.  Papers.  There  is  a  very  brief  official  report  of  Leisler's  Trial  in  Col. 
State  Papers,  1691,  p.  1379.  There  are  also  four  contemporary  pamphlets  in 
the  Dutch  Museum  under  the  head  Leisler.  None  of  them  throw  any  new 
light  on  the  subject. 

3  For  Andros's  commission  and  instructions,  see  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  pp. 
537-49- 


1 88  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  NEW    YORK. 

croachment,  such  as  a  colony  must  expect  and  make  the  best  of ; 
to  the  latter  it  was  an  act  of  sacrilege.  It  is  easy  to  contrast  the 
sobriety  and  moderation  of  New  York,  at  this  juncture,  with  the 
petulant  self-will,  the  disposition  to  enlarge  on  and  even  manu 
facture  grievances,  the  diplomatic  sharp  practice  of  the  New 
Englanders.  But  we  must  not  forget  that  the  provocation  and 
the  stake  were  in  each  case  wholly  different.  Nor  must  we  for 
get  that  Massachusetts,  with  all  the  needful  political  instincts 
developed  and  highly  trained,  at  once  showed  herself  able  to 
supply  an  efficient  substitute  for  the  government  which  she  over 
threw,  while  New  York,  for  lack  of  such  training,  became  the 
prey  of  a  disreputable  adventurer,  who  neither  understood  the 
wants  nor  represented  the  wishes  of  the  colony. 

The  system  which  vested  the  supreme  authority  in  a  council 
chosen  by  the  Crown  from  the  whole  body  of  incorporated  colo- 
Eviis  of  mes  could  not  work  smoothly.  It  failed  to  secure  the 
the  system.  r{ghts  of  the  colonies  not  only  as  against  the  Crown, 
but  also  as  against  one  another.  If  union  were  to  be  carried  out 
effectively  it  must  be  by  a  system  which  should  give  each  colony 
a  due  share  of  representation  in  the  common  government.  To 
do  that  equitably  and  effectively  was  the  real  difficulty.  James 
and  his  advisers  cut  the  knot  by  sweeping  away  all  representa 
tion.  To  such  a  system  no  colony  could  be  loyal  since  it  offered 
to  none  any  safeguard  for  its  own  special  interests. 

Yet  the  attitude  of  New  York  to  the  government  of  Andres 
was  one  of  discontent  only,  not  of  vigorous  hostility.  Of  An- 
The  colony  dros  himself  New  York  saw  but  little.  Administra- 
Andros.  tive  difficulties  at  Boston  and  military  duties  on  the 
frontier  kept  him  fully  employed.  The  government  of  New 
York  was  left  to  his  deputy,  Nicholson,  and  three  councilors. 
Far  above  Andros  in  intelligence  and  power  of  expression,. 
Nicholson  was  not  greatly  superior  in  decision  and  practical 
capacity,  and  much  inferior  in  moral  character.  His  three  as 
sistants,  Philipse,  Van  Cortland,  and  Bayard,  were  all  Dutch 
men  of  wealth  and  good  station.1  Their  nationality  is  a  point  of 
importance,  as  it  clearly  shows  that  the  insurrection  which  fol 
lowed  was  not,  as  some  have  held,  an  uprising  of  the  old  Dutch 
settlers  against  English  domination.  Philipse  seems  to  have  been 
a  nonentity.  Van  Cortland  was  at  the  time  of  his  appointment 

1  Brodhcad,   vol.  ii.   p.   558. 


DESTRUCTION  OF  LA    CHINE,  i«9 

Mayor  of  New  York.  Protestant  though  he  was,  his  demon 
strations  of  loyalty  at  the  rejoicings  for  the  birth  of  the  Prince  of 
Wales  were  so  exuberant  as  to  discredit  him  at  a  later  day  with 
the  followers  of  William.  Bayard's  after  career  showed  energy 
and  ability.  But  up  to  this  time  he  had  little  scope  for  display 
ing  those  or  any  other  qualities.1  He  held  the  colonelcy  of  the 
city  train-bands,  and  the  vindictive  hostility  of  one  under  his 
command  soon  entangled  him  in  what  proved  a  death  struggle 
for  the  assailant,  and  little  less  for  Bayard. 

Before  the  abdication  of  James  could  become  known  in  Amer 
ica,  it  had  materially  influenced  the  prospects  of  New  York  by 
French  the  change  which  it  wrought  in  European  politics. 

scheme  of       _,,  ,  .  .  .-,.,. 

invasion.  1  here  was  no  longer  anything  to  restrain  Lewis  from 
carrying  out  to  the  full  those  schemes  which  the  rulers  of 
Canada  had  been  for  years  maturing.  Such  projects  would  now 
serve  a  double  purpose.  The  aggressive  policy  of  Frontenac 
would  no  longer  entangle  his  country  with  a  friendly  power. 
The  action,  which  would  secure  for  France  the  dominion  of  the 
New  World,  would  at  the  same  time  avenge  James  of  his  enemy. 
Accordingly  in  the  spring  of  1689  a  scheme  of  attack  was 
planned.  A  land  force  was  to  carry  out,  but  somewhat  more 
effectively,  the  policy  of  Courcelles  and  Tracy,  and  to  invade 
New  York  by  the  line  of  Lake  Champlain  and  the  Hudson.  At 
the  same  time  a  French  fleet  was  to  attack  from  the  sea.2 

The  intended  invasion  was  hindered  by  events  in  which  no 
Englishman  had  any  share.  In  August  1689  Denonville's 
The  treachery  met  its  appointed  reward.  Although  there 

French  if-  •  i 

invaded        was   on    the    frontier   an    exasperated    enemy   with 


every  means  of  making  a  sudden  attack,  yet  the 
French  seem  to  have  taken  no  special  precautions.  On  a  stormy 
night,  which  concealed  their  preparations,  fifteen  hundred  Mo 
hawk  warriors  in  canoes  crossed  the  St.  Lawrence.  Their  point 
of  attack  was  the  prosperous  village  of  La  Chine,  nine  miles 
above  Montreal.  No  blow  so  terrible  had  ever  befallen  civilized 
men  at  the  hands  of  the  American  savage.  La  Chine  was  burnt 


1  In  1675,  just  after  the  re-establishment  of  English  rule,  Bayard  and  others 
were  prosecuted  for  signing  a  seditious  petition.  The  purpose  of  the  petition 
was  to  urge  the  rights  of  the  Dutch  inhabitants.  The  prisoners  were  dis 
missed  on  giving  security  for  good  behavior. 

*•  De  Callieres  (Governor  of  Canada)  to  De  Seignelay.  N.  Y.  Docs,  vol.  ix. 
pp.  404-28. 


190  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  NEW    YORK. 

and  its  inhabitants  to  the  number  of  two  hundred  were  mas 
sacred.  The  invaders  swept  on,  destroying  everything  in  their 
path.  Montreal  itself  was  devastated.  The  total  loss  of  life 
was  estimated  at  a  thousand ;  of  the  invaders  only  thirteen  fell. 
The  fort  at  Cataracouy  was  abandoned;  at  one  blow  all  the 
work  of  Tracy  and  Frontenac  was  undone. 

Before  the  effect  of  this  diversion  was  known  vague  rumors 
of  the  intended  attack  by  the  French  reached  the  English  colo- 
News  of  nies.  Nothing  could  be  more  calculated  to  shatter 
Uitlorfat0"  all  confidence  among  a  community  disunited  in  itself, 
New  York.«  justJy  distrusting  the  efficiency  of  its  rulers,  naturally, 
though  perhaps  not  justly,  distrusting  their  loyalty.  To  the 
citizens  of  New  York,  thus  unsettled,  came  tidings  even  more 
calculated  to  rouse  vague  expectations  and  vague  fears.  In 
February  a  merchantman  from  Virginia  reached  New  York  with 
the  news  that  William  had  landed  in  England.  Nicholson 
scoffingly  foretold  that  the  attempt  would  but  repeat  Mon- 
mouth's.  The  very  prentice  boys  of  London  would  drive  out 
the  would-be  usurper.  Like  Andros  in  New  England,  Nichol 
son  determined  that  the  matter  was  to  be  kept  a  secret  from  the 
people.2  How  far  he  succeeded  does  not  appear.  One  can 
hardly  suppose  that  neither  by  way  of  England  nor  of  Holland 
did  any  rumor  of  William's  enterprise  reach  the  citizens  of 
New  York;  nor,  wanting  though  they  were  in  political  and 
national  enthusiasm,  can  we  doubt  that  the  success  of  their 
count^men  would  have  been  welcome  tidings.  Be  that  as  it 
may,  while  the  citizens  of  Massachusetts  were  declaring  them 
selves  once  again  a  self-governing  province,  no  measure  of  resist 
ance  was  carried  out,  nor  as  far  as  we  can  learn  meditated,  at 
New  York. 

In  April  the  citizens  of  New  York  learnt  that  Andros  was  a 
prisoner  at  Boston.3  The  position  of  Nicholson  was  even  more 
pitiable  than  that  of  his  chief.  Andros  at  least  was  divested  of 
responsibility.  Nicholson  and  his  council  were  left,  at  a  crisis 
when  invasion  from  without  and  insurrection  within  were  alike 
possible,  ignorant  under  what  king  they  were  really  serving. 

1  An  official  summary  of  these  events  taken  from  the  dispatches  of  colonial 
officials  is  in  the  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  x.  pp.  424,  &c. 

1  Deposition  of  Andries  Greveraet,  Dec.  13,  1689,  in  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p~ 
660. 

3  Nicholson  to  Board  of  Trade,  May  15,  1689.     N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  574. 


NICHOLSON'S  DIFFICULTIES.  191 

France  they  heard  had  declared  war  against  England.  But  war 
against  England  now  might  mean  alliance  with  one  who  would 
soon  again  be  the  king  of  England.  How  at  such  a  crisis  were 
Crown  servants  in  a  distant  dependency  to  shape  their  course? 

Nicholson's  first  step  showed  no  lack  of  judgment.  On  the 
arrival  of  the  news  from  Boston,  the  Aldermen  and  Council 
Attitude  were  called  together.  Next  day,  when  it  was  re- 

ofNichol-  ,,         „    c          1111          i  i  •!••         f 

son.  ported  that  r  ranee  had  declared  war,  the  militia  of 

ficers  were  invited  to  join.  All  were  to  act  as  a  General  Con 
vention.1  To  make  the  people  as  far  as  might  be  partners  in  his 
responsibility  was  doubtless  Nicholson's  best  course.  Unluckily 
it  was  a  course  slowly  taken  and  soon  abandoned. 

With  all  Dongan's  strenuous  exertions  for  the  defense  of  the 
frontier,  he  seems  to  have  culpably  neglected  the  safety  of  the 
Dispute  capital  itself.  The  fortifications  were,  if  Nicholson 
Leisier.  may  be  believed,  ruinous  beyond  all  possibility  of  re 
pair,  and  there  was  no  money  in  the  treasury  to  meet  the  cost  of 
rebuilding.2  The  Council  accordingly  decided  that  the  import 
duties  should  be  applied  to  purposes  of  defense.  This  proposal 
at  once  called  out  resistance.  This  was  made  dangerous  by  the 
position  rather  than  the  character  of  the  chief  opponent.  Jacob 
Leisier  was  a  German  emigrant,  prosperous  in  his  trade  as  a 
brewer,  and  holding  office  as  a  captain  in  one  of  the  city  train 
bands.  He  chanced  to  own  a  valuable  cargo  of  wine,  liable  for 
duty  to  the  amount  of  a  hundred  pounds.  There  is  nothing  to 
show  that  personal  cupidity  was  among  Leisler's  failings.  He 
was  a  fanatical  Protestant,  and  on  that  ground  bitterly  opposed 
to  the  existing  government,  overbearing,  noisily  and  ostenta 
tiously  ambitious.  In  such  a  man  the  chance  of  playing  the  part 
of  a  colonial  Hampden  overpowered  every  thought  for  the 
public  welfare.  Leisier  refused  to  pay  customs,  basing  his  re 
fusal  on  the  technical  ground  that  the  collector  was  a  Papist^ 
and  that  therefore  his  commission  was  invalid.3 

Leisler's  action  seems  to  have  been  imitated  by  others.4  Even 
if  it  had  stood  alone,  such  conduct  on  the  part  of  a  prominent 


1  Cortland's  letter  to  Andres,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  590. 
s  Nicholson  to   Board  of   Trade,   May   15,   1689,  ib.   vol.   iii.  pp.   575-637;  cf. 
Cortland  to  Andros,  ib.  p.   592. 

*  Modest  Narrative,  p.   667.     I  do  not  find  any  contradiction  of  this  by  the- 
Leislerian  party. 

*  Nicholson  to  Board  of  Trade,  v.s. 


THE  REVOLUTION  IN  NEW    YORK. 

citizen  must  have  perilously  weakened  the  government.  Mean 
while  danger  was  showing  itself  in  another  quarter.  Though 
pisaffec-  there  might  be  no  active  sympathy  with  the  Dutch 
Long"  usurper,  there  were  many  who  were  ready  at  once 
island.  to  make  common  cause  with  New  England  mal 
contents.  Leisler's  attack  on  the  government  might  have  died 
down  for  lack  of  support.  The  English  settlements  on  Long 
Island  were  the  real  spririg  of  disaffection.  On  Long  Island  and 
on  the  mainland  bordering  Connecticut  the  people,  acting  in 
their  townships  or  counties,  displaced  the  civil  and  military  of 
ficials.1  Delegates  were  sent  to  Nicholson  to  demand  that  the 
fort  should  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  persons  chosen  by  the  com 
mons.2  Most  alarming  symptom  of  all,  the  militia,  whose  pay 
was  in  arrears,  assembled  under  arms  at  Jamaica,  and  vague 
rumors  began  to  spread  about  New  York  that  the  city  would  be 
attacked  and  plundered.  Impoverished  as  the  treasury  was,  that 
danger  was  averted  by  payment  of  arrears  due."  The  demand 
for  control  over  the  fort  was  met  by  a  partial  concession;  the 
counties  might  send  representatives  to  New  York  to  act  with  the 
council.4  To  share  the  responsibilities  of  government  at  such  a 
time  was  not  a  tempting  offer,  and  no  delegates  came. 

Nicholson's  hot  temper  and  lack  of  judgment  brought  matters 
to  a  head.  A  dispute  broke  out  between  him  and  Henry  Cuyler, 
The  mai-  a  lieutenant  of  militia,  as  to  the  right  of  the  latter  to 
seizVthe  Post  a  sentry.  In  the  course  of  the  dispute  Nichol- 
ibrt>  son,  it  is  said,  was  misguided  enough  to  use  the  words 

"I  would  rather  see  the  city  on  fire  than  be  commanded  by  you." 
Instantly  a  rumor  went  abroad  that  the  Deputy  had  endeavored 
to  enforce  his  authority  by  a  threat  to  burn  New  York.5  Vague 
discontent  and  alarm  found  a  representative  and  spokesman  in 
Leisler.  Either,  however,  the  enthusiasm  of  the  people  some 
what  outran  his  own  intentions,  or  he  had  enough  tact  and  self- 
restraint  to  see  the  advantage  of  keeping  for  awhile  in  the  back 
ground.  On  the  day  following  the  dispute  Nicholson  called  to- 

1  Nicholson  as  above,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.   575. 

*  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  577. 

1  Cortland  to  Andros,  ib.  p.  592.  Modest  Narrative,  pp.  665-6.  I  infer  from 
Cortland's  account  that  a  night  intervened.  But  he  is  not  quite  clear  on  the 
point. 

4  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  575. 

8  Doc.  Hist.  vol.  ii.  p.  7.  Declaration  of  inhabitants,  &c.  Col.  Papers,  1689- 
•92,  p.  1 60. 


LEISLER  AND  HIS  PARTY  SEIZE  THE  FORT.       193 

gether  the  militia,  and  denied  the  charges  against  him.  Cuyler 
repeated  them,  whereupon  true  Deputy  deprived  him  of  his  com 
mission.1  Cuyler's  cause  was  at  once  taken  up  by  his  fellow- 
soldiers  and  the  citizens  at  large.  Rising  under  arms  they  de 
manded  and  obtained  the  keys  of  the  fort.  Up  to  this  point 
Leisler  seems  to  have  taken  no  part  in  the  mutiny.  He  now 
came  forward  and  drew  up  a  declaration  on  behalf  of  the  muti 
neers.  It  set  forth  the  Popish  character  of  the  previous  govern 
ment.  On  that  ground  Leisler  and  his  followers  would  hold  the 
fort  till  it  could  be  delivered  over  to  the  Protestant  authority  in 
England.2 

Even  yet  the  game  was  not  so  far  lost  that  resolute  action  on 
Nicholson's  part  might  not  have  retrieved  it.  On  the  day  follow- 
Progress  ing  the  seizure  of  tlie  fort  a  demand  was  made  by  a 
ReVoiu-  number  of  the  inhabitants  that  Bayard  should  take 
tion.  the  command.  This  he  refused  to  do  on  the  plea  that 

the  fort  had  been  occupied  by  the  malcontents  without  authority, 
and  that  by  taking  the  command  he  should  be  condoning  their 
action.8  In  form,  no  doubt,  he  would  have  been  violating 
Nicholson's  authority  by  consenting.  Practically,  Bayard  would 
thereby  have  given  the  Deputy  all  the  standing  ground  which  he 
needed  till  help  came  from  England.  While  Nicholson  and  his 
supporters  remained  passive,  Leisler  was  kindling  popular  feel 
ings  by  appeals  to  Protestant  sympathy,  and  by  spreading  rumors 
that  a  French  fleet  was  in  view.  Acting  on  this  alarm  the  train 
bands  assembled  before  the  fort.  Then  by  Leisler's  order  they 
marched  in  and  took  possession.  Many  of  the  officers,  it  is  said, 
hung  back  and  were  only  forced  in  by  threats  of  punishment. 
A  declaration  was  then  drawn  up  and  signed  by  all  six  captains 
and  by  four  hundred  of  their  men.  This  pledged  them  to  hold 
the  fort  till  they  could  hand  it  over  to  some  person  authorized 
by  the  Prince  of  Orange.  It  is  to  be  observed  that  this  declara 
tion  did  not  accept  the  English  Revolution  as  a  fact  and  pledge 
the  colonists  to  abide  by  the  result  of  it.  It  put  the  government 
of  the  colony  in  the  position  of  Whig  partisans,  pledged  to  the 
Prince  of  Orange.  They  were  to  obey  him  not  as  the  de  facto 
Sovereign  of  England,  but  as  a  Dutchman  and  a  Protestant. 
So  far  it  is  true  that  the  movement  was  a  national  one,  represent- 

1  Modest  Narrative,  p.   669.  *  Doc.   Hist.  vol.  ii.   p.   7. 

•Col.   Papers,    1689,  p.   173. 


194  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  NEW    YORK. 

ing  Dutch  feelings  and  interests  as  against  English.  But  it  cer 
tainly  could  not  be  looked  on  as  a  spontaneous  outburst  of 
national  feeling.  Excepting  Nicholson,  the  authorities  against 
whom  Leisler  rebelled  were  Dutch,  while  Leisler  himself  was  a. 
German  acting  in  obedience  to  that  natural  law,  as  it  would 
seem,  whereby  one  who  has  adopted  a  nationality  always  outdoes 
those  born  to  it. 

If  Nicholson,  immediately  upon  learning  the  success  of 
William  and  Mary,  had  declared  in  their  favor  and  announced 
that  the  government  was  to  be  carried  on  in  their  name,  he 
would  have  cut  the  ground  from  under  Leisler's  feet.  Instead, 
on  June  24,  he  took  ship  for  England.1  That  incapacity  for  po 
litical  action  which  the  rule  of  the  Company  had  created  and 
which  the  later  rule  of  England  had  done  little  to  remedy,  now 
left  the  colony  at  the  mercy  of  an  aggressive  and  self-confident 
usurper.  Leisler  summoned  a  convention.  Thanks,  too,  to- 
Nicholson's  action,  Leisler  was  able  to  represent  his  own  attitude 
as  no  more  than  a  proper  and  legitimate  adhesion  to  William 
and  Mary.  Nicholson  by  his  flight  left  in  force  the  commissions 
made  out  in  the  name  of  James.  These  Leisler  declared  void. 
To  annul  a  Jacobite  government  and  to  substitute  for  it  one 
loyal  to  the  Protestant  interest  was  but  a  mere  following  in  the 
footsteps  of  the  revolutionary  convention  at  home.  Had  Leisler 
gone  no  further  he  could  have  had  nothing  to  fear  save  in  the 
unlikely  chance  of  a  Jacobite  counter-revolution.  Even  the 
declaration  with  which  Leisler  overbore  his  colleagues,  "Do  you 
talk  of  law?  The  sword  must  now  rule,"2  might  be  pardoned  in 
one  whose  cause  was  morally,  but  not  yet  legally,  a  good  one. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  insurgents  in  New  York  had 
been  encouraged  by  the  example,  if  not  by  the  direct  counsel,  of 
Assumption  their  neighbors  in  New  England.  Connecticut  sent 

of  authority  .  ,    7          ,  .   .  ,     XT 

by  Leisler.  two  representatives  to  advise  the  citizens  or  JNew 
York.  The  three  Councilors  whom  Nicholson  had  left  behind 
him  met  the  delegates  from  Connecticut  and,  taking  the  part 
which  the  Deputy-Governor  should  have  taken,  proposed  the 
proclamation  of  William  and  Mary.  The  Connecticut  dele 
gates  instead  of  now  recognizing  the  Councilors  as  the  reposi- 


1  N.  Y.    Docs.  vol.   iii.  pp.   585-95.     It  is  only   fair  to  Nicholson  to  say  that 
his  council  seem  to  have  advised  him  to  take  this  course. 
*  Modest  Narrative,  p.  671. 


THE  NEW  YORK  CONVENTION-  1 95 

tories  of  legal  authority  chose  to  confer  with  Leisler.1  He  then 
by  their  advice  proclaimed  the  new  Sovereign.2  Thus,  one  may 
say,  his  New  England  advisers  urged  him  to  the  first  step  which 
put  him  in  the  wrong.  The  Councilors  having  expressed  them 
selves  willing  to  accept  the  authority  of  William  and  Mary,  be 
came  the  representatives  of  the  Crown,  and  in  refusing  to  ac 
knowledge  them  Leisler  was  taking  the  first  step  in  the  direction 
of  treason.  It  was  a  short  stage  onward  to  active  disobedience, 
A  proclamation  by  the  new  Sovereigns  issued  on  February  19 
confirmed  the  appointments  of  all  existing  officials  in  the  colo 
nies.3  This  was  published  by  Van  Cortland.  Acting  on  the 
authority  thus  conferred  he  and  his  colleagues  removed  the  col 
lector  whose  religion  had  been  an  offense  to  Leisler,  and  substi 
tuted  provisionally  four  commissioners  of  customs.  Leisler 
thereupon,  accompanied  by  a  troop  of  soldiers,  seized  the  custom 
house,  deposed  the  commissioners,  and  substituted  a  creature  of 
his  own.4 

On  June  26  a  convention  met  at  New  York.  The  composition 
and  action  of  the  convention  soon  showed  what  was  the  real 
The  New  state  of  affairs  in  the  colony.  There  was  nothing  like 
vention.s  widespread  enthusiasm  on  behalf  of  Leisler.  But  he 
had  at  his  back  a  solid  body  of  partisans.  These  may  have  been 
in  part  moved  by  a  national  Dutch  feeling  which  had  not  been 
strong  enough  to  prevent  the  English  conquest,  but  which  re 
sented  it.  More  manifest  elements  in  the  attitude  of  the  Leis- 
lerian  party  were  the  desire  of  the  New  England  immigrants 
for  such  self-government  as  they  had  enjoyed  at  home,  and  a 
hatred  of  James  which  would  be  satisfied  with  nothing  less  than 
the  displacement  of  his  whole  official  staff.  It  is  almost  certain 
that  those  who  supported  Leisler  were  a  minority.  But  they 
were  an  earnest  and  resolute  minority  with  definite  views. 
Their  opponents  had  no  convictions  to  bind  them  together  or  to 
waken  enthusiasm. 

As  to  the  actual  numerical  strength  of  parties,  it  must  be  re 
membered  that  we  derive  our  knowledge  mainly  from  Leisler's 

1  The  advice  of  the  Connecticut  delegates  was  given  by  a  memorandum  dated 
June  26,  1689.     N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  589. 

2  This  is  stated  in  a   letter   from  John  Tuder  to   Nicholson.     Tuder  was  a 
lawyer  who  had  held  office  under  Dongan. 

8  Col.  Papers,   1689,  p.  22. 

*  Cortland  to  Andros  as  above,  cf .  p.  608. 

•  Ib.  Cf .  Tuder's  letter  as  above. 


196  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  NEW    YORK. 

successful  opponents.  But  there  is  nothing  to  discredit  the 
statement  that  not  more  than  a  third  of  the  inhabitants  took  part 
in  electing  a  convention.  When  one  thinks  of  all  the  suffering 
that  might  have  been  saved  by  timely  resistance  to  Leisler  one 
feels  the  justice  of  the  Greek  view,  that  in  civil  strife  absti 
nence  is  itself  a  crime.  New  York  wholly  lacked  that  feeling 
which  in  New  England  existed  with  morbid  intensity,  that  the 
State  was  an  inheritance  wherein  every  citizen  had  a  share,  for 
which  he  must  render  an  account. 

In  one  instance  the  disaffection  of  a  colony  from  New  Eng 
land  took  the  form  of  demanding  to  be  restored  to  its  parent 
stock.  The  settlers  in  Suffolk  county  sent  no  delegates  to  the 
convention,  but  petitioned  the  government  of  Connecticut  to  re- 
annex  them.  Connecticut  had  learnt  the  value  of  royal  favor 
too  well  to  risk  it  by  compliance.1 

Eighteen  delegates  from  seven  towns  formed  the  convention. 
Not  only  did  the  convention  represent  a  minority,  but  the  acting 
part  of  it  was  little  more  than  a  minority  of  itself.  Two  dele 
gates,  seeing  that  the  convention  intended  to  vest  supreme  au 
thority  in  Leisler,  formally  withdrew.2  Six  more  seem  to  have 
stood  aloof.  Finally,  ten  delegates  representing  nine  towns 
formed  themselves  into  a  committee  of  public  safety.3 

The  one  act  of  the  convention  was  to  vest  all  authority  in 
Leisler.  He  was  appointed  Captain  of  the  Fort,  with  full 
Position  of  power  to  suppress  any  foreign  enemy  and  to  check  any 
Leisler.  internal  disorder.  Never  did  a  party  in  the  act  of 
claiming  its  freedom  make  a  more  full  and  frank  confession  of 
political  incapacity. 

Leisler's  own  position  was  thoroughly  and  hopelessly  illogical. 
Claiming  to  be  the  representative  of  the  new  Whig  Govern- 
Anti-Papai  ment  of  England,  he  showed  not  the  least  anxiety  to 
panic.  learn  the  wishes  of  that  Government  or  to  comply 

with  its  principles.  His  policy  in  New  York  was  not  even  a 
crude  and  clumsy  imitation  of  William's  policy  in  England. 
For  its  counterpart  we  must  look  not  among  the  recognized 
political  parties,  but  among  that  fringe  of  Protestant  malcon 
tents  who  denounced  William  as  a  Gallic  and  worshiped  Gates 

1  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  573. 

*  Modest  Narrative,  p.  670. 

*  Only  ten  signed  Leisler's  commission.     Col.  Papers,   1689,  p.  217. 


VIOLENCE   OF  LEISLER'S  PARTY.  197 

as  a  martyr.  One  of  the  first  incidents  of  Leisler's  rule  was  an 
anti-Papal  panic,  as  extravagant,  though  happily  not  as  blood 
thirsty,  as  any  which  had  terrified  Londoners  in  1678.  Four 
students  from  Cambridge  in  Massachusetts  appeared  in  the  col 
ony.  Leisler  suspected,  for  some  unknown  reason,  that  they 
were  on  friendly  terms  with  certain  of  the  deposed  Jacobite 
officials  in  New  England,  and  from  this  he  deduced  the  opinion 
that  their  presence  was  a  danger  to  Protestantism  and  to  him 
self.  Dongan,  too,  had  not  yet  left  the  colony,1  and  this  fact, 
coupled  with  the  recent  attempt  of  Andros  to  escape,  seems  to 
have  increased  Leisler's  alarm.  He  appears,  indeed,  to  have 
worked  himself  into  a  frame  of  mind  easy  to  an  uneducated  fa 
natic  of  meager  abilities.  He  believed  that  his  own  safety  and 
that  of  the  State  were  bound  up  together,  that  every  public 
enemy  took  that  view,  and  that  he  was  therefore  menaced  on 
every  side.  Thus,  while  claiming  to  be  the  representative  of  the 
people's  wishes,  he  never  threw  himself  with  loyal  confidence  on 
popular  support. 

The  four  unfortunate  scholars  were  arrested;  four  hundred 
of  Leisler's  supporters  turned  out  in  arms,  and  certain  leading 
citizens  thought  to  be  unfavorable  to  the  usurper  were  sum 
marily  imprisoned.  The  supposed  danger  was  furthermore  made 
a  pretext  for  enlarging  Leisler's  powers.  The  committee  of 
ten  granted  him  a  commission  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
province.  He  was  thereby  empowered  to  administer  oaths, 
to  issue  warrants,  and  "to  order  such  matters  as  shall  be  neces 
sary  and  requisite  to  be  done  for  the  preservation  of  the  peace 
of  the  inhabitants,  taking  always  reasonable  advice  with  militia 
and  civil  authorities  as  occasion  shall  require."  The  commission, 
however,  premised  that  this  was  done  in  the  uncertainty 
"whether  orders  shall  come  from  their  Majesties."  This  view 
of  Leisler's  position  made  his  authority  merely  provisional  pend 
ing  the  formal  claim  of  sovereignty  by  William  and  Mary.  But 
Leisler's  more  enthusiastic  adherents  were  not  content  with  that. 
According  to  them  Leisler's  authority  rested  on  popular  choice, 
just  as  William's  own  authority  did  in  England.  That  such  a 
contention  carried  with  it  a  denial  that  the  sovereignty  of  Eng 
land  included  the  sovereignty  of  her  colonies  probably  never 
once  occurred  to  those  who  put  it  forward. 

1  Leisler  to  Burnet,  Col.  Papers,  1689,  p.  690. 


198  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  NEW   YORK. 

Leisler's  government  was  in  real  truth  that  of  a  faction  ruling 
by  the  sword,  and  resting  on  the  sympathy  of  an  eager  minority 
Elections  and  the  inertness  of  the  rest.  Yet  he  saw  the  ex- 

held  under  ,.  /•      i  •  t  i  11 

Leisier.  pediency  or  observing,  so  far  as  he  could,  certain 
forms  of  popular  government.  Constitutional  forms  one  cannot 
call  them,  since  such  political  rights  as  New  York  had  yet  en 
joyed  only  existed  by  the  pleasure  of  the  monarchy  which  had 
been  overthrown,  and  could  only  be  revived  by  its  successor. 
In  September  the  counties  were  ordered  to  choose  civil  and  mili 
tary  officers,  and  did  so.  At  the  same  time  the  freemen  of  the 
city  were  called  on  in  accordance  with  the  charter  given  them  by 
Dongan  to  elect  a  mayor  and  aldermen.  But  while  Leisier 
availed  himself  of  the  charter  to  hold  an  election  in  defiance  of 
its  provisions,  he  restricted  the  election  to  Protestants.1 

The  effect  of  these  elections  was  to  place  the  municipal  gov 
ernment  of  New  York  and  the  local  government  of  several  of 
the  counties  in  the  hands  of  Leisler's  partisans.  If  these  elections 
had  been  so  carried  out  as  to  secure  a  real  expression  of  the  pop 
ular  will  they  would  not  have  made  Leisler's  position  legally 
valid,  but  they  certainly  would  have  made  it  morally  strong. 
But  it  is  clear  from  statements  which  Leisler's  advocates  never 
denied  that  the  New  York  election  was  a  mere  farce.  Of  the 
whole  body  of  freeholders  not  one  hundred  voted.2 

In  New  York  Leisier  ruled  by  the  power  of  the  sword.  In 
the  county  districts,  so  far  as  he  could  be  said  to  rule,  it  was  by 
the  apathy  of  those  who  might  have  opposed  him.  There  was, 
however,  one  portion  of  the  colony  which  looked  on  Leisier  with 
neither  indifference  nor  fear.  Albany  had  been  incorporated 
Position  of  under  a  charter  from  Dongan.  Commanding  the 
Albany.  upper  navigation  of  the  Hudson,  it  became  the  center 
of  the  fur  trade,  while  at  the  same  time  it  was  the  key  of  the 
Mohawk  country  and  the  approaches  to  Canada.  Unlike  New 
York,  its  sense  of  corporate  unity  was  not  impaired  by  a  con 
stant  influx  of  alien  nationalities. 

If  Leisier  had  any  claim  to  represent  Dutch  feeling  as  against 
English,  Albany  should  have  been  a  very  stronghold  of  his  par 
tisans.  Nor  was  there  any  lack  of  Whig  zeal  there.1  The  news 

1  Bayard's   Narrative,   p.   645;   Modest  Narrative,   p.   675. 

2  Bayard  states  this. 

*  This  point  is  emphasized  in  a  memorial  presented  by  certain  inhabitants  of 
New  York  to  the  Crown,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  764. 


CONVENTION  AT  ALBANY.  199 

of  William's  landing  was  gladly  received  and  the  new  Sover 
eigns  were  proclaimed  with  public  rejoicings.  Albany,  too,  was 
far  more  than  New  York  exclusively  Protestant.  But  the 
citizens  of  Albany  were  nowise  minded  to  come  under  the  con 
trol  of  a  German  adventurer.  They  had,  indeed,  special  ground 
for  their  mistrust  of  Leisler.  Menaced  as  they  were  by  the  pros 
pect  of  invasion  at  the  hands  of  the  French  and  their  savage 
allies,  internal  unity  was  of  vital  importance. 

On  August  i  the  Mayor,  Aldermen,  Justices  of  the  Peace,, 
and  military  officers  at  Albany  met.  They  gave  themselves  the 
The  not  wholly  appropriate  name  of  a  convention.  The 

convSn-  really  significant  point,  however,  is  that  the  Mayor 
tion-1  and  Aldermen  were  chosen  by  the  townsmen,  that  the 

convention  included  a  definitely  popular  and  representative  ele 
ment,  and  that  there  is  no  trace  of  any  attempt  to  resist  the 
authority  of  the  convention.  The  first  act  of  that  body  was  to 
vest  the  government  of  the  colony  in  the  existing  officials  until 
orders  should  arrive  from  the  King  and  Queen  of  England.  As 
an  evidence  of  loyalty  all  the  civil  and  military  officers  took  an 
oath  of  allegiance  to  William  and  Mary.  No  course  could  have 
been  taken  more  embarrassing  to  Leisler.  His  authority  either 
rested  on  the  approval  of  the  citizens  generally,  or  was  exercised 
provisionally  pending  some  definite  action  by  the  English  Gov 
ernment.  On  the  former  view  he  could  not  claim  to  override 
the  express  wishes  of  the  inhabitants  of  Albany.  On  the  latter 
the  course  taken  by  them  was  practically  identical  with  his  own. 
His  nearest  approach  to  a  justification  was  the  plea  of  necessity, 
and  what  necessity  could  there  be  for  him  to  force  his  authority 
on  loyal  English  subjects  against  their  will?  One  need  not, 
however,  suppose  that  Leisler  was  consciously  setting  up  his  own 
authority  against  that  of  the  Crown.  A  passionate  temper  and  a 
confused  mind  had  led  him  to  identify  the  success  of  the  Prot 
estant  cause  with  his  own  ascendency,  and  to  believe  that  what 
ever  thwarted  the  one  must  be  an  enemy  to  the  other. 

The  men  of  Albany  were  assuredly  justified  in  thinking  that 
it  was  no  time  to  fritter  away  their  energy  and  resources  in  the 
stage  antics  of  Leisler's  grotesque  imitation  of  sovereignty.  A 
force  of  Canadians  and  Mohawks  might  at  any  moment  appear 

1  For  the  composition  and  proceedings  of  the  convention,  see  Doc.  Hist.  vol. 
ii.  p.  46. 


2CO  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  NEW    YORK. 

before  the  gates.  The  church  was  temporarily  converted  into  a 
magazine.  There  every  member  of  the  convention  was  to  de- 
Prepara-  posit  a  gun  and  a  supply  of  ammunition  ready  for  an 
against  a  emergency.1  There  seemed  some  fear  that  the  dread 
invasion.  of  invasion  would  lead  the  inhabitants  to  desert 
the  town.  To  guard  against  this  an  order  was  issued  that  no 
able-bodied  inhabitant  should  leave  without  special  permission.2 

The  news  of  the  Iroquois  invasion  of  Canada  removed  these 
apprehensions.  But  to  some  extent  it  merely  substituted  one 
alarm  for  another.  The  lust  of  plunder  and  bloodshed  once 
kindled  among  the  savages  might  flow  into  unlooked-for  chan 
nels,  and  the  very  fact  that  the  Iroquois  were  set  free  from  fear 
of  the  French  might  make  them  a  source  of  danger. 

All  attempts  to  obtain  help  from  Leisler  failed.  He  showed 
plainly  that  unless  Albany  was  defended  in  accordance  with  his 
Albany  wishes  and  in  deference  to  his  authority  he  would 
Itself  *  rather  not  see  it  defended  at  all.  After  some  inef- 

enteofend~  factual  attempts  to  persuade  the  citizens  of  Albany  by 
Leisier.  letter  to  accept  his  authority  he  decided  to  use  force. 
A  letter*  addressed  by  Leisler  at  this  time  to  the  Assembly  of 
Maryland  is  a  most  significant  document,  full  of  self-revelation. 
At  a  time  when  the  very  existence  of  the  British  colonies  de 
pended  on  effective  common  action,  Leisler's  uppermost  thought 
is  to  prevent  the  "Papists  and  popishly  evil-affected  adversaries 
to  effect  and  bring  to  pass  their  wicked  designs  against  their 
Majesties'  loyal  Protestant  subjects."  That  anyone  can  oppose 
him  except  under  some  evil  influence  is  to  Leisler  utterly  unin 
telligible.  He  has  "done  all  the  diligence  possible  to  join 
Albany  to  us,  and  has  caused  their  Majesties  to  be  proclaimed 
there,  but  they  are  lulled  asleep  by  some  of  the  former  creatures 
to  the  late  government." 

When  these  attempts  at  persuasion  failed  Leisler  sent  three 
sloops  with  an  armed  force  of  fifty  men  under  one  of  his  chief 
partisans,  Millborne,  to  take  possession  of  the  town.4 

As  soon  as  the  news  of  Leisler's  purpose  reached  Albany  the 
citizens  took  measures  of  defense.  By  a  popular  vote  the  Mayor, 

*  Doc.  Hist.  vol.  ii.  p.  46. 
*Ib.  p.  48. 

1  Ib.  p.  19. 

*  Bayard's  Narrative,  p.   646;   Modest  Narrative,  p.   675;  Doc.  Hist.  vol.  iu 
p.  63. 


LEISLER'S  DEALINGS    WITH  ALBANY.  2OI 

Peter  Schuyler,  was  formally  installed  as  Commander  of  the 
Fort.  On  November  9  Millborne  landed.  He  was  admitted  to 
the  city  and  allowed  to  address  the  citizens.  He  told  them  that 
their  charter  was  null  and  void  as  it  had  been  granted  by  a 
Jacobite  and  a  Papist.  The  Recorder,  Wessels,  speaking  on  be 
half  of  the  city,  at  once  put  'the  case  clearly  and  effectively. 
They  would  accept  the  authority  of  King  William  if  it  could 
be  produced,  but  not  that  of  a  company  of  private  men  at  New 
York.1 

For  three  days  Millborne,  as  it  would  seem,  contented  himself 
with  attempting,  not  wholly  without  success,  to  raise  a  party 
among  the  citizens.  But  though  he  was  able  to  prove  that  the 
citizens  of  Albany  were  not  absolutely  unanimous  in  their  ac 
ceptance  of  the  convention,  he  could  not  secure  any  effective  sup 
port.  After  an  undignified  and  futile  attempt  to  enter  the  fort 
and  read  his  commission,  he  withdrew. 

Millborne's  departure  seems  to  have  been  accelerated,  if  not 
caused,  by  a  somewhat  singular  intervention.  A  party  of  Mo- 
hawrks  were  encamped  outside  the  town.  They,  apparently  re 
garding  the  men  of  Albany  as  their  friends,  and  Millborne  as  a 
spy  and  an  invader,  sent  a  squaw  into  Albany  with  a  message. 
Unless  Millborne  at  once  withdraws  they  will  fire  on  him. 
Thereupon  the  Mayor  sent  out  the  minister,  Dr.  Dellius,  with 
the  Recorder,  to  pacify  the  Indians,  and  to  assure  them  that 
"the  business  was  that  a  person  without  power  or  authority 
would  be  master  over  the  gentlemen  here."  The  Indians  then 
sent  a  message  to  say  that  if  Millborne  showed  himself  they 
would  shoot  him.2  Nothing  could  illustrate  more  forcibly 
how  the  Mohawk  alliance,  the  very  corner-stone  of  English 
colonial  policy,  was  imperiled  by  the  dissensions  among  the 
colonists. 

Within  a  fortnight  of  Millborne's  departure  a  troop  of  eighty- 
seven  men  arrived,  sent  by  Connecticut  to  help  in  guarding  Al 
bany  against  French  or  Indian  attack.  This  at  least  shows  that 
the  government  of  Connecticut,  whose  natural  prejudices  would 
have  been  in  favor  of  Leisler,  did  not  condemn  the  attitude  of 
Albany.* 


1  Doc.  Hist,  vol  ii.  pp.  63-67.  *  Ib.  p.  73. 

3  O'Callaghan,   ii.    74. 


-202  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  NEW   YORK. 

Meanwhile,  Leisler  was  at  every  stage  more  and  more  thrust 
ing  his  own  authority  into  the  foreground,  and  ignoring  that  of 
Further  the  English  Crown.  Before  Millborne  returned 
from  Albany  Leisler  had  called  upon  his  adherents  to 
form  an  association,  pledging  themselves  to  obey  the 
Committee  of  Safety,  and  himself  as  its  representative.  There 
was,  indeed,  a  reservation  of  fidelity  to  William  and  Mary,  but 
there  was  no  attempt  to  show  that  Leisler  was  acting  under  any 
commission  from  the  Sovereigns.1 

One  cannot  acquit  the  home  Government  of  having  by  its 
heedlessness  played  into  Leisler's  hands.  When  the  news  of  the 
Proceed  Revolution  at  Boston  and  the  capture  of  Andros 
'home*  reached  England,  the  Privy  Council  at  once  took 

rnent.rn"  measures  to  supply  the  vacancy.  Nicholson  was  in 
structed  to  proclaim  William  and  Mary.  There  was  also  sent 
him  what  was  virtually  a  commission  as  governor,  pending  other 
arrangements.  This  was  embodied  in  a  letter  from  the  King, 
authorizing  Nicholson  to  call  to  his  assistance  such  of  the  prin 
cipal  freeholders  and  inhabitants  as  he  should  think  fit,  and  with 
their  help  to  act  as  Lieutenant-Governor  and  Commander-in- 
Chief  of  the  Province.  This  letter  was  addressed  to  Nicholson, 
and  in  his  absence  "to  such  as  for  the  time  being  take  care  for 
preserving  the  peace  and  laws"  in  the  colony.2  Before  this  could 
be  sent  Nicholson  himself  arrived  in  England.  One  would  have 
supposed  that  this  would  have  brought  with  it  of  necessity  a 
revocation  of  the  commission,  or  a  complete  change  in  its  terms. 
Nevertheless  the  letter  was  dispatched,  apparently  on  the  as 
sumption  that  the  Councilors  whom  Nicholson  had  left  behind 
him  were  his  representatives  and  would  receive  and  act  upon  the 
^commission.  The  bearer  of  the  letter  was  that  John  Riggs,  a 
follower  of  Andros,  to  whom  we  owe  a  large  share  of  our 
knowledge  of  the  Revolution  at  Boston."  He  did  not  reach 
New  York  till  December.  He  then,  as  might  have  been  ex 
pected,  proposed  to  deliver  his  letter  to  the  three  Councilors. 
Leisler  at  once  interposed.  They,  he  said,  were  Papists,  and  as 
•such  could  exercise  no  authority.  The  plea  was  good  neither  in 
fact  nor  in  law.  Leisler  then  claimed  that  the  letter  should  be  de- 

1  Bayard's  letter,   p.    648. 

'Col.   Papers,   1689,  p.   307;   N.   Y.   Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  306. 
•  It  is  clear  that  Riggs  had  not  sailed  on  August  26,  1689,  since  his  pass  is 
•dated  that  day.     Col.  Papers,  1689-92,  p.  323.     Nicholson  was  then  in  England. 


LEISLER'S   USURPATION  OF  AUTHORITY.          203 

livered  to  him.  The  letter,  he  said,  was  addressed  in  Nicholson's 
absence  to  the  de  facto  governor  of  the  colony,  and  he  was  the 
only  person  who  could  be  so  regarded. 

If  Leisler  had  really  ruled  by  free  popular  choice  there  would 
have  been  some  moral  weight  in  his  plea.  His  next  step  showed 
Leisier  how  little  ground  there  was  for  that  contention.  He 
governor-6  na^  used  the  alleged  approval  of  the  citizens  as  a 
ship.  ground  for  seizing  on  the  royal  commission.  He  now 

used  that  commission  to  fortify  his  position  with  the  citizens. 
To  have  published  the  King's  letter  would  have  been  a  fatal 
acknowledgment  that  he  had  been  superseded,  and  that  power 
was  vested  in  the  very  men  to  whom  he  refused  to  allow  any 
share  in  government.  We  may  be  sure  that  if  the  real  state  of 
things  had  been  known,  many  who  were  now  apathetic  would 
.at  once  have  dissociated  themselves  from  a  usurper  whose  au 
thority  could  be  but  temporary.  The  true  secret  of  the  letter 
was  confided  only  to  those  who  were  too  deeply  committed  to 
retreat ;  to  the  public  it  was  announced  that  Leisler  had  received 
a  commission  as  Lieutenant-Governor.1 

Leisler's  career  shows  no  trace  of  real  administrative  power. 
But  one  quality  at  least  he  had,  fruitful  of  temporary  success, 
promptness:  the  promptness  of  a  fanatic  honestly  convinced  of 
the  justice  of  his  cause  and  its  final  success,  never  caring  to 
qualify  his  actions  or  to  secure  himself  possibilities  of  retreat. 
At  once  and  without  hesitation  he  took  upon  himself  all  the 
rights  and  all  the  outward  forms  of  his  alleged  office  in  a  man 
ner  which  could  not  fail  to  impress  the  popular  imagination  with 
a  sense  of  authority.  He  nominated  a  council  from  which  all 
who  had  opposed  him  were  excluded.  He  established  courts  of 
justice.  All  civil  and  military  officials  who  had  held  commis 
sions  from  Andros  were  compelled  to  surrender  them,  and  fresh 
appointments  were  made.  A  seal  was  struck.  On  one  point, 
however,  Leisler  could  not  avoid  coming  into  conflict  with  pop 
ular  feeling.  He  issued  a  proclamation  declaring  that  all  public 
rates  previously  in  force  should  still  be  paid.  The  refusal  to  pay 
duty  had  been  Leisler's  first  overt  act  of  resistance  to  authority. 
He  had,  it  is  true,  based  his  refusal  on  the  ground  that  the  col- 

1  Bayard's  Narrative,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  Hi.  p.  648.  Certificate  of  Plypse  (Phil- 
ipse)  and  Van  Cortland,  »'&.  p.  649.  Modest  Narrative,  Memorial,  ib.  p.  764. 
Letter  from  a  gentleman,  Doc.  Hist.  vol.  ii.  p.  264. 


204  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  NEW   YORK. 

lector  was  a  Papist.  But,  though  the  seeming  inconsistency 
might  be  explained  away,  it  could  not  fail  to  impress  the  popular 
imagination  unfavorably.  The  difficulty  was  just  one  of  those 
which  the  agitator  turned  official  has  inevitably  created  for  him 
self.  The  proclamation  was  torn  down.  Leisler  at  once  replied 
by  another  proclamation  making  it  henceforth  illegal  to  remove 
an  official  notice.  This  was  enforced  by  imprisonment,  and 
those  who  refused  to  pay  the  dues  required  suffered  distraint  by 
order  of  a  court  specially  called  into  existence  by  Leisler.  While 
Leisler  was  thus  using  his  pretended  authority  from  the  Crown 
to  overawe  the  citizens  of  New  York,  he  was  endeavoring  to 
strengthen  his  position  in  England  by  representing  himself  as 
ruling  by  the  choice  and  approval  of  the  people.  He  sent  home 
a  dispatch  to  the  King1  with  a  short  and  formal  report  of  his 
proceedings.2  For  fuller  information  he  refers  the  King  to  a 
letter,  sent  at  the  same  time  to  Burnet.  The  letter  contains 
nothing  beyond  vague  denunciations  of  Leisler's  opponents  and 
the  repetition  of  the  old  charges  against  Andros  and  Nicholson. 
Everyone  who  opposes  Leisler  is  a  Jacobite,  and  if  not  a  Roman 
Catholic,  at  least  a  traitor  to  the  Protestant  religion.  One  part, 
however,  stands  out  plainly,  that  Leisler  was  losing  rather  than 
gaining  ground  with  his  fellow-citizens.  "Though  our  num 
bers  were  lessened  we  still  keep  the  major  part."  "We  then 
settled  the  magistracy,  appointed  courts  of  judicature  and  pro 
ceeded  to  establish  the  militia,  in  all  which  we  met  in  the  cir 
cumstances  with  indifferent  success." 

In  a  second  letter  to  Burnet,  written  some  two  months  later, 
Leisler  complains  in  the  same  strain  that  he  "finds  the  people 
very  slack  in  bringing  up  money;"  they  will  not  convene  us  an 
Assembly  to  levy  the  same,  though  our  writs  were  long  ago 
issued  to  the  various  counties  for  the  purpose.8 

It  is  to  be  noticed  that  Leisler  speaks  of  the  Quakers  in  New 
Jersey  and  Pennsylvania,  and  especially  of  Penn,  as  bitterly  as 
he  does  of  Andros  and  the  supposed  Papists.  That  may  be 
looked  on  as  in  a  certain  sense  prophetic.  Throughout  the  com 
ing  century  the  Quaker  colonies  were  often  insubordinate  in 
their  attitude  to  the  Proprietors  and  to  the  British  Government. 

1  Col.   Papers,   1689-92,  p.   689. 

2  Ib.   p.    690.     N.    Y.    Docs.    vol.    iii.    p.   664. 
*  Col.  Papers,   1689-92,  p.  805. 


FORMATION  OF  AN  ANTI-LEISLERITE  PARTY.      205 

They  can  hardly  be  said  ever  to  have  come  into  line  with  the 
other  colonies,  or  to  have  joined  heartily  and  unreservedly  in 
any  movement  of  resistance. 

The  change  in  Leisler's  position  forced  action  upon  his  op 
ponents.  Hitherto  they  might  feel  that  they  were  only  suffering 
An  anti-  under  a  transient  tyranny  made  possible  because  those 
party.  in  authority  in  England  had  no  knowledge  of  the 

state  of  affairs  in  the  colony.  Now  the  blunder  of  the  English 
Government,  backed  by  the  audacity  and  good  luck  of  Leisler, 
had  so  altered  affairs  that  a  mere  policy  of  delay  would  no 
longer  suffice.  The  English  Government  must  learn  that  the 
popular  approval  which  Leisler  claimed  was  really  an  unwilling 
obedience  extorted  by  misrepresentation  and  terror.  Accord 
ingly  some  of  Leisler's  chief  opponents,  including  Bayard  and 
Van  Cortland,  drew  up  letters  to  be  sent  to  the  authorities  in 
England.  Dishonesty  does  not  seem  to  have  been  naturally  one 
of  Leisler's  failings.  But  by  yielding  to  the  temptation  of  oppor 
tunity  he  had  forced  himself  into  a  position  which  could  only  be 
maintained  by  continued  deceit.  To  his  fellow-colonists  he  as 
sumed  the  position  of  a  public  servant,  responsible  only  to  the 
Crown.  To  the  English  Government  he  assumed  the  position  of 
a  popular  leader  forced  into  power  at  a  crisis  by  the  general  will. 
Such  a  game  of  double  pretenses  could  only  end  in  ignominious 
discovery.  An  experienced  and  sagacious  intriguer  might  have 
been  glad  to  retreat.  But  the  wit  to  discern  a  hopeless  position 
and  the  moral  courage  to  abandon  it  were  qualities  not  to  be 
found  in  company  with  Leisler's  vulgar  audacity  and  brutal 
self-confidence.  He  might  at  least  delay  the  evil  hour  by  hinder 
ing  communications  between  his  enemies  in  the  colony  and  the 
authorities  at  home.  With  this  hope  he  intercepted  and  read  the 
letters  from  Bayard  and  his  allies.  To  attempt  to  discredit 
Leisler  in  England  was  "a  hellish  conspiracy,"  and  the  writers 
were  at  once  arrested.  Leisler  was  not  of  a  temper  to  be  con 
tent  with  rendering  an  opponent  innocuous.  Bayard  was 
refused  bail;  he  was  publicly  exhibited  to  his  fellow-citizens  in 
chains,  and  his  house  was  pillaged  by  a  mob  of  Leisler's  fol 
lowers.1 


1  Leisler  himself  in  a  private  letter  {Doc.  Hist.  vol.  ii.  p.  36)  reports  the  ar 
rest  of  Bayard  and  his  associates.  For  the  other  incidents  see  Doc.  Hist.  vol. 
ii.  pp.  37-246,  and  the  Modest  Narrative. 


206  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  NEW   YORK. 

Meanwhile  the  men  of  Albany  were  holding  their  ground 
stubbornly  against  the  usurper. 

Evils  were  at  hand  worse  than  internal  disunion.  During  the 
autumn  of  1689  Frontenac  made  strenuous  attempts  to  win  over 
Dealings  the  Five  Nations.  The  task  of  counteracting  him 
F/ve  the  was  kft  to  the  self-appointed  rulers  of  Albany.  At 
Nations.  fa  beginning  of  1690  a  great  council  of  the  Five 
Nations  met  at  Onondaga  to  consider  what  policy  should  be 
adopted  towards  the  rival  powers.  Before  they  met  messengers 
were  sent  to  Albany  to  confer  with  the  English.  They  returned 
bringing  the  message  that  a  governor  sent  from  England  was 
every  day  expected,  and  that  his  arrival  would  be  the  signal  for 
an  attack  on  Canada.  They  were  accompanied  by  an  interpre 
ter,  so  that  the  English  might  know  what  passed  in  the  councils 
of  their  allies.1 

Never  had  that  alliance,  the  keystone  of  English  supremacy, 
and  almost  a  needful  condition  to  the  existence  of  the  English 
colonies,  been  in  greater  danger.  Peter  Millet,  a  Jesuit  mission 
ary  who  for  twenty  years  had  lived  and  labored  among  the 
savages,  was  now  with  the  Iroquois  striving  not  unsuccessfully 
to  undo  the  mischief  wrought  by  the  timidity  of  De  la  Barre  and 
the  treachery  of  Denonville.  His  labors  were  in  part  successful, 
The  members  of  the  savage  confederacy  had  more  than  once 
shown  that  they  could  act  independently,  and  the  Oneidas  and 
Cayugas  now  refused  to  follow  the  other  three  tribes.  But  the 
rest  of  the  confederacy  accepted  eagerly  the  policy  suggested 
from  Albany.  They  would  not  send  an  embassy  to  meet  Fron 
tenac.  They  called  loudly  for  an  aggressive  policy  against 
France.  Let  the  English  no  longer  content  themselves  with  lop 
ping  off  the  branches  ;  let  them  strike  at  the  root  by  the  capture 
of  Quebec,  and  the  tree  of  French  colonization  would  at  once 
wither.2 

Unhappily  the  English  colonies,  disunited  and  distrustful  of 
their  rulers,  were  in  no  condition  for  such  measures.  This 
French  Frontenac  doubtless  knew.  He  saw  that  the  waver- 
ing  allegiance  of  the  Five  Nations  might  be  yet 


further  shaken  by  bold  measures,  and  that  it  was  his  true  pol 
icy  not  to  wait  for  the  blow  but  to  anticipate  it.     The  season 

1  Colden's  History  of  the  Five  Nations  (ed.   1750),  pp.   108-10. 


FRENCH  SCHEME   OF  INVASION.  207- 

made  it  impossible  to  renew  the  scheme  of  the  last  year  for 
a  joint  invasion  by  sea  and  land.  He  decided  on  a  land  invasion 
of  the  English  colonies  along  three  lines.  The  two  invading 
parties  to  the  north-east  aimed  at  nothing  more  than  harrying  the 
frontier  of  New  England.  The  third  attack  was  the  real  back 
bone  of  Frontenac's  scheme.  It  was  intended  to  seize  Albany 
and  thus  to  obtain  the  mastery  of  the  Hudson.  The  French 
policy  of  that  day  was  identical  in  principle  with  the  French 
policy  of  fifty  years  later,  differing  only  in  that  it  substituted 
for  the  arc  of  the  Great  Lakes,  the  Ohio,  and  the  Mississippi, 
the  narrower  one  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  Lake  Champlain,  and  the- 
Hudson. 

The  force  designed  to  invade  New  York  consisted  of  a. 
hundred  and  fourteen  Canadian  militia,  with  ninety-six  Indian 
allies.  The  wisdom  of  that  policy  by  which  the  French  mission 
aries  had  detached  a  body  of  converts  from  the  Five  Nations, 
and  settled  them  as  a  separate  village  was  now  seen.  Of  the 
Indian  allies  only  sixteen  were  Hurons.  The  rest  were  Mo 
hawk  converts,  whose  knowledge  of  the  track  and  of  the  country 
to  be  invaded  was  of  inestimable  service. 

The  Indian  alliance  was  a  needful  condition  for  French  suc 
cess,  yet  it  was  in  some  ways  a  hindrance.  The  savages  were 
wholly  indifferent  to  the  French  schemes  of  invasion  for  pur 
poses  of  conquest.  All  that  they  wanted  was  a  raid  which  should 
give  them  scalps  and  plunder.  Had  the  French  officers  been  left 
to  themselves  they  would  have  marched  direct  on  Albany.  But 
the  Indians  saw  an  easier  and  more  accessible  prey  in  Schenec- 
tady.  That  place  was  guarded  by  only  twenty-four  men.  It 
might  therefore  with  perfect  safety  have  been  left  in  the  rear, 
while  an  attack  upon  it  was  likely  to  rouse  an  alarm  at  Albany,, 
and  thus  to  hinder  the  main  purpose  of  the  expedition.  Never 
theless  the  council  of  the  Indian  allies  prevailed,  and  it  was  de 
cided  that  Schenectady  should  be  the  first  point  of  attack.1 

When  the  representative  whom  Leisler  had  sent  to  Albany  to 
summon  the  citizens  to  accept  his  authority  had  failed  there,  he 
pestruc-  had  gone  on  to  Schenectady.  He  had  not  persuaded 
Schenec-  tne  inhabitants  to  accept  the  authority  of  Leisler  or 
tady.  to  sever  themselves  from  Albany,  but  he  had  done 

something  to  beget  a  sense  of  insecurity,  and  to  sow  mutual  dis- 

1  Monseignat's   report   mentioned   below. 


208  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  NEW   YORK. 

trust  between  the  citizens  and  the  garrison.  The  village  con 
sisted  of  one  long  street,  with  a  palisade  running  outside  and  a 
gate  at  each  end.  These  the  inhabitants,  with  incredible  folly, 
left  open.  The  commander  of  the  garrison  warned  them,  but  to 
no  purpose.  At  midnight  on  Saturday,  February  9,  the  invad 
ing  force  reached  the  village.  Wearied  with  their  journey  and 
numbed  with  cold  they  would  have  been  powerless  if  they  had 
been  resolutely  resisted.  But  twenty-four  soldiers  unsupported 
by  the  inhabitants  could  do  nothing.  The  whole  garrison  per 
ished  and  sixty  inhabitants  with  them.  As  many  more  were 
taken  prisoners,  while  five-and-twenty  made  their  escape.  Be 
fore  dawn  on  Sunday  morning  one  survivor,  a  wounded  man  on 
a  crippled  horse,  reached  Albany,  as  Brydon  reached  Jellalabad. 
The  alarm  was  immediately  given  and  the  militia  called  in  from 
the  neighboring  villages.  That  was  needless.  The  Indian  as 
sailants,  true  to  their  usual  mode  of  warfare,  had  withdrawn 
after  a  single  onslaught  with  their  prisoners  and  their  plunder.1 
Leisler's  action  when  the  news  reached  New  York  was  char 
acteristic.  The  colony  was  to  be  saved  not  by  suppressing  jeal- 
Vioient  ousies  and  differences,  and  by  a  union  of  parties,  but 

conduct  ,  ,  ..         .  ,  ill 

by  a  complete  extirpation  of  what  he  would  have 


termed  the  Popish  faction.  All  persons  who  had  held  commis 
sions  from  Dongan  or  Andros  were  to  be  arrested.  As  a  result 
some  of  the  most  influential  settlers  fled,  among  them  Dongan, 
who  had  stayed  on  in  the  colony,  but  now  found  refuge  in  New 
Jersey.2  Leisler's  wrath  extended  to  all  who  in  any  way  coun 
tenanced  the  convention  at  Albany.  He  sent  a  letter  of  almost 
incredible  insolence  to  the  government  of  Connecticut.3 

The  Governor  and  Mayor  of  Connecticut  are  denounced  as 
favoring  the  rebellious  party  at  Albany.     Unless  they  immedi- 

1  We  have  two  accounts  of  the  Schenectady  massacre,  one  from  the  French, 
the   other    from   the    English   side;    the   former   is   the    fuller.     It  is   contained 
in  a  report  written  by  Monseignat,  the  Controller  of  Marine  and   Fortification, 
in  Canada.     A  translation  of  it  is  in  the  New  York  Historical  Documents,  vol. 
ix.     The  translator  thinks,   apparently   with   good   ground,   that   the   report   was 
addressed  to   Madame   de   Maintenon.     There  is  on  the  other  side  a   report   by 
Peter  Schuyler,  Mayor  of  Albany,  in  the  third  volume  of  the  Andros  Tracts. 
Golden  also  describes  the  massacre  (pp.  113-5),  and  there  are  several  references 
to  it  in  letters  from  New  York. 

2  Col.  State  Papers,  1689-92,  p.  886. 

*  The  letter  addressed  by  the  Council  in  New  York  to  the  Governor  of  Con 
necticut,  and  signed  by  Millborne,  is  in  the  Col.  State  Papers,  1689-92,  p.  776. 
Though  it  is  signed  by  Millborne,  we  can  safely  credit  Leisler  with  the  au 
thorship,  at  least  in  substance. 


OPPOSITION   TO  LEISLER.  209 

ately  "control1  the  orders  they  have  issued  for  obedience  to  the 
convention,  the  forces  belonging  to  them  at  Albany  shall  be  de 
clared  enemies  and  treated  accordingly."  Finally,  it  is  de 
manded  that  Allen,  the  secretary  for  Connecticut,  be  dealt  with 
as  a  traitor. 

In  February  Leisler,  acting  on  his  imaginary  commission  as 
governor,  issued  writs  for  the  election  of  an  Assembly.  The  ap- 
Leisier  peal  roused  no  enthusiasm.  Easthampton,  one  of 
Assembly,  those  townships  of  New  England  origin  where  Whig 
feeling  was  strongest,  declared  its  intention  of  seeking  incorpora 
tion  with  Connecticut.2  Leisler's  dealing  with  the  Assembly 
showed  what  indeed  he  had  made  manifest  enough,  that  he  had 
no  real  confidence  in  the  people.  Petitions  came  in  to  the  As 
sembly  from  the  victims  whom  Leisler  had  imprisoned.  Dread 
ing  the  result  Leisler  prorogued  the  Assembly  after  a  session  of 
a  few  days.8  This  was  but  of  a  piece  with  his  treatment  of 
Bayard  and  his  conduct  in  the  matter  of  the  intercepted  letters. 
A  government  claiming  to  exist  by  popular  approval  and  yet 
obliged  to  stifle  free  speech  is  an  anomaly  too  glaring  to  survive 
save  under  favorable  conditions  and  dexterous  management.  In 
the  presence  of  external  danger  the  demagogue-tyrant  may  make 
himself  necessary  to  the  community,  or  he  may  delude  his  sub 
jects  with  forms,  blinding  them  to  the  fact  that  the  freedom  un 
derlying  the  forms  had  vanished.  Leisler  had  not  the  executive 
power  for  the  one  part  nor  the  diplomatic  skill  for  the  other. 
Whatever  hold  he  may  have  had  on  the  people  was  gone ;  his 
power  was  a  bubble,  ready  to  burst  the  moment  that  anyone 
with  real  authority  from  England  appeared.  As  the  year  went 
on,  the  true  state  of  affairs  became  more  and  more  manifest.  A 
memorial  was  addressed  to  the  English  Sovereigns,  signed  by 
thirty-six  men  of  position,  several  of  them  ministers  of  religion, 
setting  forth  the  tyranny  which  prevailed  at  New  York,  arbi 
trary  imprisonments,  banishment,  and  violation  of  private  cor 
respondence.  Leisler  was  in  this  denounced  as  "an  insolent 
alien,"  his  supporters  as  a  rabble.4  Men  refused  to  pay  the  dues 

1  "Control"   apparently  means  withdraw. 

*  Their  letter  to  Leisler  is  in  the  Documentary  History,  vol.  ii.  p.  104. 

*  The  fact  of  the  petition  is  stated  in  Van  Cortland's  letter.     Mr.   Brodhead 
is   my  authority   for  the  proroguing  of  the  Assembly.     I   have   not   been   able 
to  verify  it  from  any  contemporary  authority.     There  is,  however,  no  sign  of 
its  existence  between  April  and  September. 

4  The  memorial  is  in  the  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  748. 


210  THE   REVOLUTION  IN  NEW    YORK. 

demanded  by  the  government,  and  Leisler  himself  was  as 
saulted  in  the  streets  by  a  mob  and  only  rescued  by  main  force.1 
Clutching  desperately  at  the  last  remnants  of  power,  he  pre 
pared  an  address,  pledging  the  citizens  to  be  faithful  to  him  as 
the  representative  of  the  Sovereign,  and  declared  that  all  who 
refused  to  sign  it  should  be  treated  as  traitors. 

Leisler's  career  was  now  varied  by  the  one  incident  in  it 
which  shows  some  approach  to  statesmanlike  perception  and  ca- 
pacity.  That  a  man  assuredly  not  more  far-sighted 
ai  than  the  ordinary  run  of  colonial  officials  should  have 
tj0oiT.en  set  on  foot  the  first  working  scheme  for  a  union  of  the 
colonies  is  strong  proof  that  such  projects  had  already  found 
general  acceptance.  At  the  summons  of  Leisler,  Massachusetts, 
Plymouth,  and  Connecticut  sent  delegates  to  a  meeting  at  New 
York.  Maryland  likewise  was  summoned.  It  sent  no  delegates, 
but  its  government  entered  into  communication  with  the  con 
gress.  A  force  of  eight  hundred  and  fifty-five  men  was  raised,, 
to  which  New  York  contributed  half. 

This  first  attempt  at  an  allied  expedition  foreshadowed  the 
difficulties  which  for  more  than  half  a  century  beset  every  like 
Failure  enterprise.  The  colonies  did  not  contribute  the  con- 
campaign,  tingents  which  they  had  promised.  Massachusetts 
and  Plymouth  withheld  theirs,  pleading  that  all  their  available 
forces  were  needed  at  home  to  defend  them  against  a  French 
attack.  Leisler  at  first  wished  to  give  the  command  to  his  fol 
lower,  Millborne.  Such  an  appointment,  however,  would  have 
been  displeasing  to  Connecticut;  the  command  was  given  to 
Fitz-John  Winthrop,  and  Millborne  took  the  post  of  commis 
sary.  Winthrop  was  a  kindly,  upright  man,  not  lacking  in 
sense,  and  of  unimpeachable  courage  and  honor.  But  in  the 
Winthrop  family  power  to  rule  and  conspicuous  energy  seem  to 
have  disappeared  with  the  death  of  its  founder.  Yet  one  may 
doubt  whether  a  more  vigorous  commander  could  have  achieved 
anything  with  such  material.  At  the  beginning  of  August  the 
force  set  forth.  They  were  dependent  on  their  savage  allies  for 
all  the  material  of  transport.  The  supply  of  canoes  was  insuf 
ficient;  when  the  English  proposed  that  more  should  be  built 
the  Indians  explained  that  so  late  in  the  year  the  bark  would  no 
longer  peel.  The  excuse  may  have  been  a  good  one :  the  English 

1  Depositions  in  N.  Y.   Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  740,  &c. 


SCHUYLERS  RAID.  211 

allies  were  evidently  in  that  hopeless  condition,  dependent  upon 
subordinates  whom  they  distrusted,  but  yet  could  not  convict  of 
fraud.  The  Indians  pleaded,  too,  that  they  were  crippled  by  an 
outbreak  of  smallpox.  That  at  least  was  true;  the  English 
soon  had  proof  of  it  by  the  appearance  of  it  in  their  own  camp. 
On  August  15  a  council  of  war  decided  that  the  expedition  was 
hopeless  and  Winthrop  led  his  troops  back  to  Albany. 

Such  small  share  of  success  as  rewarded  the  expedition  fell  to 
the  lot  of  New  York.  John  Schuyler,  the  brother  of  the  Mayor 
Schuyier's  °^  Albany,  was  detached  with  a  force  of  forty  Eng- 
raid-  lish  and  a  hundred  and  twenty  Indians  to  make  an  at 

tack  on  a  French  settlement,  Prairie  de  la  Madeleine,  facing 
Montreal.  As  a  mere  raid  the  attack  was  brilliantly  successful. 
The  settlement  was  devastated,  six  of  its  defenders  killed  and 
nineteen  carried  off  prisoners,  with  trifling  loss  to  the  assailants. 
But  the  victory  did  nothing  to  divert  the  French  from  the  de 
fense  of  Quebec  or  to  further  the  general  purposes  of  the  cam 
paign.1 

As  far  as  the  blame  of  failure  could  be  laid  on  any  one  person, 
Leisler  and  Millborne  were  assuredly  responsible  for  it.  The 
former  by  his  insolent  and  arbitrary  attitude  had  alienated  the 
men  of  Connecticut,  and  quelled  the  not  very  ardent  temper 
of  Winthrop.  Millborne  as  commissary  had  done  nothing  to 
further  a  task  which  depended  on  good  arrangements  for  trans 
port  and  supply  quite  as  much  as  on  courage  or  military  skill. 
Nevertheless  Leisler,  in  the  fury  of  disappointment,  treated 
Winthrop  as  criminally  responsible.  At  first  he  was  put  under 
arrest.  The  disapproval  of  the  troops  at  this  proceeding  was  too 
strong  to  be  faced,  and  Leisler  had  to  content  himself  with  de 
faming  Winthrop's  character,  charging  him  in  dispatches  sent 
to  the  governments  of  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut  with 
treachery,  cowardice,  and  uncleanness  of  life.2 

In  September  the  adjourned  Assembly  again  met.  Its  pro 
ceedings  were  a  last  despairing  effort  on  the  part  of  the  Leis- 
The  lerian  party  to  crush  resistance  with  the  strong  hand. 

Assembly        XT  ,  .  .,  TT1  .  , 

meet  again.  No  person  was  to  leave  Albany  or  Ulster  without 
Leisler's  leave  on  pain  of  a  hundred  pounds  fine ;  all  persons  who 
had  already  GO  left  these  counties  must  return  within  fourteen 
days.  The  same  rule  was  applied  to  the  whole  colony,  save  that 

1  Col.  Doc.  vol.  iii.  p.  753.  2  Doc.  Hist.  vol.  ii.  p.   169. 


212  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  NEW    YORK. 

the  term  of  grace  was  there  extended  to  three  weeks.  Disobedi 
ence  to  either  of  these  orders  was  made  criminal,  without  the  pro 
tection  of  a  specified  penalty. 

Leisler's  wrath  against  Winthrop  was  not  all  the  result  of 
disappointed  patriotism.  The  failure  of  the  Canadian  expedition 
Decline  of  had  deprived  him  of  the  one  plea  which  in  the  eyes  of 
influence.  his  fellow-citizens  could  have  justified  his  arbitrary 
policy.  Waste  and  dishonesty  are  the  vices  which  make  a  des 
potic  government  unpopular.  It  was  reported  that  Leisler  and 
his  friends  were  growing  rich,  and  that  distraints  against  public 
offenders  were  so  conducted  as  to  create  a  profitable  trade  with 
the  West  Indies.  The  people  of  Queen's  County  and  of  various 
townships  on  Long  Island  refused  to  pay  their  taxes,  and  showed 
other  symptoms  of  disaffection.  Leisler's  one  policy  for  dealing 
with  complaint  was  to  gag  it.  Millborne,  already  an  unpopular 
man  and  of  tarnished  character,  was  authorized  to  arrest  dis 
affected  persons,  with  powrer  to  search  houses  and  shops.  But  it 
was  impossible  to  stifle  the  complaints  of  Leisler's  victims. 
Early  in  1691  the  Secretary  of  State,  the  Earl  of  Nottingham, 
received  a  memorial,  drawn  up  in  the  previous  November,  from 
the  inhabitants  of  four  Long  Island  townships,  which  set  forth 
Leisler's  misdeeds,  and  implored  the  interference  of  the  Crown.1 

It  is  little  to  the  credit  of  William's  advisers  that  such  a 
petition  should  have  been  needed,  and  that  the  grievances  of  the 
Apathy  New  York  colonists  should  have  gone  so  long  with- 
Engiish  out  redress.  One  cannot  indeed  wonder  that  there 
ment.rn"  should  have  been  some  delay  in  finally  settling  the 
constitution  of  the  colony.  New  York  was  in  real  truth  the 
point  on  which  the  whole  future  of  the  American  Empire  of 
Great  Britain  turned.  No  settlement  could  be  satisfactory 
which  did  not  make  some  provision  for  a  scheme  of  defense 
common  to  the  body  of  colonies.  James  had  made  a  crude  at 
tempt  to  solve  the  difficulty  by  placing  the  whole  group  of 
northern  colonies  under  a  government  responsible  only  to  the 
Crown  and  containing  no  element  of  representation.  That  was 
indeed  a  hopeless  policy,  yet  it  at  least  acknowledged  a  difficulty 
which  William  and  his  successors  either  ignored  or  abandoned 
in  despair.  To  satisfy  the  aspirations  of  New  England  after 
self-government,  and  yet  to  retain  that  control  which  was  need- 

1  Col.  Papers,  1689-92,  1170;  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  625. 


ATTITUDE   OF   THE  BRITISH  GOVERNMENT,       213 

ful  for  the  safety  of  the  frontier,  were  difficulties  which  might 
well  excuse  delay.  But  there  was  at  least  no  excuse  for  leaving 
New  York  for  two  years  at  the  mercy  of  Leisler.  He  might 
have  been  superseded  by  a  provisional  government  without  any 
attempt  to  settle  at  once  the  future  of  the  colony.  For,  be  it 
remembered,  Leisler  was  something  more  than  an  arbitrary 
tyrant.  He  was  a  tyrant  masquerading  in  the  show  of  constitu 
tional  authority,  bringing  discredit  on  the  Crown  by  professing 
himself  its  representative.  We  know  now  that  his  authority  had 
no  moral  weight,  that  it  was  no  better  than  a  forged  commission. 
The  majority  of  his  fellow-citizens  may  have  been  puzzled  as  to 
the  origin  and  extent  of  his  authority,  but  in  a  vague  way  they 
believed  in  its  existence. 

Months  passed  from  the  day  that  William  and  Mary  were 
acknowledged  Sovereigns  of  England  before  any  action  was 
Colonel  taken  towards  New  York.  In  November  1689  a  Gov- 
ap°po1nted  emor  was  appointed.  His  commission  contained  pro- 
Governor,  visions  which  made  it  virtually  a  constitution  for  the 
colony.  The  Governor  was  to  be  assisted  by  a  Council  nomi 
nated  by  the  Crown.  He  was  to  call  an  Assembly  of  the  repre 
sentatives  of  the  freeholders.  Their  enactments  might  be  vetoed 
in  the  first  instaace  by  the  Governor,  or  later  by  the  Crown. 
The  apportionment  of  representatives  was  implicitly  left  to  the 
Governor.  The  right  to  adjourn  or  dissolve  the  Assembly  was 
expressly  conferred  upon  him.1 

The  system  was  a  mere  reproduction  of  that  in  force  before 
the  attempted  consolidation  under  Andros.  There  was  assuredly 
nothing  in  its  provisions  to  justify  the  long  delay  which  preceded 
it.  And  while  William  and  his  advisers  were  to  blame  for  the 
tardiness  of  their  measures,  they  did  not  make  amends  by  any 
specially  wise  choice  of  instruments.  The  governorship  was 
given  to  Colonel  Sloughter.  He  seems  to  have  been  a  man  of 
moderate  temper  and  fair  common  sense.  But  he  had  no  colo 
nial  experience,  and  his  private  character  was  not  free  from  re 
proach.2  There  was  nothing  in  him  to  call  out  the  respect  and 
confidence  which  were  needed  at  such  a  time.  His  subordinate, 
on  whom  in  case  of  any  mishap  to  the  Governor  his  authority 
would  devolve,  was  Ingoldsby,  a  respectable  official  of  no  special 

1  The  commission  is  in  the  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  pp.  623-9. 

2  See  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  594. 


314  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  NEW   YORK. 

capacity.  At  such  a  crisis  the  presence  of  one  like  Nicolls 
would  have  been  invaluable.  In  his  hands  the  authority  of  the 
Crown  would  have  appeared  as  a  moderating  and  restraining  in 
fluence,  delivering  from  tyranny  and  making  the  future  recur 
rence  of  either  tyranny  or  anarchy  impossible.  The  measures 
which  Sloughter  adopted,  or  one  should  rather  say  to  which  he 
gave  an  inert  and  unthinking  consent,  may  have  been  needful. 
The  punishment  which  overtook  Leisler  and  his  associates  cer 
tainly  did  not  exceed  their  moral  deserts.  It  may  not  have  been 
even  needlessly  severe.  But  it  was  so  administered  as  to  seem  not 
the  justice  of  supreme  authority,  but  the  revenge  of  a  faction. 

One  thing  only  can  be  urged  in  extenuation.  Whenever  the 
English  Government  made  any  error,  the  turn  of  events  was 
sioughter's  sure  to  bring  out  all  the  evil  consequences  in  their 
delayed.  fullest  form.  To  have  sent  out  a  commission  to 
Nicholson  when  Nicholson  was  actually  known  to  be  in  Eng 
land  was  a  strange  blunder.  But  it  was  the  astounding  reckless 
ness  of  Leisler,  perhaps  in  some  measure  the  timidity  and  lack  of 
promptness  shown  by  the  resident  Councilors,  which  made  the 
error  a  fatal  one.  So  it  was  after  Sloughter  was  commissioned. 
The  demands  made  upon  the  transport  service  by  the  Irish  cam 
paign  and  the  weakness  of  the  English  navy  made  it  almost  im 
possible  to  allot  vessels  for  Sloughter  and  the  troops  which  it 
was  needful  to  send  with  him. 

In  October  1690  they  set  sail  in  four  vessels.  The  same  mis 
hap  befell  them  that  befell  the  Virginian  fleet  in  1609.  The 
The  troops  frigate  Archangel  with  Sloughter  on  board  became 
without  separated  from  her  consorts,  and  the  three  others 
Sloughter.  reached  New  York  without  the  Governor.1  In- 
goldsby  was  commander  of  the  troops,  and  as  such  was  entitled 
to  the  supreme  command  in  the  absence  of  his  superior.  That 
being  so,  the  delay  in  Sioughter's  arrival  need  have  made  no 
difficulty  in  the  pacification  of  the  province.  But  Leisler  had 
made  it  clear  that  he  would  create  every  hindrance,  clinging  to 
power  without  a  thought  of  consequences.  Ingoldsby  on  landing 

1  Sloughter  to  Nottingham,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  756.  For  what  followed 
our  authorities  are:  (i)  a  letter  from  Chidley  Brooke,  a  councilor  who  accom 
panied  Ingoldsby,  to  Sir  Robert  Southwell,  and  Sioughter's  own  dispatches. 
These  are  in  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  pp.  758-62.  (2)  Leisler's  own  declaration 
against  Ingoldsby.  This  was  in  Dutch.  There  is  a  translation  in  the  Docu 
mentary  History,  vol.  ii. 


LEISLER'S  ATTITUDE    TOWARD  I N  GOLD  SB  Y.       215 

•made  no  attempt  to  exercise  civil  authority,  but  contented  him 
self  with  demanding  possession  of  the  fort.  This  Leisler  re 
fused,  contending  that  his  authority  could  only  be  superseded  by 
that  of  the  Governor,  and  that  it  included  the  control  of  the  fort 
and  of  the  troops.  It  is  clear  that  Leisler  had  the  true  fanatic's 
gift  of  persuading  himself  of  that  which  he  wished  to  believe, 
and  that  the  grotesque  fiction  by  which  he  had  acquired  a  pre 
tense  of  constitutional  authority  had  become  in  his  own  eyes  a 
grave  reality. 

At  first  Leisler 's  tone  towards  Ingoldsby  was  moderate.  He 
would  do  everything  for  the  convenience  of  the  troops  short  of 
Defiant  surrendering  the  fort.  The  troops  were  to  be  billeted 

attitude  of       .        ,          •  rr»        ,  ,  ,          t      i 

Leisler.  in  the  city.  The  fort  could  only  be  given  up  to  the 
Governor. 

If  Leisler  had  really  held  the  position  of  delegated  authority 
to  which  he  pretended,  his  contention  would  have  been  a  reason 
able  one.  Unfortunately  for  him  Ingoldsby  had  a  ready  answer. 
Where  was  Leisler's  commission?  He  had  no  formal  authority 
in  the  fort,  and  in  the  absence  of  such  authority  he  was  bound  to 
surrender  it  to  the  military  commander.  Leisler's  refusal  to  rec 
ognize  Ingoldsby's  authority  might  not  be  in  itself  treasonable; 
but  if  in  any  other  matter  he  crossed  the  line  of  treason  this  was 
certain  to  be  regarded  as  an  aggravation  of  his  offense. 

Leisler's  refusal  to  surrender  the  fort  was  followed  by  an  even 
grosser  defiance  of  the  royal  authority.  Ingoldsby  demanded  the 
release  of  Bayard  and  that  of  another  political  prisoner,  Nicolls, 
who  like  Bayard  was  nominated  to  the  Council.  When  Leisler 
first  heard  of  the  appointment  of  Bayard,  Cortland,  and  Philipse 
as  Councilors,  he  burst  into  a  fury.  They  were  Popish  rogues. 
He  would  destroy  three  thousand  such  in  defiance  of  the  King's 
commission.  He  now  refused  to  liberate  Bayard  and  Nicolls. 

Ingoldsby  showed  no  wish  to  push  matters  to  extremities. 
For  two  months  he  took  no  active  measures  beyond  quartering 
his  troops  in  the  town-hall.  That  done  he  waited  for  the  ar 
rival  of  Sloughter.  Meanwhile  Leisler  was  more  and  more 
drifting  into  the  position  of  an  armed  traitor.  He  or  some  of 
his  more  extreme  partisans  made  a  wild  attempt  to  discredit 
their  opponents  by  declaring  that  they  were  Jacobites  with 
forged  commissions.  The  garrison  of  the  fort  was  strengthened 
by  levies  introduced  from  New  Jersey,  and  it  was  victualed 


2l6  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  NEW    YORK. 

against  a  siege.  Tradition  represents  Ingoldsby  as  hasty  and 
violent.  His  conduct  at  this  stage  of  proceedings  shows  the  very 
opposite  qualities.  If  he  was  to  blame,  it  was  for  inertness  and 
dread  of  responsibility,  for  sitting  with  folded  hands  while 
sedition  was  gaining  strength.  By  prompt  action  now  he  might 
have  saved  future  bloodshed.  Nothing  can  prove  more  fully 
the  hollowness  of  Leisler's  cause,  its  lack  of  any  real  hold  on 
popular  feeling,  than  its  failure  to  make  any  head  even  against 
such  patient  and  half-hearted  opposition. 

Ingoldsby,  indeed,  seems  to  have  been  perfectly  willing  to 
await  Sloughter's  arrival.  It  was  Leisler's  own  deliberate  act 
that  finally  led  to  strife.  His  whole  attitude  was  so  strange,  his 
purpose  so  hopeless,  that  one  can  hardly  impute  to  him  a  definite 
policy.  But  he  would  seem  to  have  been  using  the  respite 
granted  to  him  by  Ingoldsby's  inaction  to  garrison  and  provision 
the  fort,  and  to  have  decided,  as  soon  as  he  was  strong  enough, 
to  take  active  measures  of  attack.  In  the  middle  of  March  hav 
ing  three  hundred  men  in  the  fort,  Leisler  sent  a  message  to  In 
goldsby  and  his  fellow-counselors  bidding  them  disband  their 
troops  under  pain  of  death. 

The  insolence  of  the  demand  was  even  surpassed  by  the  vio 
lence  of  the  language  in  which  it  was  couched.  Ingoldsby  and 
his  "evil  counselors"  are  described  as  "enemies  to  God,  their 
present  Majesties,  and  the  peace  and  welfare  of  this  people  and 
province." 

Such  a  defiance  to  a  commissioned  officer  at  the  head  of  the 
King's  troops  would  assuredly  have  justified  the  immediate  use 
of  force.  Ingoldsby  contented  himself  with  a  mere  warning 
that  an  attack  such  as  Leisler  threatened  would  be  an  act  of 
treason.  He  did  not  even  demand  submission,  but  suffered 
Leisler  and  his  adherents  to  keep  the  peace  till  Sloughter  ar 
rived,  and  Ingoldsby  and  the  Council  would  be  content. 

Leisler  now  showed  that  he  was  ready  to  pass  the  line  which 
separated  treasonable  words  from  treasonable  acts.  He  may 
Leisler  possibly  have  hoped  to  overwhelm  the  royal  troops 
troops.  before  the  arrival  of  Sloughter,  and  thus  to  be  able 
to  treat  with  the  Governor  from  a  position  of  armed  supremacy. 

Early  on  March  17  Ingoldsby's  answer  to  Leisler  was  handed 
in  to  the  fort.  In  less  than  half  an  hour  the  garrison  opened 
fire.  The  negligence  of  Ingoldsby  had  suffered  his  enemy  to 


ARRIVAL   OF  SLOUGHTER. 

obtain  an  important  military  advantage.  Not  only  had  Leisler 
garrisoned  the  fort,  but  his  troops  also  held  an  outwork  on  the- 
landward  side,  probably  on  the  high  ground  by  the  Hudson 
which  commands  the  town. 

This  advantage,  however,  was  sacrificed  by  the  indecision  of 
Leisler's  lieutenant,  Brasher,  who  had  command  of  the  outwork. 
He  apparently  shrank  from  the  thoroughgoing  policy  of  his  com 
mander,  and  leaving  his  post  went  to  the  fort  for  further  orders. 
Before  he  could  reach  the  fort  he  was  arrested,  and  his  troops,, 
having  the  responsibility  of  treason  thus  thrown  on  their  own 
shoulders,  laid  down  their  arms  and  abandoned  their  post. 

In  spite  of  this  defection,  the  first  exchange  of  hostilities  was 
all  in  favor  of  the  Leislerites.  The  musketry  fire  of  the  fort 
killed  two  men  and  wounded  several  more.  Ingoldsby's  artillery 
was  less  fortunate,  and  its  only  recorded  result  was  an  accidental 
discharge  which  killed  six  loyalists. 

Discouraged  probably  by  this,  Ingoldsby  seems  to  have  con 
tented  himself  with  keeping  his  men  out  of  fire  and  waiting  the 
Arrival  of  turn  °^  events.  The  day  passed  with  no  active  re- 
sioughter.  newa}  Of  hostilities.  But  on  the  morrow  Leisler's  fol 
lowers  heard  the  unwelcome  noise  of  cheering  in  the  streets. 
Their  fears  interpreted  the  sounds :  the  Governor  must  at  length 
have  landed.  It  was  so:  after  a  delay  of  three  weeks  at  the  Ber 
mudas  the  Archangel  had  reached  America  and  was  at  anchor  in 
New  York  Bay.  The  Council  at  once  hurried  to  meet  Sloughter 
with  news  of  the  state  of  affairs,  and  brought  him  without  de 
lay  into  the  city.  Having  read  his  commissions  and  sworn  in 
his  Council,  he  at  once  sent  to  demand  the  surrender  of  the 
fort. 

The  time  had  now  come  for  Leisler  to  show  whether  there 
was  any  foundation  for  his  repeated  professions  of  loyalty. 
Three  times  did  Sloughter  command  him  to  surrender  the  fort. 
At  first  Leisler  met  the  demand  by  equivocation.  He  must  see 
direct  orders  from  the  King's  own  hand  to  himself.  He  could 
not  give  up  the  fort,  but  he  would  negotiate  with  Sloughter. 
Finally,  when  it  was  plain  that  Sloughter  would  be  content  with 
no  compromise,  his  demand  was  met  with  flat  refusal.  Such 
conduct  can  only  be  explained  in  one  of  two  ways :  either  Leisler 
was,  as  some  of  his  enemies  hinted,  insane,  or  else  he  had  wholly 
deluded  himself  as  to  the  true  state  of  popular  feeling,  and  be- 


2l8  THE  REVOLUTION  Iff  NEW    YORK. 

lieved  that  even  at  the  eleventh  hour  there  would  be  some  out 
burst  on  the  part  of  the  citizens  which  would  give  him  the  upper 
hand. 

The  nearest  approach  which  he  had  made  to  concession  had 
been  to  send  out  Millborne  and  another  of  his  chief  supporters, 
a  lawyer,  Peter  de  la  Noy,  to  treat  with  Sloughter.  They  were 
not  suffered  to  return,  but  put  under  arrest. 

Their  detention  seems  to  have  convinced  Leisler  that  the 
Governor  was  in  earnest.  He  now  for  the  first  time  showed 
Submis-  a  wish  to  come  to  terms.  He  sent  a  message  profess- 
Leisier.  ing  himself  ready  to  yield  up  the  fort  and  give  an 
account  of  his  conduct.  But  his  day  of  grace  was  past.  Slough 
ter  refused  to  negotiate  with  an  armed  rebel,  and  sent  a  mes 
sage  to  the  fort  bidding  the  garrison  lay  down  their  arms  and 
withdraw.  If  they  did  so  they  should  be  pardoned,  excepting 
only  Leisler  and  those  who  had  acted  on  his  Council.  The  gar 
rison  at  once  accepted  the  terms  offered.  Sloughter's  troops 
occupied  the  fort  and  Leisler  was  made  prisoner  without  re 
sistance.  Bayard  and  his  fellow-prisoner  were  set  free,  and,  if 
we  may  believe  tradition,  their  very  fetters  were  used  upon 
Leisler. 

Sloughter's  commission  gave  him  power  to  constitute  crim 
inal  courts.  In  accordance  with  this  he  appointed  a  court  to  try 
Trial  of  Leisler  and  his  chief  accomplices.1  It  consisted  of 
Leisler.  three  trained  lawyers,  Joseph  Dudley  of  New  Eng 
land,  Thomas  Johnson,  and  William  Pinhorne,  of  Ingoldsby 
and  three  other  soldiers,  of  the  commander  of  the  Archangel, 
Hicks,  and  of  Sir  Robert  Robinson,  an  ex-Governor  of  Bermuda. 
Of  this  somewhat  cumbrously  large  tribunal  six  were  to  form  a 
quorum,  provided  that  either  Dudley  or  Johnson  was  present. 
The  partisans  of  Leisler  found  fault  with  the  composition  of 
the  court.  Some  of  its  members  were  personally  hostile  to  Leis 
ler,  others  too  young  to  have  judgment  or  influence.  But  in 
truth  in  such  a  trial  there  was  little  for  the  jury  to  do.  The 
facts  were  all  matter  of  notoriety.  The  only  question  at  issue 
was  the  question  of  law:  was  such  conduct  as  Leisler's  treason 
able?  Was  the  alleged  authority  from  the  Crown,  which  he 
had  pleaded  throughout,  valid  ?  Nothing  in  the  composition  of 
the  court  showed  any  wish  to  bear  hard  on  Leisler.  None  of  the 

1  See  the  official  account  of  the  trial. 


TRIAL    OF  LEISLER.  219 

members  had,  as  far  as  appears,  any  personal  grievance  against 
him.  The  chief  fault  in  its  composition,  its  unwieldy  size,  was 
certainly  in  favor  of  the  prisoners.  For  in  so  large  a  court  there 
was  no  great  likelihood  of  unanimity,  and  in  a  criminal  trial  a 
lack  of  unanimity  is  almost  sure  to  make  for  acquittal.  Never 
theless  Leisler,  as  throughout,  clutching  at  every  shift  as  if  it 
contained  hope,  begged  Sloughter  to  take  the  matter  into  his  own 
hands.  This  he  might  possibly  have  done  lawfully  under  the 
orders  given  him  by  the  King  in  Council.  Indeed,  while  the 
court  was  sitting  on  Leisler's  case,  Sloughter  was  conducting  a 
concurrent  inquiry  into  the  charges  embodied  in  the  various  re 
ports  and  petitions  sent  home  by  Leisler's  opponents.  But  to 
make  such  an  inquiry  with  a  view  to  reporting  to  the  Govern 
ment  in  England  was  a  very  different  thing  from  trying  Leisler 
on  a  criminal  charge,  and  Sloughter's  refusal  to  take  on  himself 
this  responsibility  was  assuredly  no  grievance. 

In  spite  of  Sloughter's  refusal  the  course  of  the  trial  did  prac 
tically  shift  the  main  question  on  to  the  Governor  and  his  Coun 
cil.  The  principal  count  on  which  the  prisoners  were  tried  was 
that  of  traitorously  levying  war  against  the  Crown.  Leisler 
himself  and  nine  of  his  chief  followers  were  put  on  trial.  Eight 
of  them  pleaded  not  guilty.  Leisler  and  Millborne  technically 
refused  to  plead.  They  suspended  their  plea  till  the  court 
should  have  decided  on  the  question  whether  the  intercepted 
commission  to  Nicholson  had  not  authorized  Leisler  to  act  as  he 
did.  This  was  to  all  practical  effect  a  plea  of  not  guilty.  The 
court,  however,  refused  to  take  upon  itself  the  responsibility  of 
deciding  the  question  so  submitted,  and  referred  it  to  Sloughter 
and  his  Council.  They  ruled  that  the  commission  in  question 
had  given  no  authority  to  Leisler.  In  the  face  of  that  declara 
tion  the  court  could  only  take  one  course.  Leisler's  actions  were 
matter  of  open  notoriety;  there  could  be  no  dispute  as  to  fact. 
Leisler  and  Millborne  now  made  it  plain  that  when  they  re 
fused  to  plead  till  the  preliminary  question  of  authority  had 
been  settled,  they  were  merely  adopting  a  subterfuge.  For  when 
the  court  pronounced  the  question  settled  they  still  remained 
mute.  The  court  passed  sentence.  Of  the  ten  prisoners,  six  be 
side  Leisler  and  Millborne  were  found  guilty  and  sentenced  to 
be  drawn  and  quartered.  The  court,  however,  appended  to  their 
verdict  a  recommendation  that  execution  should  be  deferred  till 


220  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  NEW    YORK. 

the  King's  pleasure  was  known,  unless  any  insurrection  of  the 
people  should  necessitate  the  execution. 

To  let  a  question  of  life  and  death  depend  on  political  expedi 
ency  is  on  the  face  of  it  a  repellent  policy.  But  to  deal  on  such 
The  sen-  a  principle  with  a  life  justly  forfeited  is  a  widely 

tence  on  ..„  ,  .          ,  .?.    . 

Leisier.  different  thing  from  sacrificing  an  innocent  man  in 
obedience  to  supposed  necessity.  If  ever  a  man  of  free  choice 
played  a  game  in  which  the  stake  was  his  own  life,  Leisier  did. 
If  we  blame  those  who  approved  of  Leisler's  death  we  must 
blame  them  not  for  injustice  to  their  victim,  but  for  having  mis 
interpreted  the  signs  of  the  times,  for  having  seen  a  necessity  for 
strong  measures  where  no  such  necessity  existed.  There  were 
not  in  Leisler's  case  any  of  those  conditions  which  may  beget  a 
conflict  between  public  policy  and  reasonable  human  feeling.  If 
Charles  Edward  had  been  captured  his  execution  would  have 
shocked  the  moral  sense  of  men,  because  he  was  but  carrying  out 
a  theory  held  by  upright  and  humane  men,  and  impressed  on  him 
from  his  childhood.  The  execution  of  the  mutineers  at  the 
Nore  shocks  us,  because  they  had  been  goaded  into  rebellion  by 
the  folly  and  wrong-doing  of  their  superiors.  Leisier  was  the 
victim  neither  of  his  own  theories  nor  of  others'  wrong-doing. 
He  threw  a  province  into  confusion,  wantonly  and  for  his  own 
personal  objects.  For  two  years,  while  he  had  ruled  as  the  head 
of  a  faction,  his  opponents  had  suffered  under  a  greedy  and 
brutal  tyranny. 

One  plea,  and  one  only,  could  be  urged  for  mercy.  It  might 
be  said  that  Leisler's  faults  of  temper  and  character  prevented 
him  from  being  dangerous,  that  he  did  not  embody  any  general 
feeling  of  disaffection  which  it  was  needful  to  intimidate,  and 
that  therefore  imprisonment  or  banishment  would  have  sufficed. 

Let  that  be  as  it  may,  at  least  the  blame,  if  any,  does  not  rest 
on  the  Governor  nor  on  any  of  his  official  colleagues.  The 
worst  that  could  be  said  of  Sloughter  was  that  he  did  not  show 
sufficient  firmness  in  resisting  the  cry  for  blood.  There  is  no 
reason  to  doubt  his  statement  made  in  a  dispatch  to  the  Eng 
lish  Government,  that  "the  loyal  part  of  the  colony  was  very 
earnest  for  execution."  He  may  perhaps  have  erred  in  his 
opinion  that  "if  the  chief  ringleaders  be  made  an  example,  the 
whole  country  may  be  quieted,  which  otherwise  will  be  hard 
to  do." 


SUMMONING   OF  AN  ASSEMBLY.  221 

Sloughter  lost  no  time  in  enabling  the  colonists  to  express 
their  opinions  and  wishes  legally  and  constitutionally.  Early 
An  in  April  he  issued  writs  for  an  Assembly.  It  was  but 

-summoned,  natural  that  the  members  returned  should  have  been 
enemies  to  Leisler  and  his  faction.  A  party  just  beaten  and  dis 
credited,  whose  leaders  are  in  prison,  is  not  likely  to  obtain  even 
its  due  share  of  influence  in  a  general  election.  But  the  Leis- 
lerites  had  at  a  later  day  full  opportunity  of  making  their  griev 
ances  heard,  and  we  meet  with  nothing  to  show  that  the  election 
was  in  any  way  an  unfair  one. 

The  first  proceeding  of  the  new  Assembly  was  to  pass  a  reso 
lution  condemning  Leisler's  conduct,  and  attributing  the  massa 
cre  at  Schenectady  to  his  misgovernment.  Nevertheless,  they 
declared  at  the  same  time  that  the  question  of  a  reprieve  was  one 
on  which  they  could  not  give  an  opinion. 

Meanwhile  pressure  was  being  brought  to  bear  on  Sloughter 
from  various  quarters  to  force  him  into  a  policy  of  severity. 
Public  The  Mohawks,  it  was  said,  were  exasperated  by  Leis- 
as  to  the  ler's  conduct  in  the  Canadian  war.  They  were  show- 
of  Leisler.  ing  an  inclination  to  intrigue  with  the  French:  the 
fate  of  Leisler  might  confirm  or  overthrow  their  tottering 
loyalty.  The  anti-Leislerite  party  might  be  temperate  in  their 
public  and  official  utterances,  but  in  private  the  Governor  was 
beset  by  the  cry  for  blood,  a  cry,  it  is  said,  in  which  many  women 
of  high  position  in  the  colony  loudly  joined.1 

Sloughter's  first  intention  manifestly  was  to  divest  himself  of 
responsibility  by  waiting  for  the  decision  of  the  Crown.2  It 
Theques-  would  obviously  have  been  far  better  for  his  future 
re°dntoethe"  relations  with  the  colonists  to  have  kept  to  that  reso- 
•councii.  lution,  to  have  carefully  avoided  an  attitude  which 
even  resembled  that  of  a  partisan.  But  he  lacked  the  strength 
of  will  to  resist  the  pressure  which  was  put  upon  him.  The 
enemies  of  Leisler  knew  that  the  policy  of  the  Whig  Govern 
ment  had  been  one  of  consistent  clemency.  They  might  well 
feel  that  if  they  once  allowed  the  matter  to  come  before  the  home 
Government  their  chance  of  revenge  was  gone.  Sloughter  did 
not  wholly  yield  to  the  pressure  put  upon  him.  He  would  not 

1  Brodhead,  vol.   ii.   p.   147. 

2  Sloughter  to  Nottingham,  May  6,  1691.     Printed  in  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p. 
762. 


222  THE  REVOLUTION  IN  NEW    YORK. 

take  on  himself  the  responsibility  of  the  execution,  but  he  re 
ferred  the  matter  to  the  Council.1  The  Councilors,  naturally 
less  afraid  of  responsibility  than  the  Assembly,  were  in  all  like 
lihood  more  amenable  to  the  pressure  put  on  them  by  Leisler's 
opponents.  He  was  threatened  not  by  the  just  indignation  of  a 
whole  people  whose  constitutional  rights  he  had  violated,  but  by 
the  resentment  of  a  class  in  whose  eyes  he  was  an  upstart  and  a 
demagogue.  The  opinion  of  the  richest  and  best-born  citizens 
would  find  voice  in  the  Council.  Their  unanimous  resolution 
was,  "that  as  well  for  the  satisfaction  of  the  Indians  as  the  as 
serting  of  the  government  and  authority  residing  in  his  Excel 
lency  in  preventing  insurrections  and  disorders  for  the  future,  it 
is  absolutely  necessary  that  the  sentence  pronounced  on  the 
principal  offenders  be  forthwith  put  in  execution."2  Tradition 
represents  Sloughter  as  still  wavering,  and  at  last  overcome  by 
the  persuasion  of  his  wife,8  or,  according  to  another  story,  sign 
ing  the  death  warrant  in  a  fit  of  drunkenness.4  There  is  little 
likelihood  in  either  tale.  When  Sloughter  had  once  referred 
the  question  to  the  Council  he  had  virtually  placed  the  decision 
out  of  his  own  hands.  There  has  always  been  a  tendency  to 
clutch  at  any  incident  which  may  invest  the  dull  records  of  colo 
nial  history  with  something  of  romance,  and  to  that  in  all  likeli 
hood  the  legend  owes  its  origin.  Yet  it  contains  a  faint  sugges 
tion  of  the  truth.  The  execution  was  not  the  work  of  Slough- 
ter's  own  judgment;  it  was  a  policy  forced  on  him  by  popular 
clamor. 

The  death  warrant  included  only  the  two  chief  offenders. 
The  rest  were  to  await  the  pleasure  of  the  Crown.  On  May  16, 
Execution  Leisler  and  Millborne  were  hanged.  Millborne  was 
and'Mu"  defiant  to  the  last  and  denounced  his  enemies  at  the 
borne.  foot  of  t^e  gallows.  Leisler  did  not  explicitly  ac 

knowledge  his  own  crimes.  But  he  admitted  those  committed 
by  his  followers  in  his  name ;  for  those  he  asked  pardon. 

There  is  little  need  for  comment  on  Leisler's  career  or  his 
end.  His  was  not  one  of  those  crimes  where  the  verdict  of  sen 
timent  either  outruns  that  of  reason  or  falls  short  of  it.  He  was 

1  Sloughter  to  Blathwayt,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  759.     This  letter  was  sent,, 
with  some  amendment,  by  the  Council  after  Sloughter's  death. 

2  Resolution  of  Council  quoted  by  Brodhead,  vol.  ii.  p.  648. 
1  Brodhead  mentions  this  only  as  a  rumor. 

*  Smith  is  the  authority  for  this  story. 


LEISLER  AND  HIS  ACTS  ANALYZED.  22$ 

not  a  Marat  sinning  much  against  law,  but  far  more  against 
human  feeling.  He  was  not  a  Balmerino  on  whose  fate  law 
and  human  feeling  inevitably  speak  with  discordant  voices. 
Leisler  sinned  against  law  and  against  human  feeling.  He  was 
an  unscrupulous  rebel  and  a  harsh  and  arbitrary  ruler.  But  in 
neither  matter  can  we  say  that  he  sinned  greatly.  Till  almost 
the  end  his  acts  of  rebellion  were  tricks  and  evasions,  not  open 
defiances  of  authority.  He  was  to  such  a  rebel  as  Monmouth 
what  a  pickpocket  is  to  a  pirate  on  the  high  seas.  Nor,  on  the 
other  hand,  do  the  wrongs  inflicted  on  Bayard  and  his  fellows 
rank  with  the  tyranny  of  such  men  as  Kirke  or  Carrier.  There 
was  no  greatness  in  the  man  either  for  good  or  evil;  he  was 
throughout  the  slave  of  events,  wholly  without  foresight  or  con 
structive  genius.  If  we  condemn  the  government  that  put  him 
to  death,  we  must  condemn  it  for  reckoning  such  an  one  seri 
ously  dangerous.  The  worst  side  of  the  matter  was  not  the  fact 
but  the  manner  of  his  execution.  The  government  lost  all  dig 
nity,  it  threw  away  that  influence  for  which  dignity  is  needful 
when  men  saw  that  its  representative  shrank  from  maintaining 
and  upholding  his  own  views,  that  he  shifted  his  responsibility 
on  to  a  body  of  heated  partisans,  and  made  himself  the  instru 
ment  of  class  terror  and  party  revenge. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

NEW   YORK   AFTER   THE   REVOLUTION.1 

THE  general  result  of  Leisler's  rebellion  was  to  leave  the  colony 
in  a  condition  which  went  far  to  make  good  administration  im- 
Kffect  of  possible.  For  if  government  by  a  representative  body 
rebellion.  implies,  and  almost  inevitably  brings  with  it,  a  system 
of  parties,  it  also  requires  that  the  issues  which  divide  these 
parties  should  be  distinctly  limited,  that  there  should  be  behind 
party  differences  certain  general  principles  common  to  all,  and 
that  it  should  always  be  possible  to  overrule  such  differences  for 
the  common  good.  Above  all  was  this  needful  when  govern 
ment  was  vested  partly  in  a  representative  assembly,  partly  in  a 
governor  who  could  know  little  of  the  real  condition  of  the  col 
ony,  and  who  was  therefore  largely  dependent  on  the  Assembly 
not  only  for  support  but  also  for  advice.  The  strife  kindled  by 
Leisler  had  rent  the  colony  into  two  embittered  factions.  The 

1  After  the  Revolution  the  Official  Documents  concerning  New  York  greatly 
increased  in  number  and  value.  The  dispatches  of  Bellomont,  Cornbury,  and 
Hunter,  all  to  be  found  among  the  New  York  Documents,  are  of  great  value. 
We  lose  the  guidance  of  Brodhead,  but  as  a  compensation  we  gain  that  of 
:Smith,  whose  work  now  becomes  much  fuller  and  more  authoritative.  The  au 
thor,  William  Smith,  was  the  son  of  a  William  Smith  who  played  a  conspicu 
ous  part  in  New  York  politics.  He  (the  elder)  came  to  America  with  his 
father  in  1715,  being  then  eighteen  years  old.  He  was  a  successful  barrister, 
became  Attorney-General  in  New  York,  and  a  member  of  Council,  and  at  a 
later  date  a  judge.  His  son,  the  historian,  was  born  in  1728.  Like  his  father, 
he  graduated  at  Yale,  and  distinguished  himself  at  the  New  York  bar.  He 
'became  Chief  Justice  of  that  colony.  His  History  originally  appeared  in  1793. 
As  then  published  it  only  came  down  to  1732.  But  a  further  portion  of  it, 
'coming  down  to  1761,  remained  in  manuscript,  and  was  published  by  the  New 
York  Historical  Society  in  1826.  This  I  refer  to  as  part  2. 

The  Acts  of  Assembly,  from  1692  onwards,  were  published  in   1725. 

Colden's  History  of  the  Five  Nations  now  becomes  an  important  authority. 
He  was  a  Scotchman  who  emigrated  to  New  York  in  1710,  being  then  twenty- 
two  years  old.  He  became  a  large  landholder,  a  member  of  Council,  and  at 
length  lieutenant-general.  Golden  has,  what  is  in  a  colonial  writer  the  unusual 
•quality,  of  enthusiastic  admiration  for  the  savages.  If  this  sometimes  makes 
him  untrustworthy,  it  at  least  serves  to  balance  the  opposite  tendency  in  most 
•colonial  writers  of  that  day.  The  elaborate  orations  which  he  often  puts  into 
the  mouth  of  his  savages  cannot  possibly  be  historical.  Colden's  book  appeared 
in  1727.  This  edition  was  reprinted  in  1866.  Another  edition  was  published 
in  1750,  and  it  is  to  this  that  my  references  apply. 


ATTEMPTS   TO  DEFINE    THE    CONSTITUTION.      225 

object  of  each  in  dealing  with  a  newly  arrived  governor  was  to 
possess  themselves  of  his  support  and  to  use  it  as  a  weapon  for 
crushing  and  keeping  down  their  enemies.  The  colony,  too,  was 
suffering  from  the  perils  incident  to  its  position,  and  to  that  ter 
rible  sense  of  insecurity  which  such  a  rule  as  Leisler's  is  certain 
to  produce.  There  was  a  heavy  public  debt;  men  were  every 
day  withdrawing  to  safer  and  less  burdened  colonies — to  Con 
necticut  and  Pennsylvania.  The  perpetual  need  for  guarding 
against  invasion  left  the  settlers  at  Albany  no  leisure  to  attend 
to  business,  and  thus  the  two  great  resources  of  the  colony — 
tillage  and  the  Indian  trade — were  crippled.  Meanwhile  the 
French  missionaries  were  working  their  way  among  the  Five 
Nations,  and  French  emissaries  were  using  all  their  unscrupulous 
craft  to  prevent  any  union  between  the  confederacy  and  the 
native  tribes  outside  its  limits.  To  counteract  that  would  need 
all  the  energy  and  adroitness  of  an  able  governor,  backed  with 
the  resources  of  a  united  province. 

The  effect  of  James  II. 's  later  policy  had  been  to  leave  New 
York  without  a  constitution.  That  want  was  in  part  supplied 
Attempts  by  the  instructions  issued  by  the  Crown  to  its  succes- 
the  con-  siye  representatives,  in  part  by  enactments  in  which 
of'the'0"  t^ie  Assembly  definitely  declared  what  should  be  the 
colony.  constitutional  rights  of  the  colonists.  The  Assembly 
which  met  under  Sloughter,  immediately  after  the  overthrow 
of  Leisler,  passed  two  Acts  which  set  forth,  the  one  the 
nature  and  extent  of  the  authority  enjoyed  by  the  Crown,  the 
other  the  rights  and  privileges  of  the  settlers.1  The  first 
was  avowedly  a  declaration  against  the  principles  involved  in 
Leisler's  proceedings.  The  preamble  contrasted  loyal  New 
York  with  its  disaffected  neighbors.  The  people  had  been 
''poisoned  from  New  England  with  the  mistake  that  the  Crown 
has  nothing  to  do  with  the  people  here."  On  the  other  hand 
''there  can  be  no  power  or  authority  exercised  over  their  Majes 
ties'  subjects  in  this  their  province  and  dominion  but  what  must 
be  derived  from  their  Majesties,  their  heirs  and  successors." 
There  clearly  spoke  the  voice  of  a  party  exasperated  by  the  self- 
constituted  rule  of  a  demagogue  tyrant.  With  no  truth  could  it 
be  said  that  anyone  speaking  with  any  authority  in  the  name  of 

1  For  the  Proceedings  of  the  Assembly  see  Acts  of  Assembly,  pp.  2-14. 


226  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

New  England  had  ever  declared  that  the  colonists  were  inde 
pendent  of  the  Crown.  The  only  quarter  in  which  such  a  doc 
trine  had  ever  been  suggested  even  by  implication  was  in  the  wild 
utterances  of  Leisler's  most  reckless  partisans.  Leisler  himself 
had  assuredly  never  set  up  such  a  claim,  and  the  declaration  of 
the  Assembly  did  but  enunciate  what  was  regarded  on  all  hands 
as  a  truism. 

At  the  same  time  the  Assembly  passed  an  Act  which  was  un 
doubtedly  intended  as  an  equivalent  to  the  Bill  of  Rights.  It 
Bin  of  provided  that  an  Assembly  should  be  elected  annu- 
Rights.  anVi  y^  franchise  was  to  be  enjoyed  by  all  free 
holders  worth  forty  shillings  a  year.  The  apportionment  of 
representatives  was  also  determined.  New  York  City  and  county 
were  to  have  four  members,  each  of  the  other  counties  two,  Al 
bany  two,  and  Rensselaerwyck  one.  No  tax  was  to  be  imposed 
save  by  the  joint  action  of  the  Governor,  Council,  and  Deputies,, 
and  freedom  of  conscience  was  secured  to  all  Christians,  Papists 
only  excepted.  That  clause  was  a  sufficient  answer  to  the  charge 
of  Popish  sympathies  so  recklessly  brought  by  Leisler  and  his 
allies  against  their  opponents.  The  Whiggish  nature  of  the 
settlement  was  also  shown  by  an  Act  enabling  persons  who  con 
scientiously  objected  to  an  oath  to  substitute  a  declaration.  Ex 
isting  rights,  too.  were  secured  by  enacting  that  the  land  tenure 
neither  of  individuals  nor  of  corporations,  if  good  in  equity, 
should  be  vitiated  by  any  want  of  technical  legality.  Those 
rights  of  local  self-government  which  were  already  enjoyed  by 
various  townships  were  put  on  a  more  secure  basis.  It  was 
enacted  that  the  freeholders  in  any  town  might  hold  meetings, 
and  make  orders  for  the  improving  of  their  respective  lands  and 
tillage,  and  appoint  surveyors.1 

Another  clause  in  the  General  Act  for  protecting  the  rights  of 
the  colonists  provided  that  no  soldiers  might  be  billeted  on  any 
The  Bin  inhabitant  without  his  consent.  This,  however,  was 
vetoed.  apparently  fatal  to  the  acceptance  of  the  Act  in  Eng 
land.  Mainly  in  consequence  of  that  provision,  partly  too  from 
the  power  which  it  vested  in  the  representatives,  the  lords  of 
trade  advised  the  King  to  withhold  his  consent  to  the  Act. 
They  recommended  that  instead  the  rights  of  the  colonists 
should  be  set  forth  in  a  charter  analogous  to  that  granted  to 

1  Acts  of  Assembly.    Cf.  Bishop  on  History  of  Elections  in  U.  S.  p.  207. 


DEATH  OF  SLOUGHTER.  227 

Virginia.1  That,  however,  was  not  done,  and  the  privileges  of 
the  colony  were  left  to  rest  on  the  successive  instructions  to 
governors,  gradually  crystallizing  into  continuous  usage. 

In  another  matter  the  Assembly  showed  that  reaction  had  not 
begotten  indifference  to  the  recognized  principles  of  constitu 
tional  freedom.  The  money  in  the  public  treasury  might  be  paid 
out  under  a  warrant  from  the  Governor.  But  this  provision 
only  extended  over  two  years,  and  thus  the  Assembly  retained 
in  its  own  hands  a  check  over  the  Governor. 

Sloughter's  conduct  over  the  trial  and  execution  of  Leisler 
showed  that  he  was  wholly  unfitted  for  the  heavy  task  before 
Death  of  him.  To  guard  the  frontier,  to  keep  the  good  will  of 
sioughter.  ^g  lndian  allies,  to  assert  the  authority  of  the 
Crown,  and  to  protect  the  remains  of  Leisler's  faction  against 
their  vindictive  enemies — here  was  indeed  a  complex  task  which 
might  tax  the  best  ability  that  had  ever  been  employed  in  the 
colonial  service  of  England.  The  death  of  Sioughter  within 
three  months  of  Leisler's  execution  gave  the  King  the  oppor 
tunity  for  choosing  a  more  efficient  instrument.  It  is  a  melan 
choly  illustration  of  the  pitch  of  bitterness  which  party  feeling 
had  reached,  that  Sloughter's  death  was  set  down  by  rumor  as 
the  result  of  poison,  without,  as  far  as  can  be  seen,  a  tittle  of  con 
firmatory  evidence.2  Readiness  to  accept  such  rumors  shows  a 
state  of  social  and  political  morality  little  less  diseased  than 
would  be  shown  by  their  truth. 

One  assuredly  has  no  right  to  blame  William  and  Mary,  or 
those  responsible  for  their  policy,  if  they  failed  to  find  a  governor 
Appoint-  equal  to  the  task  before  him.  But  that  plea  will 
Fletcher.  hardly  avail  for  the  choice  of  such  an  one  as  Slough 
ter's  successor.  Colonel  Benjamin  Fletcher  seems  to  have  been 
suddenly  thrust  into  a  responsible  position  in  colonial  politics 
without  special  experience,  and  without  any  of  those  gifts  of 
mind  or  character  which  could  make  up  for  its  absence.  All 
that  was  creditable  in  his  career  was  due  to  his  advisers,  and  his 
whole  policy  justifies  one  in  saying  that  when  he  did  light  on 


1 N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iv.  p.  244.  Inasmuch  as  Virginia  had  no  charter,  I  find 
it  difficult  to  understand  what  this  means.  Probably  the  words  were  used 
proleptically  of  some  charter  for  Virginia  which  was  under  consideration;  or  it 
might  be  a  clerical  error  for  New  England. 

*  Smith,  p.   1 06. 


228  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION, 

good  advisers  luck  had  more  to  do  with  the  matter  than  judg 
ment. 

The  instructions  given  to  Fletcher  came  nearer  to  giving  the 
colony  a  definite  constitution  than  Sloughter's  had  done.  The 
His  in-  same  arrangements  were  prescribed  for  carrying  on 
structions.»  government.  But  certain  definite  provisions  were  in 
serted  on  matters  which  had  been  before  left  vague.  The  right 
of  taxation  was  not  explicitly  vested  in  the  Assembly.  But  that 
was  implied  in  the  absence  of  any  other  direction  for  raising 
money,  and  in  the  provision  that  every  Act  of  Assembly  which 
granted  money  should  contain  a  special  reservation  of  the  pur 
poses  for  which  such  money  might  be  spent. 

The  instructions  introduced  a  new  feature  in  the  ascendency 
given  to  the  Church  of  England.  This  may  be  said  in  a  certain 
sense  to  have  created  a  religious  establishment  in  the  colony. 
Every  minister,  so  ran  the  instructions,  was  to  have  a  certificate 
of  orthodoxy  and  good  conduct  from  the  Bishop  of  London,  and 
to  receive  a  stipend  and  glebe.  This  might  fairly  be  held  to 
mean  that  there  was  to  be  a  body  of  endowed  Anglican  clergy. 
At  the  same  time  the  conditions  of  such  endowment,  the  mode  of 
raising  it,  and  the  liability  to  pay  it,  were  left  undetermined, 
And  as  a  clause  was  added  which  gave  liberty  of  conscience  to 
all,  Papists  excepted,  it  was  evidently  not  intended  to  deprive 
Nonconformist  sects  of  the  right  to  endow  their  own  ministry. 

Further  provision  was  made  for  the  supremacy  of  the  estab 
lished  Church,  by  a  clause  prohibiting  any  schoolmaster  to  keep 
school  without  a  certificate  from  the  Bishop  of  London. 

The  reaction  against  the  Dutch  party,  and  the  inevitable  tend 
ency  of  the  community  after  the  discreditable  failure  of  a  revo- 
Dteput*  lution  to  cling  to  constitutional  authority,  had  insured 
church  harmony  between  Sloughter  and  the  Assembly.  But 
ment.  these  influences  soon  spent  their  force,  and  there  was 

nothing  to  reconcile  the  Assembly  either  to  the  personal  char 
acter  of  Fletcher  or  to  the  various  features  of  his  instructions 
which  ran  counter  to  the  feelings  and  prejudices  of  the  settlers. 
He  soon  found  himself  in  conflict  with  the  Assembly.  The 
scheme  for  endowment  was  brought  before  them,  and  was  ur 
gently  pressed  by  the  Governor.  The  Assembly  took  the  matter 

1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  818. 


DISPUTE  ABOUT  CHURCH  ENDOWMENT.          229 

into  consideration,  and  at  length  drafted  a  bill  giving  not  a 
general  endowment  throughout  the  colony,  but  one  in  certain 
parishes.  To  this  Fletcher  and  his  Council  apparently  assented. 
But  they  introduced  an  amendment,  which  made  the  approval  of 
the  Governor  necessary  for  the  appointment  of  any  incumbent. 
The  representatives  refused  to  accept  the  bill  thus  amended. 
Fletcher  thereupon  prorogued  the  Assembly,  reading  them  a  lec 
ture  on  their  stubbornness,  their  indifference  to  orthodox  re 
ligion,  and  their  wish  to  arrogate  to  themselves  the  whole  of 
legislation.1  Practically  the  Assembly  carried  their  point  in  sav 
ing  the  endowment  from  being  appropriated  exclusively  to  the 
Episcopalian  Church.  For  two  years  later,  when  a  dispute  arose 
as  to  the  right  of  the  churchwardens  and  vestrymen  to  appoint  a 
Dissenter  as  their  minister,  the  house  decided  that  under  the  late 
Act  they  could  do  so.2 

The  result  of  Fletcher's  instructions  and  the  Act  of  the  As 
sembly  taken  together  was  to  bring  about  a  state  of  things 
fraught  with  difficulty  and  complication.  The  one  part  which 
stood  out  clearly  was  that  every  parish  was  to  have  an  endowed 
minister.  Fletcher's  instructions  implied  that  it  was  the  inten 
tion  of  the  English  Government  that  such  endowment  should 
be  confined  to  the  Church  of  England.  The  Act  of  the  As 
sembly  as  subsequently  interpreted  by  that  body  provided  that 
religious  bodies  other  than  the  Church  of  England  should  benefit 
by  the  endowment.  To  accept  the  former  view  was  to  recognize 
the  right  of  the  English  Crown  to  impose  a  form  of  Establish 
ment  which  might  be  wholly  opposed  to  the  wishes  of  the  in 
habitants.  To  accept  the  latter  view  was  to  vest  in  the  Bishop 
of  London  a  certain  control  over  clergy  outside  his  own  Church. 
Either  of  these  positions,  even  if  accepted  without  reserve,  would 
have  been  full  of  difficulty.  The  conflict  of  the  two  created  a 
situation  pregnant  with  troubles,  nor,  as  we  shall  see,  were  they 
long  in  coming  to  the  birth. 

The  best  side  of  Fletcher's  career  as  Governor  was  his  dealing 
with  the  Indians  on  the  Canadian  frontier.  There  he  had  the 
Fletcher's  good  fortune  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  capable  and 

Indian  if          •    •       i        i    • 

policy.          public-spirited  advisers. 

1  Smith   (pp.    115-8)   gives  a  full  account  of  this  dispute,   quoting  Fletcher's 
speech  to  the  Assembly  verbatim. 

2  Smith,  p.    119. 


230  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

One  may  almost  say  that  there  was  now  in  America  a  school 
of  public  men  strongly  impressed  with  the  need  for  carrying  out 
john  the  policy  which  Dongan  had  been  the  first  to  advo- 

Neison.  cate  publicly  and  definitely.  Such  was  Nelson,  of 
whose  later  career  as  Governor  of  Acadia  I  have  spoken  else 
where.1  In  an  able  dispatch,  written  the  year  before  Fletcher 
came  into  office,  he  urged  the  need  of  meeting  the  French  policy 
not  by  merely  defensive  measures,  but  by  counter-aggression.2 
He  dwells  on  the  advantage  of  creating  a  militia  on  the  frontier, 
a  scattered  garrison  of  armed  hunters  answering  to  the  coureurs 
de  bois  of  Canada.  In  this  he  was  supported  by  another  of 
Fletcher's  advisers,  Lodwyck.  More,  too,  must  be  done  in  the 
way  of  showing  active  sympathy  with  the  Indians.  Their  chiefs 
must  be  brought  over  to  England  and  impressed  with  a  sense  of 
the  greatness  of  Britain.  The  settlers  must,  like  the  French, 
show  themselves  eager  in  embracing  the  quarrels  of  their  savage 
allies.  "It  cannot  be  thought  that  they  should  also  expose  them 
selves  in  our  quarrel  while  we  remain  by  our  fires."  As  far  as 
mere  individual  courage  goes  we  are  as  well  off  as  our  neighbors. 
Such  a  feat  as  Schuyler's  raid  on  Prairie  de  la  Madeleine 
showed  that.8  Nelson  points  out,  too,  the  difference  between 
French  and  English  policy  as  illustrated  by  this  incident.  The 
French  themselves  admitted  that  such  an  exploit  as  Schuyler's 
would  with  them  have  been  the  subject  of  a  special  acknowledg 
ment  from  the  Court.  But  with  the  English  Government  it  was 
left  to  be  its  own  reward.  Another  point  of  superiority  in 
the  French  policy  not  mentioned  by  Nelson  is  put  forcibly  by  a 
colonial  historian  of  a  somewhat  later  date.  The  French  had 
men  of  military  skill  and  experience  living  among  the  Indians, 
and  ever  ready  to  advise  them.  Not  only  that,  but  every  French 
officer  quartered  in  Canada  was  liable  to  be  told  off  for  such 
duty,  and  thus  a  permanent  connection  was  established  between 
the  French  garrison  there  and  the  Indian  allies.  At  New  York 
the  English  officers  "live  like  military  monks,  in  idleness  and 
luxury."4 

Like  all  who  applied  themselves  thoughtfully  to  the  question, 
Nelson  sees  that  the  English  policy  can  never  be  really  satisfac- 

1  The  Puritan  Colonies,  vol.  ii.  pp.  318-338. 

2  Nelson's  memorial  is  in  the  Documents,  vol.  iv.  p.  207. 
1  V.  s.  p.  211. 

«Colden,  p.   183. 


BROOKE  AND  NICOLLS'S  MEMORIAL.  231 

tory  till  her  colonies  are  more  consolidated.  Broken  up  in  small 
governments  the  colonists  "in  manner  esteem  each  other  as 
foreigners." 

The  same  note  was  sounded  in  a  memorial  from  two  of  the 
Councilors,  Brooke  and  Nicolls.  In  a  memorial  submitted  to 
Brooke  the  Board  of  Trade  they  made  the  following  specific 
Nicoiis's  proposals.  Canada  was,  if  possible,  to  be  conquered. 
Memorial,  jf  t[lat  was  too  jarge  a  scheme,  then  a  subsidy  of  a 

thousand  pounds  a  year  was  to  be  granted  to  the  Indian  allies 
for  arms,  ammunition,  and  clothes.  A  standing  force  of  a  thou 
sand  men  should  be  kept  on  the  Canadian  frontier.  A  stone  fort 
was  to  be  built  at  Albany  and  Schenectady.  Conestago  on 
the  Mohawk  river  was  to  be  fortified.  The  writers  were  al 
lowed  to  attend  before  the  Board  of  Trade  and  explain  their 
proposals  more  fully,  but  there  is  no  evidence  of  any  action 
taken.1 

So,  too,  almost  every  dispatch  that  Fletcher  sends  home 
breathes  the  cry  "colonial  union,"  and  tells  of  his  failure  to  se- 
Fietcher  cure  aid  outside  his  own  province.  A  general  in- 
consoHda-  struction  had  been  issued  by  the  advisers  of  the 
tion.  Crown  that  all  colonies  north  of  the  Potomac  are  to 

help  New  York  with  men  and  money.2  Fletcher,  too,  was  in 
vested  with  a  commission  as  Commander-in-Chief  which  ex 
tended  to  Connecticut  and  Pennsylvania,"  with  further  powers 
to  raise  a  contingent  of  seven  hundred  men  in  New  Jersey.  His 
report  of  the  attitude  of  the  various  colonies  is  a  prophecy  of 
what  was  to  be  heard  for  the  next  sixty  years  from  every  British 
official  who  strove  to  organize  a  connected  scheme  of  colonial 
-defense.  Pennsylvania  is  parsimonious  and  slothful.  Connec 
ticut  is  suspicious  and  independent.  The  latter  colony  is, 
Fletcher  reports,  a  sort  of  republic;  there  all  the  better  sort  of 
people  are  dissatisfied  and  wish  to  be  united  with  New  York.  It 
is  not  hard  to  tell  what  the  "better  sort"  meant  in  the  mouth  of 
an  official  of  Fletcher's  type.  It  was  a  view  for  which  England 
had  to  pay  dear  in  the  days  to  come.  Pennsylvania  will  only 
give  good  wishes,  and  would  rather  die  than  resist  with  carnal 

1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.   iv.  pp.   183-6. 

a  Col.    Papers,    1689-92,   2533.   2543- 

3  Strictly  speaking  not  a  "commission"  but  "commissions."  They  were 
separate  instruments.  Col.  Papers,  1689-92,  2296;  1693-6,  310.  Fletcher's 
relation  to  Pennsylvania  will  come  before  us  again. 


23*  NEW   YORK  AFTER   THE  REVOLUTION. 

weapons.  Nor  is  that  all.  Men  are  actually  leaving  New 
York,  and  fleeing  to  these  unpatriotic  colonies  to  escape  the 
burden  of  war  taxation.1 

Fletcher  is  not  alone  in  these  complaints,  nor  in  the  remedy 
which  he  urges.  Brooke,  who  beside  being  a  Councilor  was 
Judge  of  the  Supreme  Court  in  New  York,  reports  that  "No 
way  can  be  found  to  prevent  the  Jerseys  from  trading  with 
the  Indians  to  o»:r  prejudice  except  by  annexing  them  to  this 
province."2 

Colonel  Lodwyck,  an  English  official  in  Fletcher's  confidence, 
goes  further,  and  urges  a  comprehensive  scheme  for  consolidat 
ing  Connecticut,  New  York,  New  Jersey,  and  Pennsylvania  into 
one  province."  He  considered  that  he  had  strengthened  his  case 
by  forwarding  a  somewhat  curious  petition  from  the  inhabitants 
of  Elizabethtown.  They  had  settled,  they  say,  under  patents 
from  Nicolls,  intending  to  be  in  the  province  of  New  York. 
The  Proprietors  of  New  Jersey  have  separated  them  from  New 
York,  they  have  treated  Nicolls's  grants  as  null  and  void,  and 
have  either  given  the  land  to  fresh  grantees  or  compelled  the 
occupants  to  take  out  fresh  patents.  Moreover,  by  exempting 
their  own  lands  from  public  burdens  they  have  impoverished  all 
private  holders. 

Here,  as  so  often  in  the  history  of  the  middle  colonies,  we  are 
confronted  with  that  root  of  all  confusion  and  discord,  the  grant 
to  Berkeley  and  Carteret. 

Either  the  Crown  or  the  Board  of  Trade  appears  to  have  laid 
to  heart  Lodwyck's  suggestions,  for  in  1693  Sir  John  Trevor,  a 
law  officer  of  the  Crown,  was  asked  to  give  an  opinion  as  to  the 
status  of  New  Jersey  and  its  relation  to  the  Crown.  The  an 
swer  was  one  which  might  well  alarm  that  colony.  He  held 
that  no  grant  or  assignment  made  by  the  Duke  of  York  could 
"absolutely  sever  New  Jersey  from  New  York,  but  that  it  still 
remains  a  part  thereof  and  dependent  on  the  Government  of 
New  York,  and  liable  to  contribute  men  and  provisions  for  the 
supply  and  protection  of  New  York  against  any  enemies." 

Strictly  interpreted  this  decision  would  have  annihilated  New 
Jersey  as  a  body  politic.  It  meant  that  the  grant  of  New  Jersey 
was  merely  a  conveyance  of  land,  and  that  the  Duke  of  York 

1  Fletcher's   dispatches   in    Col.    State   Papers,    1693-4. 
*Ib.  p.  289.  *Ib.  p.  557' 


FLETCHER  ADVISED  BY  SCHUYLER.  233 

had  not,  as  Proprietor,  any  power  to  transfer  jurisdiction.  The 
accession  of  James  II.  had  put  New  York  in  the  condition  of  a 
Crown  colony,  and  the  rights  which  the  Crown  had  thus  ac 
quired  passed  with  the  Revolution  to  the  new  Sovereigns. 

Trevor's  opinion  also  contained  a  clause  to  the  effect  that,  in 
spite  of  the  charter  of  Connecticut  and  New  Jersey,  the  Crown 
may  appoint  governors  for  those  colonies,  with  power  to  raise 
men  and  supplies  for  necessary  defense.1 

The  attack  was  in  reality  made  less  dangerous  by  being  thus 
made  more  comprehensive.  There  was  a  certain  amount  of 
reason  in  the  contention  that  the  Duke  of  York  had  no  right  to 
transfer  the  political  authority  which  had  been  granted  to  him. 
The  fact  that  such  authority  had  for  nearly  twenty2  years  been 
exercised  without  question  made  the  attempt  to  revoke  it  little 
less  than  a  revolution. 

The  inclusion  of  Connecticut  in  the  attack  went  far  to  neu 
tralize  any  real  danger  to  colonial  liberty.  To  attack  the  char 
tered  rights  of  Connecticut  would  have  been  perilous  in  itself  and 
at  variance  with  all  traditions,  so  far  as  these  were  continuous 
and  connected  traditions,  of  colonial  policy.  Trevor's  busi 
ness,  no  doubt,  was  to  advise  on  the  purely  legal  aspect  of 
the  case.  But  it  was  throughout  the  calamitous  error  of 
those  in  power  in  England  that  they  put  forward  assertions 
of  legal  rights  as  against  the  colonies,  without  any  regard 
to  the  effect  which  such  claims  were  likely  to  have  on  colonial 
feeling. 

There  is  nothing  to  show  that  Nelson  had  any  direct  influence 
over  Fletcher.  But  the  man  whose  conduct  Nelson  specially 
Fletcher  signals  out  as  the  type  and  illustration  of  what  our 
Schuyier.  policy  ought  to  be  in  all  likelihood  had.  The  one 
creditable  feature  of  Fletcher's  policy  was  his  strong  sense  of 
the  need  for  defensive  operations  on  the  frontier,  and  the  per 
sistency  with  which  he  urged  this  on  the  home  Government.  If 
we  may  believe  Fletcher's  enemies,  he  was  in  these  matters  acting 
by  the  advice  of  Schuyier.  Schuyier  was  far  more  than  a  bril 
liant  backwoods  fighter.  He  understood  all  the  diplomatic  arts 
needful  to  secure  the  good  will  of  the  Indians. 


1  Col.  State  Papers,  Feb.  13,  1694. 

1  Twenty-eight  if  we  count  from  the  original  grant  to  Berkeley  and  Carteret. 


234  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

The  relations  between  the  English  and  the  Five  Nations  had 
of  late  years  been  such  as  to  tax  and  develop  the  capacity  of  the 
Difficulties  English  for  dealing  diplomatically  with  the  savages, 
with  the  'pjjg  intrigues  of  French  missionaries  on  the  one  hand 
Nations.  jjaj  excited  the  suspicions  of  the  settlers,  while  the 
Indians  not  unnaturally  doubted  whether  men  so  supine  and 
disunited  as  the  whole  body  of  English  could  be  in  earnest  and 
trustworthy.  It  is  plain,  too,  that  the  Five  Nations  felt  jealous, 
not  without  reason,  of  the  way  in  which  the  brunt  of  the  strife 
was  thrown  on  them  by  their  allies.  Thus,  at  a  conference  held 
with  Sloughter  in  1691,  they  complained  that  he  said  "You 
must  keep  the  enemy  in  perpetual  alarm,"  not  "we  must."1 
Schuyler's  raid  had  no  doubt  done  something  to  allay  their  sus 
picions.  In  1692,  during  the  short  interregnum  which  followed 
Sloughter's  death,  Ingoldsby  met  the  chiefs  of  the  confederacy  at 
Albany.2  His  speech  to  them  was  a  repetition  of  Sloughter's,  a 
strenuous  warning  and  appeal  against  any  peace  with  the  French. 
The  reply  of  the  chief  Indian  speaker  is  possibly  colored  in 
form  by  a  partial  historian,  but  in  substance  it  has  every  internal 
appearance  of  probability.  The  Indians  have  no  thoughts  of 
peace.  But  how  is  it  that  the  smaller  and  weaker  party  in  the 
.alliance  is  expected  to  do  all  the  work  of  it?  How  is  it  that  the 
Indians  have  to  pay  the  English  more  than  ever  for  powder,  with 
out  which  they  can  neither  fight  nor  subsist?  And  even  if  they 
have  ammunition  what  are  they  to  do  without  guns?  They 
cannot  pelt  the  enemy  with  powder  and  shot.  The  Governor  of 
•Canada  takes  care  that  his  savage  allies  are  well  armed.  And 
how  is  it  that,  while  all  the  English  colonies  are  said  to  be  parts 
of  one  nation  and  subjects  of  one  King,  there  is  no  union  among 
them?  How  is  it  that  Maryland  and  the  settlers  by  the  Dela 
ware  and  those  of  New  England  are  taking  no  part  in  the  strife? 
"Has  the  King  of  England  sold  these  subjects?  or  are  they  dis 
obedient?  Pray  make  plain  to  us  this  mystery!  How  can  they 
all  be  subjects  of  the  same  Great  King  and  not  engaged  in  the 
same  war?"  The  Indian  orator  was  but  saying  what  every 
thoughtful  man  who  knew  the  condition  of  the  colonies  and  was 
not  blinded  by  provincial  jealousy  was  thinking. 

Meanwhile,  Jesuit  preachers  were  doing  all  in  their  power  to 
detach  the  Mohawks  from  the  English  alliance.  Frontenac, 

1  Golden,  p.   125.  2  Ib.  p.   138. 


FRENCH  IN  VA  SION.  235 

however,  fully  recognized  that  a  spice  of  fear  would  be  a  strong 
re-enforcement  to  the  arguments  of  the  missionaries.  In  the 
French  winter  of  1692  he  renewed  his  policy  of  three  years 
in  1692.1  back.  This  time,  however,  he  confined  his  attack  to 
a  single  expedition  directed  against  the  New  York  frontier.  As 
before,  the  dead  of  winter  was  chosen  as  the  season  for  the  at 
tack.  In  the  second  week  in  1693  a  force  set  forth  of  nearly 
seven  hundred  Indian  converts,  commanded  by  French  officers. 
In  the  way  of  actual  injury  to  the  English  the  raid  effected 
nothing.  Three  Mohawk  villages  were  surprised,  of  which  two 
were  insignificant.  The  third,  however,  was  garrisoned  with  a 
hundred  warriors,  and  though  the  defenders  were  taken  una 
wares  the.  place  cost  the  assailants  thirty  men  before  it  was 
mastered.  If  Frontenac  did  little  direct  injury  to  the  English  by 
this  attack,  yet  it  was  near  having  a  serious  influence  on  their 
alliance  with  the  Mohawks.  The  French  had  taken  with  them 
a  prisoner  captured  in  the  former  attack  on  Schenectady,  in  all 
likelihood  as  a  guide.  He  managed  to  escape  and  brought  warn 
ing  to  his  townsmen,  or  rather  to  those  who  had  replaced  them. 
There  was  no  supineness  now;  a  messenger  was  at  once 
sent  off  to  Albany  for  help,  and  fifty  mounted  men  hurried 
back  for  the  defense  of  Schenectady.  But  nothing  was  done 
to  warn  the  Mohawks  of  impending  danger,  not  even  those 
•of  whom  us  usual  there  were  a  good  number  in  and  about 
Schenectady. 

The  disaffection  thus  created  seemed  likely  to  be  dangerous, 
and  it  again  fell  to  the  lot  of  the  Schuyler  family  to  make 
amends  for  the  supineness  of  their  countrymen.  This  time,  how 
ever,  it  was  not  John  but  his  civilian  brother,  Peter,  the  Mayor 
of  Albany,  who  headed  the  expedition.  With  a  few  regular 
soldiers  and  a  force  of  colonial  militia,  making  in  all  two  hun- 
dred  and  fifty  men,  he  marched  towards  Schenec- 


-Schuyier.»  tady.  He  was  soon  joined  by  a  force  of  two  hundred 
and  fifty  Indians.  Their  ill-armed  condition  justified  their  re 
cent  complaints,  and  the  whole  force  had  no  more  provisions 
with  them  than  what  they  could  actually  carry  in  their  pockets. 
Nevertheless  they  pressed  on  —  some,  it  is  said,  going  without 

1  These  proceedings  are  described  in  a  report  from  M.   de  Champigny,   the 
Intendant,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  ix.  p.  534. 

JA  very  full  account  of  Schuyler's  expedition  is  given  in  Golden,  pp.   145-8. 


236  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

food  for  two  whole  days — fell  in  with  their  retreating  enemies, 
and  harassed  them  in  a  succession  of  skirmishes. 

They  were  then  overtaken  by  a  re-enforcement  of  eighty  regu 
lars,  under  the  command  of  a  Captain  Matthews,  with  a  supply 
of  provisions.  What  followed  illustrates  the  difficulty  which  al 
ways  attended  the  joint  operations  of  a  force  of  colonists  and 
Indians  acting  with  regular  troops.  The  English  pressed  on  and 
harried  the  retiring  force,  killing  and  wounding  more  than  sixty 
of  them  and  recovering  over  forty  prisoners.  Matthews  thought 
that  it  would  have  been  good  policy  to  call  upon  the  French  to 
surrender.  The  Mohawks,  as  usual  with  Indians,  were  content 
to  strike  but  one  effective  blow,  and  Schuyler  seems  to  have 
agreed  with  them.  The  historian  of  the  expedition  adds  the 
comment  that  Schuyler  "though  brave  was  no  soldier."1  It  is 
possible  that  Schuyler  and  his  Indian  allies  were  better  judges  of 
the  situation.  Be  that  as  it  may,  the  incident  illustrates  what 
had  been  shown  twenty-six  years  before  when  Andros  criticised 
the  operations  of  the  New  Englanders  against  Philip,  what  was 
shown  far  more  terribly  sixty  years  later  when  Braddock  went 
sneering  at  colonial  soldiership  to  meet  his  death.  There  lay  the 
one  feature  of  superiority  in  the  system  of  French  Canada,  a 
system  void  of  any  principle  of  civil  or  political  development,  but 
which  by  virtue  of  its  military  merits  held  its  own  for  nearly  a 
century  against  the  overmastering  numbers  and  resources  of  the 
English  colonies.  The  trained  soldiers  of  France  were  not 
ashamed  in  matters  of  war  to  be  the  pupils  of  their  Indian  allies. 
The  Canadian  bushrangers,  the  coureurs  de  bols,  formed  a  link 
between  the  regular  troops  and  the  savage  allies. 

The  crisis  enabled  Fletcher  to  show  that  promptitude  of 
action  which  was  the  best  side  of  his  character.  He  at  once 
Fletcher's  raised  a  force  of  three  hundred  volunteers  and  made 
ings.  his  way  to  Albany.  By  the  time  he  reached  that  city 

Schuyler  was  on  his  way  back,  and  the  invaders  were  out  of 
reach.  But  Fletcher's  liberal  promises  of  help  seem  to  have  re 
assured  the  Mohawks,  and  his  promptitude  was  acknowledged  in 
Indian  fashion  by  the  honorable  name  of  Cayenguirago,  "the 
Swift  Arrow."1 

Yet  in  reading  of  Fletcher's  dealings  with  the  Five  Nations 
one  feels  that  all  he  was  doing,  all  that  he  could  do,  was  but  a 

1  Golden,  p.  147.  2  Ib.  p.   149. 


FRONTENACS  DIFFICUL T  POSITION.  237 

makeshift  settlement,  the  temporary  and  imperfect  solution  of  a 
difficulty  which  was  only  postponed,  and  which  would  have  to  be 
Difficulties  faced  in  real  earnest  by  the  next  generation.  The 

of  the  situ-          1111         e        i       •  •  11 

ation.  whole  body  of  colonies  acting  under  the  supervision 

of  the  mother  country  might  crush  Canada.  New  York  single- 
handed  could  do  no  more  than  keep  her  at  bay.  The  best  hope  for 
the  present  really  lay  in  the  difficulties  which  faced  the  enemy. 
For  the  English  colonies  had  this  in  their  favor:  they  and  the 
government  of  Canada  were  not  playing  for  equal  stakes.  The 
English  were  genuinely  acting  on  the  defensive.  The  English 
colonists  had  as  yet  ample  territory  and  ample  undeveloped  re 
sources.  All  they  needed  was  to  keep  New  France  within  the 
limits  of  the  St.  Lawrence  valley.  But  for  France  to  be  station 
ary  meant  failure.  The  spirit  which  kept  her  alive  was  the  spirit 
of  encroaching  ambition.  Thus  the  attitude  of  each  nation  to 
their  savage  allies  was  wholly  different.  For  England  it  was 
enough  if  the  Five  Nations  interposed  a  defensive  belt  between  the 
frontier  of  her  colonies  and  the  French  invader.  France  needed 
her  Indians  to  be  subservient,  active,  and  aggressive.  Thus  if 
the  diplomatic  resources  of  France  were  far  greater,  so  was  the 
burden  laid  upon  them.  It  was  not  enough  to  buy  off  the  hos 
tility  of  the  Mohawks,  they  must  be  turned  to  account  as  a 
weapon  against  the  English.  At  the  same  time  this  must  be  done 
without  offending  the  tribes  nearer  home.  Throughout  his 
whole  career  Frontenac  was  face  to  face  with  this  difficulty.  To 
retain  the  alliance  of  the  Hurons  and  the  Dionondadies,  and  to 
win  that  of  the  Five  Nations,  was  the  ideal  condition  to  aim  at. 
But,  failing  that,  the  best  thing  practically  was  to  keep  up  the 
hatred  of  the  French  allies  against  the  confederacy.  Thus  Fron 
tenac  had  on  the  one  hand  to  labor  at  establishing  a  double  alli 
ance,  on  the  other  to  keep  open  a  possible  feud  between  his  two 
sets  of  allies.  The  short-sighted  levity  and  the  capricious  vindic- 
tiveness  of  the  savage  made  such  a  task  well-nigh  impossible, 
and  in  that  lay  the  best  hope  for  the  English  colonies. 

In  the  summer  of  1693  Fletcher  met  the  chiefs  of  the  Five 
Nations  at  Albany,  and  put  them  in  good  humor  by  a  substantial 
Conference  present  of  arms,  ammunition,  and  clothes.  The  satis- 
Mo'hVwks  faction  with  which  they  heard  that  Fletcher  was 
at  Albany. i  now  Governor  of  Pennsylvania,  inferring  that  some 

1  Golden,  p.   151. 


238  NEW   YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

common  action  against  the  enemy  might  be  looked  for,  is  a. 
strong  comment  on  the  obvious  need  for  union  among  the 
colonies. 

On  one  point,  however,  Fletcher  was  unsuccessful.  In  1689 
the  Iroquois  captured  one  of  the  most  conspicuous  of  the  Jesuit 
Negotia-  missionaries,  Father  Millet.  He  was  saved  from 
tw"enbthe  death  by  the  good  offices  of  a  Christian  squaw. 
tion»afnd  Among  the  Indians  the  prisoner  whose  life  was 
the  French,  spared  was  usually  adopted,  and  so  it  was  with  Mil 
let.  He  became  naturalized  as  an  Oneida  and  was  raised  to  the 
rank  of  a  sachem.  A  Frenchman  settled  among  the  Five 
Nations  might  become  a  potent  influence  in  undermining  their 
alliance  with  the  English,  and  in  the  following  year  the  authori 
ties  at  Albany  tried  to  persuade  the  Indians  to  hand  over  to  them 
their  captive.  The  Mohawks  approved  of  this  but  could  not  ob 
tain  the  consent  of  the  Oneidas.  This  is  a  significant  illustration 
of  that  lack  of  unity  within  the  confederacy  which  helped  to- 
make  their  alliance  an  unstable  one. 

Such  was  Millet's  influence  over  his  captors  that  he  induced 
four  out  of  the  five  confederated  tribes  to  consider  the  question  of 
the  French  alliance.  The  Mohawks,  always  the  most  warlike 
and  the  most  uncompromising  in  their  attitude  towards  Canada, 
stood  alone,  and  in  the  autumn  of  1693  the  rest  of  the  con 
federacy  sent  an  embassy  to  Quebec.  During  this  year  and  the 
following  was  to  be  seen  the  somewhat  strange  spectacle  of 
representatives  of  the  two  greatest  European  nations  sedulously 
courting  the  friendship  and  bidding  against  one  another  for  the 
alliance  of  a  body  of  savages.  The  English  overtures  made 
through  Fletcher  and  Schuyler  could  hardly  be  said  to  be  en 
tirely  successful.  It  is  plain  that  the  Indians  were  deeply  dis 
trustful,  not  of  English  good  faith,  but  of  the  efficiency  of  a 
power  whose  members  were  so  disunited.  One  of  the  represent 
atives  of  the  Mohawks  put  this  clearly  enough  in  a  conference 
held  at  Albany  in  the  summer  of  1694.  He  plainly  told 
Fletcher  that  if  the  other  colonies  would  assist  in  pushing  on  the 
war  vigorously,  the  Five  Nations  would  not  be  backward.  But 
if  they  were  to  be  left  alone,  or  to  receive  no  help  except  from 
New  York,  then  in  their  own  interest  they  must  make  peace. 

Fletcher's  policy  was  in  all  likelihood  influenced  by  this,  and 
by  a  wish  that  the  state  of  things  should  be  brought  home  to  the 


ANOTHER  CONFERENCE  AT  ALBANY.          239 

minds  of  men  in  all  the  colonies.  He  represented  to  the  govern 
ments  of  the  neighboring  provinces  how  urgent  was  the  occasion, 
Another  how  nothing  but  a  display  of  united  feeling  among 
at  Albany,  the  English  could  prevent  an  alliance  between  the 
French  and  the  Five  Nations.  Accordingly,  in  the  autumn  of 
the  same  year,  he  succeeded  in  bringing  together  representatives 
from  New  Jersey,  Massachusetts,  and  Connecticut  to  meet  the 
Indians  in  another  conference  at  Albany.1  There  another  In 
dian  speaker  repeated  the  appeal  of  his  countrymen.  He  per 
sonified,  according  to  Indian  fashion,  New  York  by  the  name 
given  to  the  Governor.  "Cayenguirago's  arms  and  ours  are 
stiff  and  tired  with  holding  fast  the  chain  of  alliance,  while  our 
neighbors  sit  still  and  smoke  at  their  ease.  They  grow  fat 
while  we  grow  lean,  they  flourish  while  we  decay."  "If  all  had 
held  the  chain  as  fast  as  New  York  it  would  be  a  real  terror  to 
the  French,  and  thunder  itself  would  not  break  it.  If  all  would 
join  in  taking  up  the  hatchet  against  the  French  the  common 
enemy  would  soon  be  destroyed,  and  there  would  be  peace  and 
ease  ever  after."  We  may  well  believe  that  this  was  a  perfectly 
true  statement  of  the  views  and  wishes  of  the  Indians.  We  need 
not  credit  them  with  a  disinterested  attachment  to  the  English. 
It  was  well  within  the  compass  of  their  intelligence  to  see  that 
they  had  everything  to  fear  from  the  French,  little  or  noth 
ing  from  the  English.  For  the  present  their  best  hope  would  lie 
in  an  effective  union  of  the  English  colonies.  A  day  when  the 
increasing  needs  of  the  white  man  would  swallow  up  their  hunt 
ing  grounds  was  beyond  their  present  view.  It  was  well  that 
the  representatives  of  the  four  colonies  should  listen  to  these 
words  and  carry  them  to  their  homes.  One  can  hardly  doubt 
that  the  plain  speaking  of  the  Mohawk  envoy  must  have  done 
something  to  strengthen  that  desire  for  union  which  was  already 
showing  itself  in  so  many  quarters. 

Meanwhile  the  Indians  made  no  secret  of  the  fact  that  they 
were  receiving  overtures  from  Frontenac,  and  that  their  envoys 
Indian  were  being  received  at  Quebec.2  All  the  arts  of 
Quebec.  French  diplomacy  were  used  to  break  the  alliance  be- 


1  Golden,  p.   170. 

*  Golden  gives  a  full  account  of  the  negotiations  between  the  French  and 
the  Five  Nations  taken  wholly  from  statements  made  by  Decanisora  to  the : 
English. 


240  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

tween  the  English  and  the  Five  Nations.  The  confederates 
were  taunted  with  having  admitted  a  sixth  nation  to  the  con 
federacy,  and  suffering  it  to  dominate  their  councils.  The  In 
dian  envoys  were  daily  entertained  at  the  table  of  the  Gov 
ernor  or  some  of  the  chief  officers.  The  French  sense  of  decorum 
and  the  French  sense  of  the  ludicrous  must  have  been  equally 
tried.  Golden  in  his  enthusiastic  sympathy  with  the  Mohawks 
gravely  tells  us  how  the  chief  Indian  speaker  Decanisora  "made 
a  good  appearance,"  in  a  scarlet  coat  with  gold  trimmings  and 
a  laced  beaver  hat  given  him  by  Fletcher.1 

But  the  wiles  of  French  diplomacy  could  not  blind  the  Mo 
hawks  to  their  true  interest.  One  feels  that  the  sins  of  France 
were  finding  her  out  when  one  reads  a  speech  in  which  an  In 
dian  orator  reminded  the  French  of  the  treachery  of  Denon- 
ville.2 

Another  characteristic  incident  showed  the  difficulties  which 
beset  the  French  in  their  Indian  policy  and  the  spirit  in  which 


French  t^c^  met  t^em-  ^  was  °^  ^e  utmost  importance  to 
torture  a  the  French  to  secure  the  Dionondadies,  whose  terri- 
prisoner.a  tory  lay  to  the  north  of  Lake  Huron.  The  Five 
Nations,  however,  had  been  making  overtures  to  them.  If  those 
succeeded  and  if  an  alliance  were  established,  the  French  fort  at 
Michillimakinac,  on  the  strait  connecting  Lake  Huron  and 
Lake  Michigan,  would  be  in  perpetual  danger,  and  if  that  fell 
there  would  be  an  end  of  any  chance  of  a  westward  extension 
towards  the  Ohio  and  the  Mississippi.  To  avoid  awakening 
the  suspicions  of  the  French  all  show  of  amity  was  avoided  ;  be 
tween  the  Five  Nations  and  the  Dionondadies  skirmishes  went 
on,  but  those  who  were  ostensibly  prisoners  were  really  ambas 
sadors.  In  1695  the  Dionondadies  captured  seven  warriors  of 
the  Five  Nations.  The  French  thereupon  insisted  that  as  the 
war  was  a  joint  undertaking  they  were  entitled  to  a  share  of  the 
proceeds.  They  then  cajoled  or  intimidated  the  Dionondadies 
into  yielding  them  up  one  of  the  prisoners.  The  prisoner  was 
put  to  death  with  all  the  most  hideous  tortures  of  an  Indian  exe 
cution.  A  Frenchman,  we  are  told,  actually  began  the  process 
with  his  own  hands.  Even  if  this  be  an  exaggeration  and  if 

1  Golden,  p.  169.  *Ib.  p.    172. 

•  The  whole  of  this  business  is  told  by  Colden,  pp.   183-7,  and  also  by  the 
French  historians. 


THE  FRENCH  AND    THE  FIVE  NATIONS.  241 

the  French  left  the  actual  butchery  to  their  Indian  allies,  it  is 
perfectly  clear  that  it  was  done  not  merely  with  the  approval,  but 
under  the  actual  superintendence,  of  the  French  garrison.  Noth 
ing  can  be  more  illustrative  of  the  French  political  morality  of 
that  day  than  the  manner  in  which  a  contemporary  historian  tells 
and  comments  on  the  incident.1 

When  we  shudder  at  the  horrors  of  the  French  Revolution 
we  must  not  forget  that  for  generations  the  responsible  rulers  of 
France  had  been  training  up  a  nation  in  unscrupulous  cruelty. 

Cadillac's  act  of  treachery  did  not  even  serve  the  purpose  for 
which  it  was  designed.  In  the  next  year  the  Dionondadies  again 
sought  the  alliance  of  the  Five  Nations.  They  succeeded  in 
proving  that  the  French,  not  they,  were  responsible  for  what  had 
been  done.  Belts  were  exchanged,  and  peace  established.  It  is 
said  that  the  main  motive  which  influenced  the  Dionondadies 
was  their  wish  to  share  in  the  English  trade,  a  trade  which 
from  the  superior  resources  of  the  Albany  merchants  was  more 
gainful  than  that  with  Montreal. 

Though  the  French  failed  in  their  schemes  for  the  alliance  of 
the  Iroquois,  they  succeeded  in  obtaining  an  influence  over  two 
Frontenac  at  least  of  the  confederate  nations,  the  Cayugas  and 
Fort  cata-  tne  Senecas,  which  did  something  to  weaken  the  pa- 
race^.'  sition  of  the  English.  It  was  in  all  likelihood  their 
neutrality  which  enabled  Frontenac  to  carry  out  his  favorite 
scheme  for  the  restoration  of  the  fort  at  Cataracouy  which  had 
borne  his  own  name.  Fletcher  showed  that  he  understood  the 
urgency  of  the  case  by  the  energy  with  which  he  pressed  upon 
his  savage  allies  the  need  of  preventing  this.  It  would  have 
been  no  difficult  task  for  a  competent  commander  with  the  re 
sources  of  the  united  colonies  at  his  back  to  seize  upon  the  place 
before  Frontenac  had  reoccupied  it,  and  to  use  it  as  an  effective 
bridle  upon  French  aggression.  The  separate  English  colonies, 
each  with  its  representative  system  and  its  strong  local  patriot 
ism,  were  schools  of  statesmanship  to  which  the  world  owes 
much.  But  years  of  needless  bloodshed,  of  paralyzing  distrust 
and  suspicion,  of  demoralizing  warfare,  were  the  price  at  which 
that  gain  was  bought. 

1  La  Potherie,  vol.  iv.  p.  75.     His  words  are  "Cette  conjoncture  ne  laissa  pas 
de  faire  impression  sur  ces  sauvages,  qui  virent  que  Ton  continuait  tout  de  bon 
a  faire  la  guerre."     For  the  incident  itself  see  also  Golden. 

2  Golden,  p.  182. 


242  NEW   YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

The  undying  energy  of  Frontenac  at  once  urged  him  to  use  his 
re-acquired  possession  as  the  base  for  a  great  invasion  of  the  Mo- 
Frontenac  hawk  territory.  He  was  too  subtle  a  tactician  to  be- 

makes  a  i>i  •  i  TI*  •  /•    i 

military  lieve  that  a  mere  inroad  upon  Indian  territory  not  fol- 
through*  lowed  up  by  armed  occupation  could  have  any  effect 
country  beyond  striking  terror.  It  is  clear,  too,  that  the  ex- 
pfivee  pedition  was  far  too  massive  in  its  character  to  have 

Nations.!  ever  Deen  designed  for  aiming  a  blow  at  the  English 
frontier.  It  was  clearly  no  repetition  of  the  merciless  but  effect 
ive  policy  of  1689.  We  must,  therefore,  look  on  Frontenac's 
last  expedition  as  a  great  military  pageant,  with  something  of 
theatrical  purpose  in  its  arrangement.  The  advanced  guard 
consisted  of  five  hundred  Indian  allies.  Then  came  the  colonial 
militia  commanded  by  Frontenac  himself,  borne  in  a  chair.  In 
the  rear  came  the  regular  troops,  with  an  Indian  contingent 
under  French  officers.  Braddock  fifty  years  later  might  have 
learnt  a  lesson  from  the  policy  which  threw  the  duty  of  guard 
ing  against  a  surprise  on  the  Indian  allies,  and  which  treated  the 
colonial  militia  as  the  mainstay  of  the  force.  The  cumbrous  ex 
pedition  wound  its  way  along  the  southern  shore  of  Lake  On 
tario  into  the  country  of  the  Senecas.  But,  unless  it  suited  an 
Indian  tribe  to  meet  an  invader  in  arms,  there  never  was  any  dif 
ficulty  in  dispersing  through  the  woods.  The  French  found  the 
Seneca  villages  empty;  in  one  was  an  old  chief,  who  according 
to  tradition  stayed  to  maintain  the  dignity  of  his  nation  against 
the  invaders.  As  usual  the  Huron  allies  demanded  their  victim 
for  the  torture,  and  the  French  paid  the  price  of  their  aid  with 
out  scruple.  The  country  of  the  Oneidas  was  also  harried  and 
their  corn  destroyed.  There  twenty-five  prisoners  were  taken.. 
Pere  Millet,  the  French  missionary,  had  gained  enough  influ 
ence  over  that  tribe  to  raise  some  hopes  of  winning  them  to  the 
French  alliance.  Accordingly  the  prisoners  were  brought  alive 
to  Quebec. 

The  scanty  resources  of  the  country  could  not  long  maintain 
the  French  army,  and  by  the  middle  of  August  Frontenac  was. 
back  in  Montreal.  The  enemy,  who  had  left  the  advancing 
force  unmolested,  swarmed  out  of  the  woods  during  the  retreat, 
harassing  the  rear  and  cutting  off  stragglers. 

1  Golden,  pp.   188-92. 


FRENCH  ATTACKS  ON   THE  ENGLISH  FRONTIER.      243 

The  success,  such  as  it  was,  was  bought  dear.  Canada  had 
not  men  enough  to  fill  the  ranks  of  the  militia  and  to  till  the 
fields,  and  the  summer  brought  scanty  crops  and  famine  in  its 
train.  One  may  fairly  think  that  Frontenac  with  all  his  astute 
ness  had  overrated  the  effect  of  mere  display  on  the  Indian  char 
acter.  Such  an  expedition  was  in  no  way  likely  to  intimidate  the 
Five  Nations,  or  to  detach  them  from  the  English.  As  a  colo 
nial  historian  justly  said,  "the  enterprise  was  a  kind  of  heroic 
dotage."1 

The  real  work  of  invasion  was  to  be  done  not  by  large  and 
elaborately  organized  force,  but  by  small  parties  of  raiders,  such 
Raid  as  that  which  had  made  havoc  of  Schenectady.  For 

Albany.  these  winter  was  the  fitting  season.  The  greater 
hardships  and  the  difficulty  of  subsistence  were  more  than  made 
up  for  by  the  security  against  surprise  when  there  was  no  foliage 
to  cover  an  ambush.  One  such  expedition  was  set  on  foot  in 
the  winter  of  1695  against  Albany.  But  is  was  'intercepted 
by  a  force  of  Indians  and  dispersed  with  loss.  A  few  fled 
to  Albany  and  were  there  taken  prisoners;  none  returned  to 
Canada.2 

Such  raids  across  the  frontier  by  the  Indian  allies  of  each 
Power  made  up  the  whole  sum  of  hostilities  till  the  Peace  of 
injury  to  Ryswick.  The  French  had  failed  in  their  main  object, 
bVthe  °rk  m  their  purpose  of  detaching  the  Five  Nations.  But 
war-  the  struggle  had  inflicted  a  heavy  blow  on  the  pros 

perity  of  New  York.  The  population  on  her  north-west  fron 
tier  had  lessened  instead  of  increasing.  Albany,  as  the  great 
mart  for  the  upper  Hudson,  for  the  trade  in  furs  and 
in  all  kinds  of  produce,  should  have  been  a  rapidly  growing 
settlement.  Instead,  its  population  dwindled  during  the  ten 
years  which  followed  the  Revolution.  In  1689  it  had  over  six 
hundred  and  sixty  male  adult  inhabitants.  In  1698  they  were 
reduced  to  three  hundred  and  eighty-two.8  Moreover,  if  we 
may  believe  Fletcher,  men  were  leaving  the  colony  to  avoid  mili 
tary  service  and  heavy  taxation,  and  taking  refuge  in  Pennsyl 
vania  and  Connecticut.4 

1  Golden,  p.  193. 
*Ib. 

8  This  is  stated  by  Bellomont  in  a  dispatch  in  the  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iv.  p. 
337- 

*  Fletcher  to  Lords  of  Trade,  October  2,  1693. 


244  NEW   YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION1. 

Though  Fletcher's  Indian  policy — or  one  should  perhaps 
rather  say  that  of  his  advisers — was  well  conceived  and  showed 
Fletcher's  intelligence,  yet  its  failure  in  detail  was  in  all  likeli- 
admims-  nooc^  largely  due  to  his  own  misdeeds.  We  are  told 
tration.  tfoat  fog  appropriated  the  money  which  should  have 
been  spent  on  military  stores,  and  that  he  drew  pay  calculated 
on  fictitious  muster  rolls.1  His  successor  found  Schenectady  and 
Albany,  in  his  own  words,  '-so  weak  and  ridiculous  that  they 
look  liker  pounds  to  impound  cattle  than  forts,"  that  at  Sche 
nectady  gateless,  while  the  garrisons  had  hardly  clothes  enough 
for  decency.* 

In  another  way  Fletcher's  policy  was  fatally  opposed  to  the 
needs  of  the  colony.  More  than  one  colonial  politician  pointed 
Large  out  to  the  English  Government  the  importance  of 

grants.  having  along  the  frontier  a  class  of  military  yeomen 
who  might  be  self-supporting,  and  at  the  same  time  available  for 
defensive  warfare.  To  create  such  a  class  was  no  easy  matter. 
But  Fletcher's  policy  actually  went  far  to  make  the  existence  of 
such  a  class  impossible.  He  rewarded  his  political  supporters 
with  large  grants  of  land,  and  thus  by  creating  a  small  body  of 
monopolists  set  up  a  fatal  obstacle  to  the  increase  of  freeholders. 
There  appear  to  have  been  eight  of  these  great  tracts,  or,  as 
Fletcher's  successor  calls  them,  palatinates.  Two  were  revoked  by 
the  Assembly,  not  so  much,  as  it  would  seem,  because  they  were 
specially  injurious,  but  because  the  grantees,  Colonel  Bayard 
and  Dellius,  a  Calvinist  minister,  were  hostile  to  the  party  then 
in  power.  The  grants  seem,  too,  to  have  been  somewhat  tainted 
by  the  fact  that  they  were  made  by  Fletcher  after  he  was  super 
seded.  Dellius's  grant,  moreover,  was  a  direct  encroachment 
on  the  Indian  allies.  By  negotiation  with  the  Mohawks  he  pro 
fessed  to  have  obtained  a  quasi-title  extending  over  about  three 
hundred  and  forty  square  miles.* 


1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iv.  pp.  434,  512.  Col.  State  Papers,  1622,  611.  There  is 
a  further  statement  of  Fletcher's  misdeeds  in  a  letter  addressed  by  De  Lancy, 
afterwards  Chief  Justice  of  New  York,  to  some  correspondent  in  England. 
This  is  in  the  Col.  State  Papers,  1692.  It  is  too  obviously  an  ex  parte  state 
ment  to  be  trustworthy.  De  Lancy  is  printed  Delanoy,  an  obvious  error. 

*  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iv.  pp.  687,  752. 

8  For  the  revocation  of  these  grants  see  Acts  of  Assembly,  p,  26.  Dellius's 
dealings  with  the  Indians  are  told  in  a  memorial  in  the  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  v.  p. 
10.  The  documents  contain  several  references  to  these  grants.  Cf.  Smith, 
p.  134- 


FLETCHER'S  CORRUPT  DEALINGS.  245 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that  Fletcher's  consent  to  these 
grants  was  the  reward  for  political  support.  There  is  the  very 
Fletcher's  strongest  presumption  that  he  did  not  confine  himself 
corrupt  to  sucn  guarded  and  indirect  forms  of  corruption, 
dealings.  Qf  fas  deai;ngs  with  pirates  I  have  spoken  elsewhere.1 
The  specific  charge  that  he  received  ten  thousand  pounds  from 
Kidd  may  be  untrue.  But  it  is  clear  that  the  Board  of  Trade, 
a  body  in  no  ways  prejudiced,  and  with  access  to  much  evidence 
that  would  have  moral,  though  perhaps  not  legal,  weight,  be 
lieved  Fletcher  guilty  of  corruption.  It  is  said  that  his  dis 
honest  dealings  were  not  confined  to  pirates,  but  that  he,  the 
members  of  the  Council,  and  the  custom-house  officials  were 
all  in  league  with  smugglers.2  An  argument  adduced  by 
Bellomont  in  confirmation  of  this  charge  assuredly  has  weight. 
The  trade  of  New  York,  he  says,  has  doubled  itself  in  ten 
years.  But  during  that  time  the  customs  instead  of  increasing 
were  actually  much  lessened.  Of  the  goods  imported  not  more 
than  two-thirds  he  believed  paid  duty,  and  so  universal  and 
complete  was  the  corruption  that  a  wealthy  offender,  if  prose 
cuted,  was  certain  of  acquittal.3  The  evil  practices  of  a  set  of 
officials  playing  into  one  another's  hands  are  always  hard  to 
track.  But  the  very  line  of  defense  taken  up  by  Fletcher's  de 
fenders,  who  were  in  all  likelihood  his  accomplices,  raises  a  prej 
udice  against  them.  They  had  the  impudence  to  say  that  since 
he  had  been  in  office  only  one  pirate  had  sailed  from  the  colony.* 
Such  an  unblushing  lie  makes  the  whole  evidence  of  the  witnesses 
worthless. 

It  must  be  remembered,  too,  that  Fletcher  enjoyed  the  sup 
port  of  an  Assembly  who  had  every  motive  for  befriending  him 
Fletcher's  and  making  the  best  of  his  conduct.  It  was  by  his  sup- 
w!thnthCe  Port  tnat  tne  victorious  faction  were  holding  down 
Assembly,  their  still  vindictive  opponents,  the  supporters  of  Leis- 
ler.  Thus,  after  the  opening  squabble  over  the  Endowment  Act, 
the  relations  between  Fletcher  and  the  Assembly  were  uniformly 
friendly.  They  were  indeed  suspicious  enough  of  malpractices 
to  set  on  foot  an  inquiry  into  the  conduct  of  the  Receiver-Gen 
eral,  but  there  is  no  trace  of  any  wish  to  extend  the  investigation 
to  the  more  important  offender. 

1  The  Puritan  Colonies,  vol.  ii.  p.  336.      a  N.  Y.   Docs.  vol.  iv.  pp.   303,  317. 
*  Ib.  pp.  303,   518.  *  Ib.  p.  620. 


246  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

Nothing  illustrates  more  strongly  that  characteristic  of  New 
York  history,  the  predominance  of  personal  motives  over  clearly 
defined  party  issues,  than  the  disputes  which  raged  over  the 
conduct  of  Fletcher.  We  find  Bayard  and  Heathcote,  men  of 
respectable  character,  signing  a  declaration  testifying  to  the 
good  conduct  and  public  services  of  Fletcher.1  On  the  other 
hand  we  have  a  letter  or  memorandum  written  by  De  Lancey,  a 
leading  New  York  merchant  and  a  prominent  member  of  the 
Assembly,  in  which  Fletcher  is  charged  with  the  grossest  cor 
ruption.  He  will  do  nothing  without  a  bribe,  he  pockets  the 
soldiers'  pay,  he  connives  at  piracy,  he  intimidates  voters,  and 
packs  the  Assembly  by  giving  fraudulent  qualifications.  It  is 
said  that  at  Albany  he  tried  to  turn  an  election  by  closing  the 
gates  and  so  excluding  wealthy  merchants  who  lived  outside. 
Then  he  is  induced  by  bribes  to  admit  them.  Our  faith  in  De 
Lancey  as  a  witness,  however,  is  somewhat  shaken  when  we  find 
him  belittling  what  was  undoubtedly  the  best  feature  in 
Fletcher's  policy,  and  saying  that  the  name  of  Cayenguirago,  or 
"the  Swift  Arrow,"  bestowed  on  Fletcher  by  the  Indians  was 
not  given  in  recognition  of  his  speed  and  certainty  in  war,  but 
was  "a  droll  upon  the  vain-glory  of  the  man,  being  a  sarcastical 
pun  on  the  name  of  Fletcher.  De  Lancey  must  have  reckoned 
on  the  credulity  of  his  correspondent,  if  he  was  to  believe  that 
the  Iroquois  Indians  knew  the  derivation  of  Fletcher's  name.2 

I  have  spoken  elsewhere  of  the  character  of  Fletcher's  suc 
cessor,  Bellomont,  and  of  the  acts  by  which  he  is  best  remem 
bered  in  history.  By  a  most  unhappy  administrative  blunder, 
the  cause  of  which  is  nowhere  explained,  Fletcher  was  super- 
inter-  seded  in  1695,  and  Bellomont  did  not  reach  the  col- 
befwUeTn  onv  ^  tne  spring  of  1698.  Thus  for  more  than  two 
^etcher  years  the  colony  was  left  in  the  hands  of  a  faction 
Bellomont.  wno  had  none  of  the  real  responsibility  of  power, 
and  who  had  every  temptation  to  make  the  most  of  the  short 
time  left  them. 

With  all  Bellomont's  administrative  capacity  and  moral  good 
qualities  one  may  doubt  how  far  he  was  suited  to  play  the  pe- 
Beiio-  culiarly  difficult  part  assigned  to  him.  Plainly  he 

policy8.  was  a  man  who  always  struck  right  at  one  main  ob 
ject,  heedless  of  side  issues.  He  found  the  colony  in  the  hands 

1  Col.  State  Papers,  1696-7,  217.  2  See  p.  244,  n.  i. 


ELECTION  OF  1699.  247 

of  a  corrupt  faction,  against  whom  he  had  personally  good 
grounds  for  resentment.  Without  hesitation  or  inquiry  he 
threw  himself  into  the  arms  of  their  opponents,  compromising 
his  dignity  and  weakening  his  efficiency  by  appearing  at  the  very 
outset  of  his  career  as  a  party  leader. 

The  inevitable  effect  of  this  was  at  once  to  bring  Bellomont 
into  an  attitude  of  hostility  towards  his  Council.  His  opening 
•speech  to  the  Assembly  was  a  plain  denunciation  of  his  predeces 
sor.1  Under  any  circumstances  one  may  reasonably  doubt 
whether  such  a  proceeding  was  calculated  to  beget  a  respect  for 
authority.  Moreover,  the  proceedings  of  Fletcher  and  his  al 
leged  accomplices  were  at  present  sub  judice.  Yet  Bellomont 
did  not  hesitate  to  tell  the  Assembly  that  the  Acts  of  Trade  had 
been  violated  by  the  connivance  of  those  who  were  bound  to  en 
force  them,  and  with  a  distinct  allusion  to  his  predecessor  to  an 
nounce  that  he  would  neither  embezzle  the  public  money  himself 
nor  suffer  such  dishonesty  in  others. 

We  are  told  that  the  Assembly  was  not  able  to  carry  through 
any  business.2  It  is  not  unlikely  that  the  Leislerite  party, 
The  though  still  in  a  minority,  were  strong  enough  when 

of  1699.  backed  by  the  encouragement  of  the  Governor  to  ob 
struct  the  proceedings  of  their  opponents. 

The  election  of  the  next  Assembly  early  in  1699  showed  the 
state  to  which  parties  had  come.  The  dominant  faction  en 
deavored  to  keep  their  majority  by  promising  an  abolition  of 
customs.8  This  was  not  only  a  popular  cry,  it  was  calculated  to 
injure  Bellomont  by  stopping  the  resources  of  government. 
Thus  it  might  even  so  far  discredit  him  as  to  bring  about  his 
recall.  So  far  one  may  well  believe  Bellomont's  charges.  It 
may  be  true,  too,  that  there  was  an  element  of  Jacobitism  in  the 
opposition,  and  that  they  objected  to  the  late  Revolution  being 
called  the  happy  Revolution.4  Leisler's  claim,  a  wholly  un 
founded  one,  to  represent  the  Whig  Government  may  have 
driven  his  opponents  into  some  such  attitude;  though,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  may  well  be  that  they  merely  refused  to  approve 
of  what  had  been  done  in  their  own  colony  in  the  name  of  the 

1  The  speech  is  given  in  Smith,  p.  130. 

2  Smith  (p.  13:)  says,  "The  house,  though  unanimous  in  a  hearty  address  of 
thanks  to  the  Governor  for  his  speech,  could  scarce  agree  upon  anything  else." 

3  Bellomont  in  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iv.  p.  so?- 
*  This  is  stated  in  the  same  dispatch. 


248  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

Whig  party.  One  may  believe,  too,  the  somewhat  ludicrous 
story  told  by  Bellomont,  that  in  Queen's  County,  where  two- 
thirds  of  the  voters  were  of  Fletcher's  party,  they  professed 
themselves  Quakers  in  order  to  avoid  taking  the  necessary  oaths,, 
and  then  signalized  their  new  profession  by  a  drunken  riot. 

But  we  have  a  right  to  become  suspicious  when  Bellomont 
reports  that  the  candidates  put  forward  by  the  so-called  anti- 
Dutch  party  were  generally  Dutchmen  who  could  hardly  speak 
English.  Indeed,  it  is  clear  that  Bellomont  was  that  most 
dangerous  witness,  a  conscientious  and  public-spirited  partisan, 
quite  unconscious  of  his  own  partisanship.  One  would  ask,  too, 
for  some  better  evidence  before  one  believes  that  the  Clerk  of 
the  Council  was  a  man  who  had  fled  from  England  in  disgrace, 
and  the  Clerk  of  the  Assembly  a  convicted  coin  clipper.1  It  is 
singular  that  the  charge  of  inability  to  speak  English  was  also 
brought  by  Bellomont's  enemies  against  the  candidates  whom 
their  opponents  put  forward.  It  would  seem  as  if  knowledge 
of  English  had  become  a  test  of  a  certain  standard  of  education 
and  social  culture.2 

Complaints  as  to  the  conduct  of  the  election  were  not  con 
fined  to  the  Governor  and  his  supporters.  The  other  side 
averred  that  Bellomont  so  arranged  the  times  and  places  for 
polling  that  in  some  cases  electors  who  had  four  votes  could  give 
only  one.3  The  mere  fact  of  this  charge  being  brought  con 
firms  what  everything  seems  to  make  probable,  that  the  party 
which  supported  Fletcher  and  opposed  Bellomont  drew  its  main 
strength  from  a  wealthy  oligarchy.  It  was  the  predecessor  and 
ancestor  of  the  party  in  New  York  who  at  a  later  day  broke  the 
unity  of  that  resistance  which  the  colonies  offered  to  the  unjust 
demands  of  the  mother  country. 

It  was  also  said  that  Bellomont  gave  an  additional  member  to 
Albany,  and  called  into  existence  a  fresh  constituency  in  Orange 
County,  with  but  twenty  freeholders.4  The  result  was  the  re 
turn  of  one  Abraham  Gouverneur,  the  ancestor  of  a  house  well 
known  in  the  political  history  of  New  York.  He  had  been  Leis- 
ler's  secretary,  and  had  married  the  widow  of  Millborne,  and 
seems  thus  to  have  stepped  into  the  position  of  the  recognized 
leader  of  the  now  victorious  party.  It  is  said,  and  that  by  a 

1  All  these  charges  are  in  the  same  dispatch. 

*N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iv.  p.  620.  « Ib.  4  Ib. 


VICTORY  OF   THE  LEISLERITES.  249 

witness  with  no  prejudices  to  bias  him,  that  Gouverneur  by  his- 
energetic  action  and  influence  over  the  house  suppressed  all  at 
tempts  to  investigate  the  conduct  of  the  elections.1 

Whatever  were  the  means  employed,  the  result  was  the  re 
turn  of  a  house  in  which  the  Leislerite  party  had  a  majority- 
victory  If,  indeed,  we  may  believe  their  opponents,  out  of  the 
Leisierites.  twenty-one  members  returned,  fourteen  were  Dutch. 
The  result  was  a  series  of  measures  designed  to  reverse  the 
policy  of  the  previous  house.  Fletcher's  land  grants  to  Bayard 
and  Dellius  were  annulled.  An  Act  was  passed  indemnifying 
those  who  had  been  excepted  from  the  general  pardon  granted 
in  1691.  Another,  in  which  we  may  probably  trace  Gouver- 
neur's  direct  influence,  restored  Millborne's  estate.2  The  turn 
of  public  feeling  was  shown  by  the  fact  that  the  corpses  of 
Leisler  and  Millborne  were  taken  up  and  reburied  with  religious, 
solemnities.* 

It  was  characteristic  of  Bellomont's  impatient  determination 
to  establish  his  ascendency  that  he  at  once  removed  ten  of  the 
Changes  in  Council  whom  he  thought  likely  to  be  hostile,  and 
madefy1"1  substituted  six  of  his  own  way  of  thinking.4  Among 
Beiiomont.  faose  struck  off  was  Bayard.  Setting  aside  all  ques 
tion  of  fairness,  such  a  proceeding  was  unwise  strategy.  No 
party  will  gain  by  the  attempt  entirely  to  exclude  the  more  rep 
utable  and  responsible  among  its  opponents  from  public  life, 
or  by  such  sudden  and  wholesale  attempts  to  silence  them.  Nor 
did  Bellomont's  success  even  secure  him  against  immediate  diffi 
culties.  On  financial  matters,  indeed,  the  dominant  party  dealt 
with  him  as  liberally  as  their  predecessors  had  dealt  with 
Fletcher.  They  voted  a  fixed  revenue  for  six  years,  and  imposed 
no  fresh  restraints  on  the  expenditure  of  it.  That  is  in  itself  no 
small  proof  of  the  prosperous  condition  of  the  colony.8 

But  on  other  administrative  questions  the  Governor  soon 
found  himself  at  variance  with  the  Assembly.  His  instructions 
Bellomont's  authorized  him  to  create  courts  of  justice.  The  prin- 
wfuTthe  cipal  legal  authorities,  the  Chief  Justice,  Colonel 
Assembly.  gmjth,  whose  union  of  military  and  judicial  dignity 

1  Smith,  p.   133.  'Acts  of  Assembly. 

s  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iv.  pp.  523,  620;  Smith,  p.  105. 
4  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iv.  p.  620. 
8/fc.  pp.  507,  620. 


25°  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION, 

suggests  the  American  of  later  days,  and  the  Attorney-General, 
Graham,  advised  that  the  exercise  of  this  power  by  the  Crown 
or  its  representatives  was  unconstitutional.  Bellomont  gave 
way,  and  a  bill  for  the  same  purpose  was  drafted  in  Council 
and  sent  down  to  the  House  of  Representatives.  They  intro 
duced  amendments  which,  in  Bellomont's  opinion,  conflicted 
with  the  laws  of  England,  and  when  the  bill  was  returned  he  re 
fused  his  assent.1 

The  main  dispute,  however,  arose  out  of  the  question  of  de 
fending  the  frontier.  The  peace  of  Ryswick  was  far  from  reliev- 
French  mg  the  English  colonists  from  all  anxiety  in  that 

policy  * 

towards  quarter.  It  freed  them  from  the  actual  dread  of  in- 
Nations.  vasion,  from  the  chance  of  such  a  fate  as  had  be 
fallen  the  men  of  Schenectady.  But  it  was  plain  that  the  officials 
of  New  France  merely  looked  on  the  peace  as  a  truce,  that  they 
had  no  intention  of  relaxing  their  attempts  to  secure  their  hold 
over  the  debatable  land  as  one  may  call  it,  and  the  tribes  who 
occupied  it.  Frontenac,  indeed,  died  in  the  year  in  which  peace 
was  made.  His  successor,  De  Callieres,  was  far  less  of  a  soldier. 
He  seems  to  have  had  no  love  of  a  military  policy  for  its  own 
sake.  His  aim  was  rather  to  develop  the  resources  of  Canada 
as  it  was  than  to  extend  the  boundaries  of  the  colony  westward. 
But  for  either  policy  the  Iroquois  alliance  was  needed.  More 
over  a  renewal  of  hostilities  between  England  and  France  might 
at  any  time  lay  Canada  open  to  the  danger  of  invasion.  If  the 
Five  Nations  could  be  detached  from  England  that  danger  would 
be  greatly  lessened ;  if  they  were  won  over  to  an  alliance  with 
France  it  would  be  at  an  end.  The  honest  determination  of  the 
English  Government  to  carry  through  the  treaty  of  Ryswick, 
and  to  enforce  its  provisions  on  the  Indian  allies,  was  turned 
against  England.  An  instruction  was  given  to  Bellomont  that 
if  it  were  necessary  he  should  co-operate  with  the  ruler  of  Can 
ada  in  forcing  the  Five  Nations  to  respect  the  peace.  A  letter 
from  Bellomont  explaining  this  to  De  Callieres  was  shown  to 
the  Indian  chiefs  as  a  proof  that  they  were  betrayed  by  their 
old  allies.  Appeals  were  made  to  their  vanity;  they  were 
taunted  with  listening  to  the  diplomatic  overtures  of  Schuyler, 
overtures  which  were  represented  as  commands.2  De  Callieres 

1  See  Bellomont's  own  statement,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iv.  p.  515. 

2  Golden,  p.   199. 


BELLOMONT'S  CANADIAN  POLICY.  3$l 

was  so  far  successful  that  he  induced  the  Five  Nations  to  send 
representatives  to  Quebec.  There  a  treaty  was  signed.1 

The  fact  that  certain  of  her  allies  had  made  an  independent 
peace  with  France  was  not  in  itself  a  matter  of  danger  to  Eng 
land  nor  an  evidence  of  disrespect.  The  real  danger  lay  in  the 
uses  to  which  the  French  were  sure  to  put  the  ground  which 
they  had  won.  Even  in  times  of  peace  their  policy  was 
sure  to  be  one  of  covert  aggression.  The  policy  of  patiently 
undermining  the  Colonial  power  of  England  would  never  be 
abandoned.  It  was  certain  that  the  country  of  the  newly  ac 
quired  allies  would  be  used  as  a  base  from  which  missionaries  and 
traders  might  spread  French  influence  among  the  three  tribes 
who  had  so  far  withstood  diplomacy.  Thus  the  peace  did  noth 
ing  to  release  the  Governor  of  New  York  from  the  obligation  of 
constant  watchfulness,  of  persistent  and  studied  efforts  to  win 
back  the  tribes  who  had  yielded,  and  to  secure  those  who  might 
be  wavering. 

In  the  spring  of  1699  two  commissioners  and  an  interpreter 
were  sent  to  Onondaga  to  confer  with  the  Five  Nations.  At 
Commis-  every  turn  they  are  met  with  evidence  of  French  in- 

sioners  J  * 

sent  to  .  fluence.  The  Senecas  stayed  away  altogether.  The 
daga.  Cayugas  for  a  while  avoided  all  intercourse  with  the 

English  on  the  transparently  frivolous  pretext  that  they  were 
busy  hunting  for  wood-pigeons.  After  some  rather  vague  nego 
tiations  it  was  agreed  that  five  sachems,  one  from  each  of  the 
confederated  tribes,  should  visit  Albany.2 

Whatever  errors  there,  might  be  in  Bellomont's  policy  he 
might  be  trusted  to  follow  up  the  opportunity  thus  offered.  We 
Beiio-  find  him  approaching  the  matter  with  characteristic 

Canadian  directness  and  energy.  The  Five  Nations  were  to  be 
policy.  regarded  as  English  subjects,  their  land  as  English 
territory.  Colonel  Nanfan,  Bellomont's  lieutenant,  was  sent  on 
an  embassy  to  Quebec,  with  instructions  to  demand  the  surrender 
of  Mohawk  prisoners  and  to  warn  the  Governor  of  Canada 
against  any  encroachment  on  English,  which  no  doubt  meant 
Mohawk,  soil.3  An  Act  was  also  passed  by  the  Assembly  mak 
ing  it  a  capital  crime  for  any  Popish  priest  to  enter  the  colony, 
a  measure  avowedly  aimed  at  the  missionaries  from  Canada.4 

1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  ix.  p.  708.  *  Ib.  pp.  558-78. 

8  Ib.  p.  578.  *  Acts   of  Assembly,   p.   42. 


252  NEW   YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

Another  measure  designed  was  the  building  of  a  fort  in  the 
Onondaga  country,  that  is,  the  district  which  is  now  Vermont. 
The  onon-  An  Act  was  passed  ordering  this  to  be  done  at  the 
daga  fort.>  cost  of  ^g  colony,  and  under  the  control  of  commis 
sioners  appointed  by  the  Assembly.  Bellomont  expressed  his 
disapproval  of  the  Act,  but  with  unwonted  moderation  forbore 
to  veto  it,  thinking  that  such  a  proceeding  might  alarm  and  dis 
courage  the  Indian  allies.  He  evidently  trusted  that  the  Crown 
would  use  its  veto,  and  in  all  likelihood  employed  his  own  influ 
ence  to  bring  about  that  result.  The  matter  was  taken  out  of 
the  hands  of  the  Assembly,  and  undertaken  by  officers  directly 
appointed  by  the  Crown.  The  difficulty  was  a  characteristic 
one.  On  the  one  hand  it  was  undoubtedly  necessary  that  all 
military  operations  should  form  part  of  a  united  scheme.  The 
task  of  checking  French  aggression  could  not  be  left  to  the  dis 
cretion  of  any  individual  colony.  On  the  other  hand  it  could  be 
hardly  expected  that  any  colony  would  throw  itself  into  the  con 
test  zealously  or  contribute  liberally  unless  it  had  some  voice  in 
the  conduct  of  the  struggle. 

Another  incident  illustrates  the  difficulties  which  beset  Bello 
mont  in  his  anti-French  policy.  The  English  colonies  were  far 
better  suited  for  horse-breeding  than  Canada.  Horses  were  of 
great  service  not  for  cavalry  purposes,  but  for  the  conveying  of 
stores,  and  it  was  important  that  the  English  colonies  should 
retain  this  natural  advantage.  Nevertheless  horses  were  sold 
from  New  York  to  Canada,  and  Bellomont  was  accused  by  his 
enemies  of  conniving  at  the  trade.  In  a  dispatch  to  the  Lords 
of  Trade  Bellomont  indignantly  denied  this,  declaring  that  he 
had  done  his  best  by  proclamation  to  check  the  traffic,  but  that  in 
spite  of  his  attempts  no  fewer  than  fifty  brood  mares  had  been 
sold  into  Canada.  There  will  be  no  checking  such  malpractices 
till  the  English  Government  adopts  a  more  liberal  policy,  and 
employs  more  efficient  law  officers.2 

Bellomont  clearly  saw  that  a  merely  passive  policy  would  not 
suffice.  We  must  not  only  exclude  the  French  missionaries,  but 
Lack  of  we  must  counteract  their  efforts  by  rival  missions. 
etrterpriseT  This,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  the  policy  advocated 
by  Dongan.  Unfortunately  there  was  one  fatal  obstacle,  the 
lack  of  real  missionary  zeal  among  the  English  settlers.  Bello- 

*N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iv.  p.  713.  2  Ib.  pp.  646-7. 


LIVINGSTONE'S  INDIAN  POLICY.  253 

mont  himself  points  out  the  difficulties  in  a  spirit  of  apology 
rather  than  condemnation.  He  himself,  he  says,  had  found  an 
Indian  conference  an  unpleasant  business,  shut  up  with  fifty 
chiefs  all  stinking  of  tobacco,  bear's  grease  and  rum.1  "How," 
he  asks,  "can  one  expect  missionaries  to  spend  their  lives  among 
men  who  never  wash  their  hands  or  cooking-dishes,  and  who  eat 
the  flesh  of  bears  and  dogs?"2 

When  one  reads  that,  and  thinks  of  those  French  missions 
where  such  hardships  were  luxury,  of  priests  and  Recollect 
fathers  going  with  calm,  unboasting  courage  to  the  certainty  of 
tortures  which  taxed  the  seasoned  courage  and  brute-like  endur 
ance  of  the  savage,  one  is  constrained  to  admit  with  shame  that 
the  superior  ascendency  of  France  was  not  wholly  due  to  crafty 
diplomacy  or  unscrupulous  use  of  force. 

The  most  capable  and  strenuous  of  all  Bellomont's  advisers 
on  Indian  policy  was  Livingstone.  In  1700  he  was  sent  on  a 
mission  to  the  Mohawks.  He,  like  Nelson,  was  a  conspicuous 
advocate  of  what  might  be  called  in  language  borrowed  from  a 
closely  similar  situation  a  forward  policy. 

His  views  are  to  be  found  in  a  report  addressed  to  Bello- 
mont,3  and  in  a  letter  written  shortly  after  to  the  Board  of 
Trade.4  He  states  that  two-thirds  of  the  Iroquois  confederacy 
were  now  within  French  territory,  supplied  by  the  French  with 
-clothes  and  taught  by  the  priests.  If  the  English  are  to  check 
this  they  must  have  continuous  and  secure  communication  with 
the  Iroquois  country.  For  this  purpose  there  ought  to  be  a  fort 
within  a  day's  march  of  Schenectady.  Like  Lodwyck  and  Nel 
son,  Livingstone  urges  the  need  for  an  irregular  force  on  the 
frontier  answering  to  the  French  coureurs  de  bois.  These  are  to 
form  part  of  an  organized  scheme  of  frontier  defense.  There  is 
to  be  a  standing  force  of  four  hundred  men  in  the  colony.  Every 
two  years  half  these  are  to  be  disbanded  and  replaced  by  fresh 
troops  from  England.  Those  discharged  are  to  be  settled  on  the 
frontier  with  grants  of  land,  and  are  to  form  garrisons  for  a 
chain  of  forts  round  Albany.  Continuous  connection  is  to  be 
kept  up  between  these  forts  by  the  bushrangers  "moving  every 
day  round  the  frontier  garrisons,  as  is  the  motion  of  the  pendu 
lum  of  a  clock." 

1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iv.  p.  714.  *  Ib.  p.  717. 

*  Ib.  p.   643.  « Ib.  p.  870. 


254  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

The  French  fort  at  Oswego,  or  as  it  was  then  called  Cada- 
raquie,  must  be  destroyed.  The  King  ought  to  acquire  the  ter 
ritory  of  the  Iroquois  by  purchase  from  them,  and  then  re-estab 
lish  them  there  as  his  tenants.  Livingstone  also  mentions  that 
those  Indians  who  were  in  the  French  interest  were  cutting  off 
the  English  allies  by  poison.  This  is  repeated  in  a  public  docu 
ment  of  the  following  year,  with  the  added  detail  that  the 
Jesuits  supply  the  poison  and  that  one  of  their  converts,  a 
squaw,  administers  it.1  It  would  also  seem  that  the  very  same 
charge  was  being  brought  by  the  French  allies  against  the 
English.2 

The  transfer  of  territory  suggested  by  Livingstone  was  almost 
immediately  carried  out,  though  there  is  no  evidence  that  it  was 
done  in  deference  to  his  advice.  In  1701  the  sachems  of  the  Five 
Nations  executed  a  deed  signed  with  their  respective  totems  mak 
ing  over  the  territory,  a  tract  of  eight  hundred  miles,  to  the 
King  of  England.  The  deed  is  extant,  or  at  least  was  so  far  on 
in  the  nineteenth  century.'  Unhappily  no  chronicle  or  official 
records  tells  us  the  means  whereby  it  was  obtained.  Its  chief, 
probably  its  only,  value  lay  in  the  fact  that  it  might  always  be 
used  as  a  bar  to  any  territorial  claim  over  the  Iroquois  country 
made  by  France. 

One  can  hardly  say  that  Bellomont's  career  as  Governor  was 
a  successful  one.  Yet  his  death  after  two  years  of  office  was 
Beiiomont  beyond  doubt  a  calamity  to  the  colony.  Disposed  as 

dies,  and  is          J  *  /   .  *. 

succeeded  the  colony  was  to  those  rapid  oscillations  or  policy 
Combury.  which  are  the  almost  certain  accompaniment  of  two 
parties  bitterly  opposed  and  equally  balanced,  continuity  of  ad 
ministration  was  that  which  gave  the  best  hope  of  improvement ; 
and  even  a  worse  governor  than  Beiiomont  would  have  been  a 
heavy  loss,  looking  to  the  character  of  his  successor.  The  advent 
of  Lord  Cornbury  to  office  may  be  said  definitely  to  mark  that 
evil  and  unhappy  state  of  things  when  a  colonial  governorship  was 
enough  of  a  prize  to  tempt  an  incompetent  and  worthless  place 
man.  The  legitimate  emoluments  might  not  be  great,  but  the 
position  now  brought  influence.  Even  used  fairly  it  brought 


1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iv.  p.  689.  2  Parkman's  Count  Frontenac,  p.  439. 

*  It  is  printed  with  facsimiles  of  the  totems  used  as  signatures  in  the  New 
York  Documents,  vol.  iv.  p.  708.  The  publication  of  these  documents  began, 
in  1853. 


LORD   CORN  BURY,  255 

patronage,  and  if  corruptly  used,  the  post  might  become,  as  the 
example  of  Fletcher  showed,  a  valuable  prize.  And  while  the 
possible  gain  had  increased  in  value,  the  drawbacks  attending  it 
had  lessened.  In  this  way  the  very  increase  of  material  pros 
perity  which  had  befallen  the  colony  was  a  detriment.  Hitherto 
the  hardships,  the  monotony,  the  dreariness  of  colonial  banish 
ment  repelled  men  of  high  stations  and  luxurious  tastes.  Now 
America  had  become  a  place  where  a  dissolute  courtier  with  a 
train  of  greedy  followers  might  find  life  endurable. 

In  the  two  colonies  in  which  Cornbury  held  office,  in  New 
York  and  in  New  Jersey,  things  were  such  that  a  capable  and 
character  efficient  governor  might  have  failed  to  find  favor.  In 
Cornbury.  each  the  hostile  feeling  which  separated  parties  in  the 
mother  country  was  reflected,  intensified,  as  is  usually  the  case, 
by  the  smallness  of  the  field  on  which  it  was  displayed.  In  such 
a  state  of  things  no  public  man  could  escape  abuse.  But  the  case 
against  Cornbury  does  not  rest  on  the  evidence  of  his  enemies  in 
the  colony.  The  most  effective  condemnation  of  him  is  to  be 
found  in  his  own  writings.  There  are  passages  in  his  corre 
spondence  with  those  who  opposed  him  which  are  like  a  travesty 
of  the  style  of  a  hack  pamphleteer.  These  outbursts  of  violence 
enable  one  to  believe  what  one  would  otherwise  set  down  as 
partisan  calumnies:  the  tales  of  Cornbury 's  grotesque  want  of 
personal  dignity,  of  his  appearing  in  public  dressed  in  woman's 
clothes,  and  the  like.1 

In  other  respects  Cornbury 's  character  was  to  that  of  his. 
father,  the  second  Lord  Clarendon,  much  what  the  father's  had 
been  to  that  of  the  founder  of  the  house.  The  Churchmanship- 
of  Edward  Hyde,  like  that  of  his  first  royal  master,  may  have 
been  narrow,  but  it  was  reverential  and  dignified.  The  Church 
manship  of  his  son  and  successor  was  that  of  a  stanch  political 
partisan  with  whom  Anglicanism  is  an  accepted  article  in  the 
party  creed.  Cornbury's  Church  principle  seems  to  have  had 
no  influence  over  his  conduct,  save  by  making  him  the  bitter 
enemy  and,  as  far  as  might  be,  the  persecutor  of  Nonconformists, 
when  there  was  no  political  necessity  to  palliate  such  an  attitude. 
The  immense  wealth  of  the  first  earl  showed  that  he  did  not  rise 

1  Morris,  then  a  rising  politician,  complains  that  business  is  hindered  by 
Cornbury  dressing  up  as  a  woman,  and  "putting  a  stop  to  all  business  while  he 
is  pleasing  himself  with  that  peculiar  but  detestable  maggot."  N.  Y.  Docs, 
vol.  v.  p.  38. 


--256  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

above  the  practices,  common  to  all  public  men  of  that  generation, 
which  in  his  day  made  official  life  so  lucrative.  The  son  clung 
to  power  by  subterfuges  and  compromises  which  would  have 
shocked  his  father.  But  he  was  not,  like  his  successor,  venal  in 
a  manner  and  to  an  extent  which  outraged  the  morality  of  his 
own  age.  Cornbury's  entry  on  public  life  was  characteristic. 
In  the  Revolution  of  1668  he  was  the  willing,  one  may  even  say 
the  zealous,  instrument  of  a  treason,  of  which  the  details  had 
been  so  carefully  pre-arranged  that  no  intelligence  was  needed 
in  the  perpetrator.  Four  years  later,  Young,  the  fraudulent 
'discloser  of  an  imaginary  Jacobite  plot,  deemed  Cornbury  of 
sufficient  importance  to  select  him,  with  Marlborough,  Sprat, 
and  Bancroft,  as  the  alleged  conspirators.  His  services  to 
William,  such  as  they  were,  probably  still  more  his  close  kinship 
to  the  royal  family,  gave  him  a  hold  on  the  favor  of  the  Crown. 
That  such  claims  should  have  been  rewarded  by  the  governor 
ship  of  an  important  province  is  a  melancholy  instance  of  the 
colonial  policy  which  the  opening  century  brought  with  it. 

The  choice  of  a  governor  was  not  the  only  error  for  which 
the  advisers  of  the  Crown  were  responsible.  As  in  the  case  of 
inter-  Bellomont's  appointment,  they  so  managed  matters 

between  ^at  an  interregnum  of  more  than  a  year  occurred 
during  which  the  governorship  was  vacant.  During 
tne  last  year  that  Bellomont  held  office  the  support 
given  by  him  to  the  Leislerite  party  had  effectually  kept  down 
their  opponents.  His  death,  however,  at  once  gave  the  signal  for 
a  renewal  of  hostilities.  Unfortunately  the  Lieutenant-Gov 
ernor,  Colonel  Nanfan,  was  absent  from  the  colony.  A  dis 
pute  at  once  arose.  In  such  a  case  how  was  the  executive  power, 
normally  vested  in  the  Governor  or  his  deputy,  to  be  exercised  ? 
The  right  was  claimed  for  himself  by  Smith,  the  President  of  the 
Council,  a  member  of  the  party  opposed  to  Bellomont.  On  the 
other  hand  the  Leislerite  majority  in  the  Council  contended  that 
executive  power  was  vested  in  the  whole  body,  that  is  virtually 
in  themselves.  Among  the  supporters  of  Smith  were  Schuyler 
and  Livingstone.  The  latter  was,  like  Schuyler,  a  member  of  a 

1  There  is  a  lack  of  official  documents  during  this  period,  and  we  are  com 
pelled  to  rely  mainly  on  the  guidance  of  Smith.  There  is  no  appearance  of 
partisanship  in  his  account.  His  leanings  were  on  the  whole  towards  the  Leis 
lerite  party,  but  he  does  not  palliate  the  misdeeds  of  Nanfan,  and  he  is  con 
spicuously  fair  to  Livingstone. 


A   NEW  ASSEMBLY  ELECTED.  257 

•wealthy  house  at  Albany.  His  position  and  connection  had  given 
him  an  interest  in  the  dealings  of  the  English  with  the  Five 
Nations.  He  seems  to  have  possessed  the  same  energy  and  reso 
lution  as  Schuyler,  with  wider  views  and  greater  powers  of  ex 
pression.  In  spite  of  his  anti-Leislerite  sympathies  he  held  under 
Bellomont  the  post  of  Secretary  for  Indian  affairs,  and  his  dis 
patches  are,  as  we  have  seen,  among  the  ablest  of  the  many  official 
documents  which  deal  with  the  attitude  of  the  colony  towards 
Canada  and  the  Five  Nations.  Nothing  could  illustrate  more 
strongly  the  evil  influence  of  that  factious  spirit  which  had  estab 
lished  its  hold  on  the  colony  than  the  attempt  which  was  now 
made  to  drive  Livingstone  altogether  out  of  public  life. 

The  temporary  difficulty  was  settled  by  the  return  of  Nanfan. 
He,  acting  probably  on  the  analogy  of  a  dissolution  of  Parlia- 
A  new  ment  following  the  demise  of  the  Crown,  dismissed 
elected.  the  Assembly.  A  violent  party  conflict  ensued;  the 
Leislerites  retained  their  majority  and  elected  Gouverneur  as 
Speaker.  An  attempt  to  dispute  that  choice  on  the  ground  that 
Gouverneur  was  an  alien  was  defeated  and  brought  heavy  re 
taliation.  The  house  resolved  that  no  person  could  be  eligible 
as  a  representative  except  for  the  county  in  which  he  dwelt.  On 
this  ground  eight  elections  were  annulled,  all  as  it  would  seem 
of  the  anti-Leislerite  party.  This  goes  far  to  throw  light  on  the 
composition  of  the  two  parties.  The  Leislerites  drew  their  main 
strength  from  the  country  districts,  their  opponents  from  the 
New  York  and  Albany  merchants,  who  formed  an  oligarchy  of 
wealth  and  to  some  extent  of  family. 

Meanwhile  the  party  which  had  triumphed  in  the  elections 
was  gaining  important  advantage  in  another  quarter.  The 
teisier's  Lords  of  Trade  had  approved  the  act  of  attainder 
reversed.  against  Leisler  and  Millborne.  The  younger  Leisler, 
who  seems  to  have  inherited  his  father's  persistent  energy,  ap 
pealed  to  the  Crown  against  this  decision.  He  also  represented 
that  his  father  had  expended  four  thousand  pounds  in  advancing 
the  cause  of  the  Revolution.  He  succeeded  in  getting  a  hearing 
of  the  King.  The  attainder  was  reversed,  and  an  instruction 
sent  to  Bellomont  ordering  him  to  bring  Leisler's  case  before  the 
Assembly  in  the  hopes  that  they  would  give  him  relief. 

Party  spirit  overpowered  the  strong  antipathy  which  a  colo 
nial  legislature  naturally  has  to  such  dictation.  A  measure  was 


258  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

passed  raising  a  sum  of  money  to  satisfy  the  debts  of  the  gov 
ernment,  among  them  a  thousand  pounds  due  to  Leisler.1 

The  effect  of  Leisler's  embassy  to  England  did  not  end  there~ 
We  may  be  sure  that  the  knowledge  that  they  could  reckon  on 
Attack  on  the  approval  and  support  of  the  Crown  confirmed  the 

Living-  _.,..,.  .  .  ..  , 

stone. 2  Leislentes  in  their  uncompromising  policy  towards 
their  opponents.  Livingstone  was  charged  with  a  refusal  to 
account  for  public  moneys,  and  also  with  having  solicited  the 
Five  Nations  for  a  commission  to  act  as  their  agent  with  the 
English  Government.  If  Livingstone's  own  account  be  true  he 
was  withheld  from  answering  the  first  charge  by  the  conduct  of 
the  Lieutenant-Governor  and  other  officials,  who  seized  his  books 
and  papers.  Livingstone  may  not  have  been  wholly  clean 
handed;  few  public  men  of  that  day  were.  Indeed  it  was  one 
of  the  worst  evils  of  the  political  morality  of  that  day  that  in 
such  matters  there  was  so  wide  a  gap  between  the  letter  of  the 
law  and  the  conventional  standard  of  right  and  wrong.  There 
was  hardly  a  public  man  who  had  not  at  some  time  put  himself 
within  danger  of  the  law,  and  against  whom  party  malevolence 
could  not  find  a  weapon.  But  the  whole  after-career  of  Liv 
ingstone  fully  justifies  us  in  the  belief  that  the  present  charge 
was  simply  used  as  a  weapon  to  strike  down  a  political  oppo 
nent.  The  alleged  intrigue  with  the  Indians  was  a  matter,  from 
its  nature,  hardly  susceptible  of  proof.  The  Assembly  en 
deavored  to  put  Livingstone  himself  on  oath.  This  he  refused- 
Thereupon  the  Assembly  petitioned  the  Crown  through  Nanfan 
to  remove  Livingstone  from  his  post.  That  does  not  appear  to 
have  been  done.  But  in  all  likelihood  the  removal  of  Livingstone 
from  the  Council  was  virtually  a  suspension  of  his  functions  as 
Secretary  for  Indian  affairs. 

The  Leislerite  party,  however,  were  not  to  have  the  ear  of  the 
Government  unchallenged.  Bayard  and  a  number  of  those 
Bayard  and  who  thought  with  him  drafted  petitions  to  the 

his  support-  ° 

ers  peti-  Crown,  to  Parliament,  and  to  the  new  Governor. 
iiament.3  The  chief  features  of  their  case  were  set  forth  in  the 
petition  to  Parliament.  This  at  once  grappled  with  the  main 
point  on  which  the  whole  case  of  Leisler's  representatives  rested. 


1  Smith,  pp.   139,   140.     He  gives  the  text  of  the  King's  letter  to  Bellomont- 
*/&.  p.  139.  s  lb.  pp.  141-3. 


BAYARD  PUT  ON   TRIAL.  259 

They  had  sought  to  perpetuate  the  contention  which  Leisler 
had  in  his  lifetime  advanced,  that  he  had  been  the  representative 
of  a  party  acting  on  behalf  of  the  Prince  of  Orange,  and  that 
his  losses  and  his  sufferings  had  been  undergone  in  the  cause  of 
the  Revolution.  The  petition  pointed  out  that  his  action  had 
involved  him  in  no  expense  as  he  had  not  to  encounter  any  resist 
ance,  and  that  he  had  attacked  many  who  were  loyal  supporters 
of  the  Prince  of  Orange.  They  furthermore  charged  the  Assem 
bly  with  exercising  corrupt  influence  over  the  Lieutenant-Gov 
ernor  and  the  Chief  Justice. 

Nanfan  at  once  replied  to  this  declaration  of  war.  He  did 
not,  however,  at  first  strike  at  Bayard  who  was  apparently  the 
Trial  of  moving  spirit,  but  at  Hutchins,a  tavern-keeper  and  an 
Bayard. i  alderman  of  New  York,  at  whose  house  Bayard  and 
his  supporters  held  their  meetings  and  drafted  their  addresses. 
Bayard  and  three  of  his  chief  followers  at  once  took  up  the  cause 
of  their  ally,  protesting  by  a  written  address  to  Nanfan  against 
his  arrest  and  demanding  his  release.  In  the  Assembly  which 
met  after  the  execution  of  Leisler  an  Act  had  been  passed  mak 
ing  it  high  treason  to  endeavor  by  force  of  arms  or  otherwise  to 
disturb  the  peace  of  their  Majesties'  Government  in  the  colony. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  Act  was  designed  by  the  enemies 
of  Leisler  then  in  power  as  a  measure  for  effectually  silencing 
their  defeated  opponents.  We  may  well  believe,  too,  that  the 
greater  part  of  the  colony  was  in  a  frame  of  mind  when  it  would 
assent  to  anything  which  had  the  superficial  appearance  of  secur 
ing  peace,  and  which  at  the  same  time  implied  a  condemnation 
of  the  usurper  from  whose  power  they  had  just  escaped.  In 
more  tranquil  times  every  thoughtful  man  would  have  shrunk 
from  leaving  on  the  Statute  Book  an  enactment  so  vague  in  its 
provisions,  and  so  easily  used  as  a  weapon  of  oppression  by  any 
party  in  power.  Under  this  Act  Bayard  was  now  arrested  and 
put  on  trial.  It  would  have  been  but  natural  for  Nanfan  to 


1  Our  knowledge  of  the  proceedings  against  Bayard  is  mostly  derived  from 
the  necessarily  ex  parts  statements  made  in  writing  by  himself  and  his  son. 
These  are  confirmed  by  a  memorial  drawn  up  on  Bayard's  behalf  by  Henry 
Adderly  and  Charles  Lodwick  (the  latter  a  London  merchant)  and  by  them 
submitted  to  the  Lords  of  Trade.  There  is  not  enough  known  of  these  men 
to  enable  us  to  judge  of  the  value  of  their  evidence.  We  have  also  an  an 
onymous  paper  entitled  "Abstract  of  letters  from  New  York,  dated  May  1702, 
relative  to  the  proceedings  of  Mr.  Atwood,  Chief  Justice,  and  of  the  Assembly 
there."  The  trial  itself  is  in  the  State  Trials,  vol.  xiv. 


260  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

postpone  such  important  business  till  the  arrival  of  his  new 
superior.  On  the  other  hand  he  hurried  on  proceedings,  and 
Bayard  was  convicted  of  high  treason. 

The  specific  charges  brought  against  him  were,  firstly,  that 
he  and  others  had  drawn  up  addresses  to  Cornbury  as  the  incom 
ing  Governor,  to  the  King,  and  to  the  Houses  of  Parliament, 
setting  forth  certain  grievances,  especially  as  it  would  seem  the 
appointment  of  "the  hottest  and  ignorantest  of  the  people  to 
places  of  trust."  He  was  further  charged  with  having  incited 
the  soldiers  to  mutiny.  The  last  charge  appears  to  have  been 
wholly  unfounded.  The  other  does  not  appear  to  have  been 
anything  but  legitimate  use  of  political  criticism.  Nevertheless 
Bayard  and  his  chief  supporter,  Hutchins,  were  found  guilty  and 
sentenced  to  death,  with  all  the  horrors  incident  to  an  execution 
for  high  treason. 

One  can  hardly  suppose  that  Nanfan  ever  contemplated  the 
actual  execution  of  Bayard.  In  all  likelihood  he  and  his  sup 
porters  only  aimed  at  silencing  and  intimidating  an  opponent.  It 
is  said,  too,  that  his  object  was  a  corrupt  one,  and  that  he  used  the 
advantage  he  had  gained  to  attempt  to  extort  a  heavy  bribe 
from  Bayard  as  the  price  of  a  pardon.  Be  that  as  it  may,  it  is 
certain  that  Nanfan's  conduct  by  involving  the  judicial  and 
executive  powers  in  a  party  conflict  could  not  fail  to  bring  gov 
ernment  into  discredit,  to  shatter  the  one  influence  which  might 
counterbalance  the  spirit  of  faction  which  was  rending  the  col 
ony  asunder. 

As  far  as  the  evidence  now  accessible  goes,  there  is  nothing  to 
show  that  Cornbury  was  in  any  way  pledged  to  one  party  among 
Expected  the  colonists  rather  than  another.  But  it  is  probable 

attitude  of         ,  ,  ,  .         ,  . 

Cornbury.  that  there  was  a  closer  connection  between  parties  in 
the  colony  and  parties  in  the  mother  country  than  appears  on 
record.  The  chief  motive  over  and  above  personal  gain  which 
seems  to  have  urged  Cornbury  was  an  unintelligent  adhesion  to 
Anglicanism,  or  one  should  perhaps  rather  say  a  factious  hatred 
of  Nonconformity.  In  all  likelihood  the  main  supporters  of  the 
Church  were  to  be  found  among  the  wealthy  New  York  mer 
chants,  while  Nonconformity  had  its  chief  hold  on  the  country 
districts.  This  may  in  part  explain  what  is  undoubtedly  a  fact, 
the  certainty  which  seemed  to  prevail  that  Cornbury  would  re 
verse  the  policy  of  his  predecessor  and  ally  himself  with  the  . 


CORNBURY'S  INDIAN  POLICY.  *6l 

party  of  Bayard  and  Livingstone.  So  strong  was  this  conviction 
that  Atwood,  the  Chief  Justice,  and  the  Attorney-General, 
Weaver,  both  of  whom  had  supported  Nanfan,  fled  to  Virginia. 
That  they  should  have  thought  it  necessary  for  safety  to  conceal 
themselves  under  feigned  names  raises  a  strong  presumption  of 
their  guilt.  Cornbury's  hostility  alone  need  not  have  reduced 
them  to  such  a  strait  unless  they  were  conscious  that  their  official 
conduct  would  not  bear  investigation.1 

Partisan  as  Cornbury  was  from  the  outset,  in  one  respect  his 
partisanship  took  a  form  which  made  for  the  best  interests  of  the 
Cornbury's  colony.  As  with  Fletcher,  the  one  creditable  feature 
policy.  of  his  administration  was  his  attitude  towards  the 
Indians.  In  that  matter  the  wealthy  merchants  of  New  York 
and  Albany  were  the  men  who  might  be  relied  on  to  adopt  the 
policy  which  was  best  for  the  whole  body  of  colonies,  and  best  in 
the  long  run  for  New  York  itself.  To  them  the  security  of  the 
Indian  trade  was  a  matter  of  vital  importance ;  their  estates  could 
bear  the  temporary  strain  of  taxes  for  defense,  and  they  were 
comparatively  free  from  that  narrow  provincial  jealousy  which 
hindered  any  united  and  organized  policy. 

In  May  1702  Cornbury  reached  his  province.  One  of  his 
first  acts  was  to  receive  a  deputation  from  the  Five  Nations  at 
Cornbury  Albany.  It  is  clear  that  the  recent  surrender  of  terri- 
Fivethe  torv  was  not  regarded  by  them  as  in  any  way  inju- 
Nations.  rious  or  humiliating.  They  expressed  their  satisfac 
tion  at  having  a  ruler  among  them  of  the  royal  house,  and  they 
testified  the  loyalty  appropriate  to  their  new  position  by  singing  a 
dirge  over  the  late  king.2 

The  dispatches  sent  home  by  Cornbury  in  his  first  year  show 
that  he  was  fully  alive  to  the  need  for  guarding  against  French 
Unde-  violence  and  counteracting  French  intrigue.  He 

state6  of  the  complains  that  Bellomont  had  left  the  frontier  and 
frontier.  defenses  in  a  deplorable  condition,  the  forts  broken 
down,  the  guns  honeycombed,  the  men  ill-clad  and  ill-shod. 
There  is  withal,  he  says,  a  public  debt  of  eight  or  ten  thousand 
pounds.  Some  of  the  blame  for  this  may  justly  rest  with  Bello 
mont.  But  the  guilt  lay  far  more  with  Fletcher  and  those  other 
offenders,  whether  officials  or  private  persons,  whose  malprac 
tices  had  crippled  the  revenue  and  absorbed  Bellomont's  time  and 

1  Smith,  p.   145.  *  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iv.  pp.  980,  986. 


2d2  NEW   YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

energies.  Cornbury  also  mentions  a  somewhat  improbable  rumor 
that  the  French  Admiral  Iberville  had  been  taking  soundings  in 
New  York  harbor,1  and  that  the  Onondagas  had  received  two 
French  priests.2  It  is  clear  from  other  and  perhaps  better  evi 
dence  that  the  peace  of  Ryswick  had  not  checked  the  aggressive 
action  of  France.  If  the  wisdom  of  Cornbury's  advisers  inspired 
his  reports  of  the  evil,  we  can  see  his  own  folly  in  the  light- 
hearted  confidence  with  which  he  proposes  the  remedy.  The 
French,  he  thinks,  can  be  driven  out  of  Canada  by  a  well-offi 
cered  force  of  fifteen  hundred  men  and  eight  fourth-rate 
frigates.3 

Cornbury's  account  of  the  deplorable  condition  of  the  frontier 
defenses  is  borne  out  in  a  report  from  Colonel  Quarry.4  He  had 
Colonel  been  Governor  of  South  Carolina,  and  was  now  a 
Quarry.  Councilor  in  New  York.  He  is  said  to  have  held  the 
same  office  simultaneously  in  four  other  colonies.5  Practically 
he  was  acting  as  in  some  sort  an  agent  for  the  English  Govern 
ment,  with  a  general  commission  to  observe  and  report.  The 
employment  of  such  men  might  be  a  necessity,  but  it  is  easy  to 
see  how  in  many  ways  it  must  have  injured  the  relations  between 
the  colonies  and  the  mother  country.  Such  men  would  be  looked 
on  as  spies.  Their  policy  would  always  be  one  of  consolidation ; 
they  would  be  indifferent  to  those  local  prejudices  which  kept  the 
colonies  apart,  fully  alive  to  the  military  and  administrative  evils 
resulting  from  separation.  The  very  fact  that  such  men  were 
the  advocates  of  intercolonial  union  would  tend  to  harden  the 
colonists  in  their  prejudices  against  it. 

Quarry  and  Livingstone  might  support  Cornbury's  views  as 
to  the  need  of  prompt  action  against  Canada.  We  might  be 
chamber-  quite  sure  that  they  were  too  sensible  and  well-in- 
thensociety  formed  to  share  his  delusions  as  to  the  cost  of  such 
agattionPofP"  P°^cy-  The  more  practicable  part  of  his  proposal, 
the  Gospel.*  that  of  missionary  efforts  among  the  Five  Nations,  was 

1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iv.  p.  1057.  I  can  find  no  confirmation  of  this.  Iberville 
had  a  scheme  which  he  submitted  to  the  French  Government  for  seizing  Boston. 
But  this  was  to  be  done  by  a  land  expedition.  Parkman's  Half  Century  of 
Conflict,  vol.  i.  p.  3.  2  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iv.  p.  1069.  *  Ib.  p.  977. 

*  Quarry's  report  is  in  the  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iv.  p.    1052.     The  editor  of  the 
New  Jersey  Archives,  a  collection  of  which  I  shall  have  occasion  to  speak  later, 
gives  an  account  of  Quarry  in  a  note,  vol.  ii.  p.  280. 

6  The  colonies  were  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Maryland,  and  Virginia. 
This  is  stated  in  a  footnote  to  the  New  York  Historical  documents,  v.  199. 

•  This  is  in  the  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iv.  p.  1077. 


CORNBURY'S  FINANCIAL  MISCONDUCT.  263 

furthered  in  a  different  quarter.  Chamberlayne,  the  Secretary 
to  the  Society  for  the  Propagation  of  the  Gospel,  was  urging 
on  the  Lords  of  Trade  the  need  of  such  missions.  He  no  doubt 
looked  firstly  to  spiritual  results ;  but  he  saw  that  he  could  ap 
peal  effectively  to  temporal  motives,  and  he  points  out  that  the 
matter  is  one  which  concerns  the  State  as  well  as  the  Church. 

It  is  true  that  Cornbury  saw  the  danger  ahead  and  endeavored 
to  impress  English  statesmen  with  a  sense  of  it.  In  that  one  has 
Cornbury's  exhausted  all  that  can  be  said  in  his  praise.  The 
misdeeds,  needful  conditions  of  a  successful  policy  against  New 
France  were  that  the  government  should  be  financially  strong, 
and  that  the  colonists  should  co-operate  readily  and  eagerly. 
Cornbury 's  corruption  kept  the  government  poor;  his  arbitrary 
and  impatient  temper,  the  zealous  partisanship  with  which  he 
threw  himself  into  the  conflicts  of  the  colony,  made  it  odious. 

As  we  have  already  seen,  the  financial  system  of  the  colony 
contained  no  effective  check  on  a  corrupt  Governor.  When  once 
a  sum  of  money  had  been  voted  by  the  Assembly,  and  deposited 
in  the  public  treasury,  he  could  draw  it  out  by  his  own  warrant. 
The  Assembly  could  punish  maladministration  by  refusing  to 
grant  supplies,  they  could  not  exercise  any  direct  control  over  the 
expenditure  of  money  once  granted. 

It  was  soon  manifest  that  this  system  was  no  restraint  on  such 
a  Governor  as  Cornbury.  At  the  very  time  that  he  was  calling 
the  attention  of  the  authorities  at  home  to  the  exposed  condition 
of  New  York  on  the  seaward  side,  he  was  believed  to  have  ap 
propriated  to  his  own  use  fifteen  hundred  pounds,  raised  by  the 
Assembly  for  the  purpose  of  strengthening  the  defenses  of  the 
harbor.1  There  is  nothing  in  Cornbury's  character  to  make 
the  charge  improbable.  If  it  were  exaggerated,  even  if  it  were 
unfounded,  the  existence  of  the  suspicion  was  almost  as  bad  as  its 
truth.  The  evil  lay  not  so  much  in  the  particular  act,  as  in  the 
system  which  made  it  impossible  to  detect  and  check  such  acts. 

The  Assembly  which  was  elected  upon  Cornbury's  accession  to 
power  was  one  in  which  the  anti-Leislerite  party  had  a  majority. 
Cornbury's  One  of  the  representatives  for  the  city  of  New  York 
•withlh*  was  Philip  French,  who  had  supported  Bayard  in  the 
Assembly.  recent  dispute,  and  had  been  outlawed  by  Nanfan.2 
The  Speaker  was  Nicolls,  who,  in  the  days  of  Fletcher,  had  been 

1  Smith,  p.   155.  *  Ib.  p.  144. 


a 64  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

set  down  as  the  accomplice  of  the  Governor  in  his  worst  actions.1 
In  all  likelihood  the  knowledge  that  the  house  was  under  the  in 
fluence  of  strong  party  feelings,  and  that  some  of  its  chief  mem 
bers  were  men  whose  acts  could  ill  bear  investigation,  em 
boldened  Cornbury  in  his  rapacity.  For  a  year  his  demands  on 
the  exchequer  were  granted  as  it  would  seem  without  any  demur. 
But  the  alleged  malversation  of  the  money  designed  for  harbor 
defenses  seems  to  have  been  too  much  for  the  forbearance  of  the 
Assembly.  A  clause  had  been  inserted  in  the  Act  voting  the 
money,  which  specified  that  it  should  be  employed  for  the  defense 
of  the  harbor  and  for  no  other  purpose.2  But  it  was  clear  that 
with  a  Governor  like  Cornbury  some  more  effective  check  was 
needed,  and  the  house  in  June  1703  demanded  the  appointment 
of  a  treasurer,  whose  warrant  should  be  necessary  for  the  ex 
penditure  of  public  funds.3 

No  attention  as  it  would  seem  was  paid  to  this  proposal,  and 
in  the  following  year  the  Assembly  appointed  a  committee  to  in- 
Disputes  vestigate  the  public  accounts.  The  result  was  a 
theWee  complete  breach  between  the  Governor  and  the  As- 
smd  the°r  sembly.  The  committee  reported  that  nearly  a  thou- 
Assembiy.<  san(j  pounds  of  public  money  was  not  accounted  for. 
Cornbury  retaliated  by  an  assertion  of  principles  which,  if  put 
forward  by  a  man  of  weightier  character  and  more  serious  pur 
pose,  would  have  been  a  denial  to  the  colonists  of  the  common 
rights  of  English  subjects.  "I  know,"  said  the  Governor,  "of  no 
right  that  you  have  as  an  Assembly,  but  such  as  the  Queen  is 
pleased  to  allow  you."  The  Assembly  might  be  permitted  of 
royal  favor  to  inquire  into  the  state  of  the  public  finances;  if 
they  found  anything  wrong,  then  they  might  complain  to  the 
Governor,  depending  on  his  good  will  for  redress. 

The  Assembly  was  between  two  cross  fires :  it  had  no  hold  on 
popular  good  will,  and  it  was  forfeiting  the  favor  of  the  Gov 
ernor.  It  had,  however,  independence  enough  to  resist  the  mon 
strous  claims  put  forward  by  Cornbury.  It  refused  to  impose  an 
excise  suggested  by  him.  The  result  was  an  empty  treasury,  and 
the  officials  of  the  house  left  without  salaries.  The  Assembly, 


1  If  we  may  believe  Bellomont   (N.  Y.   Docs.  vol.  iv.  p.  507),   Nicolls  was  a 
go-between  for  Fletcher  and  the  pirates. 

*  Smith,  p.   152.  *  Ib. 

4  Ib.  p.  153.     He  quotes  Cornbury's  actual  words,  as  recorded. 


ECCLESIASTICAL  DISPUTE  AT  JAMAICA.  265 

furthermore,  refused  to  pass  a  money  bill  in  the  amended  form  in 
which  it  was  sent  down  to  them  by  the  Council.  Matters  were 
at  a  dead-lock,  and  Cornbury  dissolved  the  Assembly. 

The  new  Assembly  at  once  showed  a  very  different  spirit  from 
its  predecessor.  Two  thousand  five  hundred  pounds  had  been 
A  fresh  raised  since  Cornbury 's  arrival  for  purposes  of  defense, 
Assembly.'  a^  Qr  nearjy  a}^  Of  wnicn  nad  been  misappropriated. 
Though  the  Governor  had  specially  dwelt  on  the  need  for  forti 
fying  the  harbor,  and  though  his  appeal  for  funds  to  be  so  used 
had  been  liberally  met,  yet  nothing  had  been  done,  and  a  French 
privateer  had  actually  sailed  in  unmolested.  Accordingly  the 
new  Assembly,  while  raising  three  thousand  pounds  for  purposes 
of  defense,  took  the  money  out  of  the  control  of  the  Governor 
and  demanded  that  it  should  be  placed  in  the  hands  of  a  treasurer 
appointed  by  themselves.  Cornbury  acceded  to  this,  saving  his 
dignity  by  asserting  that  the  money  formed  no  part  of  the  ordi 
nary  revenue,  and  by  stipulating  that  the  treasurer  should  be 
accountable  not  to  the  Assembly  alone,  but  also  to  himself  and 
the  Council. 

The  right  of  the  tax-payers  through  their  representatives  to 
control  taxation,  the  right  of  all  citizens  to  choose  their  own 
Ecciesi-  method  of  worship  unhindered  by  the  civil  power, 
d?spCute  at  these  were  the  vital  points  round  which  the  political 
Jamaica.*  battles  of  England  raged  during  the  seventeenth  cen 
tury.  Both  reproduced  themselves  faithfully  in  the  field  of  New 
York  politics.  Never  has  the  Church  of  England  in  that  colonjr 
been  more  unfortunate  in  the  character  of  her  political  allies  than 
in  the  reign  of  Anne.  The  Churchmanship  of  the  house  of  Hyde 
had  through  three  generations  steadily  deteriorated,  till  in  Corn- 
bury  it  had  become  a  mere  factious  antipathy  to  Nonconformists. 
At  the  very  outset  of  his  colonial  career  he  contrived  to  entangle 
himself  in  an  ecclesiastical  dispute.  We  have  seen  how  the  settle 
ment,  if  it  may  be  so  called,  arrived  at  in  1693  had  left  the  re 
lations  between  the  Episcopal  Church  and  the  other  denomina 
tions  existing  in  the  colony  undefined  and  full  of  possibilities  of 
conflict.  There  had  been  at  Jamaica,  twelve  miles  out  on  Long 
Island,  in  the  time  of  Fletcher  a  battle  between  Churchmen  and 


1  Cornbury  in  Documents,  vol.  iv.  p.  1145.     Smith,  p.   155. 

2  Our  only  authority   for  this  business  is   Smith,  pp.   146-8. 


266  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

Nonconformists  for  the  possession  of  a  house  of  worship.  Each 
congregation  claimed  it.  We  have  no  account  of  the  dispute  by 
an  unbiased  witness,  and  no  means  of  knowing  what  measure  of 
justice  there  was  in  the  respective  claims  of  the  two  parties.  It 
is,  however,  very  certain  that  both  sides  carried  on  the  battle  vio 
lently,  and  with  a  total  lack  of  dignity  and  decorum.  It  is  said, 
with  every  probability,  that  Fletcher  used  his  official  power  un 
fairly  on  behalf  of  the  Episcopalians.  Cornbury  chose  Jamaica 
as  his  country  residence.  He,  too,  is  charged  with  having  played 
the  partisan,  and  that  in  a  singularly  mean  and  ungracious 
fashion.  It  is  said  that  he  borrowed  for  his  own  use  the  house  of 
the  Presbyterian  minister,  and  then  put  the  Episcopalians  in  pos 
session  both  of  that  and  of  the  glebe.  Be  that  as  it  may,  it  is 
clear  that  he  bore  a  part  in  the  contest,  and  that  his  rancor 
against  the  Nonconformist  party  in  the  colony  was  thereby  con 
firmed  and  defined. 

The  quarrel  at  Jamaica  was  a  purely  local  one.  But  the 
bigotry  of  Cornbury  brought  on  a  further  dispute  which  raised 
The  trial  of  general  and  important  questions  of  law.  As  we  have 
M'Kemie. i  seen,  Episcopalians,  members  of  the  Established 
Dutch  Church,  and  French  Huguenots  had  all  places  of  worship 
in  the  city  of  New  York  recognized  by  the  legislature.  There 
were  also  in  the  north-eastern  part  of  the  colony,  among  the 
settlements  formed  from  New  England,  places  of  Presbyterian 
worship.  It  is  not  certain,  but  it  would  seem  probable  that  these 
places  were  licensed  by  the  Governor.  But  the  English  Presby 
terians  had  no  place  of  worship  in  the  city,  and  were  in  the  habit 
of  meeting  in  a  private  house.  This  seemed  to  Cornbury  to  give 
-an  opening  for  a  blow  at  Nonconformity.  In  1703  two  Presby 
terian  ministers  landed,  one  apparently  a  Scotchman  or  an  Uls- 
terman,  Francis  M'Kemie,  the  other  John  Hampton,  probably 
an  Englishman.  Both  had  preached  in  Maryland  and  Virginia, 
and  had  there  complied  with  the  conditions  prescribed  for  Non 
conformist  preachers  by  the  Act  of  Toleration.  Cornbury,  hear 
ing  that  M'Kemie  intended  to  preach  in  the  Dutch  Presbyterian 
Church,  forbade  him.  He  so  far  acknowledged  Cornbury 's  juris- 


1  There  is  a  very  full  account  of  M'Kemie's  trial  in  a  pamphlet  published 
•originally  in  1707,  and  reprinted  in  the  fourth  volume  of  Force's  Tracts.  The 
writer  does  not  sign  his  name,  but  entitles  himself  "A  learner  of  law  and  a 
lover  of  liberty." 


TRIAL.  267 

•diction  in  the  matter  as  to  abstain,  and  instead  to  preach  in  a 
private  house.  We  do  not  hear  of  the  same  prohibition  being 
applied  in  the  case  of  Hampton,  but  subsequent  proceedings  im 
ply  that  it  was.  He  preached  in  the  regular  Presbyterian  chapel 
at  New  Town,  a  village  on  the  coast  of  Coney  Island  opposite 
the  north-western  portion  of  New  York.  Both  M'Kemie  and 
Hampton  were  arrested,  and  prosecuted  by  the  legal  officers  of 
the  colony  on  two  counts,  for  having  preached  in  violation  of 
the  provisions  of  the  Toleration  Act  and  also  in  defiance  of  the 
Governor's  instructions.  The  charge  against  Hampton  was 
thrown  out  by  the  grand  jury,  either  through  the  connivance  of 
the  prosecutors,  or  because  the  evidence  of  his  having  preached, 
or  having  been  prohibited,  was  defective  in  fact.  M'Kemie  on 
his  arrest  had  pleaded  that  he  had  virtually  satisfied  the  require 
ments  of  the  Act  of  Toleration  by  his  compliance  in  Virginia 
and  Maryland.  The  validity  of  that  plea  in  law  was  doubtful, 
but  the  matter  was  really  unimportant,  since  it  seems  to  have 
been  generally  accepted  that  the  penal  laws  did  not  extend 
to  the  colonies.  The  real  question  then  turned  on  Corn- 
bury's  right  to  prohibit.  The  law  officers  claimed  it  as  a  consti 
tutional  right,  inherent  in  the  first  instance  in  the  Sovereign,  and 
then  delegated  by  special  instruction  to  Cornbury.  The  jury 
held  that  neither  point  was  made  good,  and  M'Kemie  was  ac 
quitted,  though  not  before  his  law  expenses  had  mounted  up  to 
over  eighty  pounds. 

The  strictly  legal  aspect  of  the  case  is  really  of  minor  impor 
tance.  The  right  of  the  Crown  to  interfere  in  such  a  matter  was 
assuredly  one  which  could  not  easily  be  made  good  either  by  prec 
edent  or  principle.  The  clause  in  Cornbury 's  instructions  on 
which  the  prosecution  relied  was  at  least  doubtful.  It  ran  thus: 
"You  are  not  to  permit  any  minister  coming  from  England  to 
preach  in  your  government  without  a  certificate  from  the  Bishop 
of  London,  nor  any  other  minister  coming  from  any  other  part  or 
place  without  first  obtaining  leave  of  you,  as  Governor."  It  was 
plausibly  argued  by  M'Kemie's  counsel  that  minister  here  meant 
clergyman  of  the  Church  of  England.  It  must  do  so  in  the  first 
-clause  since  otherwise  it  would  be  meaningless  to  require  a  cer 
tificate  from  the  Bishop  of  London,  and  if  in  the  first  clause, 
then  also  in  the  second.  It  may  certainly  be  said  that  if  this  was 
Jiot  the  necessary  interpretation  it  was  a  reasonable  one,  and  that 


268  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

the  prisoners  were  entitled  to  the  most  favorable  interpretation. 
But  in  real  truth  the  question  was  not  one  of  law,  but  of  equity 
and  policy.  The  Crown  might  have  the  constitutional  right  to 
prohibit  a  Nonconformist  preacher.  But  no  one  could  doubt 
that  such  a  right,  even  if  it  ever  existed,  had  by  disuse  fallen 
into  abeyance,  and  that  the  attempt  to  revive  it  was  an  act  of 
injustice.  The  letter  of  Cornbury's  instructions  might  have 
authorized  him  to  act  as  he  acted.  But  there  was  no  doubt  that 
the  exercise  of  that  power  was  left  to  his  discretion,  and  there 
was  equally  little  doubt  how  the  discretion  of  a  discreet  man 
would  have  guided  him.  To  silence  one  isolated  Presbyterian 
preacher  had  not  even  the  merit  of  being  part  of  a  consistent 
policy  for  extirpating  Dissent.  It  was  an  irritating  act  of  ca 
pricious  tyranny,  which  could  do  nothing  but  exasperate. 

Yet  it  must  be  admitted  that  there  was  more  excuse  for  this 
special  error  of  Cornbury  than  there  was  for  many  of  his  official 
misdeeds.  The  situation  was  singularly  complicated  and  calcu 
lated  to  mislead  anyone  unfamiliar  with  the  peculiar  state  of 
things  subsisting  in  New  York.  There  was  something  strangely 
anomalous  in  a  system  which,  while  it  gave  the  Bishop  of  Lon 
don  a  certain  control  over  every  church  in  the  colony,  yet  did  not 
give  any  exclusive  privileges  to  the  Episcopalian  Church.  Corn 
bury's  fault  lay  not  so  much  in  his  accepting  the  claims  made  by 
that  Church,  as  in  the  arbitrary  and  unscrupulous  fashion  in 
which  he  strove  to  support  them. 

It  was  characteristic  of  Cornbury's  recklessness,  and  of  his  in 
capacity  to  gauge  opinion  or  to  look  forward,  that  he  should 
The  have  involved  himself  in  this  quarrel  at  the  very  time 

opposes'y  when  he  was  otherwise  losing  whatever  hold  he  had 
Combury.  Once  had  on  popular  good  will,  and  when  it  was 
needful  for  his  own  purposes  to  preserve  every  shred  of  influence 
which  still  remained  to  him.  Later  in  the  same  year  a  fresh  As 
sembly  was  elected.  That  the  anti-Leislerite  party  still  had  the 
upper  hand  may  be  inferred  from  the  election  of  Nicolls  as 
Speaker.  Yet  the  attitude  of  the  Assembly  towards  Cornbury 
was  wholly  changed.  They  plainly  saw  that  the  Governor 
could  not  be  trusted  with  the  expenditure  of  public  money,  and 
that  his  discretion  in  that  matter  must  be  fenced  in  with  strict 
safeguards.  Instead  of,  as  usual,  voting  a  sum  of  money  for 
gifts  to  the  Indian  allies,  the  house  required  the  Governor  to- 


DISPUTES   WITH  CORN  BURY.  269 

draw  up  a  schedule  of  such  presents,  and  of  their  prices.  They 
should  then  be  provided.1 

Cornbury's  misconduct  had  done  more  than  call  out  mere  iso 
lated  resistance  to  separate  acts  of  corruption.  It  led  the  repre- 
A  com-  sentatives  of  the  people  to  make  a  formal  declaration 
£ri"vances  °*  w^at  tne'r  constitutional  rights  were.  A  Corn- 
appointed,  mittee  was  appointed  to  inquire  into  public  griev 
ances.  It  laid  before  the  house  a  series  of  resolutions,  declaring 
what  were  these  rights  of  the  colonists.2  It  was  not  in  every 
case  set  forth  that  Cornbury  had  specifically  violated  these  rights, 
but  that  charge  was  implied  in  the  resolutions. 

The  conduct  of  the  Governor  in  taking  the  appointment  of 
coroners  out  of  the  hands  of  the  freeholders,  in  creating  a  Court 
of  Equity  without  the  approval  of  the  Assembly,  in  imposing 
heavy  port  dues,  and  in  compelling  prisoners,  even  when  ac 
quitted,  to  pay  law  fees,  is  censured.  But  by  far  the  most  im 
portant  resolution  was  one  declaring  that  to  levy  any  money 
from  the  inhabitants  of  the  colony  on  any  pretense  without  the 
consent  of  the  Assembly  was  "a  grievance  and  a  violation  of  the 
people's  property."  In  that  was  foreshadowed  the  whole  policy 
of  resistance  to  the  Stamp  Act  and  the  tea  tax. 

In  another  matter,  too,  we  may  trace  in  these  resolutions  the 
first  risings  of  the  distant  storm.  In  more  than  one  of  Corn- 
Restraints  bury's  dispatches  he  warns  the  Government  that  the 

on  colonial  .       .  ...  ,  ,     , 

industry.  colonists  are  beginning  to  manufacture,  and  that  un 
less  their  progress  was  watched  they  would  soon  be  clothing 
themselves  independently  of  the  mother  country.8  It  was  in  all 
likelihood  in  anticipation  of  the  policy  suggested  by  Cornbury, 
and  in  protest  against  it,  that  the  Committee  declared  that  "any 
tax  on  imported  or  exported  goods,  or  any  clog  or  hindrance  on 
traffic  or  commerce,  is  found  by  experience  to  be  the  expulsion 
of  many  and  the  impoverishing  of  the  rest  of  the  planters,  free 
holders,  and  inhabitants  of  the  colony,  and  of  most  pernicious 
consequence,  which  if  continued  will  unavoidably  prove  the  ruin 
of  the  colony." 

Thus  New  York  may  fairly  claim  to  have  been  the  first  col 
ony  which  plainly  claimed  the  right  of  self-taxation,  and  which 

1  Smith,    p.    145*. 

2  76.     The  resolutions  are  given  verbatim. 
*N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iv.  p.  1151;  vol.  v.  p.  55. 


270  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

protested  against  being  sacrificed  to  the  commerce  of  the  mother 
country. 

Cornbury's  personal  extravagance  and  his  open  and  glaring 
misappropriation  of  public  money  put  him  at  the  mercy  of  the 
Cornbury  Assembly.  So  far  from  making  any  head  against 
recalled.  their  opposition  or  questioning  any  of  their  claims, 
he  had  to  acknowledge  with  gratitude  their  liberality  in  paying 
for  him  a  debt  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  pounds,  incurred  as  it 
would  seem  on  the  public  behalf,  but  for  which  he  had  become 
himself  liable.  Moreover,  his  private  debts  left  him  at  the  mercy 
of  his  creditors.1  In  New  Jersey  his  career  was  equally  discredit 
able.  There  indeed,  as  we  shall  see,  he  had  met  with  far  more 
bitter  and  consistent  opposition,  and  had  in  consequence  had 
fuller  opportunities  of  showing  the  shallowness  of  his  brain  and 
the  violence  of  his  temper,  his  utter  inability  to  play  the  part 
either  of  an  intelligent  administrator  or  a  dignified  figure-head. 
The  advisers  of  the  Crown  might  at  ordinary  times  be  culpably 
indifferent  to  the  character  of  their  colonial  officials,  but  there 
were  now  reasons  which  forced  upon  them  special  vigilance. 
For  seven  years  the  colonies  of  England  and  France  had  escaped 
being  dragged  into  the  conflict  in  which  the  parent  countries 
were  engaged.  That  no  doubt  was  largely  due  to  the  cautious 
policy  of  De  Callieres  and  his  successor,  De  Vaudreuil.  They 
saw  that  France  had  more  to  lose  than  to  gain  by  hurrying  on  a 
conflict,  that  she  was  steadily  gaining  ground  by  the  labors  of 
her  missionary  envoys  and  her  teachers.  Moreover,  the  re 
sources  of  France  were  too  heavily  taxed  to  make  her  rulers 
eager  to  extend  the  field  of  war.  English  statesmen,  on  the  other 
hand,  shrank  from  a  struggle  which  would  at  once  stir  up  a  host 
of  administrative  difficulties.  But  in  1708  united  action  against 
Canada  was  determined  upon  as  part  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
country.  It  was  hopeless  to  make  any  such  attempt  without  the 
hearty  co-operation  of  the  colonies,  and  New  York  was  the  one 
on  which  the  success  or  failure  of  the  attempt  must  mainly  turn. 
It  would  be  dangerous  to  make  the  attempt  with  an  unpopular 
Governor  there,  hopeless  with  one  as  incapable  as  Cornbury. 
He  was  accordingly  recalled  early  in  1708,  and  the  governorship 
conferred  on  Lord  Lovelace. 

1  Smith,  p.  146*. 


LORD  LOVELACE.  271; 

For  an  English  nobleman  to  make  all  the  needful  preparations; 
for  taking  up  his  abode  beyond  the  Atlantic  was  no  light  matter 
in  those  days,  and  the  result  was  the  almost  inevitable  occurrence 
of  a  dangerous  interregnum  between  two  governors.  We  have 
seen  how  it  operated  before  the  arrival  of  Bellomont  and  aftef 
his  death.  In  each  case  a  dominant  faction  seized  the  oppor 
tunity,  and  used  its  short-lived  tenure  of  power  either  to  glut 
itself  with  public  spoils  or  permanently  to  incapacitate  its  op 
ponents.  But  Cornbury's  administration  had  brought  with  it 
one  indirect  good.  The  need  for  united  resistance  had  abated 
the  spirit  of  faction.  The  men  whom  Leisler's  followers  de 
nounced  as  the  servile  tools  of  arbitrary  power  had  now  been 
making  common  cause  with  their  opponents  in  an  emphatic  dec 
laration  of  popular  rights.  Thus  in  the  six  months  which  inter 
vened  between  the  appointment  of  Lovelace  and  his  arrival  we 
hear  of  no  rekindling  of  the  old  party  quarrel. 

The  new  Governor  was  a  remote  kinsman  of  that  genial, 
energetic,  and  public-spirited  man  who  had  nevertheless,  by  a  cer- 
Appqint-  tain  lack  of  administrative  foresight  and  definiteness 
Lord  °f  °f  purpose,  brought  his  career  in  New  York  to  such 
Lovelace.  a  disastrous  end.  The  second  Governor  Lovelace 
seems  to  have  resembled  the  first  in  personal  attractiveness. 
There  is  the  same  outspoken  frankness  in  all  his  public  utter 
ances.  Yet  it  is  difficult  to  think  that  one  whose  only  experience 
of  public  life  had  been  gained  as  a  cornet  in  the  Life  Guards 
could  have  long  proved  equal  to  a  task  which  sorely  embarrassed 
the  far-sighted  and  self-restrained  statesman  who  succeeded  him. 
A  chill,  caught  apparently  on  his  arrival  in  crossing  Brooklyn 
ferry,  brought  on  an  illness  which  ended  fatally  before  Lovelace 
had  been  six  months  in  the  colony.  Cornbury's  successor  was 
almost  sure  to  be  popular  by  contrast.  Given  winning  manners 
and  intelligence  enough  to  avoid  any  conspicuous  blunder,  and 
he  would  live  in  tradition  as  a  colonial  Marcellus. 

Yet  in  spite  of  the  eulogies  which  followed  his  early  death  and 
the  friendly  tone  of  his  dealings  with  the  Assembly,  his  popu- 
D"lins8  larity  did  not  disarm  the  fears  of  the  Representatives 

of  the 

Assembly      or  make  them  forget  the  lessons  which  they  had  learnt 

with 

Lovelace,  under  Cornbury.  On  Lovelace's  arrival  in  April 
1709  a  new  Assembly  was  elected.  Since  Nicolls  kept  his  post 
as  Speaker,  we  may  assume  that  the  character  of  the  house  was. 


272  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

little  changed.  Lovelace's  demand  that  the  public  accounts 
should  be  investigated,  so  that  it  might  be  made  clear  to  the 
world  in  what  condition  he  took  over  the  finances  of  the  colony, 
was  virtually  a  censure  of  his  predecessor,  and  as  such  could  not 
but  be  welcome  to  the  Assembly.  After  some  discussion  a 
revenue  of  two  thousand  pounds  was  voted.  Of  this,  sixteen 
hundred  was  to  form  the  Governor's  salary,  the  rest  was  strictly 
and  specifically  apportioned  for  the  supply  of  the  frontier  forts 
with  certain  necessaries  and  for  the  payment  of  public  officials. 
But  the  Assembly  now  for  the  first  time  limited  the  grant  of 
revenue  to  a  single  year.1  It  is  certain  that  the  cordial  relations 
between  Lovelace  and  the  Assembly  would  not  have  survived 
this  attempt  to  obtain  entire  control  over  the  public  expen 
diture. 

On  the  news  of  Lovelace's  death  reaching  England  the  gov 
ernorship  was  conferred  on  Colonel  Robert  Hunter.  The 
Appoint-  singular  good  fortune  which  presided  over  Lovelace's 
Hunter.  career  did  not  extend  to  his  successor.  No  governor 
could  have  reached  his  province  under  conditions  less  favorable 
to  popularity,  more  likely  to  make  his  task  an  arduous  one.  The 
interregnum  between  Lovelace's  death  and  the  arrival  of  his  suc 
cessor  was  occupied  with  that  disastrous  attempt  against  Canada 
which  ended  in  the  ineffectual  march  to  Wood  Creek.  New 
York  was  the  one  colony  which  threw  itself  into  the  attempt 
with  hearty  enthusiasm.  On  that  colony  fell  the  whole  burden 
of  building  boats  for  crossing  the  lake  to  the  number  of  a  hun 
dred,  of  providing  land  transport,  and  of  maintaining  the  In 
dian  force  of  auxiliaries.  This  alone  meant  keeping  six  hundred 
armed  men  in  the  field,  and  maintaining  at  Albany  a  thousand 
more  non-combatants  who  were  dependent  on  them.  To  effect 
all  this  the  public  credit  had  to  be  pledged  for  more  than  twenty 
thousand  pounds.2  The  inability  of  the  English  fleet  to  co 
operate  was  no  doubt  due  to  the  turn  of  events  in  Europe,  and 
could  hardly  be  imputed  as  blame  to  the  Government.  But  the 
colonists,  threatened,  taxed,  and  disappointed,  could  not  be  ex 
pected  to  make  due  allowance  for  that. 

After  the  failure  of  the  expedition  the  colonists  resolved  to 
lay  their  grievances  before  the  Government  at  home.  An  ad- 

1  Smith,  p.    150.  *  Ib.  p.   143*. 


THE  INDIAN  KINGS  IN  ENGLAND.  273 

•dress  was  drafted  to  the  Crown  in  the  name  of  the  Lieutenant- 
Governor,  the  Council,  and  Assembly,  setting  forth  the  perils 
to  which  the  colony  was  exposed  from  the  French  alliance  with 
the  Indians.  The  document  is  noteworthy  for  the  clearness  with 
which  it  sets  forth  that  danger  which  for  the  next  half-century 
ever  loomed  greater  and  greater  in  the  eyes  of  English  states 
men.  "It  is  well  known  that  they  can  go  by  water  from  Quebec 
to  Montreal.  From  thence  they  can  do  the  like  through  rivers 
and  lakes  at  the  back  of  all  your  Majesty's  plantations  as  far  as 
Carolina."1  For  the  conveyance  of  this  address  a  suitable  mes 
senger  at  once  offered  himself.  The  whole  conduct  of  the  Indian 
alliance  seems  to  have  been  in  the  hands  of  Peter  Schuyler.  We 
read  how  he  kept  open  house  at  Albany,  entertaining  any  chiefs 
of  the  Five  Nations  who  might  be  there,  and  how  he  thus  built 
up  an  influence  over  them  equal  to  that  which  the  French  Jesuits 
exercised  among  their  savage  allies.2  He  had  labored,  not  unsuc 
cessfully,  to  persuade  the  chiefs  of  the  confederacy  to  break  their 
treaty  of  neutrality  with  Canada.  Among  the  Senecas  the  in 
fluence  of  a  French  missionary,  Joncaire,  was  too  strong  for 
Schuyler.*  With  the  other  four  tribes  he  succeeded,  and  a  Mo 
hawk  contingent  took  part  in  the  expedition  of  1711.  But  the 
real  value  of  the  alliance  did  not  lie  so  much  in  their  co-opera 
tion  in  any  one  organized  attack  on  Canada,  as  in  the  sense  of 
insecurity  and  the  need  for  constant  watchfulness  which  their 
hostility  imposed  on  the  French. 

After  the  failure  of  the  scheme  for  invasion  Schuyler  decided, 
apparently  on  his  own  responsibility,  to  take  five  of  the  allied 
Schuyler  chiefs  to  England  in  the  hopes  of  bringing  home  to 

takes  Five  *~  i  •   i       i 

iroquois  the  Indians  the  greatness  of  the  country  which  they 
England.  served,  and  of  impressing  vividly  on  English  public 
men  the  importance  of  the  alliance.  Almost  a  century  had 
passed  since  any  American  savage  had  made  a  public  appearance 
in  London.  These  visitors  had  neither  the  same  novelty  nor  the 
:same  romance  attaching  to  them  as  Pocahontas.  Yet  their  pres 
ence  seems  to  have  made  something  the  same  stir  in  fashionable 
society.  They  were  followed  in  the  streets  by  a  staring  crowd, 

1  Smith,  p.   145*.     For  the  actual  text  of  the  address  see  Appendix  II. 

2  Ib.  p.  i44». 

3  The  neutrality  of  the  Senecas  and  the  action  of  the  other  four  Nations  is  - 
stated  in  a  dispatch   from   De   Ramesay,   Governor  of   Montreal,   to   Vaudreuil," 
October  1709.     N.   Y.  Col.   Docs.  vol.  ix.  p.  839. 


274  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

and  their  pictures  formed  the  latest  novelty  of  the  print  shop. 
They  were  presented  to  the  Queen,  and  as  the  Court  was  then  in 
mourning  for  Prince  George,  the  savage  costume  was  reduced 
by  the  aid  of  a  professed  theatrical  dresser  into  some  conformity 
with  the  occasion. 

The  visit  to  Court  was  not  a  mere  pageant.  The  chiefs 
through  their  interpreter  made  a  short  speech  declaring  the  atti 
tude  of  the  confederacy  to  the  two  great  European  Powers, 
Savages  though  the  Five  Nations  might  be,  there  was  always  art 
honest  and  vigorous  directness  about  their  diplomatic  declara 
tions.  They  never  hesitated  to  declare  plainly  where  the  obli 
gations  of  friendship  ended  and  those  of  self-interest  began. 
They  now  told  the  Queen  that,  unless  she  took  such  measures  as- 
to  protect  their  hunting  grounds  against  French  encroachment, 
they  must  either  leave  their  country  or  stand  neutral.1 

One  can  hardly  suppose  that  the  gracious  reception  of  the  In 
dian  chiefs  counted  for  anything  in  the  American  policy  of  Eng 
land.  It  may  have  had  some  slight  value  among  the  savages 
themselves  and  among  the  colonists  interested.  They  may  have 
felt  that  the  Mohawk  alliance  was  being  more  definitely  and 
vividly  forced  under  the  notice  of  English  public  men.  In  Eng 
land  itself  the  incident  would  in  all  likelihood  have  faded  from 
public  memory  if  chance  had  not  given  it  a  certain  literary  im 
mortality.  The  Indian  kings  furnished  Addison  with  the  ground 
for  perhaps  the  first  of  those  apologues  in  which  a  foreign  visitor 
is  the  imaginary  vehicle  for  criticisms  on  manners  and  institu 
tions.2 

In  June  1710,  probably  before  Schuyler  and  his  companions, 
had  returned,  Hunter  reached  his  government.  His  character  is 
character  one  °^  those  which  tempt  one  to  think  that  a  certain 
of  Hunter,  change  must  have  come  over  the  minds  and  tempers 
of  Scotchmen.  The  Scotchman  of  the  seventeenth  century  was,, 
like  his  modern  descendant,  clear-sighted,  pertinacious,  and  self- 
reliant.  But  he  seems  to  have  had  in  him  more  of  the  gifts  of  the 
courtier  and  the  soldier  of  fortune,  more  moral  flexibility,  a 
greater  capacity  for  compliance  and  compromise.  That  this 
should  be  so  is  but  natural.  The  Scotch  character  as  we  know  it 
now  has  been  produced  by  the  training  of  a  society  where  more 

1  The  visit  is  very  fully  described  by  Smith,  pp.  145-6. 

2  The  Both   Spectator  by   Addison. 


HUNTER    VISITS  ALBANY.  275 

than  anywhere  home  ties  and  home  discipline  have  paramount 
force.  The  well-born  Scotchman  of  an  earlier  day  was  far  more 
exposed  to  foreign  influences  than  his  English  contemporary. 
He  might  have  kinsmen  in  the  service  of  half  a  dozen  foreign 
courts.  There  were  constantly  recurring  opportunities  for  inter 
course  with  the  French  nobility.  Calvinism  had  not  yet  worked 
itself  into  the  moral  texture  of  the  national  character;  where  it 
influenced  the  wealthy  and  well-born,  it  more  often  did  so  by 
way  of  repulsion  than  of  attraction. 

There  was  no  lack  of  energy  about  Hunter,  nothing  that  can 
be  fairly  called  insincerity,  and  no  reluctance  to  fight  when  a 
point  could  best  be  carried  by  fighting.  But  it  is  clear  that  he 
owed  his  success  in  no  small  measure  to  winning  manners,  to 
patience,  and  to  the  tact  which  never  seeks  nor  creates  a  diffi 
culty.  Started  in  life  as  an  apothecary's  apprentice,  he  had  taken 
to  the  sea.  His  good  looks,  helped  by  his  other  gifts,  gained 
him  a  rich  wife  of  high  birth.  Attaching  himself  to  the  Whig 
party  he  became  intimate  with  Addison  and  Swift,  and  it  is  no 
small  testimony  to  the  attractiveness  of  his  character  that  his 
personal  friendship  for  the  latter  outlived  the  severance  of  their 
political  alliance.1 

Hunter's  actual  career  as  a  colonial  administrator  began  in 
New  York.  His  connection  with  the  colonies,  however,  dated 
from  1707.  In  that  year  he  had  been  appointed  Lieutenant- 
Governor  of  Virginia,  but  on  his  way  to  the  colony  was  cap 
tured  by  a  French  privateer,  and  for  some  time  kept  prisoner.2 

Three  months  intervened  between  Hunter's  arrival  and  the 
meeting  of  the  Assembly.  A  portion  of  that  time  was  spent  by 
Hunter  him  in  a  journey  to  Albany  and  in  conference  there 
Albany.  with  the  chiefs  of  the  Five  Nations,  in  which  the  exist 
ing  alliance  was  renewed  and  confirmed.3  While  at  Albany, 
Hunter  received  overtures  from  New  England  asking  him  to 
employ  the  Mohawk  allies  in  operations  against  the  tribes  who 
were  harassing  the  frontier  of  Massachusetts.  Hunter  might 
well  think  that  if  such  operations  were  to  be  undertaken  at  all 
they  should  form  part  of  a  connected  scheme  approved  of  by  the 
Government  at  home.  Private  alliances,  as  one  might  call  them, 
between  colonies  for  isolated  warfare  were  a  form  of  common 

1  See  Swift's  letter  of  March  10,  1713. 
1  See  Colonial  Papers.  •  Smith,  p.  163. 


276  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

action  more  likely  to  embarrass  than  to  help  the  mother  country. 
A  New  York  historian  tells  us  that  Hunter's  refusal  was  looked 
upon  by  the  New  Englanders  as  a  grievance,1  but  the  feeling  was 
not  wide-spread  enough  nor  lasting  enough  to  have  found  any 
record  in  New  England  history. 

In  September  the  Assembly  met.  Hunter's  somewhat  con 
ventional  disclaimer  of  any  party  preferences  and  his  exhorta- 
Lewis  *i°n  to  the  house  to  keep  out  of  party  contentions 

Morris.*  met  wjth  formal  approval.  But  it  soon  became  mani 
fest  that  there  was  no  real  abatement  of  party  strife.  A  con 
spicuous  figure  had  of  late  appeared  in  the  field  of  New  York 
politics.  Lewis  Morris  was  a  cadet  of  a  rich  New  York  house. 
He  had  spent  a  vagrant  and  adventurous  youth.  But  if  his 
career  had  been  one  of  prodigality,  he  had  neither  impaired  his 
capacity  nor  as  it  would  seem  seriously  lowered  his  reputation. 
He  made  his  entry  into  colonial  politics  in  New  Jersey,  bearing 
a  prominent  and  not  always  dignified  part  in  the  battles  there 
which  attended  the  extinction  of  proprietary  government.  Po 
litical  success  seems  to  have  brought  a  sobering  sense  of  respon 
sibility.  For  forty  years  he  held  a  leading  place  in  colonial  his 
tory,  and  our  knowledge  of  the  history  of  the  middle  colonies  is 
in  no  small  measure  due  to  his  official  writings. 

In  the  very  first  year  of  Hunter's  governorship  the  violence  of 
Morris's  language  in  debate  led  to  his  expulsion  from  the  Assem 
bly.3  Possibly  by  an  exceptionally  ready  and  acute  perception  of 
character,  more  probably  by  good  fortune,  Hunter  saw  that 
Morris  would  be  a  formidable  enemy  and  could  be  a  serviceable 
ally,  and  succeeded  in  enlisting  him  as  a  supporter  of  Govern 
ment.4 

This  personal  dispute  was  soon  followed  by  a  constitutional 
one,  turning  on  a  perpetually  recurring  point  of  difficulty.  The 


1  Smith,  p.   164. 

*  Our  knowledge  of  Lewis  Morris  is  largely  derived  from  his  own  letters  and 
official    writings.     These  are   collected  in   the   New   Jersey   Historical    Society's 
Publications.     Smith,    who   might   in   a   sense   be   called   his   contemporary,   tells 
us  a  good  deal  of  his  early  life.     He  will  come  before  us  again  in  New  Jersey. 
There  are  many  references  to  him  in  the  archives  of  that  colony.     Mr.  Tyler,  in 
the  second   volume  of   his   History   of   American   Literature    (vol.    ii.    p.    210), 
gives  a  short  sketch  of  Morris.     He  deals  with  him  more  as  a  political  writer 
than  as  a  practical  politician,  and,  as  is  sometimes  the  case  with  Mr.  Tyler,  he 
is  a   little   inclined   to   exaggerate   the  intellectual   and   literary   merits   of   the 
person  with  whom  he  deals. 

*  Smith,  p.  161.  *  Ib.  p.   165. 


DISPUTES  ABOUT  FEES  AND  SALARIES.          277 

Assembly  sent  up  a  money  bill  in  which  certain  payments  were 
specified,  while  it  was  also  ordered  that  they  should  be  made 
Dispute  through  an  official  appointment  by  the  Representa- 
the^'o'uncu  tives.  The  Council  introduced  amendments  intend- 
andthe  e(j  to  gjve  fae  Governor  a  wide  discretion  in  deal- 

Kepresent- 

ativcs.  ing  with  the  money.  The  Assembly  refused  to  pass 
the  bill  so  amended,  and  the  dead-lock  was  only  relieved  by  an 
adjournment.1 

In  this  dispute  Hunter  appears  to  have  allowed  the  Council 
to  fight  his  battle  for  him.  But  when  the  house  met  he  laid 
Dispute  down  their  duty  in  such  matters  in  language  which 
Hunter0  plainly  showed  that  he  did  not  apply  his  Whig  doc- 
Asse'mbiy  trincs  to  the  conduct  of  a  colonial  legislature.  He 
salaries  distinctly  denied  the  Assembly  the  right  to  exercise 
and  fees.  anv  control  over  official  salaries.  He  indeed  made  a 
somewhat  ingenious  attempt  to  represent  this  as  kindness  to  the 
subjects.  The  Queen  took  upon  herself  the  responsibility  of 
fixing  official  salaries,  and  relieved  the  colonists  from  all  tempta 
tion  to  make  presents  to  the  Governor.2  But  we  may  doubt 
whether  the  Assembly  were  beguiled  by  this  somewhat  obvious 
sophism,  especially  when  it  was  followed  by  the  declaration  that 
to  give  money  for  the  support  of  government  and  to  dispose  of  it 
at  their  own  pleasure  was  the  same  thing  as  giving  none,  and  that 
the  Queen  was  the  sole  judge  of  the  merits  of  her  servants. 

This  was  not  the  only  matter  in  dispute.  The  Assembly 
further  resolved  that  Hunter's  conduct  in  "erecting  a  Court  of 
Chancery  without  consent  in  general  Assembly  is  contrary  to 
law,  without  precedent,  and  of  dangerous  consequence  to  the 
liberty  and  property  of  the  subjects."  They  also  declared  that 
the  right  to  fix  fees  was  vested  not  in  the  Governor,  but  in  the 
Assembly.  These  grievances  were  set  forth  in  a  memorial  to  the 
Board  of  Trade.  The  answer  was  that  the  Governor  as 
the  representative  of  the  Crown  had  the  right  to  create  courts 
of  law.  The  question  of  fees  and  salaries  was  passed  over.8 

The  practical  effect  was  that  the  Assembly,  unwilling  to  do 
what  the  Governor  asked,  were  content  to  do  nothing.  Their 
adjournment  had  been  the  act  of  the  Governor,  when  he  was  re 
siding  out  of  the  colony  at  the  seat  of  government  for  his  other 

1  Smith,  p.   1 66.  2  Hunter's  speech  is  given  by  Smith,  p.  167. 

8  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  v.  p.  359.     Smith,  p.   175. 


278  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

province,  New  Jersey.  This,  the  Assembly  held,  invalidated  his 
action  and  their  existence,  and  they  dissolved.1 

Next  year  a  fresh  house  was  elected,  composed  of  much  the 
same  members.  On  the  question  of  official  salaries  they  were  as 
far  from  compliance  as  ever.  They  made  amends,  however,  by 
throwing  themselves  zealously  into  the  scheme  for  an  invasion  of 
Canada.  Hunter  had  no  difficulty  in  persuading  them  to  enlist 
troops.  Ten  thousand  pounds  was  to  be  raised  by  a  loan,  to  be 
paid  off  in  five  years  by  a  property  tax,  and  commodities  were  to 
be  supplied  to  the  army  at  fixed  rates.2 

On  no  colony  did  the  disastrous  and  discreditable  failure  of 
the  Canadian  expedition  bear  so  heavily  as  on  New  York.  None 
had  made  such  sacrifices,  and  to  them  as  to  no  other  the  very 
existence  of  New  France  was  a  standing  threat.  Nothing  could 
have  occurred  more  certain  to  enhance  the  difficulties  of  Hunter's 
position.  When  the  Assembly  met  in  1711  there  was  no  side 
issue  by  which  the  contest  over  official  salaries  could  be  diverted 
or  delayed.  As  before,  the  point  of  form  on  which  the  dispute 
turned  was  the  right  of  the  Council  to  amend  a  money  bill.  The 
discussion  brought  out  into  broad  light  two  conflicting  theories, 
which  had  been  vaguely  working  in  the  minds  of  the  opposed 
parties.  The  Council  claimed  to  be  a  branch  of  the  legislature, 
having  equal  rights  and  powers  with  the  House  of  Representa 
tives.  Each  was  called  into  existence  by  the  mere  grace  of  the 
Crown.  The  power  of  each,  therefore,  was  held  by  the  same 
tenure  and  subject  to  the  same  limits. 

The  Representatives  drew  a  distinction.  The  Council  were 
not  analogous  in  constitution  to  the  House  of  Representatives. 
They  were  not  like  an  upper  chamber,  representing  a  certain 
rank  or  estate.  They  existed  simply  by  the  pleasure  of  the 
Sovereign.  But  the  control  of  the  Assembly  over  the  revenue 
was  not  a  right  conferred  by  the  Sovereign.  It  was  a  natural 
and  inherent  right,  proceeding  from  the  fact  that  they  repre 
sented  the  people,  and  that  the  people  could  not  justly  be 
divested  of  their  property  without  their  own  consent.  The 
Council  had  appealed  to  the  opinion  of  the  Lords  of  Trade. 
They,  it  was  said,  could  see  no  reason  for  denying  the  Council 
the  right  to  amend  money  bills.  Their  inability,  the  Represent- 

1  Smith,  p.   1 68.  *  Ib.   p.    170. 


DISPUTE  ABOUT  A    COURT  OF  CHANCERY.        279 

atives  pointed  out,  to  see  such  reasons  did  not  prove  that  none 
existed.1 

The  difficulty  was  one  of  those  ultimate  ones  which  can  only 
be  settled  by  an  avowed  compromise  or  an  appeal  to  force.  In 
such  questions  there  is  no  common  tribunal  which  both  parties 
acknowledge,  no  law  and  no  precedent  which  they  recognize  as 
binding.  In  form  the  dispute  may  be  one  as  to  the  interpreta 
tion  of  what  the  constitution  is.  In  reality  the  question  is  what 
the  constitution  ought  to  be. 

The  necessities  of  the  Governor's  position  enabled  the  Repre 
sentatives  to  achieve  a  victory  on  at  least  one  point.  He  was 
obliged  to  allow  them  to  pass  in  their  own  form,  and  without 
accepting  any  amendment  from  the  Council,  the  vote  for  his 
.salary,  thus  abandoning  the  very  ground  which  in  his  opening 
speech  he  had  so  strongly  taken  up.  It  is  to  be  noticed  that  both 
now  and  afterwards  the  form  of  the  vote  was  not  so  much 
money,  but  so  much  plate — that  is,  no  doubt,  bullion.  This  was 
in  all  likelihood  intended  to  mark  emphatically  the  fact  that  the 
vote  was  not  simply  a  confirmation  of  the  grant  made  by  the 
Government  in  England.2 

Hunter  soon  found  himself  engaged  in  another  dispute  with 
the  Assembly.  In  conformity  with  his  instructions  he  consti- 
Dispute  tuted  a  Court  of  Chancery,  in  which  he  was  himself 
tst^bii^h*  to  discharge  the  office  of  chancellor.  The  Repre- 
court°offa  sentatives  thereupon  voted  that  to  establish  such  a 
chancery,  court  without  their  consent  was  contrary  to  law  and 
precedent,  and  dangerous  to  liberty  and  property,  and  that  it  was 
illegal  to  levy  fees  without  their  approval.3 

Here,  again,  the  dispute  went  to  the  very  root  of  the  question, 
what  ought  to  be  the  relations  between  the  Assembly  and  the 
representatives  of  the  Crown  ?  Hunter  did  not  really  bring  the 
difficulty  nearer  solution  by  producing  the  opinion  of  the  Lords 
of  Trade  in  his  favor. 

The  proceedings  of  the  next  year  were  almost  a  repetition  of 
those  of  1711.  Again  the  Assembly,  in  spite  of  Hunter's  ex- 

1  Smith,  p.   173.     In  his  account  of  these  disputes  Smith  has  the  great  merit 
of   usually   giving   the   actual    resolutions    passed   and   speeches   made   in   their 
original   form. 

2  Ib.  p.    1 74.    It  may  possibly  have  been  due  to  the  fluctuation  in  the  value 
of  paper  money. 

3Ib.  p.   175. 


28o  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

postulations,  backed  by  the  opinion  of  the  Lords  of  Trade,  re 
fused  to  accept  money  bills  as  amended,  and  again  Hunter  was 
compelled  to  accept  a  sum  specially  voted  in  bullion  instead  of 
a  regular  salary.1 

In  various  ways  did  circumstances  seem  conspiring  to  make 
the  Governor's  task  a  hopeless  one.  The  terms  of  the  peace  of 
The  treaty  Utrecht  were  far  f rom  giving  satisfaction  to  the  in- 
of  utrecht.  habitants  of  New  York.  It  did,  indeed,  decide  one 
important  point,  that  the  territory  of  the  Five  Nations  was  to  be 
regarded  as  English  soil,  and  that  any  aggression  in  that  quarter 
would  be  considered  an  act  of  hostility  to  England.  To  secure 
that  territory  as  a  guard  to  the  frontier  of  the  English  settle 
ments  was  something  gained,  even  though  the  treaty  did  not 
exclude,  as  indeed  it  was  hardly  possible  for  any  restrictions  to 
exclude,  the  operations  of  Jesuit  envoys. 

But  it  is  seldom  that  the  terms  of  a  treaty  leave  no  room  for 
conflicting  interpretations.  A  question  immediately  arose  as  to 
Dispute  the  limits  of  the  Mohawk  territory.  Did  it  extend 
Frontenac.  north  of  the  St.  Lawrence  ?  The  principle  of  the- 
peace  of  Utrecht  was  the  status  quo  ante.  There  was  to  be 
mutual  restitution  of  all  possessions  taken  during  the  war.  The 
colonists  contended  that  under  this  clause  the  French  were  bound 
to  evacuate  Fort  Frontenac.  It  had  been  abandoned  by  the 
French  garrison  in  1688,  when  the  Five  Nations  made  their  raid 
on  Prairie  de  la  Madeleine.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  the 
savages  did  not  follow  up  the  attack  by  anything  that  could 
be  called  occupation.  They  simply  contented  themselves  with 
injury  to  the  works,  and  the  fort  remained  an  empty  ruin  till 
it  was  re-established  by  Frontenac  in  1695.  There  is  no  doubt 
that  the  existence  of  the  fort  was  a  serious  threat  to  the  Five 
Nations,  and  therefore  to  the  English.  On  the  other  hand  the 
French  might  with  perfect  fairness  urge  that  it  was  a  needful 
defensive  work.  And  there  is  little  room  for  doubt  on  the 
legal  view  of  the  question.  It  could  not  be  held  with  any  show 
of  reason  that  a  mere  Indian  raid  could  constitute  territorial 
occupation.  If  Schenectady  had  remained  vacant  for  a  time 
after  the  massacre  of  1688,  would  the  English  have  admitted 
that  it  was  during  that  time  French  territory  by  right  of  con- 

1  Smith,  p.  175. 


HUNTER'S  LAND  POLICY.  281 

quest?  But  a  sober  and  impartial  interpretation  of  treaties  {& 
hardly  to  be  looked  for  in  people  as  deeply  interested  as  were  the 
colonists.  To  them  and  their  savage  allies,  Fort  Frontenac  was 
a  standing  menace,  and  the  tone  in  which  a  New  York  historian, 
writing  some  forty  years  later,  speaks  of  the  matter  shows  that 
the  surrender  of  the  claim  by  the  English  Government  rankled 
in  the  minds  of  the  colonists.1 

Jealousy  of  the  home  Government  meant  practically  jealousy 
of  Hunter.  Nor  was  this  the  only  administrative  difficulty 
Hunter's  which  beset  his  path.  He  must  have  seen  plainly 
land  policy.  tjlat  hjs  cnjef  nOpe  of  support  lay  among  the  wealthy 
merchants  and  landholders.  Yet  to  his  great  credit  Hunter  was 
at  this  very  time  sending  home  advice  which,  if  adopted,  could 
hardly  fail  to  alienate  one  of  those  classes,  or  one  should  perhaps 
rather  say  that  class,  for  as  things  then  stood  in  New  York  they 
were  in  a  great  measure  identified.  Hunter  saw  that  the  eco 
nomical  progress  of  the  colony  was  not  a  little  hindered  by  land 
holders  nominally  occupying  tracts  of  land  far  too  large  for 
them  to  cultivate,  and  thereby  excluding  settlers  who  would  have 
turned  the  soil  to  account.  To  meet  this  he  proposed  the  strict 
enforcement  of  a  quit-rent  of  half-a-crown  for  every  hundred 
acres,  which,  small  though  it  sounds,  would,  he  believed,  act  as  a 
check  on  the  existing  evil.2 

Moreover,  in  1712,  a  misfortune  befell  the  colony,  not  one 
indeed  for  which  government  was  really  responsible.  Yet 
The  negro  public  calamities,  even  if  they  are  not  expressly  laid 
plot-  to  the  charge  of  a  government,  never  fail  to  bring 

upon  it  ill-will.  And  in  this  matter,  as  in  others,  Hunter 
showed  that  his  courtesy  and  compliance  did  not  withhold  him 
from  braving  unpopularity  for  the  sake  of  principle. 

The  industrial  system  of  New  York  did  not  suffer  it  to  be  a 
slave  State  in  the  same  sense  as  the  tobacco-growing  colonies  of 
slavery  in  tne  South.  While  in  South  Carolina  the  negroes 
New  York.  were  actually  a  majority  of  the  population,  in  New 
York  they  did  not  form  one-sixth.3  The  Southern  plantations 
offered  a  better  market  to  the  importer,  and  not  more  than  a 

1  Smith,  p.   182. 

2  See  his  dispatch  of  November  14,  1710,  in  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  v.  p.  180. 

1 1  have  discussed  the  whole  question  of  population,  white  and  black,  in  an 
Appendix  to  the  volume  which  accompanies  this,  entitled  General  View  of  the- 
Colonies. 


282  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

hundred  negroes  on  an  average  were  brought  into  the  colony  in 
a  year.1 

Yet,  as  far  as  we  can  judge  from  the  statute  book,  the 
negro  in  New  York  was  viewed  with  just  as  much  appre 
hension  as  in  Virginia  or  Maryland.  All  trade  with  slaves  was 
forbidden.2  Not  more  than  three  might  meet  together  except 
on  their  master's  business,3  and  a  free  negro  might  not  entertain 
his  countrymen  who  were  still  in  slavery.4  No  negro  could  be 
accepted  as  a  valid  witness  against  a  white  man.5  Nor  was  the 
negro  if  accused  of  crime  entitled  to  the  same  civil  rights  as  the 
superior  race.  Upon  arrest  he  might  be  summarily  tried  before 
a  jury  of  five  freeholders,  summoned  by  three  magistrates,  nor 
might  the  prisoner  challenge  his  jurors.  His  master  might  in 
deed  claim  for  him  an  ordinary  jury  of  twelve,  but  must  pay 
the  jurors  himself.6  Special  provision,  too,  was  made  lest  the 
tenderness  of  a  master  should  make  his  slave  a  source  of  danger 
or  expense  to  the  community.  The  negro  might  be  set  free,  but 
the  process  was  fenced  in  with  precautions.  The  master  who 
gave  a  slave  his  liberty  must  bind  himself  under  a  penalty  of 
two  hundred  pounds  to  furnish  him  also  with  an  allowance  of 
twenty  pounds  a  year,  lest  he  should  become  chargeable  to  the 
State.  If  the  master  died,  his  executors  must  make  the  same 
undertaking;  if  they  did  not,  the  manumission  became  void/ 
The  conversion  of  negroes  was  encouraged,  but,  as  in  the  South, 
an  Act  was  passed  declaring  that  baptism  did  not  carry  with  it 
any  claim  to  freedom.8 

The  whole  tenor  of  the  legislation  about  slaves  in  New  York 
shows  a  greater  degree  of  suspicion  than  was  entertained  in  the 
Southern  colonies.  It  seems  at  first  sight  strange  that  where 
they  were  fewest  they  should  be  viewed  with  most  dread.  Yet 
this  is  not  hard  to  understand.  The  society  of  the  South  was  a 
society  in  which  slavery  was  one  of  the  chief  economical  features. 
With  the  system  naturally  grew  up  appropriate  safeguards. 
Every  planter  had  a  direct  and  personal  interest  in  keeping  his 
own  slaves  in  check,  and  nearly  every  well-to-do  man  was  a 
planter.  Thus  there  came  into  existence  a  complete  system  of 


1  General  View  of  the  Colonies,  Cornbury  in  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  v.  p.  55. 

2  Acts  of  Assembly,  p.  81.  *  Ib. 

*Ib.  *Ib.   p.  46. 

'Ib.  p.  81.  lib.  »Ib.  p.  65. 


NEGRC   OUTBREAK  IN  NEW   YORK.  283 

control  and  discipline.  Every  plantation  was  a  little  despotism 
in  itself.  In  New  York,  on  the  other  hand,  slavery  was  but  one 
form  of  industry  coexisting  with  others.  The  colony  was  not 
broken  up  into  a  number  of  separate  jurisdictions,  each  with  a 
head  who  was  distinctly  responsible  for  its  safety.  Nor  was 
this  all.  The  economical  condition  of  the  colony  had  called  into 
existence  a  distinct  and  extensive  class  of  free  negroes.  In  the 
old  days  of  Dutch  rule  the  West  India  Company  had  made  it 
easy  for  their  slaves  to  obtain  freedom.  Their  position,  indeed, 
was  not  unlike  that  of  the  indented  servants  in  the  English  colo 
nies  to  the  South.  After  a  certain  period  of  service  to  the  Com 
pany  the  negroes  become  free,  paying  a  fixed  sum  in  dues.  Thus 
an  American  traveler,  writing  in  1679,  tells  us  that  there  was  on 
Long  Island  a  large  population  of  free  negroes,  the  emancipated 
slaves  of  the  West  India  Company.1  At  the  same  time  their 
status  was  so  far  servile  that  their  children  apparently  remained 
slaves.2  It  is  easy  to  see  how  this  would  tend  to  increase  the 
danger  to  be  feared  from  the  presence  of  slaves.  The  spectacle 
of  a  free  black  population  near  him  would  at  once  incite  the 
negro  to  discontent,  and  furnish  him  with  the  means  of  doing 
harm.  Thus  it  might  well  be  that  the  smaller  negro  population 
of  New  York  was  more  a  source  of  danger  and  apprehension 
than  that  of  Virginia  or  Maryland.  There  was,  too,  always 
the  fear  that  negroes  might  escape  to  the  French.  So  strongly 
was  this  felt  that  an  Act  was  passed  in  1705  under  which  any 
fugitive  slave  found  forty  miles  north  of  Albany  might  be  put 
to  death,  his  owner  receiving  compensation.8 

In  1712  there  was  an  armed  outbreak  of  negroes  in  the  city  of 
New  York.4  A  house  was  set  on  fire,  and  in  the  confusion 
Punish-  which  followed  nine  white  inhabitants  were  put  to 
conspfra*-116  death  and  more  wounded.  The  soldiers  were  called 
tors-  out,  and  the  rioters  were  dispersed  and  fled  into  the 

open  country.  There  they  were  without  difficulty  captured. 
Six  saved  themselves  from  certain  punishment  by  suicide.  Of 
the  remaining  twenty-seven  all  save  one  were  executed.  Some 
more  fortunate  than  their  fellows  were  hanged,  others  burnt, 

1  This  is  stated  in  the  travels  of  the  Labadists,  Bankers  and  Sluyter,  p.   136. 

2  See  Appendix   III. 

8  Acts  of  Assembly,  p.  60. 

4  The   discovery   of  the   plot   and  the  various   punishments   of   the   offenders 
are  told  in  Hunter's  dispatch  of  June  23,   1712.     N.  Y.   Docs.  vol.   v.  p.   341. 


284  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

one  broken  on  the  wheel.  It  is  clear  from  the  tone  of  Hunter's 
dispatch  reporting  it  that,  while  he  had  no  sentimental  horror 
of  needful  severity,  he  was  anxious  to  check  punishment,  and 
was  not  carried  away  by  the  panic  which  pervaded  the  colony. 
"There  has  been  much  blood  shed  already,  I  am  afraid  too 
much,"  were  the  words  in  which  he  commented  on  the  matter 
to  Popple,  the  Secretary  to  the  Board  of  Trade.1 

While  Hunter  was  meeting  these  administrative  difficulties  he 
was  exposed  to  attack  in  another  quarter.  By  order  of  Gov- 
The  Paia-  ernment  he  had  taken  out  with  him  upwards  of  two 
tines.*  thousand  inhabitants  of  the  Palatinate  who  had  been 

rendered  homeless  by  the  cruelty  of  the  French  King  and  his 
councilors.  These  exiles  were  to  be  settled  on  the  upper  waters 
of  the  Hudson,  and  to  be  employed  in  making  pitch  and  felling 
ship-timber  for  the  English  navy.  Cornbury,  to  whom  his  suc 
cessor  was  hateful,  probably  as  a  Whig,  accused  Hunter  of  wast 
ing  public  money  in  the  maintenance  of  the  Palatines,  as  they 
were  called,  and  of  playing  into  Livingstone's  hands  in  the 
choice  of  a  site  for  their  settlement.  Instead  of  receiving  sup 
plies  as  they  did  from  Government  they  might  have  been  self- 
supporting.  Livingstone,  Cornbury  says,  had  a  corn  mill  and  a 
brewery  near  the  site  chosen,  and  the  increase  of  settlers  there 
was  a  direct  source  of  profit  to  him.  There  may  have  been  some 
foundation  for  this  last  charge.  But,  even  if  it  were  true,  one 
can  hardly  blame  Hunter,  new  to  the  colony,  if  he  took  the 
counsel  of  a  man  whom  he  must  have  known  to  be  a  capable  ad 
viser  and  a  good  public  servant.  The  other  charge  can  be  easily 
disposed  of.  If  the  Palatines  were  to  be  purveyors  for  the  Eng 
lish  navy,  they  must  be  freed  from  the  task  of  finding  their  own 
supplies. 

Dissatisfaction  with  the  home  Government  for  the  terms  of 
peace  was  not  the  only  ill  consequence  which  the  war  left  be- 
Financiai  hind.  In  1714  the  condition  of  the  public  finances 
difficulties.  was  suc}1  that  the  Assembly  had  to  apply  itself  in  real 
earnest  to  the  task  of  making  a  schedule  of  its  debts.  The  whole 
amount  was  found  to  be  nearly  twenty-eight  thousand  pounds.8 
This  was  met  by  issuing  bills  of  credit.  The  extremity  of  the 

1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  v.  p.  371. 

1  All  the  documents  with   reference  to  the  Palatines  are  to  be  found  in  the 
New  York  Historical   Documents,  vol  v. 

*  To  be  exact,    £27,600.     Acts  of  Assembly,  p.  96. 


GENERAL  EFFECT  OF  HUNTERS  POLICY.         285 

•case  and  the  need  for  gaining  the  zealous  support  of  the  colonists 
forced  Hunter  to  yield  in  part  the  point  which  he  had  hitherto 
contested.  The  bills  of  credit  were  placed  in  the  hands  of  a 
treasurer  appointed  by  the  Assembly,  to  be  paid  out  by  him  ac 
cording  to  the  instructions  of  that  body.1  The  maintained  pros 
perity  of  the  colony  under  this  heavy  burden  is  as  strong  a  proof 
as  could  be  found  of  its  resources,  of  the  stability  of  its  com 
merce  and  industry. 

It  is  easier  to  understand  the  difficulties  of  Hunter's  situation 
than  to  trace  the  precise  steps  by  which  he  overcame  them.  We 
Further  may  be  sure  that  his  success  was  largely  due  to  that 

disputes  •«•  •  . 

between  conciliatory  spirit  shown  in  dealings  with  individuals 
Governor  which  leave  little  trace  in  public  records.  At  the 
Assembly,  same  time  there  was  no  surrender  either  by  Hunter 
or  by  the  Assembly  of  the  main  constitutional  points  for  which 
they  contended.  The  Representatives  persisted  in  their  demands 
that  all  revenue  should  be  paid  into  the  hands  of  a  colonial 
Treasurer  appointed  by  themselves.  It  is  clear,  however,  that 
on  this  point  there  was  an  undercurrent  of  opposition  to  the 
dominant  party  among  the  Representatives.  A  number  of  the 
chief  New  York  merchants  drew  up  a  memorial  to  the  Lords  of 
Trade  protesting  against  the  claim  of  the  Assembly  to  be  supreme 
in  matters  of  taxation.2 

Neither  the  tactical  skill  of  Hunter  nor  the  action  of  his  allies 
among  the  colonists  could  do  more  than  postpone  the  contest. 
General  The  contention  that  in  all  matters  of  internal  finance 
Hffunte°/»  tne  Assembly  should  be  supreme  and  the  colonists 
policy.  independent  was,  under  whatever  form,  the  vital 
question  at  issue  down  to  the  separation  from  England.  But  the 
fact  that  the  difficulty  was  postponed,  not  overcome,  hardly 
makes  Hunter's  work  less  valuable.  If  the  conditions  of  the 
case  made  perfect  and  enduring  harmony  impossible,  it  was  no 
small  matter  to  secure  temporary  agreement.  Such  agreement 
was  a  needful  condition  of  success  in  that  coming  struggle  with 
France  on  which  turned  the  whole  future  of  the  English  race  in 
America. 

The  support  of  men  like  Morris  and  Livingstone,  no  doubt, 
had  its  full  share  in  strengthening  Hunter's  hands.  It  was  in  ail 

1  Acts  of  Assembly,  p.  124.  3  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  v.  pp.  522,  539. 


286  NEW    YORK  AFTER    THE  REVOLUTION. 

likelihood  the  voice  of  a  few  such  partisans  which,  in  1719,  set 
forth  the  Governor's  virtues  in  an  official  address.  Hunter  had 
announced  to  the  Assembly  that  he  had  obtained  leave  of  absence 
and  would  visit  England.  He  had  at  the  same  time  spoken  with 
enthusiasm  of  the  state  of  the  colony,  where  "the  very  name  of 
party  or  faction  seems  to  be  forgotten,"  and  of  the  existing 
Assembly  as  having  set  an  example  to  be  followed  by  all  its 
successors. 

In  reply,  the  address  of  the  Assembly  described  Hunter  as 
having  "played  the  part  of  a  prudent  magistrate  and  an  affec 
tionate  parent."  No  future  governor  could  earn  higher  praise 
than  to  be  likened  to  him.1 

1  These  proceedings  are  given  in  full  by  Smith,  pp.   187-9. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

SETTLEMENT   OF   NEW   JERSEY.1 

OF  the  religious  movements  which  England  in  the  seventeenth 
century  brought  forth,  three  have  left  abiding  traces  in  colonial 
Quakerism  history.  We  have  already  seen  Congregationalism 
fnco?°niaT  at  work  as  a  constructive  power;  we  have  seen  the 
history.  Baptist  and  the  Quaker  coming  in  as  dissentients  and 
disturbers.  Each  of  those  sects  also  took  part  in  the  task  of 
colonization.  But  the  method  in  which  each  worked  was 
widely  different.  The  Baptist,  denied  a  share  in  the  corporate 
life  of  New  England,  fashioned  for  himself  in  Rhode  Island  a 
community  in  some  measure  modeled  on  that  which  had  cast 
him  out.  He  was  at  once  the  opponent  and  the  imitator  of  New 
England  Puritanism.  There  was  no  direct  communitv  of  action 
between  the  Quakerism  which  disturbed  Boston  and  the  Quaker- 

1  The  materials  for  the  early  history  of  New  Jersey  are  abundant  in  quantity 
and,  on  the  whole,  satisfactory  in  kind.  The  archives  of  the  colony  from  the 
date  of  the  first  grant  to  Berkeley  and  Carteret  are  published  in  a  series  con 
sisting  of  ten  volumes,  edited  by  Mr.  Whitehead  under  the  authority  of  the 
State  government.  Many  of  these  documents  are  in  our  Record  Office,  some  in 
America.  Mr.  Whitehead  has  also  published  two  useful  monographs,  entitled 
East  Jersey  under  the  Proprietary  Governments,  and  Contributions  to  East 
Jersey  History.  The  best  history  of  the  colony  is  still  that  by  Samuel  Smith, 
written  in  1765.  It  is  a  sober,  business-like  work,  showing  a  careful  study  of 
original  documents.  Some  of  these  are  embodied  in  the  text,  and  do  not,  appar 
ently,  exist  elsewhere.  There  is  also  a  valuable  collection  of  documents,  pub 
lished  about  1750,  edited  by  Aaron  Learning  and  Jacob  Spicer. 

As  the  proprietorship  of  the  colony,  or  rather  of  the  two  provinces  into- 
which  it  was  divided,  passed  at  an  early  stage  into  the  hands  of  what  one  may 
call  a  joint-stock  company,  there  was  a  strong  inducement  to  stimulate  emi 
gration  by  descriptions  of  the  country.  The  result  was  a  number  of  small  books, 
or  rather  pamphlets,  much  like  those  published  in  the  early  days  of  the  Vir 
ginia  Company.  They  set  forth  the  material  resources  of  the  country,  de 
scribe  the  progress  hitherto  made  in  colonization,  and  give  practical  advice  to 
intending  emigrants.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  they  are  apt  to  give  a  somewhat 
highly  colored  picture  of  the  advantages  open  to  settlers.  Three  of  then* 
deserve  special  notice:  George  Scot  of  Pitlochie's  Model  of  the  Government  of 
the  Province  of  East  New  Jersey  in  America,  1685;  Thomas  Budd's  Good  Or 
der  Established  in  Pennsylvania  and  New  Jersey  in  America,  1685;  Gabriel 
Thomas's  Historical  and  Geographical  Account  of  the  Province  and  County  of 
Pennsylvania  and  New  Jersey,  1698.  Fenwick's  proceedings  are  described  lo 
an  excellent  little  monograph  by  R.  S.  Johnson,  published  in  1839.  Several 
original  documents  are  incorporated  with  it. 


288  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY, 

ism  which  founded  New  Jersey  and  Pennsylvania.  The  Baptist 
came  to  New  England  because  in  many  respects  he  was  in 
harmony  with  Puritanism.  The  Quaker  went  thither,  as  he 
went  to  Turkey,  because  there  was  spiritual  darkness  to  be 
cleared  away;  New  England  was  to  him  not  a  possible  home, 
but  a  mission  field.  Nor  can  we  speak  of  Quakerism  as  a  colo 
nizing  force  as  we  can  of  Puritanism.  It  is  true  that  Quakers 
became  colonists  because,  like  Puritans,  they  wanted  a  home  free 
from  the  control  of  a  State  Church,  free  from  what  they  deemed 
the  corruptions  of  the  Old  World.  But  their  religion  did  not 
of  its  very  self  suggest,  one  might  almost  say  enforce,  certain 
political  forms.  The  Congregational  system  suggested  and 
strengthened  an  appropriate  political  system.  Quakerism  had 
of  its  very  nature  no  such  creative  power.  Its  strength  lay  in 
its  assertion  that  mental  and  spiritual  life  is  not  to  be  found  in 
forms.  Its  weakness  lay  in  denying  that  such  forms  might  be 
needful  conditions  of  stability.  In  a  Puritan  community  the 
legislator  was  sure  to  find  the  spiritual  teacher  at  his  side, 
jealously  watching  his  work,  eager  to  co-operate  wherever  his 
principles  allowed  him  to  approve.  There  the  civil  power  was 
looked  upon  as  a  needful  agent  in  creating  the  highest  spiritual 
life.  With  the  Quaker  it  was  an  alien  influence,  only  needful 
because  men  had  not  risen  to  a  perception  of  spiritual  truth. 

There  is  a  faint  and  distorted  element  of  truth,  and  no  more, 
in  the  view  which  represents  Fox  as  a  puzzle-headed  fanatic, 
whose  theological  doctrines  and  moral  teaching  were  made  fit 
for  decent  society  by  educated  men  like  Penn.1  Such  a  view 
evades  criticism,  because  it  turns  on  arguments  to  which  canons 
of  criticism  are  hardly  applicable.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how 
anyone  can  study  the  writings  and  lives  of  Fox  and  his  com 
panion,  Burrows,  without  tracing  in  them  the  great  spiritual 
truths  which  found  more  definite  form  and  more  articulate, 
though  not  more  emphatic,  utterance  in  later  Quakerism.  But 
this  at  least  is  true:  the  Quakerism  of  Fox  and  Burrows  was  so 
full  of  the  elements  of  social  and  political  disruption,  so  averse 
to  compromise,  that  a  community  based  on  it  was  an  impossi- 

1  That  is  the  view  expressed  by  Lord  Macaulay.  A  hearty  admirer  of  the 
great  Whig  historian  need  not  hesitate  to  admit  that  he  was  wholly  out  of 
sympathy  with  a  manifestation  of  spiritual  enthusiasm,  such  as  that  of  the 
Quakers,  and  that  where  he  was  so  out  of  sympathy,  his  critical  faculties  were 
apt  to  fail  him. 


PENN  AND   QUAKERISM,  289 

bility.  Penn  and  those  who  acted  with  him  so  modified  their 
creed  that  it  could  enter  largely  into  the  political  life  of  a 
society  which  still  fell  short  of  their  ideal  standard.  Yet  even 
then  Quakerism  had  no  elements  in  it  which  blended  with  the 
political  life  of  the  community.  Therein  lay  its  great  difference 
from  Puritanism.  Puritanism  actually  gained  in  force  and  in 
tensity  from  union  with  the  political  life  of  New  England,  be 
cause  its  ecclesiastical  forms  at  once  allied  themselves  with 
political  forms,  because  its  moral  discipline  at  once  seized  on  the 
civil  power  as  its  instrument.  It  waned  not  because  it  was  im 
peded  by  union  with  the  civil  power,  but  because  it  could  not 
satisfy  the  mental  and  spiritual  wants  of  continued  generations. 
Quakerism,  on  the  other  hand,  was  no  more  than  a  motive  which 
impelled  men  to  choose  a  common  home.  It  did  not  inform  and 
animate  their  corporate  life,  and  it  was  thus  ever  liable  to  be 
thrust  into  the  background  by  temporal  and  secular  needs. 

At  the  same  time  if  these  considerations  made  the  ultimate 
course  of  Quaker  colonization  less  effective,  they  made  the 
initial  steps  more  easy.  The  Congregational  Puritan  could  act 
with  no  allies  but  those  who  accepted  his  doctrinal  creed,  his 
ecclesiastical  system,  and  those  political  principles  which  had  be 
come  inseparably  connected  with  that  creed  and  that  system. 
The  individual  Quaker  might  find  it  hard  to  adapt  himself  to  an 
organized  community.  But  Quakerism  as  a  whole  did  not  de 
mand  certain  specified  forms  of  civil  or  religious  life.  It  could 
not  dominate  life  as  Puritanism  did;  it  could  far  more  easily 
influence  and  modify  it. 

We  are  wont  when  Quaker  colonization  is  mentioned  to 
think  exclusively  of  Pennsylvania.  But  its  influence  extended 
New  jer-  to  the  whole  territory  between  the  Hudson  and  the 
chwlfe8*  Susquehanna.  Pennsylvania  was  hardly  more  truly 
colony.  a  Quaker  colony  than  West  New  Jersey.  The  per 
sonal  influence  of  Penn  has  indeed  given  it  a  more  prominent 
place  in  the  history  of  the  sect.  But  in  neither  case  was  the  col 
ony  set  aside  by  its  founder  as  an  exclusive  home  for  those  of  his 
own  faith.  And  if  it  be  said  that  in  New  Jersey  the  Quaker  did 
but  enter  into  an  inheritance  which  others  had  prepared  for  him, 
the  same  is  in  a  measure  true  of  Pennsylvania.  There  the 
Quaker  proprietor  found  the  nucleus  of  a  population  already  in 
possession,  and  their  presence  was  a  permanent  influence  in  the 


290  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

life  of  the  colony.  If  then  we  deal,  as  for  convenience  we  may, 
with  a  group  of  Quaker  colonies,  New  Jersey  ranks  first  among 
them  in  time.  I  have  already  described  the  process  by  which 
Carteret  and  Berkeley  acquired  a  portion  of  the  territory  which 
conquest  had  vested  in  the  Duke  of  York,  and  I  have  sketched 
the  system  on  which  at  the  outset  they  organized  their  colony. 

It  so  happened  that  the  very  epoch  at  which  New  Jersey  was 
thrown  open  to  English  settlers  witnessed  a  movement  of  emi- 
The  first  gration  from  New  England.  I  have  already  de- 
tion'oYNew  scribed  how  Newark  was  founded  by  those  resolute 
jersey.  citizens  of  New  Haven  who  could  not  brook  being 
swallowed  up  by  Connecticut.1  Elizabethtown  was  peopled  by 
another  band  of  emigrants  from  the  north-east.  Of  them  we 
know  less  than  we  do  of  the  Newark  settlers.  Some  came  from 
Jamaica  on  Long  Island,2  some  in  all  likelihood  from  New 
England.  That  this  was  so  may  be  assumed  almost  with  cer 
tainty  from  one  of  their  first  acts.  In  the  very  year  following 
the  first  occupation,  portions  of  the  territory  of  Elizabethtown 
were  detached  to  form  two  hamlets,  Woodbridge  and  Piscata- 
qua.8  Both  were  New  England  names,  and  their  retention  illus 
trates  the  persistency  with  which  the  inhabitants  of  a  New 
England  village  clung  to  the  traditions  of  their  home.  Two 
other  settlements  were  created  on  the  mainland  near  Staten 
Island,  by  the  names  of  Middletown  and  Shrewsbury.  There 
was  beside  a  Dutch  settlement  at  Bergen,4  and  there  is  reason  to 
think  that  there  were  beside  scattered  relics  of  Dutch  and 
Swedish  settlements  which  were  incorporated  with  New  Eng 
land  immigrants. 

To  all  this  tide  of  colonization  Carteret  and  Berkeley  con 
tributed  nothing.  Even  their  claim  of  territorial  sovereignty 
oftaheng8  was  imPerfectly  recognized.  Within  four  months  of 
Propne-  the  grant  to  Carteret  the  inhabitants  of  Elizabeth- 
the  exist-  town,  with  the  approval  of  the  Governor,  purchased 
merits.  '  a  title  to  the  soil  from  the  Indians  and  secured  a 


1  See  The  Puritan  Colonies,  vol.  ii.  p.   125. 

*  In  the  formal  grant  of  territory  from  Nicolls  two  of  the  grantees  are  de 
scribed  as  of  Jamaica.     N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  i.  p.   18. 

3  Whitehead,  Contributions,   pp.   354-401. 

*  Mr.   Whitehead  in  a  note  to  East  Jersey    (p.    17)   brings  together  various 
documents   which   seem  conclusively  to   show   the  continuous   existence  of  the 
Dutch  settlement  at  Bergen. 


EARLY  CORPORATE  LIFE  IN  NEW  JERSEY.        291 

confirmation  of  it  by  Nicolls.1  In  the  following  year  Nicolls 
made  a  grant  of  land  to  the  settlers  of  Middletown  and  Shrews 
bury.  Nor  did  he  limit  this  to  territorial  rights.  He  also  gave 
them  certain  rights  of  internal  jurisdiction,  and  a  guarantee 
against  being  taxed  against  their  will  for  the  maintenance  of 
clergy.2  Such  an  assertion  and  acknowledgment  of  a  certain 
sovereignty  still  vested  in  the  Duke  of  York  could  not  fail  to 
bring  about  conflict  between  the  original  Proprietor  and  his 
grantees.  For  the  present,  however,  the  settlers  by  an  illogical 
compromise  took  the  oath  of  fidelity  required  by  the  Proprietors 
of  New  Jersey.3 

For  two  years  after  the  arrival  of  Philip  Carteret  the  various 
townships  maintained  a  separate  existence,  with  no  common 
bond  save  the  vague  and  slight  one  of  their  allegiance  to  the 
Proprietors.  Such  political  life  as  they  enjoyed  lay  in  those 
municipal  institutions  which  they  had  brought  with  them  as  part 
of  their  New  England  training.  One  would  gladly  know  some 
thing  more  of  that  life  than  has  come  down  to  us.  It  would  be 
of  no  little  interest  to  mark  the  compact,  well-organized  system 
of  the  Puritan  township  passing  into  new  territory  beyond  the 
bounds  of  New  England.  One,  and  only  one,  such  trace  can  we 
find.  The  records  of  Newark  tell  us  that  the  settlers  started  on 
their  corporate  life  with  a  declaration  that  they  would  "endeavor 
the  carrying  out  of  spiritual  concernments,  as  also  civil  and  town 
affairs,"  and  that  to  this  end  none  should  enjoy  civic  rights  who 
was  not  a  member  of  a  church  congregation.4  New  Haven  had 
kept  to  the  last  to  the  rigid  and  impracticable  severity  of  her 
founders,  and  she  bequeathed  it  to  the  colonies  which  arose  out 
of  her  downfall.  We  shall  hardly  err  in  believing  that  the 
material  success  of  New  Jersey  was  due  to  this  solid  and  organ 
ized  foundation.  The  settlers  whom  Carteret  brought  out  dur 
ing  1667  and  1668  fell  into  place  as  recruits  to  a  disciplined 
force.  As  the  basis  of  the  colony  were  men  inured  to  the  hard- 


1  The  Indian  grant  and  Nicolls's  confirmation  of  it  are  given  in  full  in  the 
New  Jersey  Archives,  vol.  i.  pp.  14-19.  In  the  following  century  certain  dis 
affected  persons  in  New  Jersey  produced  a  document,  dated  1666,  by  which 
Philip  Carteret  gave  permission  to  the  settlers  to  purchase  from  the  Indians 
"what  quantity  of  land  you  shall  think  convenient." 

J  The  patent  as  confirmed  by  Carteret  in  1672  is  given  in  the  Archives,  vol. 
i.  p.  88. 

3  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  i.  pp.  48-51. 

*  Whitehead,  E.  Jersey,  p.  40. 


29*  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

ships  of  forest  life,  duly  tempered  alike  in  body  and  mind,  and 
trained  in  the  needful  kinds  of  mechanical  skill. 

Yet  this  very  cohesion  and  self-reliance  which  made  New 
Jersey  materially  prosperous  could  not  fail  to  bring  with  them 
Difficulties  political  difficulties.  The  situation  was  one  to  which 
the^oio-  tne  history  of  English  colonization  had  no  parallel. 
th^Pro-*1  Where  proprietary  government  existed  as  in  Mary- 
prietors.  land  and  in  Maine,  and  during  the  short  life  of  the 
Company  in  Virginia,  the  authority  of  the  Proprietor  and  the 
life  of  the  settlement  had  a  common  origin.  In  the  case  of  New 
York,  there  was  the  actual  transfer  of  a  sovereignty  which  had 
been  already  fully  accepted.  The  colony  handed  over  to  the 
Duke  of  York  had  been  ground  into  uniformity  by  the  harsh 
and  repressing  sway  of  the  Company.  But  the  Proprietors  of 
New  Jersey  were  called  on  to  exercise  their  authority  over  a 
body  of  townships  which  had  each  an  independent  civic  existence. 
So  far  as  the  various  members  of  the  colony  had  any  community 
of  feeling,  it  rested  on  their  past  connection  with  New  England, 
a  connection  which  was  sure  to  hinder  the  ready  acceptance  of 
the  proprietary  authority. 

The  first  attempt  to  bind  the  colony  together  for  legislative 
work  revealed  these  difficulties.  The  townships  had  their  own 
meetings.  Even  more,  Middletown  and  Shrewsbury  would  seem 
to  have  taken  common  action,  and  in  1667  to  have  held  a  joint 
meeting,  at  which  certain  laws  were  passed.1 

Such  a  proceeding  made  it  almost  impossible  that  the  system 
of  a  common  legislature  designed  by  the  Proprietors  could  work 
smoothly.  Local  meetings  would  secure  for  the  settlers  all  that 
they  needed;  the  General  Assembly  was  rather  the  badge  of  a 
domination  which  they  regarded  with  disfavor.  There  was  no 
motive  to  outweigh  the  cost  and  inconvenience  of  attendance. 

For  three  years  Carteret  made  no  attempt  to  call  together  an 
Assembly.  It  is  not  unlikely  that  the  action  of  Middletown  and 
The  First  Shrewsbury  made  him  feel  the  necessity  for  such  a 
Assembly.2  course.  In  May  1668  the  Assembly  met  at  Eliza- 
bethtown.  Its  proceedings  plainly  show  how  largely  its  mem 
bers  were  imbued  with  the  spirit  of  New  England  Puritanism. 

1  Whitehead,  E.  Jersey,  p.  61. 

2  Carteret's  proclamation  calling  the  Assembly  is  in  the  Archives,   vol.   i.   p. 
56.     The  proceedings  of  the  Assembly  are  in  Learning  and  Spicer,  p.  78. 


PURITANIC  LEGISLATION.  293 

Thus  swearing,  drunkenness,  and  fornication  were  all  made 
penal,  any  person  tippling  or  walking  abroad  after  nine  at  night 
was  to  be  punished  at  the  discretion  of  the  magistrate,  and  the 
child  over  sixteen  who  should  curse  or  smite  a  parent  was  to  be 
put  to  death.  An  Act  was  also  passed  in  the  true  New  Eng 
land  spirit  of  protective  legislation,  forbidding  imprudent  mar 
riages.  It  is  somewhat  remarkable  that  the  stealing  of  mankind 
was  made  a  capital  offense.  In  all  likelihood  this  meant  merely 
the  kidnapping  of  free  men,  and  did  not  in  any  way  limit  slavery 
or  the  employment  of  indented  servants.  Some  light  is  thrown 
on  the  condition  of  the  colony  by  other  enactments.  Every  male 
over  sixteen  was  to  provide  himself  with  a  serviceable  gun  and 
ammunition.  Rates  might  be  paid  in  commodities  estimated  at 
a  fixed  value.  Each  township  was  to  have  a  brand  for  its  own 
live  stock,  and  all  sales  of  horses  were  to  be  registered.  We 
may  assume  that  there  was  enough  intercourse  between  the  town 
ships  to  make  it  needful  to  provide  for  travelers,  since  every 
town  was  bound  to  keep  an  ordinary.  One  enactment  shows 
that  the  province  was  still  in  that  condition  when  public  office 
is  looked  on  as  a  burden  rather  than  a  privilege,  since  all  deputies 
absenting  themselves  were  fined  four  shillings  for  each  day  of 
absence. 

This  attempt  to  enforce  attendance  seems  to  have  been  but 
imperfectly  successful,  since  after  a  session  of  four  days  several 
members  objected  to  a  longer  absence  from  their  homes,  and  the 
meeting  broke  up.1  Part  of  the  proceedings  of  the  Assembly 
was  the  levy  of  a  rate  for  public  expenses.  This  Middletown 
and  Shrewsbury  refused  to  pay.  There  is  no  record  of  the 
ground  for  their  refusal.2 

When  the  Assembly  again  met  in  November  the  same  spirit 
prevailed.  The  elected  Representative;  from  Middletown  and 
Shrewsbury  refused  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  and  fidelity 
except  with  certain  reservations.8  It  is  clear  that  in  this  matter 
they  were  representing  the  temper  of  their  constituents.  In 
March  1669  the  Governor  found  it  necessary  to  issue  an  order 
that  no  inhabitant  of  Middletown  or  Shrewsbury  should  hold 
any  office  or  have  the  right  of  voting  unless  he  took  the  oath  of 
allegiance  to  the  King  and  fidelity  to  the  Proprietors.4  At  the 

1  Learning    and    Spicer,    84.  *  Ib.    89.  » Ib.    85. 

4  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  i.  p.  59. 


294  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

same  time  we  find  a  reference  in  the  archives  to  a  certain  paper 
reprinted  by  the  inhabitants  of  Middletown  in  opposition  to  the 
laws.1  This  was  not  all.  The  Representatives  of  those  other 
districts  which  accepted  the  authority  of  the  Proprietors  quar 
reled  with  the  system  whereby  they  and  the  Council  sat  in 
separate  chambers.  It  was  impossible,  they  said,  to  work  to 
gether  smoothly,  and  after  a  short  session  they  dissolved.2 

So  far,  though  there  had  been  occasional  disaffection,  the  real 
force  which  was  certain  to  kindle  active  hostility  between  the 
Difficulties  Proprietors  and  the  settlers  had  not  come  into  play. 
the^Pro™  Under  the  Concessions  no  quit-rents  were  to  be  levied 
and6 th"  ^or  th6  ^rst  ^ve  vears-  It  was  very  certain  that 
settlers.  when  they  were  called  for  they  would  be  withheld. 
The  settlers  in  establishing  themselves  had  bought  the  soil  from 
the  Indians,  whom  they  regarded  as  the  equitable  owners,  and 
by  their  agreements  with  Nicolls  they  had  satisfied  the  claims  of 
the  Crown.  They  might  well  resent  the  intrusion  of  a  body 
in  whose  demands  they  could  trace  nothing  of  moral  right. 
The  first  recorded  symptom  of  the  coming  storm  was  the  claim 
set  up  by  the  townsmen  of  Woodbridge  to  admit  as  freemen  in 
comers  who  had  not  taken  out  patents  for  their  land.  They 
were  formally  admonished  by  the  Governor  that  no  one  could 
hold  land,  enjoy  any  office,  nor  have  a  vote  at  the  town  meet 
ing  unless  he  accepted  the  authority  of  the  Proprietors.' 

In  the  following  year  discontent  grew  into  open  defiance  of 
authority.  Under  the  Concessions  sent  out  by  the  Proprietors 
Rebellion  it  was  specially  provided  that  there  should  be  at  the 
jTmes  beginning  of  every  year  an  Assembly.  Philip  Car- 

Carteret.<  teret,  however,  omitted  to  summon  one.  Thereupon 
five  of  the  seven  towns — Elizabethtown,  Newark,  Woodbridge, 
Piscataqua,  and  Bergen — elected  Representatives  who  met  in 
session  at  Elizabethtown.  It  was  further  provided  by  the  Con 
cessions  that  if  the  Governor  should  absent  himself  from  an 


1  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  i.  p.  61. 

2  Learning  and   Spicer,  p.  90. 

*  Carteret's  letter  is  in  the  Archives,  vol.  i.  p.  63.     It  is  addressed  to  "Mr. 
John   Pike,   Justice   of   Peace  and   President  of   the   Court  at   Woodbridge,   his 
assistants,    and   to   all   other   the   well-affected   persons   of  that    Corporation  or 
whom  it  may  concern." 

*  Our   knowledge   of  this  business   is   derived   mainly   from    Philip   Carteret's 
proclamation.     N.  J.   Archives,  vol.  i.  p.  89.     The  Labadists  give  a  bad  report 
of  James   Carteret. 


THE  REBELLION  AND  JAMES  CARTERET.          295 

Assembly,  it  should  be  competent  for  the  deputies  to  elect  a 
president.  The  elected  Representatives  interpreted  this  to 
mean,  not  that  the  Assembly  might  supply  itself  with  a  chair 
man,  but  that  it  might  by  its  vote  supersede  the  Governor.  Act 
ing  on  this  theory  they  chose  James  Carteret,  a  disreputable 
young  cadet  of  the  Proprietor's  house,  who  was  on  his  way  to 
Carolina.  Without  knowing  more  of  the  details  of  the  matter 
than  have  come  down  to  us,  it  is  impossible  to  speak  with  any 
confidence  as  to  the  equity  of  the  case.  The  settlers  had  un 
doubtedly  at  the  very  outset  a  grievance  in  seeing  the  title  which 
they  had,  as  they  thought,  acquired  from  Nicolls  overridden. 
On  the  other  hand  their  choice  of  James  Carteret  did  them  little 
credit.  But  it  is  at  least  clear  that  they  sought  redress  in  a 
sober,  constitutional  fashion,  limiting  themselves  to  certain  defi 
nite  claims. 

Philip  Carteret  issued  a  proclamation  commanding  the  depu 
ties  of  the  five  towns  to  make  submission  and  return  to  their 
allegiance.  He  then  fled  to  England  to  obtain  support  from  the 
Proprietors. 

If  the  Assembly  had  thought  to  profit  themselves  by  putting 
a  Carteret  at  the  head  of  a  movement  they  were  deceived.  The 
Proprietors  showed  no  hesitation  in  supporting  their  Governor. 
James  Carteret  was  ordered  to  resume  his  journey  to  Carolina, 
and  the  Proprietors  sent  the  Governor  back,  fortified  with  two 
documents.1  One  was  a  declaration  that  no  land  grants  made 
by  Philip  Carteret  could  be  upset  or  revoked,  and  that  no  patent 
from  Nicolls  or  from  anyone  but  the  Proprietors  had  any  va 
lidity.  The  malcontents  were  to  be  proceeded  against  accord 
ing  to  Philip  Carteret's  declaration  unless  they  forthwith  peti 
tioned  for  the  remission  of  their  punishment.  Together  with 
this  was  sent  a  document,  avowedly  a  declaration  of  the  true 
meaning  of  the  Concessions,  that  is  to  say,  of  the  conditions 
which  the  Proprietors  had  made  with  the  settlers,  in  reality  an 
alteration  of  them  in  more  than  one  important  point.  The 
power  of  appointing  ministers  of  religion,  a  power  which  the 
original  Concessions  vested  in  the  Assembly,  was  now  transferred 
to  the  Governor  and  Council.  Formerly  the  Governor  was 
bound  to  summon  a  General  Assembly  at  the  beginning  of  every 
year ;  now  he  was  left  free  to  summon  it,  and  to  dissolve  it  at  his 

1  Both  are  in  the  New  Jersey  Archives,  vol.  i.  pp.  99-103. 


296  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

discretion.  The  right  to  grant  land  and  to  admit  freemen  was 
transferred  from  the  Assembly  to  the  Governor  and  Council. 
It  was  also  decided  that  the  Governor  and  Council  should  con 
tinue  to  sit  as  a  second  chamber.  It  was  further  ordered  that 
no  one  could  be  a  freeman — that  is,  vote  for  Representatives  in 
the  Assembly — who  did  not  hold  land  under  a  patent  from  the 
Proprietors.  This  was  in  defiance  of  an  article  in  the  Conces 
sions,  which  expressly  granted  the  freedom  of  the  colony  to  all 
who  would  take  an  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  King  and  fidelity 
to  the  Proprietors.  It  is  true  that  the  same  clause  reserved  to 
the  Proprietors  the  right  of  changing  this  condition,  but  no  such 
change  was  to  affect  any  interests  already  existing.  This  en 
croachment  on  the  Concessions  was  practically  identical  with  the 
declaration  that  the  patents  granted  by  Nicolls  were  null  and 
void,  and  those  who  held  them  must  take  out  fresh  patents  from 
the  Proprietors. 

The  result  was,  at  least  for  the  time  being,  a  victory  for  the 
Proprietors.  It  is  noteworthy  that  Middletown  and  Shrews- 
Special  bury  had  in  the  original  attack  made  on  the  Governor 

privileges 

granted  to     stood  aloof  f  rom  all  the  other  towns.     There  was 

Middle-  .......  ,          .  .          T 

town  and  nothing  in  their  origin  to  account  for  this.  It  must 
bury.  have  been  due  to  some  unrecorded  personal  influence. 

They  were  rewarded  by  a  grant  of  special  privileges  which 
placed  them  on  a  different  footing  from  the  rest  of  the  colony.1 
The  patent  granted  them  by  Nicolls  was  confirmed  in  full. 
Thus  the  Proprietors  in  the  case  of  these  townships  abandoned 
all  territorial  rights.  They  were  invested  with  supreme  juris 
diction  in  all  cases  under  ten  pounds;  in  all  civil  and  military- 
appointments  the  freeholders  were  to  nominate  two  from  whom 
the  Governor  was  to  choose,  and  no  compulsory  rate  was  to  be 
levied  in  either  township  for  the  maintenance  of  a  minister  of 
religion. 

In  1673  the  invading  Dutch  force  met  with  no  more  forcible 
opposition  from  the  English  settlers  of  New  Jersey  than  they 
The  Dutch  did  from  their  countrymen  on  the  Hudson.  John 
reconquest.:  Berry  had  been  left  by  Philip  Carteret  to  act  as 
Deputy  in  his  absence.2  If  he  had  any  purpose  of  resistance  it 

1  See  Appendix  IV. 

2  Berry's  commission  does  not  seem  to  be  extant.     He  is  frequently  referred 
to  as  Deputy-Governor. 


THE  DUTCH  RECONQUEST.  297 

was  at  once  frustrated  by  the  action  of  the  deputies.  As  soon 
as  the  news  came  that  New  York  was  occupied,  the  deputies  of 
four  towns — Elizabethtown,  Newark,  Woodbridge,  and  Piscata- 
qua — sent  a  petition  desiring  to  be  heard  in  the  matter  of  a  sur 
render,  and  specially  asking  that  till  then  no  audience  should  be 
granted  to  Berry.1  As  in  the  previous  year,  the  men  of  Middle- 
town  and  Shrewsbury  showed  themselves  more  loyal  to  the  Pro 
prietors  and  took  no  part  in  the  petition.  The  Dutch  settlers 
of  Bergen  also  stood  aloof,  probably  taking  the  view  that  their 
allegiance  would  be  accepted  as  a  thing  of  course,  without  special 
surrender.  The  petition  was  favorably  received ;  the  four  town 
ships  were  to  send  delegates  to  treat  with  the  Dutch  authorities, 
and  warning  was  sent  to  the  other  settlers  to  do  the  same  on 
pain  of  attack.  The  threat  was  effective  and  delegates  from  six 
English  settlements  attended.  Their  surrender  was  received  on 
the  same  terms  that  had  been  granted  to  the  English  settlers  in 
New  Netherlands.  Government  was  to  be  carried  on  thus: 
each  town  was  to  name  six  men  for  the  office  of  Schepen,  and  of 
those  six  the  Dutch  Governor  and  his  Council  were  to  choose 
three.  Delegates  from  all  the  towns  were  to  nominate  two 
men,  one  of  whom  was  to  be  named  as  Schout.  A  Secretary 
was  to  be  chosen  in  the  same  fashion.  The  latter  office  was  be 
stowed  on  that  Samuel  Hopkins  who  had  contributed  so  largely 
to  the  success  of  the  Dutch  enterprise.2  Bergen,  of  special 
favor,  was  allowed  to  choose  its  own  Schepens,  together  with  a 
single  officer  to  act  both  as  Schout  and  Secretary. 

In  September  the  Council  of  New  Netherlands  issued  an  order 
which  practically  defined  the  constitution  of  New  Jersey  in  its. 
The  Dutch  altered  form.3  As  in  New  Netherlands,  the  Re- 
fixesnthe  formed  religion  as  accepted  by  the  Synod  of  Dort  was, 
ti°onSof  New  to  ^e  maintained  throughout  the  colony.  Civil  and 
jersey.  criminal  jurisdiction  was  to  be  vested  in  the  first 
instance  in  the  Schepens  of  each  township :  in  important  cases  or 
on  appeal,  in  the  Schout  and  the  Schepens  of  the  whole  colony.. 
In  all  civil  cases  over  two  hundred  and  forty  florins  there  was  a 
further  appeal  to  the  Governor  and  Council.  The  townsmen 

1  This  application  is  recorded  in  the  Minutes  of  the  Council  of  New  Neth 
erlands,   N.   Y.   Docs.  vol.  ii.     This  and  all  the  other  passages  bearing  on  the 
dealings   of  the   Council   with   New   Jersey  are   given  also   in  the  New  Jersey 
Archives,  vol.  i.  pp.   122-51. 

2  V.s.  p.  137.  *  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  i.  pp.   135-7. 


SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

had  in  the  first  instance  had  a  share  in  the  nomination  of  their 
•Schepens.  This  was  not  to  be  so  in  future.  The  Schout  and 
.Schepens  before  retiring  from  office  were  to  draw  up  a  list. 
From  this  and  from  the  retiring  officers  the  Supreme  Council 
were  to  nominate  the  new  officers.  Thus  the  whole  jurisdiction, 
civil  and  criminal,  was  vested  in  what  would  become  more  and 
more  an  irresponsible  oligarchy.  The  power  of  this  body,  sub 
divided  into  smaller  local  oligarchies,  was  to  override  the  old 
power  of  the  townships.  In  each  district  the  laying  out  of  high 
ways,  the  allotment  of  ground,  the  observance  of  the  Sabbath, 
the  erection  of  schools  and  churches — in  short  all  that  in  the 
free  New  England  township  was  left  to  the  town  meeting  was 
here  transferred  to  the  Schepens.  Nor  was  anything  said  of  a 
general  legislative  assembly,  while  the  Governor  and  Council 
reserved  to  themselves  the  right  to  publish  ordinances  which 
should  have  the  full  force  of  laws. 

That  there  was  no  implied  reservation  of  power  vested  in  the 
people  and  exercised  by  their  representatives  is  clear,  since  in 
Assembly  November  the  Schout  and  Schepens  met  at  Elizabeth- 
betht'own.  town  under  the  title  of  an  Assembly,1  but  there  is 
nothing  to  show  what  were  its  proceedings. 

We  have  already  seen  how  New  Netherlands  was  won  back 
for  England,  how  that  acquisition  brought  with  it  the  transfer 
Recovery  of  the  dependencies  on  the  Delaware,  and  with  what 
•colony  by  craft  Carteret  contrived  that  his  own  territorial  privi- 
.prietors.  leges  should  be  restored  to  him  unimpaired.  Early 
in  1674  Philip  Carteret  reappeared  in  the  colony.  It  may  well 
be  that  the  harsh  and  ungenial  prospect  opened  by  Dutch  rule 
-had  cleared  away  any  feeling  of  dissatisfaction  against  the  Pro 
prietors  which  had  existed.  The  instructions  issued  to  Philip 
Carteret  were  practically  a  reaffirmation  of  the  ground  taken  by 
the  Proprietors  in  their  dispute  with  the  colonists  three  years 
before.2  No  one  was  to  have  the  rights  of  a  freeman  unless  he 
Jield  land  under  a  patent  from  the  Proprietors.  The  patents 
granted  by  Nicolls  were  to  be  null  and  void.  But  the  Proprie 
tors  with  wise  moderation  granted  to  all  who  held  under  such 
patents  five  hundred  acres  of  land  in  such  places  as  should  not 

1  Mr.  Whitehead  gives  an  extract  from  the  Albany  Records  showing  the  ex 
istence  of  this  body. 

*  The  instructions  are  printed  in   full  in  the  Archives,   vol.   i.   pp.    167-75. 


TRANSFER   OF  LAND    TO  PENN.  299 

prejudice  any  other  inhabitants.  The  same  moderation  was 
shown  towards  those  who  had  supported  James  Carteret.  It 
was  only  required  that  they  should  formally  sue  pardon  from  the 
Governor,  and  indemnify  any  private  persons  who  had  sustained 
loss  by  the  outbreak.  It  is  plain  that  the  freeholders  as  repre 
sented  by  the  Assembly  met  the  Proprietors  in  a  like  spirit  of 
conciliation.  An  Act  was  passed  annulling  all  contracts  which 
had  been  made  for  revolutionary  purposes,  and  prohibiting  the 
use  of  any  language  which  could  revive  differences.1 

In  the  next  year  came  the  transfer  of  which  I  have  already 
spoken  from  Carteret's  partner  Berkeley  to  Bylling.  Bylling 
Transfer  was  Jn  difficulties,  and  it  is  said  that  the  sale  was 

•of  land 

to  Penn  an  act  of  charity  on  the  part  of  Berkeley.2  It 
partners.  is  more  likely  that  the  charity  came  in  elsewhere. 
With  Bylling  were  associated  three  prosperous  members  of  his 
sect,  one  of  them  William  Penn.  It  has  always  been  the 
practice  of  the  Quaker  brotherhood  to  rescue  insolvent  members 
of  their  own  sect,  and  in  all  likelihood  this,  Penn's  first,  step  in 
the  direction  of  colonization  was  taken  with  that  motive.  Be 
that  as  it  may,  by  a  deed  dated  February  10,  1674,  Bylling's 
interest  was  vested  in  Penn,  Gawain  Lawrie,  and  Nicolas 
Lucas.3  Fenwick  retained  an  interest  of  one-tenth,  which,  mak 
ing  worse  the  existing  complication,  he  appears  to  have  encum- 
l>ered  by  a  mortgage  or  sale,  involving  a  further  subdivision.4 

The  only  one  of  the  new  firm,  as  we  may  call  them,  who  took 
any  immediate  action  was  Fenwick.  Issuing  highly  colored 
Fenwick's  accounts  of  a  country  of  which  in  reality  he  knew 

proceed-  i  •        5   i  i          i         t         i       e    r^     \ 

ings.  ,  nothing,  he  soon  gathered  a  band  of  Quaker  emi 
grants.  But  before  sailing  he  was  arrested,  and  though  he  suc 
ceeded  in  getting  free  he  lost  his  title-deeds,  a  loss  which  brought 
trouble  with  it  later.8 

In  1675  Fenwick  sailed  from  London.  To  keep  wholly  clear 
of  the  existing  province  under  Carteret  he  pitched  on  the  west 
side  of  the  peninsula  for  the  site  of  his  settlement,  and  in  the 
autumn  landed  on  the  north-east  bank  of  the  Delaware,  nearly 

1  Learning  and  Spicer,  p.   no. 

1  This  is  stated  in  the  travels  of  the  Labadists,  p.  241. 
•*  Smith,   p.    79. 

*  Archives,   vol.   i.   p.   233.     All  that  is  clear  is  that  Fenwick  parted  with   a 
share  of  his  interest,  and  still  retained  a  certain  share. 
•*  Travels  of  the  Labadists,  p.  242.  "Ib. 


300  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

opposite  the  site  of  the  Swedish  colony  at  Newcastle.  The  folly 
against  which  Nicolls  had  vainly  remonstrated,  of  separating 
the  settlements  on  the  Delaware  from  those  on  the  Hudson  by 
the  creation  of  an  intermediate  province,  was  now  fully  seen. 
Fenwick  appears  to  have  known  nothing  of  the  condition  of  the 
country  to  which  he  was  coming.  He  made  his  grants  of  land 
from  an  imperfect  map,  and  partitioned  out  to  his  settlers 
swamps  and  woods  as  though  they  had  been  habitable  territory. 
Owing  to  this  and  the  loss  of  the  title-deeds,  the  settlers  were 
unable  to  identify  the  tracts  which  they  had  bought.1 

A  body  of  emigrants  united  by  merely  commercial  motives  and 
the  ties  of  worldly  interest  would  inevitably  have  fallen  to 
settle-  pieces.  But  it  is  plain  that  Fenwick's  followers,  or 
Salem  and  at  least  a  party  among  them,  were  bound  together  by 
Cohansjck.  t^e  same  strong  sense  of  corporate  aims  which  ani 
mated  a  New  England  community.  Some  fell  away,  settling  as 
it  would  seem  in  other  colonies.2  The  rest,  however,  accepted 
and  did  their  best  to  remedy  the  defects  of  their  position.  A 
fresh  survey  of  land  was  ordered  and  two  towns  were  laid  out,, 
each  with  its  tract  of  common  granted  to  it  by  Fenwick.8  One,. 
Cohansick,  seems  to  have  been  no  more  than  a  scattered  rural 
township ;  the  other,  Salem,  was  a  village  methodically  laid  out,, 
with  its  street  down  the  middle  and  on  either  side  houses,  each 
with  its  sixteen-acre  inclosure.4 

Although  the  Duke,  by  his  grant  to  Berkeley  and  Carteret, 
had  divested  himself  of  all  control  over  the  territory,  yet  there 
Difficulties  seem  to  have  been  settlers  there  who  regarded  them- 
«utinge  selves  as  attached  to  the  government  at  Newcastle 
and'wfth  anc^  w^°  resented  Fenwick's  intrusion.  According 
Andros.  to  their  statement  he  had  turned  out  peaceful  in 
habitants  and  destroyed  their  buildings.  The  matter  was 
brought  before  Cantwell,  the  Sheriff  at  Newcastle,  and  was 
promptly  reported  to  Andros.5  Andros  was  at  this  very  time 
reorganizing  the  government  on  the  Delaware,  and  creating  two 
subordinate  courts  at  Upland  and  Hoarkill,  under  the  jurisdic 
tion  of  Newcastle.  To  take  Fenwick  in  hand  fell  in  naturally 
with  this  policy.  Accordingly  Collier,  the  newly  appointed  mili- 

1  Travels  of  the  Labadists. 

*  Agreement  between  Fenwick  and  the  colonists  quoted  by  Johnson,  p.   16. 

*  Ib.  p.  17.  *Ib.  BBrodhead,  vol.  i.  p.  302. 


FEN  WICK  ARRESTED.  301 

tary  Commander  at  Newcastle,  was  specially  instructed  to  arrest 
Fenwick  and  send  him  to  New  York.1  Collier  appears  to  have 
modified  his  instructions  and  to  have  contented  himself  with  a 
"friendly  and  civil  letter,"  in  which  he  requested  Fenwick  to 
come  to  Newcastle.  Fenwick,  obstinate  with  the  combined 
obstinacy  of  a  Quaker  and  an  old  Ironsides,  refused  to  come. 
Collier  then  visited  him  in  person.  Fenwick  refused  to  accept 
any  orders  unless  they  came  direct  from  the  King  or  the  Duke 
of  York,  and,  having  succeeded  in  thrusting  Collier  from  the 
house,  finished  the  colloquy  through  a  hole  in  the  door.  Collier 
reported  the  matter  to  the  four  magistrates  who  formed  his 
Council.  With  their  approval  he  issued  an  order  for  the  arrest 
of  Fenwick,  who  was  sent  prisoner  to  New  York.2  His  ina 
bility  to  produce  the  originals  of  his  documents  told  against  him, 
and  he  was  fined  forty  pounds  and  for  some  time  kept  in  custody, 
but  was  finally  released  on  pledging  himself,  if  we  may  believe 
Andros,  to  exercise  no  authority  in  New  Jersey.3 

This  dispute  is  not  unimportant  since  it  undoubtedly  did  much 
to  determine  the  attitude  which  Andros  adopted  in  all  his  deal- 
Division  ings  with  the  settlements  on  the  Delaware.  The 
province.  crude  and  ill-considered  enterprise  of  Fenwick  was 
soon  followed  by  more  methodical  and  judicious  attempts.  The 
division  of  the  territory  was  a  necessary  step  before  it  could  be 
turned  to  account.  The  formation  of  the  country  suggested 
the  severing  of  it  into  two  portions,  each  with  its  own  river 
frontage.  The  south-west  bank  of  the  Hudson  and  the  north 
west  bank  of  the  Delaware  were  each  well  fitted  to  be  the  home 
of  a  community  living  in  part  by  agriculture,  in  part  by  trade. 
But  between  the  two  there  was  no  real  and  integral  connection. 
A  pathless  wilderness  severed  them ;  there  could  be  no  communi 
cation  for  trade,  for  common  political  action,  nor  for  defense. 
If  either  was  to  be  united  with  any  other  territory,  the  north 
eastern  half  belonged  naturally  to  New  York,  the  south-western 
to  the  little  dependency  which  had  its  head-quarters  at  New- 

1  The  letter  from  Andros  to  Collier  is  in  the  Archives,  vol.  i.  p.  189. 

*  All  these  proceedings  are  described  in  the  Minutes  of  a  Court  held  at  New 
castle,  Archives,  vol.  i.  p.  190.  Fenwick's  own  side  of  the  story  is  told  in  a 
document,  drawn  up  by  himself,  called  A  Remonstrance  and  Declaration  (pub 
lished  by  Johnson),  pp.  37,  &c. 

8  The  proceedings  at  New  York  against  Fenwick  are  all  in  the  New  York 
Documents,  vol.  xii.,  and  have  been  reprinted  in  the  New  Jersey  Archives,  vol. 
i-  PP-  235-9- 


302  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

castle.  If  the  whole  territory  had  been  under  the  direct  control 
of  the  Crown  it  is  possible  that  the  growing  sense  of  the  necessity 
for  colonial  unity,  both  for  purposes  of  defense  and  for  purposes 
of  trade,  would  have  hindered  any  scheme  for  division.  But 
Berkeley  and  Carteret  were  certain  to  deal  with  their  territory 
on  purely  commercial  grounds,  and  on  those  grounds  a  definite 
apportionment  of  territory  to  Bylling  and  his  partners  was  ex 
pedient.  Accordingly,  some  two  months  after  Fenwick's  arrival 
at  Salem,  an  agreement  was  drawn  up  by  which  the  province 
was  divided  into  two  moieties,  whereof  the  western,  that  on  the 
Delaware,  was  assigned  to  Penn  and  his  partners,  while  the 
eastern  was  retained  by  Carteret.1  As  a  mere  division  of  a 
landed  estate  the  arrangement  was  complete,  and  there  could  be 
no  doubt  that  so  far  its  main  purpose  was  a  good  one.  But  it 
wholly  failed  to  solve  an  important  difficulty,  which  as  time 
showed  could  not  be  ignored.  It  conveyed  to  Penn  and  his, 
partners  all  such  rights  over  the  western  portion  of  the  province 
as  Carteret  and  Berkeley  had  received  from  the  Duke.  But  the 
extent  of  those  rights  was  not  specified,  and  it  is  difficult  to  think 
that  the  omission  was  accidental.  Nothing  in  the  deed  showed 
whether  the  Duke's  grant  to  Carteret  was  merely  territorial,  or 
whether  it  carried  with  it  political  sovereignty.  Yet  at  this  very 
time  Philip  Carteret  was  engaged  in  a  dispute  with  the  Duke  of 
York's  collector  of  customs,  Dyer.2  We  can  hardly  suppose 
that  Penn  and  his  partners  did  not  know  that  fact.  If  they 
knew  it  in  all  likelihood  they  saw  the  difficulty  ahead,  and 
avoided  instead  of  facing  it. 

In  the  summer  of  1676  the  partners  sent  out  commissioners  to- 
represent  them  in  the  colony.  The  designs  of  the  new  Proprie- 
Poiicyof  tors  may  be  learnt  from  their  instructions  to  their 
hie8nasso-d  commissioners,3  from  a  letter  to  their  intending 
ciates.  settlers,4  and  from  an  agreement  drawn  up  with  them 
and  signed  by  each  party.5  The  commissioners,  three  in  num 
ber,  were  to  represent  the  Proprietors,  and  to  act  as  an  executive 
government  for  the  colony  till  such  a  time  as  a  representative 
Assembly  should  be  set  on  foot.  The  commissioners  were  to 

1  The  deed  of  division  is  in  the  Archives,  vol.  i.  p.  205. 

*  A  letter  from  Werden,  the  Duke  of  York's  Secretary,  to  Andros,  August: 
31,  1676,  refers  to  Dyer's  "late  bickering  with  Captain  Carteret."  N.  Y.  Docs, 
vol.  iii.  p.  240. 

•New  Jersey  Archives,  vol.  i.  p.  219.  *  Ib.  p.  231.  5  Ib.  p.  241.. 


SETTLEMENT  OF   THE    WESTERN  PROVINCE.     303- 

hold  office  for  a  year  and  then  to  be  reappointed.  Should  the 
Proprietors  neglect  to  appoint,  the  right  devolved  on  the  free 
holders.  It  is  not  easy  to  understand  the  precise  details  of  the 
land  system  intended.  Apparently  the  commissioners  were  to> 
choose  sites  for  townships,  taking  care  to  satisfy  by  purchase  any 
claim  which  the  natives  might  have.  Each  township  was  to  be- 
divided  into  a  hundred  spaces.  These  were  to  be  assigned  by 
lot  to  the  various  Proprietors  and  then  sold  to  the  settlers.  In 
fact  it  was  the  duty  of  the  commissioners,  first  to  secure  an  equita 
ble  partition  of  the  soil  among  the  Proprietors,  and  then  a  satis 
factory  distribution  of  it  among  the  freeholders.  It  is  plain 
that  the  Proprietors  considered  that  Fenwick  in  establishing 
himself,  and  so  getting  first  choice  of  land,  had  encroached  on 
the  rights  of  his  colleagues.  Accordingly,  in  portioning  out  the- 
territory  the  ground  already  occupied  by  his  grantees  was  to  be 
included,  but  the  actual  occupants  were  not  to  be  disturbed.  If 
when  the  lots  were  cast  the  ground  occupied  by  them  fell  to  any- 
other  Proprietor,  the  occupying  holder  was  to  retain  his  land,, 
and  the  Proprietor  was  to  receive  an  equivalent  out  of  Fenwick's 
lot.  Fixed  quantities  of  land  were  to  be  assigned  to  all  persons 
approved  by  the  Proprietors,  and  emigrating  at  their  own  cost. 
Those  who  went  out  in  the  first  year  (1677)  were  to  receive 
seventy  acres,  with  seventy  more  for  every  able-bodied  male- 
servant,  and  fifty  for  every  woman  or  inferior  man-servant.  In 
the  next  year  these  quantities  were  to  be  reduced  to  fifty  and 
thirty  acres,  in  the  following  year  to  forty  and  twenty.  For 
such  land  a  quit-rent  was  to  be  paid  of  a  penny  an  acre  if  the^ 
land  was  within  a  township,  otherwise  a  half-penny.  But  if 
any  tenant  failed  adequately  to  occupy  his  land — that  is  to  settle: 
it  with  a  servant  to  every  hundred  acres — the  holding  was  to 
revert  to  the  Proprietors  for  twenty  years.1 

Besides  these  provisions  for  dealing  with  the  land,  thirty-two 
articles  were  drawn  up  defining  the  constitution  of  the  colony. 
Articles  The  first  set  forth  that  the  constitution  there  de 
stitution,  scribed  was  to  be  unalterable,  and  that  the  Assembly 
was  to  have  no  power  to  make  any  laws  at  variance  with  it. 
This  was  confirmed  by  the  second,  which  prescribed  that  any 
person  designedly,  willfully,  or  maliciously  moving  anything. 

1  It  would  seem  that  after  twenty  years  the  interest  of  the  original  tenant 
has  to  revive. 


304  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

which  should  subvert  or  contradict  the  fundamental  constitution 
was  to  be  treated  as  a  traitor. 

It  is  needless  to  point  out  the  futility  of  such  a  provision. 
There  must  in  every  community  be  some  sovereign  body  which 
has  among  its  other  powers  the  power  to  annul  any  law.  It  is 
certain,  too,  that  when  the  time  comes  if  men  wish  the  constitu 
tion  altered  they  will  alter  it,  if  not  avowedly,  by  raising  ques 
tions  of  interpretation.  Such  a  declaration  is  only  valuable  as 
an  emphatic  way  of  saying  that  those  who  have  fashioned  the  con 
stitution  wish  it  to  be  permanent.  The  constitution  went  on  to 
enact  that  no  person  should  suffer  in  any  way  for  his  religious 
faith  or  his  form  of  worship,  that  there  should  be  trial  by  jury, 
and  that  the  liberty  of  the  subject  should  be  secured  by  provisions 
analogous  to  those  of  the  Habeas  Corpus  Act. 

Special  provision  was  made  for  avoiding  any  hostility  with  the 
Indians.  No  land  was  to  be  taken  up  till  the  commissioners  had 
satisfied  themselves  that  the  claims  of  the  native  occupants  had 
been  fully  satisfied,  and  all  cases  between  a  native  and  an  Eng 
lishman  were  to  be  tried  by  a  mixed  jury.  The  Proprietors  ex 
pressly  renounced  all  right  of  taxation.  No  impost  of  any  kind 
might  be  imposed  except  with  the  approval  of  the  Assembly. 
Till  that  should  come  into  existence  the  direct  consent  of  the 
people  themselves  was  required. 

The  existence  of  a  representative  Assembly  was  to  be  post 
poned  till  the  formation  of  local  divisions.  When  the  surveying 
and  allotment  of  the  holdings  were  complete  there  would  be  a 
hundred  townships,  or  as  they  were  to  be  called  proprietorships. 
Each  of  these  was  to  return  a  member.  The  Assembly  thus 
composed  was  to  be  the  supreme  legislative  body,  but  its  powers 
were,  as  we  have  just  seen,  to  be  limited  by  the  immutable 
character  of  the  fundamental  constitutions.  The  Assembly 
was  to  elect  ten  commissioners,  to  act  as  the  Executive  Coun 
cil  of  the  Province.  Judges  and  other  officials  were  to  be 
chosen  by  the  Assembly,  justices  and  constables  by  the  people, 
probably  acting  in  their  different  districts,  though  this  is  not 
expressed. 

There  is  in  this  constitution  something,  though  far  less,  of  the 
same  elaborate  and  fantastic  character  as  there  is  in  the  first  con 
stitution  of  Carolina.  It  is  an  attempt  to  construct  an  ideal 
community  with  little  regard  to  the  peculiar  needs  and  condition 


FOUNDATION  OF  BURLINGTON.  305 

-of  the  country.  Especially  was  it  an  error  to  require  a  hundred 
members  for  the  Assembly. 

In  the  same  year  the  foundation  of  the  new  province  was  laid 
by  a  settlement  on  an  eastern  tributary  of  the  Delaware  above 
Founda-  Salem.  The  settlers  came  in  two  bodies,  one  from 
Burifng-  London,  one  from  Yorkshire,  each  with  certain  terri- 
ton-  torial  rights  acquired  by  purchase  from  Penn  and  his 

co-Proprietors.  Each  occupied  one  side  of  the  stream,  but  the 
whole  formed  a  united  township,  named  after  the  Yorkshire 
town  Bridlington.1  This  soon  passed  into  the  colloquial  form 
of  the  original,  Burlington.2  Fenwick's  settlement  remained  for 
the  present  a  detached  community,  managing  its  own  affairs. 
There  were  thus  three  separate  governments  existing  in  New 
Jersey:  the  eastern  colony,  under  Carteret,  with  Elizabethtown 
for  its  capital,  and  the  two  detached  settlements  at  Burlington 
and  Salem.  The  principal  incident  in  the  history  of  each  at 
this  stage  was  a  feud  with  Andros.  Each  turned  on  the  same 
point :  the  contention  of  Andros  that  the  Duke  in  parting  with 
the  soil  of  New  Jersey  had  retained  some  sort  of  fiscal  authority 
over  the  inhabitants. 

In  the  case  of  Fenwick  the  dispute  was  reopened  in  1678.  In 
the  spring  of  that  year  he  called  a  meeting  of  the  settlers  at 
f.resh  Salem,  and  demanded  from  them  an  oath  or  declara- 

dispute 

between  tion  of  fidelity,  and  at  the  same  time  appointed 
Penwick.  officials.*  It  is  clear  that  there  were  about  Salem 
some  isolated  settlers,  squatters  as  we  should  call  them,  not  con 
nected  with  Fenwick,  who  hitherto,  so  far  as  they  acknowledged 
any  jurisdiction,  belonged  to  Newcastle.4  They  do  not  seem 
themselves  to  have  raised  any  objection  to  Fenwick's  proceed 
ings.  But  Cantwell  attended  the  meeting  and,  as  it  would  seem, 
on  their  behalf  protested  against  Fenwick's  claim  of  jurisdic 
tion.5  Fenwick  replied  by  issuing  a  paper  ordering  all  settlers 
in  and  about  Salem  to  acknowledge  his  rights  as  landlord,  and  it 
is  said  that  he  also  forbade  them  to  pay  any  dues  at  Newcastle.6 

1  Smith,  ch.  vi.  He  quotes  letters  from  the  original  settlers,  and  refers  to 
other  documents. 

1  Burlington  is  used  in  1683.     N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  i.  p.  428. 

8  This  is  stated  in  the  depositions  of  Cantwell  and  three  other  witnesses  given 
in  the  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  xii.  p.  592. 

1  This  is  implied  in  Fenwick's  proclamation  mentioned  below.  The  procla 
mation  is  in  the  New  Jersey  Archives,  vol.  i.  p.  277. 

5Cantwell's  deposition.  '/&. 


306  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

This  was  reported  at  New  York,  and  Fenwick  was  immedi 
ately  summoned  to  attend  there,  on  the  ground  that  he  had  vio 
lated  the  conditions  on  which  he  was  set  free.1  Fenwick  on  this 
occasion  showed  himself  more  tractable  than  before.  He  pre 
sented  himself  at  New  York.  There  his  case  was  submitted  to 
the  Supreme  Court,  who  decided  against  him.2  The  result  was 
that  Salem  was  for  the  time  being  incorporated  with  Newcastle. 
A  local  government  of  a  simple  kind  was  established.  Six  of 
the  inhabitants  were  appointed  by  Andros  to  act  as  "overseers, 
select  men  or  commissioners  under  the  authority  of  the  court  at 
Newcastle."3 

To  Penn  and  his  partners  the  question  was  one  of  overwhelm 
ing  importance.  If  the  claim  of  Andros  to  exercise  authority 
Position  over  Salem  was  allowed,  it  must  be  on  the  ground 
and  his  tnat  t^e  grant  of  New  Jersey  carried  with  it  no  polit- 
partners.  jcaj  rjgntS-  If  that  were  so  the  whole  scheme  of 
forming  a  colony  must  fall  to  the  ground.  It  was  very  certain 
that  Penn  and  his  friends  would  not  have  troubled  themselves  to 
acquire  the  territory  if  they  were  to  be  simply  a  company  of 
landholders  under  the  political  sovereignty  of  the  Duke.  It  was 
very  certain,  too,  that  their  claims  would  be  pushed  with  per 
severance  and  dexterity. 

It  was  no  doubt  fortunate  for  the  Quaker  Proprietors  that  the 
settlements  in  the  eastern  half  of  the  province  had  gained  a  secure 
foothold.  Philip  Carteret  and  his  companions  had  in  fact  been 
acting  as  pioneers  for  the  Quaker  colonists.  To  annul  political 
rights  which  rested  on  a  prescription  of  thirteen  years  would 
have  been  a  manifest  violation  of  equity.  Yet  any  attempt  to 
incorporate  the  western  half  of  the  colony  with  Newcastle  must 
carry  with  it  as  a  logical  consequence  the  incorporation  of  the 
eastern  half  with  New  York. 

Having  regard  no  doubt  to  these  considerations  Andros  made 
no  attempt  to  enforce,  or  even  to  raise,  a  general  claim  of  sov- 
Dispute  ereignty  over  the  settlers  at  Burlington.  There  was, 
customs.  however,  a  claim  which  he  might  make,  less  serious, 
yet  enough  to  strike  a  heavy  blow  at  the  prosperity  of  the  new 
colony.  It  might  be  urged  that,  though  the  Duke  of  York  had 
abandoned  all  political  authority  over  the  territory  of  New 

1  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  xii.  p.  595.  a  Ib.  pp.  597-600.  */&.  p.  610. 


PENWS  REMONSTRANCE.  3°7 

Jersey,  he  still  kept  certain  fiscal  rights.  This  claim,  too,  might 
be  put  forward  with  a  show  of  equity,  since  a  colony  set  free  to 
frame  its  own  system  of  import  duties  might  be  a  most  formida 
ble  rival  to  its  neighbors  in  the  paths  of  commerce.  If  the  ports 
on  the  Delaware  were  set  free  from  customs,  they  were  certain 
to  draw  away  the  trade  of  New  York.  Andros  at  once  saw  this 
danger,  and  issued  an  order  that  all  vessels  landing  goods  within 
the  territory  of  Penn  and  his  partners  should  pay  the  same 
duties  as  if  they  had  landed  their  cargoes  at  New  York.  This 
was  not  only  the  assertion  of  a  dangerous  right,  but  also  the 
exercise  of  it  in  a  peculiarly  irksome  form.  For  the  duty  was  to 
be  levied  not  only  on  goods  imported  and  exported  for  purposes 
of  trade,  but  also  on  the  landing  of  such  goods  as  were  needful 
for  stocking  the  colony.  The  Quaker  partners  at  once  saw  the 
importance  of  the  issue  raised  and  responded  to  the  challenge. 
We  can  hardly  err  in  assigning  to  the  hand  of  Penn  the  re 
monstrance  which  they  put  forward. 

The  document  is  one  of  the  most  remarkable  in  colonial  his 
tory.  Hitherto,  in  all  the  disputes  between  the  New  England 
Penn's  colonies  and  the  home  Government,  the  colonists  had 
stance. i  limited  themselves  to  strictly  legal  grounds.  They 
had  invariably  pleaded  the  letter  of  their  charters,  and  had  de 
clined  to  touch  on  general  questions  of  what  one  may  fairly  call 
imperial  policy.  Penn  held  firmly  to  his  legal  right  as  trans 
mitted  to  him  through  Carteret.  The  conveyance  made  by  the 
Duke  to  Carteret  and  Berkeley  expressly  gave  power  of  govern 
ment,  and  what  the  Duke  conveyed  to  Carteret  they  had  handed 
on  intact  to  Penn  and  his  partners.  "Was  it  likely,"  Penn 
urged,  "that  they  would  have  gone  to  all  the  labor  and  cost  of 
establishing  a  colony  if  it  had  been  otherwise?"  Who  would 
leave  a  prosperous  country  and  settle  in  a  wilderness  unless  he 
were  at  least  assured  of  the  fruit  of  his  own  labor,  free  from 
the  possibility  of  arbitrary  taxation  ? 

The  argument  waxes  bolder  as  it  advances.  If  the  partners 
had  not  bought  the  right  to  be  independent  of  control  from  with 
out,  what  had  they  bought  ?  Not  the  right  to  the  soil  itself,  for 
that  was  vested  in  the  natives  and  was  not  the  Duke's  to  sell. 
Then,  with  an  anticipation  of  the  ground  taken  up  by  the  colo- 

1  The  remonstrance  is  given  in  full  in  Smith,  p.  117. 


308  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY, 

nists  a  hundred  years  later,  Penn  argues  that  the  grant  to  the 
Duke,  on  which  he  based  his  claim,  was  limited  by  a  reference  to 
the  laws  and  government  of  England.  But  those  laws  ex 
pressly  protected  the  subject  against  the  levy  of  any  tax  save  by 
his  own  consent. 

Penn  then  passes  from  the  declaration  of  the  strictly  legal 
aspect  of  the  case  to  those  considerations  of  equity  and  good 
policy  which  make  it  to  the  interest  of  the  Duke  to  forbear,  and 
of  the  Crown  to  enforce  such  forbearance.  The  duty  is  not 
merely  one  upon  goods  imported  for  the  purpose  of  trade.  It 
will  fall  also  on  the  stock  which  is  absolutely  needful  for  the 
settlement  of  a  new  colony.  Thus  to  adopt  a  system  by  which 
any  external  power  could  levy  duties  on  the  colonists  was  to  cut 
up  the  roots  of  commercial  prosperity.  "There  can  be  no 
trade  without  a  people ;  there  will  be  no  people  where  there  is  no 
encouragement,  nor  can  there  be  any  encouragement  where 
people  have  not  greater  privileges  by  going  than  staying;  for  if 
their  condition  be  not  meliorated  they  will  never  forgo  the  com 
fort  of  their  kindred  they  must  leave  behind  them,  nor  forsake 
their  native  country,  run  the  hazard  of  the  seas,  nor,  lastly,  ex 
pose  themselves  to  the  wants  and  difficulties  of  a  wilderness; 
but,  on  the  contrary,  if  they  have  less  privileges  there  than  at 
home  'tis  in  every  way  to  worst  themselves  to  go." 

Penn  points  out,  too,  that  the  claim  is  an  unlimited  one.  If 
it  is  admitted  "what  security  have  we  of  anything  we  possess? 
We  can  call  nothing  out  own,  but  are  tenants-at-will  not  only 
for  the  soil,  but  for  all  our  own  personal  estates."  "This  is  to 
transplant  not  from  good  to  better,  but  from  good  to  bad;  this 
sort  of  conduct  has  destroyed  governments,  but  never  raised  one 
to  any  true  greatness,  nor  ever  will  in  the  Duke's  territories, 
while  so  many  countries  equally  good  in  soil  and  air  are  sur 
rounded  with  greater  freedom  and  security." 

We  seem  to  hear  the  pleading  of  Adams  and  Franklin. 
Moreover,  Penn's  arguments  show  a  conception  of  colonial  policy 
clearer  and  more  advanced  than  anything  with  which  we  have 
yet  met. 

Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  the  ground  taken  by  Andros  asserted  a 
principle  which  could  not  safely  be  put  aside.  It  was  needful 
that  there  should  be  for  the  whole  body  of  colonies  some  uniform 
fiscal  system.  To  impress  that  on  men's  minds  was  indeed  one 


FRESH  GRANT  OF  EAST  JERSEY.  309 

of  the  main  results  of  the  conquest  of  New  Netherlands  and  the 
acquisition  of  the  adjoining  territory.  In  two  ways,  by  making 
some  common  system  of  defense  necessary  and  some  common  sys 
tem  of  revenue  possible,  that  conquest  was  the  first  step  towards 
colonial  unity. 

In  all  likelihood  Penn's  position,  and  the  favor  with  which 
he  was  regarded  by  the  royal  family,  did  more  for  him  and  his 
Legal  partners  than  the  justice  of  his  reasoning.  In  August 

?nfa!vor*  I68o  the  question  was  referred  to  Sir  William  Jones, 
of  Penn.  ^e  Attorney-General.  He  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that 
inasmuch  as  the  grant  to  Berkeley  and  Carteret  had  contained  no 
reservation  of  any  profit,  nor  even  of  any  jurisdiction,  the  Duke's 
claim  as  made  by  Andros  was  not  binding  in  law.1 

Before  the  end  of  the  year  the  question  was  finally  set  at  rest. 
A  fresh  grant  was  made  by  the  Duke  of  York  conveying  to 
The  matter  Bylling  and  his  heirs  and  assigns,  for  a  nominal  quit- 

compro-  D  ' 

mised  by  rent,  the  territory  purchased  from  Carteret.  With 
grant.  the  land  were  conveyed  all  such  political  rights  as  the 

King's  grant  had  conferred  on  the  Duke.  The  document  em 
bodied  a  practical  compromise  which  gave  the  Quaker  Proprie 
tors  all  that  they  asked  for,  but  it  did  not  acknowledge  the  jus 
tice  of  their  case.  The  Duke  granted  the  very  thing  which,  ac 
cording  to  their  contention,  he  had  before  alienated. 

To  the  present  grantees  it  was  a  matter  of  indifference  which 
view  was  accepted,  whether  the  Duke  surrendered  his  claim  as 
Altered  invalid  or  extinguished  it  by  a  fresh  grant.  But 
the1East°f  otherwise  there  was  a  very  great  difference  between 
proSpne-  tne  two  views.  Sir  George  Carteret  had  died  early 
tors.  jn  1680.  The  grant  to  Bylling  was  an  implicit 

denial  of  the  title  enjoyed  by  Carteret's  heirs.  Recent  doings  in 
East  Jersey  showed  that  they  had  real  grounds  for  apprehension. 
In  West  Jersey  the  attack,  as  we  have  seen,  began  with  the  de 
mand  to  levy  customs.  The  vigorous  action  of  Penn  kept  it 
from  reaching  a  further  stage.  In  East  Jersey  the  strife  had  a 
like  beginning,  but  ran  a  different  course. 

For  some  years  after  the  foundation  of  the  eastern  colony 
under  Philip  Carteret  the  question  of  customs  remained  in  abey 
ance  since  there  was  no  port.  But  about  1677  vessels  began 

1  This  opinion  is  in  the  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.   284. 
*  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  i.  p.   324. 


310  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

to  land  at  Elizabethtown,  and  the  Governor  had  exercised 
the  right  of  clearing  them  there  without  reference  to  New 
Andros  York.1  Elizabethtown  was  a  more  dangerous  rival 
toVe'v'y**  to  tne  commerce  of  New  York  than  the  settlements 
customs  on  the  Delaware  could  be.  It  is  clear,  too,  that  the 

in  c^asi 

jersey.  Assembly  of  the  colony  was  determined  to  contest  any 
claim  that  might  be  made  by  the  Governor  of  New  York  to  levy 
custom  duties.  A  sum  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  pounds  was 
raised  by  rate,  and  kept  as  a  reserve  fund,  to  indemnify  any  ship 
owner  that  might  suffer  by  the  action  of  the  authorities  of  New 
York.2  Andros  not  improbably  thought  that  the  death  of  Sir 
George  Carteret  offered  a  favorable  opening  for  enforcing  the 
claims  of  his  master.  In  the  spring  of  that  year  (1680)  he 
wrote  a  letter  to  Philip  Carteret  forbidding  him  to  exercise  any 
jurisdiction  over  the  King's  subjects  on  the  ground  that  it  would 
be  an  encroachment  on  the  Duke's  authority.  He  also  claimed 
the  right  to  establish  a  fort  on  the  coast  of  New  Jersey  and  to 
erect  beacons,  on  the  plea  that  these  works  were  for  the  benefit  of 
all  the  King's  subjects.3  Whatever  justice  there  might  be  in 
Andres's  case  as  far  as  customs  were  concerned,  his  general  con 
tention  was  manifestly  extravagant.  He  was  disputing  a  title 
which  for  fifteen  years  had  been  uncontested,  and  on  the  strength 
of  which  men  had  conveyed  themselves,  their  goods,  and  house 
holds  to  a  home  in  the  wilderness. 

Carteret  answered  in  a  temperate  letter.4  He  had  consulted 
his  council  and  the  chief  settlers.  They  bore  him  out  in  the 
view  that  the  Duke's  grant,  the  letter  of  the  King,  and  the  pre 
scription  of  undisputed  possession  all  justified  him  in  refusing  to 
accept  the  authority  of  Andros.  He  was  willing,  however,  to 
refer  the  matter  to  the  King.  In  the  meantime,  if  force  was 
used,  he  would  meet  it  with  force. 

One  expression  in  Carteret's  answer  is  noteworthy.  He  was 
acting,  he  said,  with  the  most  eminent  though  not  numerous  part 
of  the  country.  This  awakens  a  suspicion  that  Andros  was  re 
lying  on  the  help  of  a  party  within  the  colony  who  were  disloyal 
to  Carteret.  Later  events  showed  plainly  that  the  spirit  of  dis- 

1  See  Mr.  Whitehead's  (E.  Jersey)  note,  p.  82.  He  quotes  a  proclamation 
by  Carteret  and  a  statement  made  in  1698  by  Graham,  Attorney-General  of 
New  York,  to  Bellomont.  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iv.  p.  382. 

1  Learning  and  Spicer,  p.   131.  *  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.   i.  p.  292. 

*Ib.  p.  294. 


DISPUTE  BETWEEN  ANDROS  AND   CARTERET.      311 

affection  roused  by  James  Carteret  was  not  extinct.  Those  who 
had  been  his  partisans  had  no  ground  for  cleaving  to  Andros,  but 
they  were  ready  to  make  common  cause  with  anyone  in  oppo 
sition  to  the  Proprietors  and  their  Deputy. 

Andros  had  not  the  fairness  or  courtesy  to  wait  for  Car- 
teret's  answer.  Relying  in  all  likelihood  on  his  adherents  within 
the  colony,  he  issued  a  proclamation  forbidding  not  only  Car 
teret,  but  all  acting  under  him,  to  exercise  any  jurisdiction.1 
For  the  present  Andros  confirmed  the  existing  constables  in  their 
office.  Presently  he  would  take  further  order  in  accordance 
with  the  terms  of  his  commission.  In  other  words,  New  Jersey 
was  to  be  dealt  with  as  forming  a  dependency  of  New  York. 

Carteret  now  abandoned  the  somewhat  submissive  attitude 
which  he  had  hitherto  taken  up.  He  admonished  Andros  to 
abstain  from  any  disturbance,  and  notified  him  that  if  any  such 
took  place  he  should  appeal  to  the  King.2  At  the  same  time  he 
took  measures  as  if  against  a  foe  from  whom  he  anticipated  in 
vasion.  He  appointed  a  deputy  to  succeed  him  in  case  of  acci 
dent,3  and  raised  an  armed  force  of  a  hundred  and  fifty  men  to 
act  as  a  body-guard.4  A  summons  had  been  issued  for  the  call 
ing  of  a  General  Assembly.  This  was  now  revoked,  which 
makes  one  think  the  Governor  feared  the  influence  of  Andros 
over  the  people.5 

Carteret  in  nowise  exaggerated  the  danger.  In  April  Andros 
set  sail  for  New  Jersey.  It  is  hardly  likely  that  he  set  forth 
Andros  with  any  definite  purpose  of  using  violence,  since  he 
Ehz'abeth-  was  attended  only  by  his  official  staff,  and  a  few 
town.8  volunteers  carrying  no  arms  save  swords.  This  seems 
to  have  allayed  Carteret's  suspicions,  and  though  Andros  met 
more  than  one  armed  party,  no  resistance  was  offered.  Having 
reached  Elizabethtown,  Andros  read  aloud  the  Duke  of  York's 
title  to  the  whole  province.  This,  as  Carteret  reasonably  urged, 
"signified  little  to  the  purpose,"  since  it  was  no  part  of  the  Pro- 

1  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  i.  p.  293. 

2  Ib.  p.  297. 
8/&.  p.   295. 

4  Carteret's  letter  to   the   Proprietor,   July   9,    1680,   N.   J.   Archives,   vol.   i. 
P-  314- 

5  Carteret's  letter  to  Andros  as  above. 

'  There  are  two  accounts  of  Andres's  visit  published  in  the  New  Jersey 
Archives,  vol.  i.  pp.  299-302  and  pp.  304-6,  taken  from  manuscripts  at  Albany. 
They  appear  to  have  been  written  by  members  of  Andros's  staff.  We  have 
also  Carteret's  own  account  in  the  letter  of  July  9,  referred  to  above. 


312  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

prietors'  case  to  question  the  Duke's  original  title.  Some  dis 
cussion  followed,  but  Andros  turned  a  deaf  ear  to  all  remon 
strance,  and  was  content  to  silence  his  opponents  by  vague 
threats.  He  then  returned  to  his  vessel  and  set  sail  for  New 
York. 

The  next  incident  reads  like  some  story  of  mediaeval  violence. 
Carteret  lived,  not  in  Elizabethtown,  but  in  a  detached  dwelling- 
Arrest  of  place.  Three  weeks  after  Andres's  departure,  in  the 
Carteret. »  night  a  party  from  New  York,  having  corrupted  one 
of  Carteret's  servants,  gained  access  to  this  house.  The  Gov 
ernor  was  dragged  out  of  bed,  thrown  half-naked  into  a  boat, 
and  hurried  off  as  a  prisoner  to  New  York.  There  he  was  kept 
for  five  weeks  awaiting  his  trial.  In  New  Jersey  the  hostility  of 
an  important  party  to  Carteret  had  smoothed  the  path  for 
Andros.  In  New  York  we  may  well  believe  that  the  unpopu 
larity  of  the  Duke's  deputy  stood  his  enemy  in  good  stead.  Car 
teret  was  put  on  his  trial  on  the  count  of  having  exercised  illegal 
authority.  The  jury  acquitted  him,  and  in  spite  of  repeated 
charges  from  Andros  and  refusals  to  accept  their  verdict  they 
stood  firm.  Nevertheless  they  appended  to  their  verdict  the 
somewhat  illogical  addition  that  if  Carteret  returned  to  New 
Jersey  he  should  give  security  not  to  assume  any  authority  or 
jurisdiction,  civil  or  military.  If  this  authority  was  illegal  it  is- 
not  easy  to  see  on  what  grounds  he  was  acquitted. 

Meanwhile  the  settlers  in  East  Jersey  were  taking  advantage 
of  the  existing  state  of  things  to  throw  off  the  yoke  of  the  Pro- 
Andros  prietors.  In  June  Andros  revisited  the  colony.  His 

revisits  •* 

Elizabeth-     purpose  was  avowedly  peaceful,  since  he  was  accom- 

town  and  ; ,  ,          .,  T  i  •          c  i  2 

summons  panied  by  his  wife  and  her  train  of  gentlewomen. 
Assembly.  He  had  already  issued  writs  for  the  election  of  an 
Assembly.  Each  township  returned  two  Deputies.  The  pro 
ceedings  of  the  Assembly  opened  in  a  curiously  illogical  fashion. 
The  Deputies  presented  an  address  to  Andros,  expressing  their 
wish,  or  rather  their  demand,  that  the  privileges  granted  them  in 


1  Our  knowledge  of  this  business  is  derived  partly  from  Bankers  and  Sluyter, 
p.  345,  partly  from  Carteret's  own  account,  contained  in  two  letters,  one  to  a 
certain  Coustier  of  whom  we  know  nothing  else,  one  to  Captain  Bollen,  the- 
Secretary  of  West  New  Jersey.  The  incident  seems,  not  unnaturally,  to  have 
made  a  great  impression  on  the  Labadist  travelers,  and  is  told  by  them  very 
vividly. 

3  The  Labadists,  p.   346. 


CARTERETS  DISPUTE    WITH  SETTLERS.          3^ 

the  concessions  from  Berkeley  and  Carteret  should  remain  unim 
paired.  Thus,  in  the  very  moment  of  repudiating  the  authority 
of  the  Proprietors,  they  acknowledged  the  validity  of  past  acts 
done  by  that  authority. 

It  is  impossible  to  say  what  relations  Andros  believed  to  exist 
between  the  Duke  of  York  and  the  New  Jersey  settlers,  or  how 
he  wished  to  arrange  those  relations.  Probably  he  had  himself 
no  clear  idea  on  the  subject.  He  submitted  to  the  Assembly  that 
code  of  laws  drawn  up  after  the  conquest  of  New  Netherlands 
known  as  the  Duke's  laws,  and  he  gave  the  members  to  under 
stand  that  the  Court  of  Assizes  on  Long  Island  was  now  to  be 
the  supreme  tribunal  for  the  colony.  In  other  words  New 
Jersey  was  to  be,  like  the  settlements  on  the  west  bank  of  the 
Delaware,  a  dependency  of  New  York.  Yet  it  is  very  certain 
that  the  Assembly  would  never  have  accepted  that  view,  nor  does 
Andros  seem  in  practice  to  have  put  any  restraint  on  their  exer 
cise  of  legislative  power. 

Meanwhile  Penn  and  his  partners  in  fighting  their  own  battle 
were  also  fighting  that  of  Carteret.  The  grant  from  the  Duke 
Further  to  Bylling  was  followed  six  weeks  later  by  one  to  the 
between  young  Sir  George  Carteret,  the  grandson  and  heir  of 
ancUhe*  t^le  origma^  proprietor,  bestowing  on  him  also  full 
settlers.  territorial  and  political  rights.1  This  grant  fully  re 
established  the  authority  of  Philip  Carteret,  and  the  recall  of 
Andros  early  in  1 68 1  left  the  Governor  free  to  assert  that 
authority  without  danger  of  molestation.  In  March  1681  he 
issued  a  proclamation  warning  the  inhabitants  of  the  province 
that  the  supremacy  of  the  Proprietors  was  again  in  force,  that  all 
acts  done  by  Andros  were  invalid,  and  that  no  courts  which  he 
had  constituted  had  any  legal  power.2  Later  in  the  year  Brock- 
holls,  that  incompetent  deputy  whom  Andros  had  left  in  his 
stead,  called  in  question  the  authority  of  Carteret.3  It  was  easy 
to  meet  that  by  producing  the  Duke's  grant  and  Carteret's  own 
commission.  But  the  attack  made  by  Andros  had  brought  about 
troubles  not  to  be  got  over  so  lightly.  There  was,  as  we  have 
seen,  among  the  settlers  an  anti-proprietary  party.  The  leaders 

1  This  grant  is  in  the  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  i.  p.  337. 

»  Jb.  p.  346. 

*  He  writes  to  Carteret  (July  26,  1681)  that  he  has  received  certain  papers, 
from  him,  but  can  "find  no  power  thereby  for  you  to  act  in  or  assume  the. 
government  of  New  Jersey."  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  i.  p.  352. 


314  SE  TTLEMENT  OF  NE  W  JERSE  Y. 

of  that  party  were  shrewd  enough  to  see  danger  in  the  recent 
grant  to  the  Proprietors.  It  might  be  said  that  while  the  grant 
conferred  future  authority  on  the  Proprietors,  it  annulled  the 
authority  which  they  had  claimed  in  the  past,  and  would  enable 
them  to  disclaim  their  past  obligations.  It  is  plain  that  those 
who  opposed  the  Proprietors  were  the  ruling  party  in  the  Assem 
bly.  On  October  17  the  Deputies  met.  Their  very  first  pro 
ceeding  was  to  pass  a  resolution  asking  the  Governor  and  Council 
whether  they  were  to  consider  the  late  grant  as  the  foundation 
of  government.1  The  question  was  an  embarrassing  one.  To 
admit  it  was  to  admit  that  Andros  had  been  right  and  Carteret 
wrong.  To  deny  it  might  reopen  questions  which  it  was  far 
more  convenient  for  the  Governor  and  his  party  to  let  rest.  It 
will  be  remembered  that  in  1672  Carteret,  acting  for  the  Pro 
prietor,  had  made  certain  modifications  in  the  Concessions.  If 
he  fell  back  on  the  Concessions  as  the  basis  of  his  authority,  it 
might  be  needful  to  revoke  these  later  changes.  A  sense  of  this 
difficulty  was  clearly  disclosed  in  the  petulant  tone  of  the  an 
swer.  The  original  grant  on  which  the  Concessions  were  based 
was,  Carteret  said,  the  foundation  of  government.  Only  "the 
seed  sown  by  Sir  Edmund  Andros  could  have  bid  men  raise  such 
questions;  let  them  leave  such  disputes,  and  fall  upon  something 
for  the  good  of  the  province." 

The  Deputies  had  now  cleared  the  ground  for  an  obvious  and 
effective  line  of  attack.  They  passed  a  resolution  declaring  that 
the  changes  introduced  in  1672  were  a  violation  of  the  Con 
cessions.  The  lack  of  temper  which  the  Council  had  shown  in 
their  first  answer  became  more  and  more  manifest  as  the  dispute 
went  on.  The  Deputies  were  reminded  that  they  alone  did  not 
form  the  Assembly,  and  they  were  told  that,  though  they  might, 
as  they  said,  have  read  and  weighed  the  documents  in  dispute, 
they  had  failed  to  understand  them.  On  one  point,  however,  the 
Council  had  the  best  of  the  dispute.  They  bade  their  opponents 
remember  that  the  payment  of  quit-rents  was  part  of  the  original 
constitution.  If  the  Proprietors  had  broken  their  compact,  so  in 
that  matter  had  the  settlers.  The  difficulty  was  increased  by 
the  arrangement,  on  which  at  an  earlier  day  the  Governor  and 
Council  had  insisted,  whereby  the  Council  and  the  Deputies 

1  This  and  all  the  other  documents  which  make  up  the  history  of  this  dis 
pute  are  in  the  New  Jersey  Archives,  vol.  i.  pp.  354-65. 


THE  PROPRIETARY  SYSTEM.  315 

sat  as  two  separate  chambers.  Proposals  were  made  for  a  con 
ference,  but  it  is  clear  that  neither  side  was  in  earnest  in  ask 
ing  for  it,  nor  was  there  any  such  wish  for  agreement  as  could 
make  it  useful.  After  a  fortnight  of  profitless  bickering  the 
Governor  dissolved  the  Assembly.  The  Deputies  protested 
against  the  proceedings  as  unconstitutional,  but  do  not  seem  to 
have  made  any  attempt  to  prolong  their  session. 

Throughout  the  history  of  the  proprietary  colonies,  every  dis 
pute  between  a  Proprietor  and  his  settlers  was  almost  certain  to 
•working  of  end  in  favor  of  the  latter.  The  one  exception  was 
p^fetary  New  York,  and  New  York  was  proprietary  only  in 
system.  name.  There  no  doubt  the  authority  of  the  Proprie 
tor  was  really  felt.  But  it  was  so  mainly  because  the  Proprietor 
had  the  supremacy  of  the  Crown  at  his  back,  and  also  because 
the  position  of  New  York  gave  it  exceptional  importance.  It 
was  the  key  of  the  military  position,  and  the  Crown  had  a  direct 
interest  in  the  security  and  stability  of  the  government.  But  in 
every  other  case  the  Proprietor  was  certain  to  be  fighting  at  odds. 
Where  resistance  to  arbitrary  government  may  involve  material 
loss,  the  suspension  of  works  in  which  capital  is  invested,  the 
waste  of  that  time  which  is  the  equivalent  of  capital,  there  the 
members  of  a  prosperous  society  may  acquiesce  in  much  bad  gov 
ernment  before  they  risk  a  breach  of  the  peace.  But  in  a  colony 
beginning  its  life  none  of  these  restraints  exist.  And  when  it 
came  to  the  ultimate  resort,  to  force,  what  resources  had  the 
Proprietor?  He  had  no  armed  force  of  his  own  wherewith  to 
overawe  his  colonists.  He  must  depend  on  the  help  of  the 
Crown,  and  what  motive  had  the  Crown  for  supporting  him? 
Even  in  its  dealings  with  its  own  colonies,  we  shall  see  the 
sovereign  and  his  advisers  ever  slow  and  reluctant  to  push  mat 
ters  to  extremities.  There  was  little  chance  that  they  would 
show  a  vigor  in  the  cause  of  others  which  they  failed  to  show  in 
their  own. 

Thus  the  Proprietor  was  virtually  at  the  mercy  of  his  colo 
nists.  If  the  political  arrangements  which  he  enforced  were  con 
venient  to  the  settlers,  or  not  so  objectionable  to  them  as  to  be 
worth  a  dispute,  they  would  be  accepted  with  more  or  less  good 
will.  If  the  quit- rents  charged  fairly  represented  what  one  may 
call  the  monopoly  value  of  the  soil,  they  would  be  paid,  probably 
with  more  or  less  grumbling.  Those,  it  may  safely  be  said,  were 


3 1 6  SE  TTLEMENT  Of  NE  W  JERSE  Y. 

the  limits  within  which  proprietary  authority  could  be  exercised.. 
The  Proprietor  inevitably  sinks  into  the  position  of  a  titular 
sovereign  who  does  not  govern,  and  a  rent-charger. 

There  was  indeed  one  exception  to  this,  one  really  valuable 
office  which  the  Proprietor  might  discharge.  He  might  be  at 
the  foundation  of  a  colony  what  one  may  call  the  superintending 
capitalist.  He  could  to  some  extent  select  the  emigrants,  sur 
vey  the  soil,  decide  the  apportionment  of  land,  and  be  responsi 
ble  for  the  needful  outfit  and  supply  of  live  stock.  We  have 
seen  in  Plymouth  how  a  colony  suffered  from  the  lack  of  some 
one  person  responsible  for  these  things,  who  at  the  same  time  had 
an  interest  in  the  permanent  welfare  of  the  colony,  how  it 
thereby  fell  into  the  hands  of  a  body  of  money-lenders  who  had 
no  sympathy  with  the  wants  and  objects  of  the  colony.  On  the 
other  hand,  in  Maryland  and  Carolina  the  difficulties  attending 
the  foundation  of  a  colony  had  been  successfully  overcome  by  the 
action  of  a  Proprietor  or  body  of  Proprietors.  We  may  even  say 
that  Massachusetts  was  in  a  measure  an  instance  of  success- 
achieved  in  the  same  fashion. 

A  proprietary  government,  however,  can  hardly  fulfill  these 
conditions,  unless  there  be  on  the  part  of  the  Proprietor  a  desire 
Transfer  of  for  the  success  of  the  colony  apart  from  personal  gain. 
pn>prietoSr-  The  most  successful  proprietary  colonies  were  those 
ship.  where  leading  members  of  some  sect  were  building  up 

a  home  for  their  brethren  in  the  faith.  No  such  motive  had 
been  at  work  upon  the  proprietorship  of  Carteret  and  Berkeley. 
It  was  working  successfully  in  that  part  of  their  territory  which 
they  had  sold  to  Penn  and  his  partners.  To  Sir  George  Car 
teret  no  doubt  the  position  of  a  colonial  Proprietor  had  attrac 
tions.  It  conveyed  dignity,  and  it  might  be  a  useful  piece  to 
play  in  his  game  of  political  ambition.  But  to  his  heirs  the 
colony  was  nothing  but  a  troublesome  property.  Accordingly 
early  in  1682  they  disposed  of  their  territorial  and  other  rights, 
it  is  said  by  auction.1  No  stronger  illustration  could  be  found 
of  the  inconveniences  of  the  proprietary  system,  or  the  possibili 
ties  of  abuse  which  attached  to  it  as  it  existed.  Carrying  with 
it  as  it  did  the  right  of  appointing  officials  and  of  granting  or 
withholding  political  rights,  it  should  have  been  regarded  as  a 

1 E.  Jersey,  p.  103.  Mr.  Whitehead  states  this  but  does  not  give  his  au 
thority. 


REASONS  AGAINST  SALE   OF  PROPRIETORSHIP.     317 

trusteeship,  only  to  be  vested  in  trustworthy  and  competent  per 
sons.  The  government  of  each  colony  was  a  link  in  a  chain  on 
which  the  whole  security  and  welfare  of  the  empire  depended. 
That  it  should  have  been  put  up  for  sale  in  open  market  shows 
how  far  the  Crown  and  its  advisers  were  from  any  distinct  and 
comprehensive  scheme  of  colonial  administration. 

There  was,  too,  another  serious  objection  to  such  an  arrange 
ment.  To  give  a  man  proprietary  rights  over  a  vacant  territory 
which  was  to  be  peopled  under  his  own  supervision,  and  in  some 
measure  at  his  own  cost,  was  a  very  different  thing  from  giving 
him  proprietary  rights  over  a  settled  province,  which  had  already 
put  on  all  the  forms  of  political  life.  In  the  former  case  settlers 
came  at  their  own  risk  and  of  their  own  free  choice.  Some  com 
munity  of  feeling  and  interest  between  them  and  the  Proprietor 
might  safely  be  presumed.  But  here  a  body  of  colonists  were 
made  over  to  a  new  sovereign  without  the  possibility  of  their  ex 
pressing  consent  or  disapproval.  The  principle,  it  is  to  be  ob 
served,  was  one  wholly  new  in  the  history  of  the  proprietary  col 
onies.  The  nearest  approach  to  it  before  was  the  settlement  of 
Middletown  and  Shrewsbury  simultaneously  with  the  original 
grant  of  New  Jersey  to  Berkeley  and  Carteret.  That,  however, 
was  an  accident,  not  the  result  of  set  purpose,  and  it  might  fairly 
be  said  that  the  emigrants  risked  such  a  contingency  by  settling 
•on  the  strength  of  an  uncertain  title.  There  was  at  all  events  no 
reason  for  confirming  and  extending  the  precedent.  A  Colonial 
Proprietorship  should  have  been  regarded  not  as  an  ordinary 
landed  estate,  but  as  a  trusteeship  or  office.  If  circumstances 
made  it  impossible  or  inexpedient  for  the  Proprietor  to  continue 
his  trust,  his  proper  course  was  not  transfer  but  resignation.  If 
the  Crown  had  insisted  on  that  principle,  New  Jersey  would 
have  escaped  years  of  bickering  and  confusion.  But  in  truth 
the  mischief  began  when  the  Duke  of  York  was  allowed 
to  carve  his  grant  into  provinces  and  to  dispose  of  them  at  his 
pleasure. 

In  the  present  case  the  best  security  against  evil  lay  in  this,  that 
Purchase  the  purchase  was  from  a  mercantile  point  of  view  an 
NfCwast  unattractive  one.  No  one  was  likely  to  become  a 
"iYnn^nl  purchaser  unless  he  had  some  interest  in  the  colony, 
others  and  some  designs  for  its  future  other  than  those  of 

a  land  speculator.  The  purchasers  were  a  body  of  partners 


3 1 8  SE  TTLEMENT  OF  NE  W  JERSE  Y. 

of  whom  Penn  was  the  chief.1  That  was  in  itself  some  guar 
antee  for  the  safety  of  the  settlers  and  the  good  government  of 
the  province.  It  might,  moreover,  be  a  step  towards  uniting  the 
whole  territory  between  the  Hudson  and  the  Delaware,  either 
by  bringing  it  under  a  single  government,  or  if  not,  at  least  by 
securing  a  certain  community  of  origin,  usage,  and  principle 
among  all  the  settlers. 

The  basis  of  this  Proprietary  Company  was  soon  extended  by 
the  addition  of  twelve  fresh  partners.  Among  them  was  that 
Addition  of  corrupt  and  discreditable  politician  the  Earl  of  Perth, 
the  scotch  \yjth  hjm  were  associated  three  Scotchmen  of  a  far 
pnetors.  worthier  type,  Gawain  Lawrie,  who  already  had  a 
share  in  West  Jersey,  Barclay  of  Ury,  the  soldier  of  fortune 
who  had  bowed  his  neck  to  the  peaceful  yoke  of  George  Fox> 
and  his  brother  John  Barclay.  The  presence  of  these  men 
among  the  partners  was  possibly  the  cause,  more  probably  the 
symptom,  of  a  new  movement  in  colonial  life.  So  far  Scotland 
had  no  part  in  the  task  of  colonization,  nor  are  there  frequent 
traces  even  of  isolated  Scotchmen  figuring  as  colonists.  But  a 
great  wave  of  social  and  economical  change  was  now  passing 
over  that  kingdom.  Scotland  had  not — indeed,  the  day  was  far 
distant  when  she  could  have — the  resources  needful  to  make  her 
a  colonizing  nation.  Her  children  had  not  the  needful  training 
in  trade  or  industry.  Moreover,  with  the  contracted  and  ex 
clusive  principles  of  commerce  which  then  prevailed,  every  colony 
was  dependent  for  its  markets  on  the  parent  nation.  The  trade 
and  the  shipping  of  Scotland  could  not  maintain  dependencies  in 
prosperity.  Yet  Scotland  was  beginning  to  feel  the  need  of  col 
onies  as  a  vent  for  her  surplus  population.  A  poor  soil  and  petty 
industries  had  long  been  unequal  to  the  task  of  furnishing  a  live 
lihood  for  all  whom  the  country  produced.  "The  Scot  abroad'" 
had  found  in  mercenary  soldiership  that  career  which  the  Eng 
lishman  or  the  Hollander  found  in  the  New  World.  With  the 
cessation  of  the  great  continental  wars  that  resource  had  failed. 
Even  if  Scotch  commerce  could  have  expanded,  family  pride 
would  have  withheld  the  cadets  of  landed  houses  from  profiting 
thereby.  Moreover,  the  country  was  just  awakening  to  a  sense 
of  the  inadequacy  of  its  resources.  There  is  nothing  to  prove 

1  For  the  deed  of  transfer  see  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  i.  p.   366.     I  have  called 
it  a  purchase.     It  was  really  the  purchase  of  a  leasehold  at  a  peppercorn  rent. 


BARCLAY  APPOINTED   GOVERNOR.  319 

the  Scotchman  of  1680  was  worse  off  than  his  grandfather.  But 
such  writings  as  those  of  Fletcher  of  Saltoun  show  that  one  of 
those  waves  of  thought  was  passing  over  Scotland,  in  which  a 
country  suddenly  awakens  to  evils  which  it  has  long  endured 
tranquilly.  There  was  too,  as  was  shown  a  little  later  by  the 
tragedy  of  Darien,  a  certain  desire  to  prove  that  any  path  which 
Scotland's  old  rival  and  oppressor  had  trodden  successfully  she 
too  could  tread.  It  needed  but  a  slight  impulse  to  turn  these 
newly  awakened  wants  and  aspirations  into  the  channel  of 
American  colonization.  One  argument  which  was  used  by  the 
Scotch  advocates  of  colonization  to  allay  the  doubts  of  their 
countrymen  is  worth  special  notice.  It  was  urged  that  the  colo 
nists  would  lose  their  national  independence  and  become  Eng 
lish  subjects.  The  advocate  for  colonization  points  out  that 
this  will  really  be  a  gain,  since  they  will  then  share  in  the  bene 
fits  of  the  Navigation  Act.1  The  use  of  that  argument  throws 
light  on  the  motives  which  twenty-four  years  later  led  to  the 
passing  of  the  Act  of  Union. 

The  appointment  of  Barclay  as  Governor  would  seem  de 
signed  to  conciliate  the  two  classes  on  whom  the  future  of  the 
Robert  colony  was  to  depend,  the  Quakers  and  the  Scotch. 
Appointed  Apparently  it  was  the  weight  of  his  name  rather  than 
^f°East°r  his  actual  ability  which  was  valued.  The  terms  of 
jersey.!"  ^jg  commission  authorized  him  to  discharge  his  duties 
by  deputy.3  This  he  did,  and  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  he 
even  so  much  as  set  foot  on  the  soil  of  America.  His  choice  fell 
on  Thomas  Rudyard,  a  London  attorney,  who,  though  not  him 
self  a  Quaker,  had  been  of  service  to  Penn  when  under  prosecu 
tion  in  1670.* 

In  theory  the  new  Proprietors  were  but  stepping  into  the 
Attitude  position  occupied  by  Carteret,  a  position  of  territorial 
prietors™"  possession  and  political  sovereignty,  subject  only  to 
thTrJuke  {he  rignts  inherent  in  the  Crown.  But,  as  we  have 
of  York.  seerlj  the  view  that  the  Duke  of  York  had  by  his  origi- 


1 A  Brief  Account  of  the  Province  of  East  New  Jersey,  published  by  the 
Scots  Proprietors.  Reprinted  in  New  York  Historical  Magazine,  and  series, 
vol.  i. 

2  Barclay's  commission  does  not  seem  to  be  extant,  but  it  is  referred  to  in_ 
the  Fundamental  Constitutions  to  be  mentioned  hereafter. 

8  This  is  stated  in  the  Fundamental  Constitutions. 

4  For  Rudyard's  commission  see  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  i.  p.  376. 


-320  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

nal  grant  divested  himself  of  all  rights,  though  asserted  when 
it  could  be  useful,  was  not  consistently  held.  Men  evidently 
felt  that  he  had  a  certain  undefined  supremacy  which  must  be 
taken  into  account  at  each  fresh  transfer  of  territory.  Early  in 
1683  the  new  partners  obtained  from  the  Duke  a  grant  making 
over  to  them,  for  payment  of  a  fixed  sum  not  specified  in  the 
grant,  and  for  a  small  annual  quit-rent,  all  his  rights  not  only 
over  the  soil,  but  also  of  jurisdiction  and  government/ 

Rudyard's  first  proceeding  was  to  call  an  Assembly.  Their 
measures  were  in  themselves  of  some  importance,  and  are  of 
Proceed-  interest  as  showing  that  the  Assembly  did  not  regard 

ings  of  the       .  •  •         ,  .   .  .  , 

.Assembly.*  its  powers  as  provisional  or  anticipate  any  interference 
from  the  new  proprietary.  The  colony  was  divided  into  four 
•counties.  Laws  wrere  passed  regulating  the  relations  of  servant 
and  master.  No  indented  white  servant  was  to  serve  for  more 
than  four  years,  unless  under  seventeen.  In  that  case  he  was 
to  serve  till  he  was  twenty-one.  He  might  not  be  transported 
out  of  the  colony  against  his  will,  and  at  the  end  of  his  term  he 
was  to  have  from  his  master  an  ax,  a  hoe,  and  seven  bushels  of 
corn.  Injury  to  limb  by  the  master  was  to  be  indemnified  by  the 
servant  being  set  at  liberty,  and  the  infliction  of  unmerciful 
chastisement  was  to  be  punished  at  the  discretion  of  the  magis 
trate.  Though  this  protection  only  extended  to  white  servants, 
yet  something  was  done  for  the  negro  slave  by  an  enactment 
.securing  him  sufficiency  of  food  and  clothes.  At  the  same  time 
the  rights  of  masters  were  protected  since  it  was  penal  to  receive 
;a  runaway  slave  as  an  apprentice.  Other  enactments  show 
traces  either  of  the  original  Puritanism  of  the  settlers  or  of  later 
'Quakerism.  A  large  consolidating  Act  which  summed  up  pre 
vious  legislation  made  it  penal  to  afflict  the  widow  or  fatherless. 
This  attempt  to  enforce  a  vague  precept  of  morality  was  thor 
oughly  characteristic  of  New  England  legislation.  A  general 
prohibition  of  Sabbath-breaking  was  explained  and  amplified  by 
specific  enactments.  No  work  was  to  be  done  on  that  day,  there 
was  to  be  no  drinking  at  ordinaries,  no  riding  save  of  necessity, 
no  going  abroad  save  for  sober  and  religious  exercise.  As  in 
New  England,  the  drinking  of  healths  was  penal.  Acting, 
sword-playing,  games,  masques,  revels,  bull-baitings,  and  cock- 

1 N.  J.   Archives,  vol.   i.  p.   383. 
•  Learning  and  Spicer,  pp.  229-53. 


NEW  FUNDAMENTAL   CONSTITUTION.  3*1 

fightings  were  not  explicitly  forbidden,  but  were  to  be  "dis 
couraged"  by  the  judges  and  courts.  Here  again  we  have  an 
absence  of  precision  and  a  confusion  of  the  spheres  of  law  and 
morality,  thoroughly  characteristic  of  New  England. 

In  1683  Rudyard  was  superseded,  not  apparently  for  any 
offense  or  shortcoming,  but  to  be  replaced  by  a  deputy,  Lawrie, 
The  New  who  was  himself  one  of  the  original  twelve  pur- 

Funda- 

mentai          chasers,  and  who  more  fully  understood  and  entered 

Constitu-          .  ,.  e    \       -n  '  TT  i  i 

tion.>  into  the  schemes  of  the  Proprietors.     He  was  charged 

with  the  task  of  carrying  out  what  his  colleagues  regarded  as  a 
thoroughgoing  and  valuable  scheme  of  constitutional  reform. 
Instead  of  being  content  with  the  system  of  representation  in  use 
which  fifteen  years  of  practice  had  done  something  to  perfect, 
and  with  which  at  least  the  settlers  were  familiar,  they  drafted 
a  brand-new  constitution.  It  began  by  defining  the  position  of 
the  Governor.  He  was  to  be  resident  and  was  to  hold  office  for 
three  years.  Fears  seem  to  have  been  entertained  that  the  Gov 
ernor  might  seek  to  continue  his  office  beyond  the  statutory  time 
or  to  make  it  hereditary.  Any  person  furthering  the  reappoint- 
ment  of  the  Governor  or  the  appointment  of  his  son  was  to  be 
reputed  a  public  enemy. 

The  Assembly,  or  as  it  was  called  the  Great  Council,  was  to 
consist  of  the  twenty-four  Proprietors,  acting  personally  or  by 
proxy,  and  a  hundred  and  forty-four  delegates  chosen  by  the 
freemen.  For  the  present,  however,  in  consideration  of  the 
smallness  of  the  colony  the  elected  representatives  were  to  be 
seventy-two.  It  is  hard  to  imagine  anything  more  grotesquely 
complicated  and  unpractical  than  the  method  of  election  pre 
scribed,  and  the  qualifications  imposed  on 'representatives.  "For 
the  full  preventing  of  all  indirect  means  the  election  shall  be 
after  this  manner :  the  names  of  all  the  persons  qualified  in  each 
county  shall  be  put  on  equal  pieces  of  parchment,  and  prepared 
by  the  Sheriff  and  his  clerk  the  day  before,  and  at  the  day  of 
election  shall  be  put  in  a  box  and  fifty  shall  be  taken  out  by  a  boy 
under  ten  years  of  age;  those  fifty  shall  be  put  into  the  box 
again,  and  the  first  five-and-twenty  then  taken  out  shall  be 
capable  to  be  chosen  for  that  time,  the  other  five-and-twenty 
shall  by  plurality  of  votes  name  (of  the  aforesaid  twenty-five) 

1  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  i.  pp.  395-410. 


322  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

twelve  if  there  be  three  to  be  chosen,  and  eight  if  there  be  two 
to  stand  for  it ;  these  nominators  first  solemnly  declaring  before 
the  Sheriff  that  they  shall  not  name  any  known  to  them  to  be 
guilty  for  the  time,  or  to  have  been  guilty  for  a  year  before,  of 
adultery,  whoredom,  drunkenness,  or  any  such  immorality,  or 
who  is  insolent  or  a  fool,  and  then  out  of  the  twelve  or  eight  so 
nominated,  three  or  two  shall  be  taken  by  the  ballot  as  afore 
said." 

The  Assembly  thus  composed  was  to  meet  every  year.  Every 
motion  must  be  carried  not  by  a  simple  majority,  but  by  two- 
thirds.  The  Proprietors  and  the  elected  representatives  were  to- 
sit  together,  but  were  to  act  so  far  separately  that  nothing  could 
be  carried  without  the  consent  of  half  the  Proprietors.  Under 
this  system  one  may  doubt  which  would  be  more  troublesome,  ta 
elect  the  legislature  or  to  obtain  any  results  from  it  when  elected. 

There  was  to  be  also  an  executive  committee,  consisting  of  the 
Proprietors  and  of  twelve  others  chosen  by  ballot  from  among 
the  elected  representatives.  This  was  to  be  divided  into  three  sub 
committees,  whose  provinces  of  action  were  thus  assigned  to 
them.  One  was  "for  the  public  policy  and  to  look  to  manners, 
education  and  arts/'  one  "for  trade  and  management  of  the 
public  treasury,"  one  "for  plantations  and  regulating  of  all 
things." 

There  was  also  to  be  a  war  department.  This  part  of  the 
public  policy  was  much  complicated  by  the  views  of  the  Quaker 
section  of  the  colony.  To  prevent  the  colony  from  being  prej 
udiced  by  their  peculiar  principles  it  was  provided  that  they 
should,  by  a  process  described  in  very  complex  and  cumbrous 
terms,  be  excluded  from  all  deliberations  on  military  questions. 
Their  consciences  were  to  be  protected  by  a  provision  that  they 
need  not  contribute  to  any  funds  raised  for  purposes  of  war. 
That,  however,  was  made  somewhat  illusory,  since  in  that  case 
they  were  to  contribute  a  proportionately  larger  sum  to  other 
public  purposes. 

The  landed  system  was  as  fantastic  and  unpractical  as  the  rest.. 
Its  general  principle  was  to  allow  the  subdivision  of  the  pro 
prietary  interest  within  certain  limits.  Each  Proprietor  might 
alienate  three-fourths  of  his  share  of  land  without  prejudice  to 
his  political  rights.  If,  however,  he  failed  to  retain  one-fourth, 
his  rights  came  to  an  end.  But  where  a  proprietorship  was  held 


CONSTITUTION  OF  EAST  NEW  JERSEY,  323 

by  coheirs  they  might  elect  a  representative  to  act  for  them. 
Otherwise,  the  original  Proprietor  was  to  be  replaced  by  some 
one  who  held  the  fourth  of  an  original  share.  This  qualifica 
tion,  however,  might  be  reduced  to  five  thousand  acres,  or  if 
necessary  even  below. 

On  the  other  hand,  increase  of  territory  was  guarded  against 
as  much  as  diminution,  since  no  one  might,  by  purchase,  amass 
into  his  own  hands  more  than  one  original  proprietary  share. 

For  the  rest,  trial  by  jury  was  provided  for,  no  persons  pro 
fessing  a  belief  in  God  were  to  be  in  any  way  molested  for  their 
opinions,  and  a  simple  declaration  of  belief  in  Christianity  was 
to  be  the  only  qualification  required  for  office. 

It  is  clear  that  the  Proprietors  were  beset  by  no  doubts  or  fears 
as  to  the  merits  of  this  scheme.  Nor  had  they  any  doubts  that 
introduc-  the  settlers  would,  when  once  they  understood  it, 
new°conh-e  hail  it  as  a  vast  improvement  on  the  clumsy  and  com- 
stitution.  monplace  constitution  under  which  they  lived.  But 
they  do  seem  to  have  felt  that  to  force  the  scheme  on  reluctant 
settlers  might  be  attended  with  difficulties,  that  it  would  be  in 
some  sort  a  breach  of  those  obligations  to  which  they  had  suc 
ceeded.  Accordingly,  Lawrie  is  not  to  put  the  new  constitution 
in  force  at  once,  but  to  explain  to  the  settlers  its  advantages, 
"how  much  it  exceeds  their  former  commissions,"  and  so  with 
the  approval  of  the  Assembly  to  secure  its  acceptance.  Mean 
while  the  Proprietors  exercised  their  power  of  vetoing,  or  at  least 
of  refusing  to  confirm,  the  Acts  passed  by  the  Assembly  in  the 
previous  year,  avowedly  on  the  ground  that  the  new  constitution 
would  render  them  needless.  At  the  same  time  they  suggested 
that  whatever  deficiencies  there  might  be  in  that  system  could 
be  supplemented  from  the  common  law  of  England  without 
special  legislation.1 

Lawrie  wyas  not  long  in  discovering  that  the  new  system  was 
not  accepted  as  eagerly  as  the  Proprietors  had  expected.  They 

A  com-          then  changed  their  ground  and  declared  that  the  con- 
promise  .  ,    ,  ,          1111 
adopted.        stitution  was  not  intended  to  apply  to  the  old  settlers, 

but  only  to  those  who  should  come  out  after  the  late  purchase 
of  the  province.  In  other  words  they  proposed  to  set  up,  side 
by  side  in  the  same  province,  two  systems  of  government,  each 

1  See  the  Instruction  to  Lawrie  in  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  i.  pp.  426-34. 


324  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

applying  to  a  separate  section  of  the  population.  The  old 
settlers,  however,  might  be  admitted  as  a  special  act  of  grace  to 
the  benefit  of  the  new  constitution  on  certain  conditions.  They 
must  submit  to  a  resurvey  of  their  lands  and  an  inquiry  into  the 
validity  of  their  title.  They  must  pay  up  all  arrears  of  quit- 
rent,  and  must  pass  an  Act  providing  the  revenue  needed  for  the 
purposes  of  government.1 

As  in  Carolina,  usage  proved  too  strong  for  theory.  Lawrie 
does  not  seem  to  have  made  any  serious  attempt  to  enforce  the 
new  constitution.  Assemblies  met  annually,  and  the  Great 
Council  with  its  complicated  ballots  was  even  less  of  a  reality 
than  the  landgraves  and  caciques  of  Locke's  imagination. 

Meanwhile  strenuous  attempts  were  being  made  to  carry  out 
one  part  of  the  Proprietors'  scheme  in  the  erection  of  a  great  sea- 
Establish-  port  town.  So  important  did  the  Proprietors  con- 
a  town  at  sider  this  that  it  formed  the  subject  of  a  special  set  of 

Perth  .  .  .     2   J  ,_  f  . 

Amboy.  instructions  issued  to  Lawrie.  Iwenty-four  houses 
were  to  be  built,  one  for  each  Proprietor,  and  when  these  were 
finished,  a  house  for  the  Governor.  Markets  and  wharfs,  too, 
were  to  be  laid  out.  The  site  for  the  town  was  to  be  divided 
into  one  hundred  and  fifty  lots.  The  purchaser  of  each  was 
bound  to  build  a  house  on  it,  on  pain  of  forfeiting  his  claim,  and 
was  to  hold  with  it  three  acres  of  upland.  The  town  was  to 
retain  the  Indian  name  of  the  site,  Ambo,  soon  modified  into 
Amboy,  with  the  prefix  Perth  in  honor  of  the  chief  Proprietor. 

Meanwhile  Lawrie  and  others  were  doing  all  in  their  power 
to  stimulate  interest  and  confidence  in  the  colony  among  those 
Material  at  home.3  We  are  reminded  of  the  early  days  of 
ofthetlon  Virginian  colonization  as  we  read  the  glowing  ac- 
coiony.  count  of  the  resources  of  the  country  and  of  the  pros 
perity  of  the  settlement,  sent  home  by  Lawrie  and  his  associates. 
Thanks  to  a  good  climate  and  soil,  to  the  pacific  temper  of  the 
natives,  and  to  the  absence  of  any  serious  interruption  or  hin 
drance  from  those  in  authority,  the  course  of  New  Jersey  had 
doubtless  been  one  of  unbroken  material  prosperity.  We  may 
well  believe  that  Lawrie  hardly  exaggerated  when  he  wrote  that 
there  was  "not  a  poor  body  in  the  province,  nor  one  that  wants." 

1  Additional   Revisions  to  Constitution  in  Archives,  vol.  i.   p.  443. 

2  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  i.  p.  434. 

*  Lawrie's  Report  with  others  is  to  be  found  in  Scott's  Model. 


LAWRJES  REPORT.  325 

His  report,  however,  is  something  more  than  a  mere  eulogy. 
It  contains  in  a  short  compass  the  best  account  that  we  have  of 
the  visible  and  material  condition  of  the  colony,  and  also  of  the 
mental  and  moral  state  of  the  settlers.  There  are  a  few  stone 
houses,  but  most  are  of  wood.  The  towns  are  not  compactly 
built,  but  are  straggling  rural  communities  like  many  of  those 
in  New  England.  Between  the  houses  are  large  vacant  spaces, 
and  the  sheep  feed  where  the  street  should  be.  Most  of  the 
towns  are,  as  in  Maryland  and  Virginia,  on  the  banks  of  streams 
where  small  vessels  can  land  goods.  There  are  no  large  Pro 
prietors;  a  planter  with  ten  servants  and  thirty  cows  is  excep 
tionally  wealthy.  The  most  abundant  stock  are  horses;  these 
breed  wild  through  the  country.  Wages  are  high;  a  workman 
can  earn  two  shillings  or  half  a  crown  a  day.  That  being  so,  it 
is  hardly  surprising  to  learn  from  another  writer  that  they  are 
a  careless  and  unfrugal  people.1  They  have  already  fallen  away 
from  the  traditions  of  New  England  Puritanism.  There  is  not 
in  all  East  Jersey  a  minister  of  religion  who  has  not  some  secular 
calling;  there  is  no  regular  public  provision  for  schooling,  but 
something  is  done  by  the  voluntary  efforts  of  the  settlers. 

Other  witnesses,  not  assuredly  accustomed  to  a  high  standard 
of  luxury,  show  a  less  favorable  picture  of  the  material  condition 
of  the  colony.  They  tell  us  of  the  comfortless  houses,  built  of 
ill-fitting  logs,  of  the  hard  fare  of  the  indented  servants,  living 
on  maize-bread  and  water.  They  also  mention  the  impoverish 
ment  of  the  colony  by  reason  of  the  trade  restrictions  imposed 
by  the  Government  of  New  York.  Burlington,  the  chief  town, 
has  shrunk  to  a  settlement  of  fifty  wooden  houses.2 

While  the  transfer  of  East  Jersey  from  Carteret's  heirs  to  the 
new  body  of  Proprietors  did  not  bring  with  it  those  constitu- 
Effect  of  tional  changes  which  were  designed,  we  must  not  re- 
ofeproange  8ar^  i*  as  an  unimportant  measure.  It  was  a  step 
prictors.  towards  the  consolidation  of  the  whole  body  of  colo 
nies.  Though  the  two  Jerseys  and  Pennsylvania  were  not  con 
nected  by  any  political  bond,  yet  they  were  now  exposed  to  influ 
ences  which  fitted  them  to  work  together  at  a  future  day.  Each 
was  largely  influenced  by  Quakerism.  Each  came  under  the 
personal  influence  of  one  man,  William  Penn.  The  records  of 

1  Letter  from  Johnstone  of  Spotswoode,  in  the  Model,  p.  299. 
*The  Labadists,  pp.   173-227. 


326  SE  TTLEMEN  T  OF  NE  W  JERSE  Y. 

each  state  show  a  certain  identity  of  principle  guiding  legislation. 
The  colonists  were  drawn  from  the  same  sources ;  we  may  in  fact 
say  that  from  1680  onwards  the  three  provinces  were  fed  by  one 
common  stream  of  emigration. 

If  the  new  Proprietors  had  erred  in  thinking  that  they  could 
suddenly  impose  on  the  colonists  a  new  system  of  government, 
The  Pro-  constructed  without  regard  to  its  existing  condition, 
rJpVe""  they  at  least  deserve  the  credit  of  having  soon  drawn 
"resident  back  from  an  untenable  position.  They  saw  that  no 
committee.  gOOJ  administrative  results  could  attend  the  action  of 
a  body  living  in  England  and  endeavoring  to  manage  the  affairs 
of  the  colony.  Accordingly  in  1684  the  authority  of  the  whole 
body  of  Proprietors  was  vested  in  a  resident  committee.1  Their 
approval  was  to  give  temporary  validity  to  laws,  and  thus  the 
legislature  was  freed  from  the  inconvenience  of  referring  all  its 
measures  to  a  non-resident  body.  They  were  furthermore  in 
trusted  with  the  duty  of  maintaining  the  territorial  rights  of  the 
Proprietors,  acting,  in  fact,  as  the  resident  agents  of  an  absentee 
Proprietor.  The  political  authority  of  the  Proprietors  was 
short-lived,  and  even  while  it  lasted  ineffectual.  But  by  this 
system  of  delegation  they  saved  their  territorial  rights,  and  ad 
ministered  them  with  better  effect. 

Meanwhile  the  glowing  pictures  of  colonial  prosperity  drawn 
by  Lawrie  and  his  friends  were  doing  little  to  attract  colonists. 
Lack  of  The  contrast  between  the  reluctance  of  the  Scotch  to 
SuwlS'in  support  New  Jersey  and  the  success  with  which  the 
Scotland.  Darien  scheme  appealed  to  them  illustrates  the 
national  character  as  it  then  was.  The  Darien  scheme  was  ex 
clusive  and  military.  It  appealed  to  the  patriot  and  to  the 
soldier  of  fortune.  There  was  little  attraction  in  the  prospect 
of  being  absorbed  into  a  community  of  English  farmers  and 
tradesmen. 

Such  emigration  as  there  was  from  Scotland  was  hardly  the 
result  of  voluntary  choice.  Among  those  who  took  a  leading 
Scot  of  Part  in  pressing  the  claims  of  New  Jersey  on  his 
Pitiochie »  countrymen  was  George  Scot  of  Pitlochie.  He  was  a 

1  Learning  and  Spicer,  p.  195. 

1  The  main,  one  may  indeed  say  the  only,  authority  for  Scot's  proceedings 
is  Wodrow.  His  partisan  bias  makes  him  a  dangerous  witness,  but  here  one 
sees  no  special  reason  why  it  should  have  misled  him.  For  Scot's  own  writ 
ing  see  the  introductory  note  to  this  chapter. 


SCOT  OF  PITLOCHIE.  327 

wealthy  laird  in  Midlothian,  who  had  three  times  been  heavily 
fined  and  imprisoned  for  persistent  attendance  at  conventicles 
-and  for  harboring  a  Nonconformist  minister.  It  was  during  his 
third  imprisonment  that  the  change  of  proprietorship  in  New 
Jersey  seemed  to  offer  a  refuge  for  persecuted  Covenanters. 
The  presence  of  Perth  among  the  Proprietors,  Royalist  and 
High  Churchman  though  he  was,  was  no  obstacle  to  such  a 
scheme.  His  tenets,  political  and  religious,  were  but  a  matter  of 
convenience.  Covenanters  in  Scotland  were  obnoxious  to  him  as 
interfering  with  a  system  of  government  in  which  he  was  per 
sonally  interested.  He  assuredly  would  not  have  thought  of 
sacrificing  to  the  demands  of  religious  uniformity  anything  which 
could  help  the  material  prosperity  of  the  colony.  Nor  was  his 
presence,  and  that  of  others  who  may  have  thought  with  him, 
likely  to  stand  in  the  way  of  Scot's  projects.  The  Proprietors  of 
East  Jersey,  as  we  have  already  seen,  included  men  of  widely 
different  views  in  politics  and  religion,  Kingsmen  and  Common- 
wealthmen,  Churchmen  and  Quakers.  Nothing  is  more  note 
worthy  in  the  history  of  Scotland  during  the  seventeenth  century 
than  the  ease  with  which  men  of  widely  different  views  and  prin 
ciples  could  form  temporary  combinations.  The  men  who 
plotted  for  Argyle  and  Monmouth  and  murdered  Sharp  in  the 
interests  of  the  Covenant  were  ready  at  a  later  day  to  plot 
against  William,  and  to  support  James  and  Dundee  for  the  same 
end. 

Another  peculiarity  of  Scotland  at  that  time  no  doubt  made 
Scot's  task  an  easier  one.  Predial  servitude  was  still  a  recog 
nized  institution  in  Scotland.  In  the  English  plantations  the 
class  of  indented  servants  was  mainly  recruited  by  professional 
kidnappers,  or  from  men  exempted  from  the  gallows.  But  the 
Scotch  laborer  who  voluntarily  sold  himself  for  a  term  of  serv 
ice  was  not  sinking  below  the  level  commonly  occupied  in  his 
own  country  by  a  collier  or  saltworker. 

Accordingly  Scot  asked  and  obtained  leave  from  the  Privy 
Council  to  transport  with  him  a  company  of  men  like  himself 
undergoing  imprisonment  for  their  religious  practices.  But  it 
was  specially  provided  that  he  should  not  take  advantage  of  this 
to  remove  any  prisoners  of  importance,  since  none  might  go  who 
had  real  estate  of  more  than  a  hundred  pounds  annual  value. 
The  whole  company  collected  amounted  to  two  hundred.  A 


328  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

contemporary  chronicle  not  likely  to  be  unfavorable  to  Scot 
accused  him  of  "tampering  with"  some  of  the  prisoners,  by 
promising  them  their  liberty  in  New  Jersey  on  a  payment  of  five 
pounds.1  This  is  denounced  as  "making  merchandise  of  the  suf 
fering  people  of  God."  As  far  as  we  can  see,  Scot  asked  for 
nothing  but  a  very  moderate  recompense  for  the  necessary  cost  of 
outfit  and  transport. 

The  voyage  was  disastrous:  violent  sickness  broke  out,  and 
Scot  with  seventy  of  his  followers  perished.  Among  the  trage 
dies  of  the  voyage  was  the  death  of  Scot's  daughter,  Euphemia, 
newly  married  to  a  young  Scotchman  of  a  noted  Covenanting 
house,  John  Johnstone,  destined  to  play  a  leading  part  in  the  his 
tory  of  New  Jersey.  The  Presbyterian  chronicler  of  whom  I 
have  just  spoken  tells  us  that  the  ship's  captain  made  an  attempt 
to  land  them  in  Virginia,  there  to  be  sold  as  slaves,  and  was 
only  thwarted  by  weather  which  forced  him  to  his  original 
destination.  One  is  tempted  to  class  this  with  the  legend 
which  brought  the  Mayflower  to  Plymouth  not  of  set  pur 
pose,  but  as  the  result  of  Dutch  malevolence  and  the  captain's 
treachery. 

This,  though  the  most  extensive,  was  not  the  only  immigration 
into  New  Jersey  brought  about  by  the  political  and  ecclesiastical 
Lord  Neil  troubles  of  Scotland.  After  the  extinction  of  Ar- 
Campbeii.  gyle's  rebellion  his  brother,  Neil  Campbell,  already 
one  of  the  Proprietors,  visited  the  colony,  followed  by  many  of 
the  defeated  party,  and  was  appointed  Governor.2  Campbell's 
stay  in  the  colony  was  a  short  one.  Within  half  a  year  he  re 
signed  his  post,  and  named  Andrew  Hamilton  as  his  successor 
an  appointment  confirmed  by  the  trustees.3 

Andrew  Hamilton  was,  as  his  name  suggests,  of  Scotch  ex 
traction.  He  himself  was  established  as  a  merchant  in  London. 
Andrew  His  connection  with  colonial  politics  lasted  for  some 
Hamilton.  yearS)  anj  he  showed  himself  throughout  a  capable 
administrator,  with  clear  and  sound  views  of  colonial  policy; 
but  in  his  present  post  he  had  little  opportunity  of  displaying 
his  fitness  for  office. 


1  Wodrow. 

*  Whitehead,  E.  Jersey,  p.    117.     Mr.  Whitehead  says  he  was   "Deputy  Gov 
ernor."    He  was  "Deputy"  only  in  the  sense  of  representing  the  Proprietors. 
1  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  i.  p.  541. 


DONGAN  AND  NE  W  JERSE  Y.  329 

The  removal  of  Andros  had  as  far  as  outward  appearances 
went  re-established  peace  between  New  York  and  New  Jersey. 
jealousy  But  there  were  underlying  causes  of  jealousy  and 

' 


enmity  which  went  far  deeper  than  the  personal  feel- 
settiers.  jng  Q{  any  one  offo-ja^  New  Jersey  was  a  perpetual 
menace  to  the  commercial  prosperity  of  her  neighbor.  Unless 
the  New  York  officials  could  exercise  their  authority  over  the 
settlers  to  the  west  of  the  Hudson  it  was  wholly  impossible  for 
them  to  check  smuggling  in  their  own  territory.  Moreover 
that  which  the  Proprietors  of  New  Jersey  made  the  chief  aim, 
the  establishment  of  a  prosperous  seaport  at  Perth  Amboy,  was 
fraught  with  danger  to  New  York.  By  granting  more  ad 
vantageous  terms  to  merchants,  the  Proprietors  could  draw  off 
the  stream  of  trade  and  emigration  to  their  own  colony.  For 
New  York  was  not  like  a  New  England  town,  where  the  settlers 
were  bound  to  the  spot  by  ties  other  than  those  of  self-interest 
and  stronger.  The  New  York  traders  and  householders  now 
felt  the  reality  of  the  danger.  If  we  may  believe  a  memorial 
sent  by  the  Mayor  of  New  York  to  the  Proprietors'  Secretary^ 
by  1685  the  city  had  lost  a  third  of  its  trade,  and  there  was  a 
manifest  falling  off  in  inhabitants  and  in  buildings.1 

Thus,  outrageous  as  had  been  the  form  of  Andres's  proceed 
ings,  there  was  some  justification  for  the  feeling  which  prompted. 
Dealings  of  them.  There  was  no  danger  of  their  being  imitated 
withgNew  by  a  man  so  sagacious  and  self-restrained  as  Dongan. 
jersey.  pjjg  relations  with  the  rulers  of  New  Jersey  were 
ostensibly  friendly.  But  he  was  in  reality  just  as  urgent  for  re 
union  as  any  of  his  predecessors.  Early  in  1684  we  &n&  mm 
sending  home  a  memorial  in  which  the  Proprietor  is  urged  to  re- 
annex  New  Jersey,  and  thus  prevent  the  ruin  of  New  York.1 
The  New  Jersey  Proprietors  at  once  addressed  an  angry  remon 
strance  to  Dongan.3  He  received  it  courteously  and  with  a 
soft  answer,  but  none  the  less  persisted  in  his  advice  to  his 
master.4 

The  general  dispute  was  embittered  by  a  conflict  of  claims 
for  a  piece  of  territory.  Staten  Island,  lying  in  the  very  mouth 
Contest  for  of  the  Hudson,  might  well  seem  to  each  colony  an- 
island.  invaluable  possession.  Without  the  control  of  it  the 

1  This  memorial  is  in  the  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  i.  p.  491. 

*N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  pp.  358-59-  3  Ib.  p.  348.  *  Ib.  pp.  353-6. 


330  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

trade  neither  of  New  York  nor  of  Perth  Amboy  could  be  effectu 
ally  secured  against  smugglers.  The  island  had  since  the  very 
first  establishment  of  New  Jersey  formed  matter  of  debate.  It 
was  originally  occupied  under  the  Dutch  West  India  Company, 
and  thus  formed  part  of  New  Netherlands.  As  such  it  passed 
in  the  natural  course  to  New  York.  Berkeley  and  Carteret, 
.however,  put  forward  such  claims  to  it  as  forming  part  of  their 
grant  that  the  Duke  thought  it  well  in  1668  to  get  a  formal  ac 
knowledgment  of  his  right.1  Philip  Carteret  himself  had  ap 
parently  already  acknowledged  the  validity  of  this  claim  by  buy- 
ing  the  island  as  a  private  estate  from  the  Duke's  representa 
tives.2  Next  year  Nicolls's  successor  Lovelace  confirmed  his 
patron's  right  by  a  purchase  of  the  soil  from  the  natives.  After 
the  treaty  of  Westminster  the  territory  reverted  to  the  Duke, 
.and  was  made  by  Andros  into  a  separate  jurisdiction  under  a 
ranger.  That  office  was  held  by  John  Palmer,  at  a  later  day  a 
conspicuous  and  not  very  creditable  figure  in  the  history  both  of 
New  York  and  New  England.*  No  attempt  was  made  for 
-eleven  years  to  challenge  the  title  or  to  detach  Staten  Island  from 
New  York.  But  in  1681  Carteret's  widow  revived  the  claim. 
The  new  title  created  by  the  grant  of  September  1680  furnished 
a  pretext,  but  in  all  likelihood  Lady  Carteret  built  her  hopes  of 
success  on  the  recall  of  Andros  and  the  disfavor  which  had 
fallen  upon  the  Duke.  Accordingly,  in  July  1681,  Philip  Car 
teret  wrote  to  Brockholls,  the  Deputy-Governor  of  New  York, 
demanding  in  peremptory  terms  the  surrender  of  Staten  Island, 
as  being  included  in  the  recent  grant.4  At  the  same  time  a 
notice  was  sent  to  the  settlers  on  the  island  forbidding  them  in 
.any  way  to  acknowledge  the  jurisdiction  of  New  York. 

Brockholls  met  the  demand  with  a  plain  refusal,  whereupon 
Carteret  announced  his  intention  of  appealing  to  the  Govern 
ment  at  home,  and  laying  before  them  Brockholls's  "uncivil" 
letter. 

Philip  Carteret's  claim  dealt  with  political  sovereignty  over 


1  Maverick,  in  a  letter  to  Winthrop  (February  24,  1669),  says  "Staten  Island 
is  adjudged  to  belong  to  New  York."     Mass.  Hist.  Coll.  4th  series,  vol.  vii.  p. 
.315- 

2  Brodhead,  vol.   ii.  p.    149. 

*  Ib.  p.  166.     Mr.  Brodhead  quotes  the  actual  text  of  the  conveyance. 
4  Carteret's  letter  and  the  other  documents  to  which  I  refer  are  in  the  N.  J. 
Archives,  vol.  i.  pp.  349-52. 


DISPUTE  ABOUT  STATEN  ISLAND.  33 * 

the  island.  At  the  same  time  Lady  Carteret,  the  widow  of  Sir 
George,  who  had  died  in  1680,  was  advancing  a  territorial  claim 
on  her  own  account.  That  could  easily  be  met.  Even  if  Staten 
Island  had  been  Carteret 's  to  dispose  of,  such  territorial  interest 
as  he  had  in  New  Jersey  was  disposed  of  by  a  will  which  took  it 
all  out  of  the  hands  of  his  widow.  If  any  claim  could  be  set  up, 
it  must  be  made  not  by  her,  but  by  the  legatees.  Both  Philip 
Carteret  and  Lady  Carteret  seem  to  have  quietly  accepted  de 
feat.  When  in  1683,  under  the  short-lived  system  of  represent 
ative  government  introduced  by  Dongan,  New  York  was  divided 
into  electoral  counties,  Staten  Island  was  incorporated  with  one 
of  them. 

In  the  same  year  East  Jersey  under  the  new  Proprietors  was 
.also  divided  into  counties.  No  attempt  was  made  to  include 
Staten  Island.  This  might  have  been  taken  for  an  acknowledg 
ment  that  the  claim  was  at  an  end.  But  in  1685  Perth  and  his 
partners  without  any  pretext  reopened  the  matter.  Dongan 
might  well  be  indignant  when  he  learnt  that  papers  were  being 
distributed  among  the  settlers  in  the  island  bidding  them  accept 
the  jurisdiction  of  New  Jersey,1  nor  can  we  wonder  that  he 
should  have  pressed  upon  his  patron  the  necessity  of  resuming  his 
grant  and  annexing  New  Jersey  to  New  York.2 

At  the  same  time  Dongan  addressed  Perth  as  representing  the 
Proprietors  of  New  Jersey,  clearly  and  forcibly  setting  forth  the 
justice  of  the  Duke's  claim  to  the  island  and  the  impolicy  of 
-combating  that  claim,  and  pointing  out  that  it  was  as  well  not 
to  force  the  Duke  to  extremities.  It  was  better  to  surrender 
Staten  Island  than  to  run  the  risk  of  some  curtailment  of  terri 
tory  on  the  mainland. 

The  firm  front  shown  by  Dongan  answered  its  purpose,  and 
the  claim  of  New  Jersey  to  Staten  Island  was  quietly  allowed  to 
drop. 

The  question  was  one  of  far  more  practical  importance  than 
many  of  the  barren  disputes  about  territory  which  embittered  the 
relations  between  colony  and  colony.  Staten  Island  contained 
two  hundred  families.  It  commanded  the  mouth  of  the  Hud 
son,  and  might  at  any  time  become  the  key  to  the  navigation  of 
the  river. 

1  This  is  stated  in  Dongan's  letter  to  Perth.     It  is  in  the  N.  Y.   Docs.  vol. 
»»•    P-    353-  */&.  pp.  354-6. 


332  SE TTLEMEN T  OF  NEW  JERSE Y. 

The  various  elements  of  division  and  discord  from  which  East 
New  Jersey  had  been  suffering  were  happily  absent  in  the 
state  of  Western  province.  Proprietors  and  settlers  were  a 

West 

jersey.  homogeneous  body.  There  were  no  inhabitants  al 
ready  established  with  their  own  traditions  and  usages,  and  it  was- 
therefore  easy  for  the  Proprietors  to  mold  the  colony  to  their 
own  wishes.  Moreover,  they  had  the  wisdom  to  steer  clear 
of  those  elaborate  fantasies  with  which  the  Eastern  Pro 
prietors  encumbered  themselves.  The  first  representative  As 
sembly  met  in  I68I.1  It  at  once  passed  a  set  of  resolutions  defin 
ing  the  principles  of  the  constitution.  These  were  practically  a 
repetition  and  acceptance  of  the  concession.  There  was  to  be  an 
Assembly  elected  every  year.  Their  concurrence  was  necessary 
for  all  purposes  of  legislation,  finance,  or  foreign  policy.  Nor 
could  the  Assembly  itself  impose  any  tax  to  last  beyond  the 
period  of  its  own  life.  There  was  to  be  full  liberty  of  belief  and 
worship,  and  no  religious  disabilities  were  to  exist. 

While  it  was  provided  as  by  the  Concessions  that  all  public 
lands  should  be  laid  out  by  commissioners  appointed  by  the  As 
sembly,  certain  general  principles  were  now  set  forth  on  which 
these  commissioners  should  act.  No  one  person  was  to  have 
more  than  a  certain  amount  of  river  frontage,  and  the  settle 
ments  were  to  be  as  far  as  possible  continuous.  Moreover,  to 
promote  the  growth  of  a  town  at  Burlington,  it  was  enacted  that 
any  land  there  left  for  six  months  unoccupied  and  unemployed 
should  revert  to  the  community  and  be  apportioned  by  the  Land 
Commissioners.  Two  years  later  this  last  provision  was  ex 
tended  further,  and  it  was  enacted  that  no  one  should  have  land 
allotted  to  him  at  Burlington  unless  he  gave  security  to  build  a 
house  there. 

The  proceedings  of  1681  showed  the  perfect  unanimity  of 
feeling  which  existed  between  Proprietors  and  settlers.  This- 
Harmony  was  further  confirmed  in  1683.  The  Assembly  of 
the^ro"  tnat  year  to°k  upon  itself  to  investigate  and  decide 
ami  th?  tne  Questi°n  whether  this  purchase  was  of  land  or  of 
settlers.  Government — in  other  words,  what  was  the  position 
of  the  Proprietors.  Their  unanimous  decision  was  that  the  Pro 
prietors  had  acquired  not  merely  the  soil  but  also  political 

1  Laws  of  W.  Jersey. 


FEN  WICK'S  PROVINCE  INCORPORATED.  333 

rights.1  This  action  of  the  Assembly  was  in  itself  a  proof  that  it 
regarded  itself  not  merely  as  the  mouthpiece  of  the  commonalty, 
but  also  of  the  Proprietors.  For  a  third  party,  having  no 
judicial  status,  to  pronounce  judgment  on  the  relations  between 
the  Proprietors  and  the  Crown  would  have  been  absurd.  The 
vote  of  the  Assembly  was  virtually  a  declaration  by  the  Proprie 
tors  themselves  claiming  certain  rights. 

In  the  same  year  the  Assembly  modified  that  provision  in  the 
Fundamental  Concessions  which  aimed  at  making  them  unalter 
able.2  While,  however,  it  claimed  for  its  successors  the  right  to 
make  changes,  it  jealously  fenced  in  that  right.  It  could  only 
be  exercised  by  a  majority  of  six-sevenths,  and  it  could  not  be 
extended  to  what  was  regarded  as  the  specially  vital  portions  of 
the  system.  The  laws  which  were  to  be  exempt  from  this 
change  were  those  which  provided  for  liberty  of  conscience,  for 
the  security  of  property,  for  the  annual  meeting  of  the  Assembly, 
for  trial  by  jury,  and  that  which  required  every  verdict  to  be 
based  on  the  evidence  of  two  witnesses. 

The  Concessions  of  West  Jersey  differed  not  a  little  from 
those  of  the  Eastern  colony  in  their  practical,  businesslike 
character.  But  they  differed  even  more  widely  in  the  general 
principles  on  which  they  rested.  The  East  Jersey  constitution 
was  a  system  forced  upon  the  settlers  from  outside,  in  disregard 
of  their  wishes  and  in  defiance  of  their  existing  institutions. 
The  West  Jersey  constitution  was  almost  as  much  the  work  of 
the  settlers  themselves  as  of  the  Proprietors. 

There  was  a  possible  element  of  discord  in  the  independent 
attitude  of  Fenwick.  His  position,  however,  was  not  materially 
Fenwick-s  changed.  The  grant  of  territory  to  Penn  in  1681  de- 
Fncorpo-6  tached  the  little  dependency  on  the  Delaware  from 
rated.  New  York,  and  incorporated  it  with  the  new  province 

of  Pennsylvania.  There  was  now  no  choice  for  Salem  but  incor 
poration  with  Pennsylvania  or  West  Jersey.  In  1682  Fenwick 
made  over  his  territorial  rights  to  Penn  and  his  partners,  whose 
jurisdiction  was  thereby  effectively  established  over  the  whole  of 
West  Jersey." 

The  moderation  and  the  conciliatory  temper  of  the  Proprietors 

1  Laws  of  W.  Jersey,  p.  468. 
'  Ib. 

1  The  deed  of  transfer  was  printed  for  the  first  time  in  the  N.  J.  Archives, 
vol.  i.  p.  370. 


334  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

did  not  wholly  avert  disputes.  The  settlers  claimed  the  right 
to  elect  their  own  Governor.  The  Proprietors  had  at  the  outset 
Dispute  invested  Bylling  with  that  office.  He  discharged 
governor,  his  duties  by  a  deputy,  Samuel  Jennings.  In  1863 
ship."  the  Assembly,  apparently  without  any  communication 

with  Bylling  or  the  other  Proprietors,  elected  Jennings  as  Gov 
ernor.  Bylling  refused  to  approve  of  the  appointment,  and  the 
Assembly  thereupon  sent  Jennings  and  another  representative  to 
England  to  confer  with  the  Proprietors.  At  the  same  time  they 
in  some  measure  prejudged  the  question  by  appointing  one 
Thomas  Oliver  Deputy-Governor.  According  to  Quaker  usage 
the  matter  was  referred  to  the  arbitration  of  a  Committee  of 
Friends.  Their  decision  was  in  favor  of  the  Proprietors,  and 
when  Bylling  nominated  one  John  Skene  as  Deputy-Governor, 
the  Assembly  acquiesced. 

The  inclusion  of  West  Jersey  was  really  no  essential  part  of 
the  scheme  of  consolidation  suggested  by  Dongan  and  adopted 
New  by  James.  West  Jersey  belonged  as  distinctly  to- 

jorrnTpart  what  one  may  call  the  Delaware  Bay  group  of  settle- 
soudatedn"  rnents  as  did  East  Jersey  to  those  on  the  Hudson, 
territory  gut  neither  the  Duke  of  York  nor  his  advisers  were 

under 

Andros.  likely  to  understand  the  different  position  of  the  two 
halves  of  the  province.  If  the  policy  of  resumption  of  charters 
and  consolidation  of  government  could  be  justified  at  all,  as 
suredly  it  might  be  in  the  case  of  East  Jersey.  That  colony  was 
a  standing  menace  to  the  commercial  prosperity  of  New  York, 
its  independence  made  any  effective  system  of  revenue  impossi 
ble,  and  the  recent  conduct  of  its  government  in  the  matter  of 
Staten  Island  showed  that  it  might  be  a  greedy  and  unscrupulous 
competitor  for  territory.  The  Eastern  province  dragged  down 
the  Western  in  its  inevitable  fall.  The  one  thing  that  might 
have  saved  either  or  both  was  the  personal  influence  of  Penn  at 
Court.  But  since  he  had  become  a  separate  colonial  Proprietor 
with  a  province  of  his  own,  his  interest  in  New  Jersey  had  prac 
tically  vanished.  There  are  no  extant  documents  to  show  pre 
cisely  how  the  desire  of  James  II.  to  consolidate  the  American 


1  This  account  is  borrowed  from  Mr.  Whitehead's  chapter  on  New  Jersey 
in  the  Memorial  History,  vol.  iii.  His  statements  are  based  on  two  contem 
porary  pamphlets.  I  have  failed  to  find  these  either  in  the  British  Museum  or 
in  the  Bodleian  Library. 


EAST  JERSEY  OPPOSES  ANNEXATION.  335; 

colonies  was  brought  before  the  Proprietors  of  New  Jersey.. 
But  in  the  summer  of  1687  we  find  the  Proprietors  of  the 
Eastern  province  laying  before  the  Crown  a  representation  evi 
dently  meant  as  a  protest  against  the  intended  annexation  to, 
New  York.1  They  point  out  that  they  are  not  in  the  position  of. 
Proprietors  who  have  received  a  free  grant  from  the  Crown.. 
They  have  invested  a  large  sum  in  the  province,  and  to> 
interfere  with  their  proprietary  rights  is  to  deprive  them  of  all 
hope  of  return.  The  question  of  customs  was  dealt  with  some 
what  superficially  and  disingenuously.  It  might  be  true,  the: 
protest  urged,  that  if  the  duties  imposed  at  the  New  Jersey 
ports  were  lower  than  those  at  New  York,  ships  would  land  at 
the  former  and  so  trade  would  be  drawn  off.  But  if  the  scale  of 
customs  in  New  Jersey  was  so  raised  as  to  equalize  it  with  that 
at  New  York,  the  only  effect  would  be  to  enable  other  ports  to 
undersell  them  both.  To  this  it  might  fairly  be  answered  that 
there  was  a  certain  fixed  amount  of  trade  which  must  go  to  the. 
Hudson,  and  that  New  York  and  East  Jersey  were  the  only 
possible  rivals  who  could  compete  for  it. 

Then  came  a  proposal  which  showed  that  the  Proprietors  at 
tached  little  value  to  their  political  rights  in  themselves.  What 
they  really  dreaded  was  not  the  loss  of  sovereignty,  but  such  a 
transfer  as  should  make  their  province  a  dependency  of  New 
York,  and  so  put  her  at  the  mercy  of  her  commercial  rival.  Ac 
cordingly  they  petitioned  not  to  retain  their  charter,  but  that  the 
whole  of  New  Jersey,  East  and  West,  should  be  united  in  a 
single  colony.  Let  New  York  have  no  authority  over  the  cus 
toms  and  no  appellate  jurisdiction,  but  let  New  Jersey  be  under 
the  direct  control  of  the  Crown.  Let  the  King  show  his  respect 
for  the  interest  of  the  Proprietors  by  appointing  one  of  them 
Governor.  The  great  number  of  them  would  give  him  an  ample 
choice. 

There  is  nothing  to  show  how  this  document  was  received, 
and  for  some  time  we  hear  no  more  in  the  way  of  either  threat 
Proposed  or  protest.  But  a  document  is  extant  which  shows 
of  Author-  tnat  the  Proprietors  had  found  resistance  useless.  In 
Propri^16  April  !688  they  drew  up  a  short  statement  setting 
tors.  forth  that  as  the  King  desired  "for  several  weighty 

1  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  i.  p.  535.  It  is  headed  "Representation  of  the  case  of 
the  province  of  East  Jersey,  with  their  proposals." 


336  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

reasons  of  State"  to  resume  the  government  of  the  colony  they 
made  a  full  surrender  of  authority.1 

If  the  records  of  the  surrender  of  East  Jersey  are  scanty,  that 
of  the  Western  province  has  left  no  traces.  We  only  know  that 
Surren4er  both  were  included  in  the  commission  issued  to  An- 
p'rov'nces  dros  m  March  1 688,2  that  in  the  following  August 
toAndros.  ^e  vjs|ted  first  Elizabethtown  and  then  Burlington, 
and  that  at  both  places  he  asserted  his  authority  and  was  favor 
ably  received.3  It  is  easy  to  see  why  the  transfer  was  so  quietly 
accepted.  There  was  no  interference  with  local  institutions, 
and  as  long  as  that  was  so  it  was  a  matter  of  indifference 
to  the  settlers  where  the  titular  sovereignty  resided.  The  terri 
torial  rights  of  the  Proprietors  were  respected.  And  though  the 
change  as  made  was  not  exactly  that  which  the  East  Jersey  Pro 
prietors  had  asked  for,  yet  it  was  still  further  from  that  which 
they  had  dreaded.  The  real  danger  in  the  eyes  of  the  Proprietors 
was  incorporation  with  New  York.  Give  the  New  York  As 
sembly  any  sort  of  authority,  and  commercial  jealousy  might 
check  the  tide  of  emigration  into  New  Jersey  and  make  the  ter 
ritory  worthless.  But  now  New  York  was  only  one  of  a 
group  of  united  dependencies,  invested  with  no  superiority  and 
no  jurisdiction  over  her  neighbors. 

In  the  case  of  West  Jersey  the  matter  was  probably  simplified 
by  the  death  of  Bylling,  which,  as  far  as  can  be  now  learnt,  hap- 
Daniei  pened  early  in  1687.  His  share  passed  into  the 

Coxe.  hands  of  one  Daniel  Coxe,  who  bears  the  title  of 

doctor,  though  there  is  nothing  to  show  in  what  faculty.  His 
intentions  are  set  forth  in  a  long  letter  addressed  to  the  whole 
body  of  Proprietors.4 

With  somewhat  grotesque  pomposity  he  disclaims  the  inten 
tion  of  "arrogating  to  himself  any  absolute  despotic  power." 
Nevertheless,  it  is  the  opinion  of  "all  intelligent  disinterested 
persons"  that  the  Government  of  England,  by  Sovereign  and 
Parliament,  is  the  best  of  constitutions.  Since  New  Jersey  is 
fortunate  enough  to  have  a  government  modeled  on  that,  Coxe 
will  not  attempt  any  change,  but  will  duly  fall  into  his  place  as 

1  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.  26. 

"  The   commission   to   Andros   is   in   the   N.    Y.    Docs.   vol.   iii.    pp.    537-42. 
3  Andros  to  the  Lords  of  Trade,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iii.  p.  554- 
*  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.  4.     In  this  letter,  written  September  1687,   Coxe 
uses  the  words  "after  Mr.  Bylling's  decease." 


ANDROS'S  POLICY    TOWARDS  NEW  JERSEY.       337 

a  constitutional  monarch.  There  may  be  some  doubt  whether 
Bylling's  consent  to  the  Fundamental  Concessions  was  really 
binding  on  him,  as  at  the  time  he  gave  it  he  was  not  yet  invested 
with  full  authority.  Coxe,  however,  will  waive  his  strict  rights 
and  accept  the  constitutions  as  they  stand.  There  is  a  grotesque 
contrast  between  the  profession  and  the  reality.  As  a  matter  of 
fact  the  only  position  that  Coxe  occupied  was  that  for  a  few 
years  of  the  chief  partner  in  a  firm  of  absentee  landlords.  There 
is  nothing  to  show  that  his  acquiescence  in  the  surrender  of  New 
Jersey  was  ever  asked  for,  even  as  a  matter  of  form. 

It  is  probable  that  New  Jersey  owed  something  to  the  troubles 
of  the  northern  colonies.  To  cope  with  the  stubborn  will  of 
Policy  of  New  England  was  a  task  which  left  Andros  no  lei- 
wardsSNew  sure  Ior  asserting  the  commercial  supremacy  of  New 
jersey.  York.  He  had  maltreated  Carteret  and  enraged 
the  Proprietors  of  New  Jersey,  not  from  any  sympathy  with 
New  York  merchants,  but  from  that  unintelligent  and  mechan 
ical  fidelity  to  his  master  which  was  among  his  more  creditable 
characteristics.  Now  his  object  was  to  organize  an  effective 
government  for  the  whole  body  of  colonies,  and  to  provide  for 
their  security  against  the  French  and  their  Indian  allies.  To 
subjugate  New  England,  to  extirpate  her  peculiar  usages,  and  as 
far  as  might  be  her  exclusive  tone  of  political  thought,  was  a 
needful  step  to  that  end.  New  Jersey  offered  no  such  hin 
drance,  and  no  such  process  was  there  needed.  Thus  it  need  be 
no  matter  of  surprise  that  the  authority  of  Andros  was  accepted 
i>y  the  New  Jersey  settlers  with  content  and  even  cordiality. 

As  the  establishment  of  Andres's  authority  failed  to  disturb 
the  course  of  New  Jersey  history,  so  was  it  with  his  overthrow. 
The  rev-  As  far  as  we  can  learn  from  the  records,  or  one  should 
fnUNe°w  rather  say  from  the  total  absence  of  records,  William 
jersey.  arl(j  ^is  advisers  felt  that  the  settlers  might  safely  be 
left  to  their  own  devices.  This  neglect  was  no  doubt  in  some 
measure  due  to  the  fact  that  Hamilton,  returning  to  England 
with  many  official  documents,  was  captured  by  a  French  priva 
teer  and  was  probably  thus  deprived  of  his  papers.1  Thus  the 


1  Hamilton's  capture  is  stated  by  Mr.  Whitehead  in  the  Memorial  History. 
I  have  been  unable  to  find  an  authority  for  the  statement.  Smith  does  not  men 
tion  it,  but  his  information  on  this  period  is  so  imperfect  that  his  silence  proves 
nothing. 


338  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

Proprietors  were  almost  cut  off  from  communication  with  their 
colony  through  any  recognized  and  trustworthy  channel.  The 
only  authentic  record  of  the  action  of  the  Proprietors  during 
these  years  of  their  connection  with  the  colony  is  a  statement 
made  seven  years  later  by  the  Proprietors  of  East  Jersey  when 
charged  by  the  settlers  with  having  neglected  the  interests  of  the 
colony.  They  had  appointed,  they  say,  as  Governors,  first  John 
Tatham,  himself  a  Proprietor,  then  Joseph  Dudley.1  But 
neither  was  accepted  by  the  settlers.  What  attempt  was  made 
in  either  case  to  enforce  authority,  and  what  was  the  nature  of 
the  resistance,  are  matters  on  which  there  is  no  evidence.  But 
one  can  hardly  err  in  thinking  that  during  these  years  neither 
colony  had  a  central  government.  One  is  forced  to  believe  that 
the  organization  of  the  township  sufficed  for  all  the  purposes  of 
administration  and  control.  We  may,  at  least,  safely  say  that 
the  training  in  self-government  which  the  settlers  had  brought 
with  them  from  New  England  stood  between  them  and  anarchy. 
Nor  can  we  withhold  something  of  the  same  praise  from  those 
religious  principles  which  had  molded  the  life  of  the  late 
founded  settlements  in  New  Jersey.  Quaker  politics  have  their 
weak  and  ignoble  side;  of  that  side  the  later  history  of  the 
American  colonies  will  show  us  more  than  enough.  But  Qua 
kerism  has  never  failed  to  supply  in  moral  sanctions  an  adequate 
substitute  for  the  grosser  forms  of  legal  restraint,  just  as  she 
provides  an  equitable  substitute  for  civil  litigation.  Four  such 
years  as  passed  over  New  Jersey  between  1688  and  1692  would 
in  all  likelihood  have  left  Maryland  or  Virginia  in  anarchy. 

Meanwhile  a  change  had  come  over  the  position  of  the  Pro 
prietors  in  West  Jersey  which  removed  an  element  of  discord, 
Formation  and  working  in  conjunction  with  other  influences 
prop"?™  wholly  altered  the  political  condition  of  the  colony. 
tar>p-  Coxe  transferred  his  whole  interest  and  rights,  terri 

torial  and  political,  to  a  company  of  fifty  shareholders.2  The 
events  of  the  revolution  had  made  a  practical  severance  between 
the  Proprietors  and  the  colonists.  The  new  body  of  Proprietors 
made  no  serious  attempt  to  revive  or  confirm  their  political  au- 

1  This  is  stated  in  a  Memorial  from  the  Proprietors  to  the  Lords  of  Trade 
in  answer  to  charges  brought  against  them  by  the  inhabitants,  October  9,  1700. 
N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.  349. 

2  The  transfer  by  Coxe  and  the  constitution  of  the  new  proprietary  are  both. 
in  the  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  ii.  pp.  41-81. 


HAMILTON  GOVERNOR   OF  BOTH  COLONIES.       339 

thority.  They  sank  contentedly  into  the  position  of  absentee 
landlords,  and  their  authority  gained  durability  by  curtailment. 
The  existence  of  a  proprietary  company  exercising  political  power 
would  have  been  a  serious  hindrance  even  to  that  very  moderate 
amount  of  centralization  which  the  Crown  required  in  its  colo 
nies.  If  the  Proprietors  had  endeavored  to  maintain  their  origi 
nal  position  they  would  in  all  likelihood  have  lost  all.  Their 
territorial  rights  escaped  because  they  were  not  encumbered  by 
untenable  political  claims. 

At  the  same  time  the  Proprietors  wisely  strengthened  their 
position  as  landowners  by  forming  a  machinery  specially  designed 
to  uphold  that  portion  of  their  rights.  They  were  constituted  a 
joint-stock  company.  There  was  to  be  a  capital  made  up  of 
sixteen  hundred  shares,  each  ten  pounds.  The  land  of  the 
province  was  not  to  be  divided  among  the  shareholders,  but  was 
to  be  a  joint  estate  administered  for  the  benefit  of  the  company. 
The  administration  of  this  estate  was  to  be  vested  in  a  committee 
annually  elected.  Every  shareholder  holding  ten  or  more  shares 
was  to  vote  for  this  committee,  having  one  vote  for  every  ten 
shares.  No  one,  however,  might  in  any  case  have  more  than  ten 
votes.  No  person  might  be  elected  to  this  committee  who  had 
not  twenty  shares.  The  Company  was  to  enjoy  the  right  of 
nominating  the  Governor  and  Deputy-Governor,  and  also  all 
officials  directly  connected  with  trade.  But  beyond  that  it  was 
to  exercise  no  control  over  legislation  and  no  authority  over  the 
colonists. 

Nor  can  we  doubt  that  the  example  of  the  West  Jersey  Pro 
prietors  influenced  the  sister  body.  That  there  was  a  general 
Hamilton  community  of  action  and  a  recognition  of  like  prin- 

appomted  *  =  *" 

Governor  ciplcs  was  shown  by  the  appointment  or  Andrew 
colonies.  Hamilton  in  1692  as  the  Governor  of  both  colonies.1 
Hamilton  was  one  of  the  first  public  men  who  clearly  saw  and 
expressed  the  need  for  some  system  of  colonial  union.  His 
views  on  that  point  at  once  brought  him  into  conflict  with  the 
settlers.  Thus  in  the  autumn  of  1696  we  find  him  writing  to 
Fletcher  lamenting  the  obstinacy  and  the  narrow  views  of  his 


1  Hamilton's  commission  for  West  Jersey  and  his  instructions  from  the  Pro 
prietors  of  East  Jersey,  both  dated  April  9,  1692,  are  in  the  Archives,  vol.  ii. 
pp.  84-8.  I  cannot  find  his  commission  for  East  Jersey. 


340  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

Assemblies.1  They  cannot  be  made  to  believe  or  understand 
the  danger  to  which  Albany  is  exposed.  The  very  prosperity  of 
the  colony  increases  the  difficulty,  since  it  makes  them  more  re 
luctant  to  leave  their  homes  and  employments.  So  strong  is  the 
aversion  of  the  settlers  to  military  service  that  some  have  fled  to 
the  southern  colonies  to  avoid  it.  The  younger  and  more  adven 
turous,  for  whom  it  would  naturally  have  had  more  attractions, 
are  drawn  off  to  join  the  crews  of  smugglers  and  pirates. 

In  the  next  year  Hamilton's  official  career  was  for  a  while 
interrupted  in  a  somewhat  singular  fashion.  An  Act  was  passed 
Hamilton  in  1696  for  preventing  frauds  upon  the  revenues  in 
seded.  the  colonies.2  Among  the  provisions  of  the  Act  was 

one  to  the  effect  that  all  Colonial  Governors  must  be  born  Eng 
lishmen.  The  Proprietors  imagined  that  as  Hamilton  was  by 
birth  a  Scotchman  his  appointment  was  invalid,  or  at  least  might 
be  so  regarded,  and  accordingly  it  was  canceled.3  In  all  likeli 
hood  this  interpretation  found  more  ready  acceptance  since  there 
was,  especially  among  the  East  Jersey  Proprietors,*  a  party  who 
disapproved  of  Hamilton's  conduct.4 

This  party  succeeded  not  only  in  ousting  Hamilton,  but  in 
replacing  him  with  a  partisan  of  their  own,  Jeremiah  Bass.  He 

Bass  had  already  acted  as  agent  for  the  West  Jersey  So- 

appointed        .  . ..  1111*1 

Governor,      ciety.     His  supporters  seem  to  have  belonged  mainly 

to  that  colony,  but  at  the  same  time  he  had  influence  enough 
among  the  Eastern  Proprietors  to  get  himself  appointed  to  the 
governorship  of  their  province.  The  events  that  followed 
showed  plainly  the  need  for  some  system  of  united  control  which 
should  take  in  New  York  and  New  Jersey.  Bellomont  was 
engaged  in  his  campaign  against  the  pirates,  and  it  was  above  all 
needful  that  he  should  have  a  free  hand  in  all  dealings  with  sus 
pected  vessels.  Smuggling  and  piracy  on  the  American  coast 
were  at  least  first  cousins,  and  Bellomont  at  once  found  himself 
thwarted  by  the  old  jealousy  of  the  East  Jersey  settlers  on  the 
subject  of  customs. 

The  wavering  and  undecided  policy  of  the  crown  and  its  ad 
visers  had  indeed  left  that  question  in  a  tangled  state.  As  we 

1  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.   115. 

1  7  and  8  William  III.  c.  22. 

1  The  Proprietors  to  Hamilton,  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.   176. 

4  What  we  know  about  Bass  is  almost  entirely  derived  from  the  Archives. 


CASE  OF   THE   "HESTER."  34* 

have  seen,  the  chief  law  officer  of  the  Crown  had  in  1680  de 
clared  that  the  Duke  of  York  had  as  Proprietor  of  New  York 
Difficulty  no  control  over  the  customs  of  New  Jersey.1  In 
Yorkist  l687  an  Order  in  Council  declared  it  legal  for  ves- 
customs.  seis  to  ioad  an(j  unload  at  Perth  Amboy  .z  But  this 
was  limited  by  the  provision  that  the  Receiver-General  of  Cus 
toms  at  New  York  should  either  in  person  or  by  deputy  levy 
tolls  at  Perth  Amboy  on  the  same  scale  as  that  adopted  in  his 
own  colony.  The  New  Jersey  traders  were  simply  relieved 
from  the  inconvenience  of  having  to  clear  their  vessels  at  New 
York,  but  were  not  allowed  any  commercial  advantage  over 
their  neighbor. 

But  in  1696  the  Commissioners  of  Customs  in  England  ap 
pointed  by  their  own  authority  a  collector  for  Perth  Amboy, 
thereby  encroaching  on  the  privileges  which  nine  years  before 
had  been  conferred  on  the  collector  at  New  York.3  This,  how 
ever,  was  not  accepted  as  a  settlement  of  the  question.  In  the 
autumn  of  1697  tne  Lords  of  Trade  reopened  the  whole  ques 
tion  by  challenging  the  right  of  the  New  Jersey  Proprietors  to 
create  a  free  port.  The  question  was  submitted  to  the  law  offi 
cers  of  the  Crown.  Their  opinion  was  a  flat  contradiction  of 
that  given  in  the  previous  reign.  It  declared  that  the  original 
grant  to  the  Duke  of  York  did  not  invest  him  with  any  right  to 
create  ports  or  to  exempt  any  colonists  from  the  operation  of  the 
revenue  Acts,  and  that  no  powers  could  be  in  the  subsequent 
grantees  which  were  not  conferred  by  the  original  deed.4  Forti 
fied  by  this  opinion  the  Lords  of  Trade  obtained  an  order  from 
the  King  in  Council  prohibiting  the  importation  of  any  goods 
into  the  Hudson  without  their  paying  customs  at  New  York.5 
This  was  followed  by  instructions  of  the  same  tenor  to  Bello- 
mont.8 

A  test  case  soon  presented  itself.  In  November  1698,  six 
months  after  Bellomont's  arrival,  he  learnt  that  a  vessel,  the 
The  case  Hester,  was  at  Perth  Amboy  loading  for  a  voyage  to 
"Hester."  Madeira.  Bellomont  thereupon  sent  an  armed  force, 
variously  estimated  as  from  thirty  to  sixty  men,  to  support  his 
collector  in  levying  his  dues.  The  crew  resisted,  and  an  affray 

1  V.s.  p.  309.  *  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  i.  p.  540. 

SN.  Y.  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.   130.  *  Ib.  pp.   136,   177. 

6  Ib.  p.  200.  e  Ib.  p.  201. 


342  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

followed.  No  lives  seem  to  have  been  lost,  but  some  sailors 
were  wounded.1 

Bass  seems  to  have  so  played  his  part  in  this  affair  as  to  offend 
all  parties.  He  refused  to  support  Bellomont's  authority,  and 
incurred  his  displeasure  as  an  aider  and  abettor  of  smugglers.* 
At  the  same  time  when  the  New  Jersey  settlers  warned  him  of 
the  intended  attack,  and  offered  to  back  him  in  resisting  it,  he 
refused  to  act.  They  averred,  too,  that  after  the  vessel  was 
taken  the  captors  heaped  insults  on  the  Governor,  which  he 
tamely  received  with  words  of  good  will  and  offers  of  meat  and 
drink.3  It  is  possible  to  put  a  better  construction  on  Bass's  con 
duct.  He  may  have  believed  that  Bellomont's  claim  was  illegal 
and  so  refused  to  support  it,  yet  he  may  have  thought  that  it  was 
not  a  case  for  meeting  force  with  force.  Finally  the  vessel  was 
taken  to  New  York,  and  there  under  Bellomont's  authority  sold 
at  auction. 

Bellomont's  assertion  of  authority  was  the  signal  for  more 
paper  warfare.  The  New  Jersey  Proprietors  at  once  petitioned 
ofethends  t^le  ^-mS>  asking  that  either  Perth  Amboy  should  be 
Newjer-  made  a  port,  or  that  at  least  the  matter  should  be 
pnetors.  settled  by  the  trial  of  a  test  case  at  Westminster.4 
At  the  same  time  they  laid  a  memorial  before  the  Lords  of 
Trade.5  In  this  they  went  over  all  the  well-worn  ground  of  the 
original  right  to  levy  customs  vested  in  Carteret  and  Berkeley. 
They  also  urged  various  practical  reasons,  showing  that  the  com 
merce  of  East  Jersey  would  be  greatly  hindered  if  vessels  com 
ing  or  going  thence  had  to  touch  at  New  York.  That,  how 
ever,  was  no  argument  against  the  proposal  to  have  a  separate 
collector  at  Perth  Amboy  acting  under  orders  from  New  York. 
Finally  they  repeated  the  proposal  to  bring  the  matter  to  a  trial 
in  Westminster  Hall.  This  they  pointed  out  would  at  least 
put  them  right  with  their  settlers.  The  colonists  who  were  the 
parties  mainly  interested  would  then  know  who  was  really  re 
sponsible  for  refusing  their  demands.  Otherwise  they  might 

1  The  facts  of  the  capture  are  stated  by  Bellomont  in  a  dispatch  to  the  Lords 
of  Trade,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iv.  p.  438;  and  in  a  petition  from  Bass  to  Parlia 
ment,  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.  311. 

2  Bellomont's  dispatch. 

*  This  side  of  the  case  is  stated  in  a  petition  from  the  freeholders  in  the 

towns  of  East  Jersey  addressed  to  the  Proprietors.  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p. 
273- 

4  Ib.  p.  255.  5  Ib.  p.  259. 


PAR  TIES  IN  NE  W  JERSE  Y.  343 

deem  that  they  had  been  betrayed  and  their  interests  surrendered 
by  the  Proprietors. 

The  case  came  to  trial  in  the  form  of  a  civil  action  brought 
against  Bellomont  by  those  who  had  been  losers  by  the  seizure  of 
judicial  tne  Hester.  The  Court  found  for  the  plaintiff  with 
.settlement,  substantial  damages,  and  the  commercial  independ 
ence  of  Perth  Amboy  was  established.1 

Meanwhile  the  colony  was  torn  asunder  with  conflicting 
claims  and  interests.  The  Scotch  settlers  were  numerous  enough 
Disunited  to  be  of  weight.  The  proclamation  by  which  the 
the  colony.  King's  subjects  were  forbidden  to  give  any  assistance 
to  the  settlers  of  New  Caledonia  seemed  specially  intended  to 
restrain  Scotch  settlers  already  established  in  America,  and  thus 
in  New  Jersey,  as  in  Great  Britain,  Darien  was  a  watchword  of 
strife.  Quakers  were  strengthened  in  their  opposition  to  au 
thority  by  the  sympathy  of  their  brethren  in  Philadelphia. 
Many  citizens  of  no  mean  standing  were  almost  openly  in  league 
with  smugglers  and  pirates.  The  Elizabethtown  settlers  were 
reviving  their  old  claim  to  a  title  derived  from  Nicolls  and 
wholly  independent  of  the  Proprietors.  It  is  plain,  too,  that 
"while  there  was  in  no  party  any  cordial  sympathy  with  the  Pro 
prietors,  there  was  not  any  sort  of  positive  agreement  among 
their  opponents.  The  colony  was  in  fact  broken  up  into  jealous 
factions.  It  is  the  tendency  of  representative  government  to 
cause  all  political  opinions  to  crystallize  into  certain  definite 
forms,  and  to  marshal  men  in  bodies  where  the  more  exact  shades 
of  opinion  disappear,  and  where  convictions  are  roughly  stretched 
or  cut  down  to  fit  a  party  standard.  But  this  at  least  carries 
with  it  one  compensation.  It  saves  a  community  from  being 
torn  to  pieces  by  petty  groups,  it  makes  parties  manageable  and 
responsible  by  dividing  them  into  certain  well-defined  and  op 
posed  bodies. 

So  it  now  was  in  New  Jersey.  Out  of  this  conflict  and  chaos 
there  gradually  emerge  two  definite  parties,  and  the  political 
pivision  history  of  the  colonv  is  more  and  more  the  history  of 

into  ,     .      '  .  .  ' ,  * 

parties.  their  opposition,  bo  far  as  we  can  clearly  trace  the 
lines  on  which  they  were  organized,  the  one  was  the  party  of  the 

1  The  result  of  the  trial  is  stated  in  a  dispatch  from  Bellomont  to  the  Lords 
of  the  Treasury,  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  iv.  p.  777.  As  might  be  expected,  he  com 
plains  of  the  damages  as  excessive. 


344  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

large  landed  Proprietors,  the  other  that  of  the  small  freeholders. 
On  the  one  side  were  the  chief  Scotch  settlers  in  East  Jersey, 
forming  an  oligarchy  of  birth  and  in  some  measure  of  wealth,, 
and  allied  with  them  the  leading  Quakers,  forming  an  oligarchy 
of  religion.  The  support  of  the  Proprietors  was  chiefly  throwa 
into  that  scale,  but  there  was  a  section,  those  who  had  brought 
about  the  election  of  Bass,  who  were  opposed  to  the  main  body  of 
their  order. 

The  main  hindrance  to  the  success  of  this  party  was  the  in 
competence  and  irresolution  of  Bass  himself.  On  the  other 
Position  nand  his  opponents  were  held  together  by  that  able 
of  Morris,  tactician  who,  as  we  have  seen,  at  a  later  day  became 
conspicuous  in  the  field  of  New  York  politics,  Lewis  Morris. 
At  first  his  position  among  parties  in  New  Jersey  was  that  of  a 
free  lance,  distinguishing  himself  mainly  by  trenchant  attacks  on 
Bass  and  his  supporters,  couched  in  language  calculated  to  bring 
contempt  on  the  whole  proprietary  authority.  But  either  con 
viction,  or  an  estimate  of  the  probable  result  of  the  contest,  at 
tracted  him  to  the  side  of  the  Scotch  party.  We  soon  find  -him 
taking  his  place  in  colonial  politics  as  the  ally,  and  afterwards  as 
the  successor,  of  Hamilton,  at  the  head  of  those  who  represented 
the  interests  of  the  large  landholders. 

By  1699  the  disaffection  against  Bass  had  become  such  that  he 
found  it  impossible  to  carry  through  the  Assembly  an  Act  for 
Opposition  levying  a  sum  of  money  needful  for  purposes  of  gov- 
to  Bass.  ernment.1  Next  year  he  and  his  Council  endeavored 
to  smooth  the  passing  of  the  Act  by  certain  amendments,  but  it 
again  failed,  and  the  strife  became  so  fierce  that  the  Assembly 
broke  up,  the  majority  of  the  members  departing  and  not  leav 
ing  a  quorum  to  carry  on  business.2  Nor  were  his  opponents 
content  with  such  constitutional  resistance.  When  the  Supreme 
Court  met  at  Perth  Amboy,  under  the  presidency  of  Bass,  Mor 
ris  appeared  and  challenged  their  right  to  sit.  For  this  he  was 
arrested  and  imprisoned  for  contempt  of  court.  A  riotous  mob 
of  his  partisans  soon  gathered  together,  attacked  the  jail,  and 
freed  Morris.' 

1  This  is  stated  in  a  letter  fom  Morris  to  the  Lords  of  Trade,  N.  J.  Archives, 
vol.  ii.  p.  398.     Morris  was  a  partisan,  but  he  would  hardly  have  dared  to  mis 
represent  what  must  have  been  a  matter  of  notoriety. 

2  Ib. 

*  The  records  of  Morris's  arrest  and  the  subsequent  riot  are  in  the  New  Jer- 


DISTURBANCES  IN  NEW  JERSEY. 

In  West  Jersey  Bass  fared  even  worse.  The  magistrates  at 
Burlington  were  beset  and  refused  admission  to  the  Court  House 
Disturb-  by  3.  mob  strangely  described  as  "a  riotous  number  of 
westn  Quakers."  Bass  thereupon  himself  visited  the  place, 
jersey.  jje  found  the  insurgents  gathered  together  in  un- 
Quakerly  guise  with  colors,  drums,  and  arms.  The  arrival  of 
the  Governor  seems,  however,  to  have  quelled  the  riot.  The' 
disaffected  laid  aside  their  firearms  and,  after  certain  threats  of 
using  their  bludgeons,  allowed  Bass  access  to  the  Court  House.1 

In  1699  the  question  as  to  Hamilton's  qualification  was  re 
opened.  Though  avowedly  a  point  of  legal  interpretation,  it  is. 
disrti!ter  plain  that  the  question  was  fought  out  on  party 
about  the  lines.  Hamilton  was  the  candidate  of  that  influential 
ship.  Scotch  party  in  the  colony  from  whom  a  large  part, 

though  not  the  whole,  of  the  opposition  to  Bass  had  proceeded. 
This  party  so  far  prevailed  that  Bass  was  superseded,  and 
Hamilton  reappointed  to  the  governorship  of  both  provinces.* 
There  was,  however,  a  sufficient  section  of  the  East  Jersey  Pro 
prietors  hostile  to  Hamilton  to  get  that  part  of  his  commission 
rescinded,  and  one  Andrew  Bowne  appointed/  Bowne's  ap 
pointment  does  not  seem  to  have  been  recognized  as  valid,  and  it 
only  had  the  effect  of  putting  an  additional  difficulty  in  Hamil 
ton's  way.  On  his  arrival  he  found  himself  confronted  with  an 
opposition,  who  refused  to  recognize  his  authority  on  the  ground 
that  his  appointment  was  only  the  act  of  the  Proprietors  and  had 
not  been  sanctioned  by  the  Crown.4 

It  is  plain  that  those  who  supported  Hamilton  relied  largely 
on  the  help  of  Morris.  It  is  clear  that  his  conspicuous  and 
Disturb-  somewhat  discreditable  appearance  as  a  party  leader 
ajonmouth  had  not  destroyed  his  influence,  since  we  are  told  by 
County.  a  contemporary  that  Hamilton,  in  placing  Morris  on 
the  Council  and  appointing  him  Chief  Justice,  looked  on  him  as 


sey  Archives,  vol.  iii.  pp.  479-82.     They  were  forwarded  to  the  Lords  of  Trade 
ten  years  later  by  the  opponents  of  Morris  as  part  of  their  case. 

1  This  is  stated  in  a  memorial  from  Bass's  partisans  in  West  Jersey,  N.  J. 
Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.  380.     I  do  not  find  any  contradiction. 

2  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.  301. 

3  Bowne's  commission  does  not  seem  to  be  extant.     But  his  appointment  ia 
mentioned  in  a  letter  from  the  Council  of  East  Jersey  to  the  Proprietors,  June 
18,  1701.     N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.  385. 

4  This  is  stated  in  a  petition  from  Hamilton  himself  and  his  Council  to  the- 
King.     N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.   369. 


346  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

the  only  man  that  could  make  the  colony  submit.1  His  opening 
exploit  as  an  administrator  hardly  justified  Hamilton's  con 
fidence.  Hearing,  as  it  would  seem,  that  certain  men  in  Mon- 
mouth  County  were  showing  some  symptoms  of  disaffection, 
Morris  ordered  the  sheriff  to  make  some  arrests.2  The  sheriff 
came  back  with  a  broken  head.  Thereupon  Hamilton  raised  a 
force  of  forty  or  fifty  men  and  marched  towards  the  scene  of  the 
disturbance.  He  was  met  by  a  hundred  and  seventy  men  un 
armed.  Hamilton  thereupon  withdrew.  Meanwhile  the  Coun 
cilors  residing  in  the  disaffected  districts  were  disclaiming  any  re 
sponsibility  for  the  Governor's  action.  Threats  were  heard  that 
Hamilton,  Morris,  and  their  chief  supporter,  John  Leonard, 
would  be  arrested  and  held  prisoners  till  the  King's  pleasure  was 
known.  Rumors,  too,  were  circulated  that  men  in  office  had 
been  drinking  Jacobite  toasts,  and  that  the  King's  government 
could  not  be  secure  without  a  change. 

The  events  of  the  next  year  revealed  a  more  probable  and  less 
creditable  cause  of  disaffection.  A  pirate  named  Butterworth, 
Riot  at  said  to  be  one  of  Kidd's  crew,  was  put  on  his  trial  at 
town.8  Middletown.  An  armed  force  beset  the  Court, 

rescued  the  prisoner,  and,  to  insure  his  safe  escape,  seized  the 
judges  and  the  law  officers  and  kept  them  for  four  days  as 
prisoners. 

In  West  Jersey  matters  were  better.  Yet  there  Hamilton 
seems  to  have  ruled  rather  as  the  head  of  a  victorious  party  than 

Hamilton  as  an  impartial  peacemaker.4  He  relied  for  his  sup- 
in  'West  .  .  ,  „.  ,  .  ,  , 

jersey.  port  on  the  same  party,  mainly  Quakers,  who  had 
rebelled  against  Bass.  According  to  their  opponents  they  were 
numerically  in  a  minority,  but  made  amends  by  their  greater 
energy  and  better  organization.  It  was  alleged,  too,  that  they 
traded  on  the  superstitions  and  on  the  peace  principles  of  the 
settlers  generally  by  persuading  them  that  if  their  opponents  re- 


1  Letter  from   Bowne  and  Hartshorne   (probably  to  one  of  the  Proprietors), 
July  23,  1700.     N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.  327. 

2  Our  knowledge  of  these  affairs  is  derived   from  the  lette-    ot   Bowne  and 
Hartshorne,  just  quoted,  and  from  a  letter,  of  which  the  signaturi  is  lost,  ad 
dressed  to  Bass  at  the  same  date.     N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.  329. 

3  The  record  of  these  proceedings  by  the  Clerk  of  the  Court  at  Monmouth  is 
in  the  New  Jersey  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.  362.     Cf.  the  Petition  of  the  Governor 
and  Council  to  the  King,  ib.  p.   371. 

*  The  case  against  Hamilton  is  set  forth  in  an  address  from  the  inhabitants 
of  West  Jersey  to  the  Crown.     N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.  380. 


PROPOSALS  FOR  SURRENDER  OF  PROPRIETORSHIP.     347 

gained  power,  they  would  introduce  an  endowed  clergy  and  a 
standing  militia.  If  we  may  believe  the  memorial  which  set 
forth  these  grievances,  the  Quaker  party  was  supported  by  the 
Proprietors.  The  petitioners  accordingly  ended  their  remon 
strance  by  a  request  that  the  proprietary  government  might  be  dis 
solved,  and  that  they  might  be  placed  under  the  direct  authority 
of  the  Crown.  This  was  soon  followed  by  a  numerously  signed 
memorial  from  the  inhabitants  of  East  Jersey,  praying  that  if  the 
Proprietors  failed  to  appoint  in  the  place  of  Hamilton  a  Gov 
ernor  who  should  be  approved  by  the  King,  they  should  be  united 
into  one  colony  with  West  Jersey,  and  placed  under  the  direct 
control  of  the  Crown.1 

There  was  little  likelihood  that  the  Proprietors  would  feel  any 
inclination  to  hold  out  against  this  proposal.  Two  years  before 
Proposals  the  Proprietors  of  East  Jersey  had  made  overtures  to 
surrender  tne  Crown  for  a  surrender.2  Their  proposal  in- 


pritetor-ro~  v°lve^  the  abandonment  of  all  political  sovereignty, 
ship.  but  the  retention  of  their  territorial  rights.  The 

colony  was  to  be  annexed  to  New  York.  At  the  same  time  the 
well-being  of  the  settlers,  and  consequently  the  commercial  pros 
perity  of  the  colony,  were  to  be  protected  by  certain  specified 
provisions  maintaining  existing  rights.  Perth  Amboy  was  still 
to  be  a  port  independent  of  New  York.  The  inhabitants  were 
to  have  the  right  of  trading  freely  with  the  natives.  The  colony 
was  to  have  its  own  separate  law  courts.  There  was  to  be  a 
joint  legislature,  in  both  branches  of  which,  the  Council  and  the 
House  of  Representatives,  New  Jersey  was  to  have  its  propor 
tionate  share. 

There  is  nothing  to  show  what  befell  this  proposal,  whether 
it  ever  came  before  any  authoritative  body  in  England,  and  if  so 
what  was  its  fate.  But  in  1701  a  fresh  proposal  was  made,  this 
time  by  the  Proprietors  of  both  colonies.8  They  did  not  as  be 
fore  propose  annexation  to  New  York,  but  a  consolidation  of  the 
two  colonies  into  a  single  government  under  the  Crown.  There 
was  a  further  important  difference.  In  1699  the  Proprietors 
of  East  Jersey  offered  up  their  political  rights  as  a  sacrifice,  hop 
ing  thereby  to  retain  their  position  as  landholders.  Now  they 

1  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.  394. 

2  Memorial  of  the  Proprietors,  ib.  p.  294. 
*N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.  404. 


SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

took  higher  ground.  The  document  proposing  the  surrender 
was  accompanied  by  a  private  letter  from  Morris  to  Popple,  the 
Secretary  to  the  Lords  of  Trade.1  In  this  the  motives  and 
policy  of  the  Proprietors  are  clearly  explained,  and  by  the  light 
of  this  commentary  we  must  read  their  proposals.  The  Proprie 
tors  set  forth  that  the  planters  had  lately  broached  the  theory, 
vesting  the  right  to  the  soil  in  the  natives  and  denying  the  claims 
of  the  Crown,  and  consequently  all  rights  derived  by  grant  from 
the  Crown.  The  Proprietors  accordingly  proposed,  as  one  of 
the  articles  of  surrender,  that  the  Crown  shall  declare  all  titles 
to  land  resting  on  purchase  from  the  Indians  null  and  void  till 
confirmed  by  the  Proprietors,  and  that  no  one  but  the  Proprie 
tors  shall  have  such  right  of  purchase.  As  Morris  points  out, 
they  would  induce  the  Crown  to  secure  for  them  a  right  which 
they  were  not  strong  enough  to  secure  for  themselves.  The 
settlers  were  to  retain  the  same  right  of  trading  with  the  natives 
as  in  New  York  or  in  any  other  Crown  colony.  Perth  Amboy, 
Burlington,  and  Cohanzey  were  to  be  independent  ports,  each 
with  its  own  customs  officers.  There  was  to  be  a  joint  As 
sembly,  sitting  alternately  at  Perth  Amboy  and  Burlington.  A 
provision  was  inserted  as  to  the  composition  of  the  Assembly 
manifestly  intended  for  the  benefit  of  the  class  with  whom  the 
Proprietors  were  most  closely  connected,  and  adverse  to  the  gen 
eral  body  of  settlers.  No  man  might  vote  for  a  representative 
unless  he  had  a  freehold  estate  of  a  hundred  acres,  and  no  man 
might  sit  in  the  Assembly  without  a  freehold  estate  of  a  thousand 
acres.  The  religious  rights  of  the  settlers  were  to  be  protected 
by  a  clause  making  all  Nonconformists  capable  of  holding  office, 
and  by  the  substitution  of  a  declaration  for  an  oath.  Finally, 
the  Proprietors  were  to  be  allowed  to  nominate  the  first  Gov 
ernor.  The  last  stipulation  was  confirmed  by  a  petition  signed 
by  sixteen  Proprietors,  asking  the  King  to  confirm  Hamilton's 
appointment  till  the  surrender  was  effected.  The  retention  of 
Hamilton  was,  Morris  points  out,  of  importance  to  the  Pro~- 
prietors  in  two  ways.  He  could  be  trusted  to  look  after  their 
interests,  and  the  fact  of  their  being  allowed  to  retain  a  Gov 
ernor  of  their  own  choice  would  impress  the  settlers  with  the  be 
lief  that  the  claims  of  the  Proprietors  were  approved  by  the 

1  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.  412. 


OPINIONS  OF  LORDS  OF   TRADE.  349 

Crown.  The  appointment  or  rejection  of  Hamilton  had  in  fact 
become  a  test  question  between  the  Proprietors  and  their  op 
ponents. 

The  proposal  at  once  called  out  a  remonstrance  from  the  anti- 
proprietary  party,  of  whom  Bass  was  the  mouthpiece.  Within 
Attitude  f°ur  weeks  a  memorial  from  Bass  was  presented  to 
of  Bass.  the  Lords  of  Trade.1  He  had  not  seen  the  proposed 
articles  of  surrender  and  therefore  could  not  criticise  them  in 
detail.  But  he  denied  the  right  of  the  Proprietors  to  make  any 
such  surrender.  Those  who  made  it  were  only  a  portion  of  the 
"whole  proprietary  body.  They  could  only  surrender  their  own 
rights,  not  those  of  their  colleagues.  The  original  grant  to  the 
Duke  of  York  was  a  personal  trust  and  could  not  be  assigned: 
it  gave  the  Duke  authority  to  govern  the  province  as  a  whole, 
not  to  cut  it  up  in  three. 

There  was  no  doubt  great  force  in  this  argument,  but  un 
luckily  it  came  thirty-seven  years  too  late.  It  was  an  excellent 
argument  against  the  original  grant  to  Berkeley  and  Carteret. 
It  was  an  excellent  argument  against  the  system  whereby  the 
Crown  allowed  sovereignty  to  become  a  mere  incident  of  terri 
torial  possession,  equally  capable  of  transfer.  But  it  wholly 
failed  to  bear  on  the  case  in  hand  or  to  carry  the  stress  which 
Bass  laid  upon  it.  So  far  from  making  against  the  surrender, 
it  tended  to  show  that  the  surrender  was  the  only  means  of  re 
pairing  a  wrong. 

That  was  the  view  of  the  case  which  presented  itself  to  the 
Lords  of  Trade.  They  declined  to  express  an  opinion  as  to  the 
opinions  validity  of  the  Proprietors'  title,  and  therefore  as  to 
Lords  of  their  competence  to  make  a  surrender.  But  on  the 
ground  of  general  policy,  for  the  prevention  of  dis 
order  within  the  colony  and  for  the  military  security  of  the 
English  possessions,  it  was  expedient  that  it  should  be  under  the 
control  of  the  Crown.  Accordingly  they  recommended  that 
the  King  should  accept  the  proposal  of  the  Proprietors,  and 
should,  by  his  instructions  to  the  new  Governor,  determine  the 
constitution  of  the  colony. 

With  all  parties  substantially  agreed  there  could  be  only  one 


1  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.  418. 

2  Their  Memorial  is  in  the  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.  420. 


35°  SETTLEMENT  OF  NEW  JERSEY. 

result.  The  proposal  to  unite  New  Jersey  with  New  York  was 
abandoned,  possibly  through  the  representations  of  Hamilton, 
The  pro-  who  pointed  out  that  in  a  mixed  representative 

prictor- 

ship  trans-  Assembly  the  smaller  colony  would  be  swamped, 
the  crown.  The  death  of  King  William  caused  some  slight  delay, 
but  in  April  1702  a  deed  was  formally  executed  by  the  Proprie 
tors  of  each  province  acting  jointly,  whereby  they  transferred 
their  whole  sovereignty  to  the  Crown.1 

1 N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.  452. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

NEW  JERSEY  A   CROWN   COLONY. 

WE  have  already  seen  what  were  the  extent  and  character  of 
the  territory  which  thus  passed  under  the  direct  dominion  of  the 
Condition  Crown.  The  Eastern  and  Western  halves  of  the 
colony.  peninsula  were  connected  by  a  single  road  of  some 
fifty  or  sixty  miles  in  length.1  On  the  Eastern  coast  were  seven 
townships,  on  the  West  three.  None,  except  perhaps  Perth 
Amboy,  were  in  the  ordinary  sense  towns.  Each  was  a  scattered 
collection  of  farmsteads,  with  at  one  or  more  points  a  more 
closely  set  nucleus  of  houses.2  The  Indian  fur  trade  was  the 
staple  of  the  colony ;  we  hear  nothing  of  the  exportation  of  corn 
or  horned  stock;  horses,  however,  were  numerous  and  were 
shipped  to  the  West  Indies.'  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  a 
considerable  portion  of  the  trade  of  the  colony  lay  in  the  pur 
chase  of  cargoes  brought  in  by  pirates,  which  could  be  landed 
more  safely  in  New  Jersey  than  in  such  ports  as  Boston  or  New 
York.  We  read  of  sawmills,4  ironworks,0  and  copper  mines, 
and  tanning  was  an  industry  of  sufficient  importance  to  be  made 
the  subject  of  special  legislation.6 

As  in  most  of  the  colonies  the  want  of  coined  money  was  a 
difficulty  which  disturbed  the  legislature,  and  rates  were  espe- 
want  of  cially  enacted  at  which  commodities  might  be  taken  in 
money.  payment  of  public  dues,7  One  attempt  to  remedy  the 
lack  of  a  currency  deserves  notice.  One  of  the  most  enterpris 
ing  of  the  early  settlers,  Budd,  to  whom  we  owe  much  of  our 
knowledge  of  the  early  history  of  the  colony,  bestirred  himself  to 

1  Whitehead,  Contributions,  p.  268. 

2  This  is  clear   from  a  memorial  addressed  by  Lewis  Morris  in   1690  to  the 
Bishop  of   London,  published  in  the  collection  of  the  New  Jersey  Historical 
Society. 

4  Budd,  p.  39;  Gabriel  Thomas,  p.  25. 

*  Lawrie  in  the  Model,  p.  292. 

B  Budd,  p.  38,  with  note  in  the  reprint  of  1902. 

•Learning  and  Spicer,  p.   112.  7 Ib.   p.   78. 


.35 2  NEW  JERSEY  A    CROWN  COLONY. 

supply  the  want  of  a  circulating  medium  by  that  device  which 
has  so  often  appealed  to  speculative  imaginations.  Anticipating 
by  a  few  years  Chamberlain's  proposal,  he  would  have  allowed 
all  landlords  to  issue  notes  on  the  security  of  their  estate.1 
Budd  eagerly  points  out  how  such  a  measure  will  give  the  whole 
soil  of  the  colony  an  immediate  commercial  value,  by  making  it 
the  basis  of  credit  and  an  equivalent  of  capital.  Happily  for 
the  well-being  of  the  colony  Budd  did  not  find  listeners  ready  to 
turn  his  theory  into  practical  experiment. 

The  New  Jersey  settlers  almost  wholly  escaped  one  set  of 
difficulties  that  beset  the  infancy  of  most  of  our  colonies.  There 
Dealings  was  not  between  the  Hudson  and  the  Chesapeake  any 

\vith  . 

Indians.  compact  or  formidable  Indian  power.  The  horrors 
of  savage  warfare  were  to  the  New  Jersey  settlers  but  a  name. 
Thus  in  neither  colony  do  we  find  any  stringent  prohibition  of 
trade  with  the  natives.  In  East  Jersey  indeed  in  the  early 
•days,  when  its  inhabitants  were  little  more  than  a  few  scattered 
Tjands  of  New  England  emigrants,  haunted  by  memories  of 
Pequod  and  Mohican  wars,  we  find  an  Act  prohibiting  the  sale 
•of  arms  and  ammunition  to  the  Indians.2  Nor  might  any  smith 
mend  a  gun  for  a  native.  There  would  seem  to  have  been  at 
this  time  special  apprehension,  since  it  was  also  ordered  that  each 
town  should  have  a  fortified  guard-house.3  Two  years  later  the 
Act  prohibiting  the  sale  of  arms  and  ammunition  was  repealed.4 

The  sale  of  drink  to  the  natives  was  also  a  subject  of  legisla 
tion.  In  1677  an  attempt  was  made  to  control  without  abso 
lutely  prohibiting  it.5  The  publican  who  sold  it  was  to  "take 
effectual  care  to  prevent  disturbance."  But  two  years  later  all 
sale  of  drink  to  natives  was  prohibited  under  penalty  of  flog 
ging.8  This  was  re-enacted  in  1692,*  and  like  enactments  were 
passed  in  the  Western  province.8  The  existence  of  negro  slaves 
is  shown  by  the  fact  that  they  were  in  more  than  one  instance 
included  in  this  prohibition.8 

It  was  no  doubt  largely  due  to  the  absence  of  any  external 
pressure  from  the  savage  that  the  New  Jersey  township  became, 


1  Budd,  pp.  49-51.  'Learning  and  Spicer. 

*Ib.  p.  86.  *Ib.  p.   125. 

*Ib.  *lb.  p.   133. 

7  Ib.  p.  316.  *Laws  of  West  Jersey,  p.  435. 

*lb.  p.  512. 


RELIGIOUS   CONDITION  OF   THE   COLONY.          353 

as  we  have  seen,  a  loose,  straggling  community.  The  same 
cause  also  co-operated  with  the  large  Quaker  element  in  the 
state  of  population  to  disincline  the  inhabitants  for  military 
education.  serv;ce)  and  to  make  New  Jersey,  like  Pennsylvania,  a 
dangerously  weak  link  in  the  English  chain  of  defense.  In  New 
Jersey  we  see  a  community  largely  of  Puritan  origin,  some  mem 
bers  of  it  at  the  outset  deeply  imbued  with  the  exclusive  spirit  of 
New  England,  gradually  under  the  influence  of  climate  and 
natural  conditions  drifting  into  a  mode  of  life  akin  in  some  de 
gree  to  that  of  Maryland  or  Virginia.  The  emigrant  from  the 
shores  of  New  Haven  could  safely  isolate  himself  amid  the  pas 
tures  by  the  Hudson.  Close  corporate  union  became  no  longer 
a  necessity,  and  as  a  consequence  close  spiritual  union  ceased. 
Education  suffered  as  well  as  religion.  An  Act  passed  in  East 
Jersey  in  1693  authorized  each  township  to  levy  a  school  rate.1 
But  two  years  later  another  Act  expressly  declared  that  this  had 
failed  from  the  fact  that  the  towns  had  no  definite  center.  The 
legislature  sought  to  remedy  the  evil  by  creating  a  committee  of 
three  responsible  school  managers  in  each  town.2 

We  have  a  very  full  and  vivid  picture  of  the  religious  con 
dition  of  the  colony  extant.  In  1690  Lewis  Morris  sent  a 
Religious  memorial  to  the  Bishop  of  London  describing  the 
of  the*10"  spiritual  needs  of  his  fellow-citizens.3  Morris,  even 
colony.  m  more  mature  and  sober  years,  had  the  temper  of  an 
advocate  and  a  partisan.  He  was  avowedly  hostile  to  a  large 
section  of  the  settlers,  and  it  would  be  rash  to  take  his  statements 
as  sober  historical  evidence.  But  after  all  possible  deduction  they 
describe  a  state  of  things  singular  in  a  colony  whose  original  root 
was  in  New  England  Puritanism,  and  which  had  been  re 
plenished  by  Quaker  and  Covenanters.  The  colony  presented  in 
the  fullest  degree  an  example  of  that  "polypiety"  so  hateful  to 
Puritan  New  England.  Elizabethtown  and  Newark  kept  their 
original  Presbyterianism,  with  a  slight  admixture  of  Anglicans, 
Baptists,  and  Quakers.  At  Piscataway  there  was  a  Baptist 
church,  at  Freehold  one  of  Scotch  Presbyterians,  and  at  Perth 
Amboy  one  of  Anglicans,  but  in  each  place  about  half  the  in 
habitants  were  of  no  church  and,  Morris  suggests,  of  no  religion. 
At  Aquednek  and  Bergen  there  were  Dutch  Calvinists  and 

1  Learning  and  Spicer,  p.  328.  *  Ib.  p.  358. 

3  See  above,  p.  351. 


354  NEW  JERSEY  A    CROWN  COLONY. 

Swedish  Lutherans  who  had  settled  there  before  the  English 
occupation.  Middletown,  though  largely  peopled  from  New 
England,  had  no  place  of  worship.  There,  as  elsewhere,  Sun 
day  was  commonly  spent  in  racing,  fighting,  and  drinking  at 
taverns.  Shrewsbury  had  a  small  Quaker  congregation,  but 
was  otherwise  in  the  same  plight.  About  1689  an  attempt  was 
made  to  carry  a  measure  for  endowment  of  the  clergy,  but  it  was 
frustrated  by  the  joint  action  of  Quakers  and  Baptists,  and  an 
attempt  to  revive  the  scheme  was  successfully  opposed  by  Bass,, 
himself  a  Baptist.  If  we  may  believe  Morris,  such  religion  as 
did  exist  among  the  colonists  was  to  be  found  among  the  older 
settlers,  those  who  had  come  either  from  the  mother  country  or 
from  New  England.  The  younger  generation,  brought  up- 
under  no  restraining  influences  of  religion  or  of  schooling,  and 
released  by  the  natural  advantages  of  soil  and  climate  from 
severe  labor,  had  drifted  into  godlessness  and  debauchery. 
Vague  charges  of  this  sort  against  a  community  are  always 
to  be  received  with  doubt,  and  Morris  no  doubt  had  in  him 
much  of  the  advocate.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  he  had  noth 
ing  of  the  Puritan  about  him,  and  if  the  stories  of  his  own 
youth  be  true,  is  not  likely  to  have  had  an  exacting  standard  of 
morals. 

Of  West  Jersey  he  tells  us  less.  There  Quakerism  was  dis 
tinctly  the  dominant  creed,  numbering  as  it  did  in  its  fold  a  third 
of  the  inhabitants,  among  whom  were  all  the  wealthiest  and  most 
influential  men.  Beyond  them  were,  Morris  tells  us,  "a  mere 
hotchpotch  of  religions." 

The  attempt  of  Hamilton's  friends  to  secure  his  appointment 
as  Governor  failed.  It  would  assuredly  have  been  an  unwise 
Cornbury  act  if  the  Queen  had  at  the  very  outset  identified  the 
Governor,  supremacy  of  the  Crown  with  an  act  which  could 
have  been  regarded  as  a  party  victory.  But  it  was  hardly  more 
unfortunate  that  her  choice  should  have  fallen  upon  Cornbury, 
then  Governor  of  New  York.  The  affairs  of  New  Jersey  alone 
would  have  been  task  enough  for  an  abler  man,  and  it  would 
have  been  well  to  avoid  anything  which  seemed  to  treat  the 
province  as  in  any  way  dependent  on  her  jealous  and  arrogant 
neighbor.  And  even  if  the  task  had  not  been  beset  by  these  diffi 
culties,  Cornbury  was  wholly  unfitted  for  it  by  his  personal 
faults. 


CORNBURY'S  COMMISSION  AND  INSTRUCTIONS.      355 

The  new  constitution  of  the  colony  was  fully  determined  by 
Cornbury's  commission  and  instructions.1  In  the  skeleton  of 
The  new  the  constitution  there  was  no  change.  It  conformed 
tion.  to  the  ordinary  model,  made  up  of  Governor,  Council, 

and  House  of  Representatives.  The  difference  lay  in  the  in 
creased  precision  and  definiteness  which  was  given  to  the  consti 
tution.  Hitherto  the  rights  of  the  Governor  and  the  distribu 
tion  of  powers  among  the  various  members  of  the  body  politic 
had  been  matter  of  usage.  There  was  indeed,  as  we  have  seen, 
in  each  colony  an  elaborate  paper  constitution,  but  the  very  com 
pleteness  at  which  it  aimed  made  it  a  dead  letter. 

The  new  constitution  provided  for  the  supremacy  of  the 
Crown  by  giving  the  Sovereign  a  veto  on  all  legislation,  and  by 
authorizing  the  Governor  to  impose  not  only  on  all  members  of 
the  Assembly,  but  also  on  all  citizens  as  far  as  he  thought  fit, 
the  oaths  now  substituted  for  those  of  supremacy  and  allegiance. 
The  Governor  had  also  an  independent  veto  on  legislation,  he 
had  the  custody  of  the  great  seal  and  the  power  of  pardon.  No 
money  could  be  spent  out  of  the  public  funds  without  the  Gov 
ernor's  warrant,  and  he  had  the  power  in  conjunction  with  his 
Council  to  appoint  fairs  and  markets,  and  to  constitute  ports. 
He  had  also  power  to  suspend  Councilors,  referring  their  case  to 
the  Crown,  and  to  nominate  them  provisionally  so  as  to  bring  the 
Council  up  to  the  necessary  number  of  seven.  It  was  also  pro 
vided  by  the  instructions,  though  not  by  the  commission,  that 
Cornbury  was  to  propose  to  the  Queen  the  names  of  twelve 
Councilors,  six  from  each  province,  and  to  suggest  names  to  fill 
any  vacancy  that  might  occur.  Three  of  the  Council  might 
form  a  quorum,  but  unless  on  some  special  emergency  the  Gov 
ernor  was  not  to  sit  with  less  than  five. 

An  Assembly  was  to  be  summoned  immediately  on  Cornbury's 
arrival.  It  was  to  consist  of  twenty-four  members,  half  for  each 
province.  Two  were  to  be  chosen  by  Perth  Amboy,  two  by 
Burlington.  Except  in  the  case  of  these  places  there  was  to  be 
no  representative  of  township  or  shire,  but  the  whole  body  of 
electors  in  each  province  were  to  choose  ten  members.  There 
was  to  be  a  property  qualification,  a  thousand  acres  of  freehold 

1  Cornbury's  commission  is  in  the  New  Jersey  Archives,  vol.  ii.  p.  489,  and 
his  instructions  at  p.  506.  They  come  under  a  hundred  and  three  heads,  and 
occupy  thirty  pages  of  small  octavo  of  rather  large  type. 


3S6  NEW  JERSEY  A    CROWN  COLONY. 

for  members  and  one  hundred  for  electors.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that  these  qualifications  were  allowed  as  a  concession  to 
the  Proprietors,  or  rather  to  that  party  among  the  Proprietors 
who  stood  by  the  great  landholders.  The  practical  result  was 
to  give  a  solid  foothold  to  the  party  headed  formerly  by  Hamil 
ton  and  now  by  Morris,  a  party  which  under  a  less  exclusive 
franchise  would  have  been  hopelessly  outnumbered.  All  Acts 
passed  by  the  Assembly  were  to  be  forwarded  to  England,  if  pos 
sible  within  three  months.  Cornbury  was  also  instructed  on  his 
arrival  to  send  home  a  statement  of  all  enactments  in  force. 

There  was  no  clause  expressly  giving  the  right  of  taxation  to 
the  Assembly.  But  it  is  implied  in  an  instruction  to  Cornbury 
that  all  money  raised  by  the  Assembly  is  to  be  formally  appropri 
ated  to  the  public  use  of  the  government,  and  that  in  voting  any 
money,  the  purpose  to  which  it  is  to  be  applied  shall  be  clearly 
specified  and  the  approval  of  the  Crown  asked.  The  control  of 
the  Assembly  over  the  public  purse  is  even  more  fully  implied  in 
an  instruction  to  Cornbury  to  "propose  with  the  Assembly,  and 
use  his  utmost  endeavors  with  them,"  that  an  Act  be  passed  to 
raise  a  revenue  for  the  purposes  of  government,  and  especially 
for  a  competent  salary  to  the  Governor  and  other  officials. 

Judges,  executive  officers,  and  justices  of  the  peace  are  to  be 
nominated  by  the  Governor,  but  are  not  to  be  removable  except 
with  the  approval  of  the  Crown.  Jurisdiction  in  cases  of  piracy 
had  already  been  vested  in  Cornbury  as  Governor  of  New  York. 
He  may  also,  in  time  of  war  and  with  the  approval  of  his  Coun 
cil,  put  in  force  and  administer  martial  law.  In  all  cases  of 
over  a  hundred  pounds  value  there  is  to  be  an  appeal  from  the 
local  courts  to  the  Governor  in  Council,  and  in  cases  of  twice 
that  value  a  further  appeal  to  the  Sovereign  in  Council. 

Supreme  military  and  naval  power  within  the  colony  is  vested 
in  the  Governor.  But  it  is  to  be  noticed  that,  while  there  is  no 
restriction  imposed  on  his  military  authority,  it  is  provided  that 
his  jurisdiction  shall  not  extend  to  any  of  the  King's  ships,  even 
though  they  may  be  within  a  harbor  or  river  of  the  province.  In 
other  words,  the  militia  under  Lord  Cornbury  was  the  recog 
nized  army  of  the  colony,  but  naval  operations  were  to  be  carried 
on  by  the  King's  ships.  It  was  a  special  instruction  to  Cornbury 
to  put  the  militia  on  an  efficient  footing,  and  to  induce  the  As 
sembly  to  pass  an  effective  mutiny  Act.  He  was  also  to  "dis- 


CORNBURY'S  INSTRUCTIONS.  357 

pose  them"  to  make  a  reasonable  contribution,  either  in  men  or 
money,  to  the  defense  of  New  York. 

In  ecclesiastical  matters  the  commission  and  the  instructions 
show  singular  ignorance  of  the  condition  of  the  colony.  The 
commission  authorizes  Cornbury  to  present  to  all  ecclesiastical 
benefices.  So,  too,  the  instructions  provided  that  the  Book  of 
Common  Prayer  should  be  read  on  Sundays  and  holy  days 
throughout  the  whole  colony,  and  the  Sacrament  administered 
according  to  the  rites  of  the  Church  of  England.  A  competent 
endowment,  a  house  and  a  glebe  were  to  be  secured  to  the  min 
ister  of  each  orthodox  church,  and  no  one  was  to  be  preferred  to 
any  benefice  without  a  certificate  of  orthodoxy  and  good  char 
acter  from  the  Bishop  of  London.  It  would  have  been  easy  to 
twist  this  into  an  engine  of  tyranny  against  the  Nonconformists, 
who  formed  at  the  very  least  nineteen-twentieths  of  the  whole 
population.  Yet  it  is  clear  that  the  framers  of  the  instruction 
had  not  the  slightest  intention  of  its  being  so  used.  The  advisers 
of  the  Crown  appear  to  have  thought  that  the  colony  had  some 
thing  like  a  parochial  system  with  endowed  churches.  As  we 
have  seen,  such  religion  as  there  was  lay  entirely  among  sects  who 
had  resented  any  attempt  at  State  control. 

That  there  was  no  wish  to  interfere  with  freedom  of  thought 
or  worship  is  manifest,  for  it  is  expressly  provided  that  all  except 
Papists  shall  enjoy  liberty  of  conscience.  The  rights  of  Quakers 
were  specially  secured  by  an  instruction  that  for  all  public  pur 
poses,  whether  judicial  or  administrative,  a  declaration  should  be 
allowed  instead  of  an  oath.  Freedom  of  speech,  however,  was 
so  far  restricted  that  nothing  was  to  be  printed  without  leave 
from  the  Governor. 

In  various  ways  provision  was  made  for  the  well-being,  or  sup 
posed  well-being,  of  the  colony.  Harbors  were  to  be  selected. 
Titles  to  land  were  to  be  revised  and  confirmed.  Workhouses 
were  to  be  built  for  the  aged  and  indigent.  Stringent  measures 
were  to  be  taken  against  smuggling,  and  full  statistical  reports 
of  the  condition  of  the  colony  were  to  be  sent  home. 

One  clause  has  a  melancholy  interest.  It  has  often  been 
made  matter  of  reproach  against  England  that  of  set  purpose, 
and  by  deliberate  and  persistent  policy,  she  fastened  on  her  colo 
nies  the  curse  of  negro  slavery.  In  the  case  of  New  Jersey  the 
charge  cannot  be  denied.  The  instruction  stated  that  the  Queen 


358  NEW  JERSE  Y  A    CRO  WN  COL  ON  Y. 

was  desirous  that  the  colonies  should  have  a  constant  and  suf 
ficient  supply  of  merchantable  negroes  at  moderate  rates.  The 
Royal  African  Company  should  be  urged  to  send  such  a  supply. 
In  return  payment  must  be  prompt,  and  all  private  trading  with 
Africa  must  be  kept  in  check. 

Yet  in  this  the  English  Government  only  acted  on  what  any 
set  of  statesmen  in  that  day  would  have  reckoned  sound  and 
benevolent  principles.  And  it  must  be  said  in  extenuation  that 
if  Cornbury's  instructions  furthered  the  slave  trade,  they  aimed 
at  abating  the  worst  evils  of  slavery.  The  conversion  of  ne 
groes  and  Indians  was  to  be  specially  proposed  to  the  Council 
and  Assembly  as  an  object  of  public  policy.  Cornbury  was  to 
endeavor  to  secure  the  passing  of  a  law  which  should  restrain 
inhuman  severity  against  slaves  by  making  it  a  penal  offense  to 
maim  one,  and  a  capital  crime  willfully  to  put  one  to  death. 

To  enforce  a  somewhat  elaborate  system  of  administration  on 
a  community  which  had  grown  up  virtually  independent  of  ex- 
Difficulties  ternal  control  was  a  dangerous  experiment.  What- 
bury-s11  ever  hopes  of  success  it  might  have  had  must  have 
position.  been  frustrated  when  it  was  intrusted  to  such  an  one 
as  Cornbury.  He  was  not  altogether  wanting  in  intelligence. 
But  his  levity  and  contentiousness,  his  lack  of  all  solid  judgment 
and  of  all  respect  for  the  feelings  and  wishes  of  those  with  whom 
he  had  to  deal,  were  faults  worse  in  such  a  position  than  actual 
stupidity. 

In  one  respect  his  path  was  cleared  for  him.  The  death  of 
Hamilton,  just  before  Cornbury's  arrival,  removed  one  whose 
presence  in  the  colony,  exciting,  as  it  would  have  excited,  the 
hopes  of  a  party,  and  stirring  up  recollections  of  strife,  could 
not  have  failed  to  prove  a  stumbling-block  in  the  path  of  the  new 
Governor.1 

Yet  even  as  it  was  there  were  abundant  elements  for  conflict, 
and  in  some  measure  they  were  set  in  action  by  the  change. 
Every  party  felt  that  its  chance  of  success  depended  on  the 
position  which  it  could  now  gain  for  itself. 

In  August  1703  Cornbury  visited  his  new  province.  Almost 
his  first  proceeding,  as  told  frankly  enough  by  himself,  illustrated 
his  extraordinary  levity  and  his  lack  of  all  sense  of  official  respon- 

1  The  Council  announced  to  Cornbury  on  his  arrival  that  Hamilton  had  died 
on  April  26,  1703. 


ELECTION  OF  AN  ASSEMBLY.  359 

sibility.  He  proceeded  to  administer  an  oath  to  the  Councilors. 
Three  being  Quakers  declined  the  oath.  Cornbury  thereupon 
corntmry  referred  to  his  instructions.  From  the  way  in  which 
with" he  ne  tells  of  the  matter  one  would  suppose  that  he 
Quakers.*  j^j  not  reacj  ^em  before:  it  is  at  least  perfectly 
certain  that  he  had  no  real  knowledge  of  their  contents.  He 
found  that  it  was  necessary  to  administer  an  oath  to  all  persons 
in  a  position  of  trust  or  authority.  It  was,  however,  pointed  out 
that  there  was  a  clause  specially  exempting  Quakers.  Unless 
Cornbury  does  himself  great  injustice  these  were  two  successive 
discoveries  of  which  before  he  knew  nothing.  He  adds  in  his 
report  that  the  ground  assigned  for  this  toleration,  the  paucity 
of  inhabitants  fit  to  sit  as  Councilors,  was  wholly  unfounded. 

After  appointing  sheriffs  and  justices  of  the  peace,  and  examin 
ing  the  composition  of  the  law  courts,  Cornbury  issued  writs  for 
Election  the  election  of  an  Assembly.  The  unsatisfactory 
Assembly,  nature  of  the  franchise  and  of  the  distribution  of  seats 
as  determined  by  Cornbury 's  instructions  at  once  made  itself 
felt.  The  qualification  which  made  it  essential  both  to  electors 
and  candidates  to  be  landholders,  unsuitable  as  may  be  easily  sup 
posed,  excluded  many  who  were  well  fitted  to  vote  or  to  sit  with 
out  insuring  any  merit  in  those  whom  it  admitted.  As  might 
have  been  foreseen,  the  remote  country  townships  were  swamped 
by  Perth  Amboy  and  Burlington.  In  the  latter  case,  indeed,  it 
is  said  that  the  energy  and  electioneering  skill  of  the  Quakers 
enabled  them,  though  a  minority,  to  get  all  the  representation 
in  their  own  hands.2  It  was  also  said,  and  it  would  seem  with 
a  fair  show  of  truth,  that  in  East  Jersey  the  unscrupulous  action 
of  the  returning  officer,  a  Scotchman  named  Gordon,  enabled 
Hamilton's  party  to  carry  the  elections  in  defiance  of  a  large 
majority.3 

Amid  a  cloud  of  conflicting  testimony,  darkened  by  abuse  and 
xecrimination,  this  at  least  stands  out  clear.  The  new  Assembly 


1  See  Cornbury's  dispatch  to  the  Lords  of  Trade,  Sept.  9,  1703.  N.  J.  Ar 
chives,  vol.  iii.  p.  i. 

-  For  all  these  statements  I  have  relied  on  the  not  very  trustworthy  evidence 
of  Cornbury.  But  his  statement  is  probable  in  itself,  and  one  cannot  see  any 
motive  for  misrepresentation.  His  dispatch  on  the  subject  to  the  Lords  of 
Trade,  dated  Jan.  14,  1704,  is  in  the  New  Jersey  Archives,  vol.  iii.  p.  28. 

!  This  is  stated  by  Colonel  Quarry,  of  whom  I  have  spoken  before,  in  a 
letter  to  the  Lords  of  Trade,  Dec.  20,  1703.  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  iii.  p.  13. 


360  NEW  JERSEY  A    CROWN  COLONY. 

set  before  it  as  its  main  object  to  secure  the  territorial  rights  of 
the  Proprietors.  A  bill  was  brought  in  and  passed  affirming 
Proceed-  the  title  of  the  Proprietors  not  merely  to  the  province 
Assembly"'  of  New  Jersey,  but  also  to  Staten  Island,  which  had 
been  judicially  declared  to  belong  to  New  York.  The  Assembly 
also,  in  affirming  the  title  of  the  Proprietors,  decided  against  the 
claims  of  those  who  held  under  grants  from  Nicolls.  They 
passed  a  bill  assigning  all  royalties  within  the  colony  to  the  Pro 
prietors.  They  also  exempted  all  unimproved  lands  from  tax 
ation,  thus  laying  all  public  burdens  on  the  smaller  landholders. 
To  give  the  Governor  a  motive  for  assenting  to  this,  they 
adopted  a  device  of  Parliamentary  procedure,  and  tacked  to  it  a 
money  bill  granting  a  revenue  of  a  thousand  pounds.  Cornbury, 
however,  refused  his  assent  to  this  and  to  nearly  the  whole  of 
their  legislation,  and  nothing  was  passed  but  a  short  bill  forbid 
ding  any  purchase  of  land  from  the  Indians. 

If  Cornbury  had  been  a  man  of  any  judgment  or  character 
there  is  little  doubt  that  he  might  have  now  established  his  own 
Dispute  authority  on  a  secure  footing,  and  might  have  taught 
Assembly,  the  great  body  of  settlers  to  look  on  the  English 
Crown  as  a  friendly  and  protecting  power.  The  Assembly  was, 
beyond  all  doubt,  acting  in  the  interests  of  the  Proprietors  re 
gardless  of  the  general  body  of  settlers.  Nor  had  they  even  the 
advantage  of  representing  the  Proprietors  as  a  whole,  for  at  this 
very  time  a  fierce  dispute  was  going  on  within  the  proprietary 
body.  There  were  certain  members  of  it  who  considered  them 
selves  aggrieved  by  the  manner  in  which  the  lands  had  been 
divided.  Their  agent,  Sonmans,  was  in  the  Council,  and  the 
other  Proprietors  were  endeavoring  to  have  him  excluded  as  a 
bankrupt  and  man  of  bad  character.2  The  nature  of  the  strife 
was  fairly  described  by  a  shrewd  observer.  That  section  of  the 
Proprietors,  he  says,  who  swayed  the  Assembly  were  endeavor 
ing  to  substitute  for  joint  proprietorship,  individual  proprietor 
ship  favorable  to  themselves.3 


1  Our  knowledge  of  the  proceedings  of  this  Assembly  is  derived  from  Quarry's 
dispatch.  He  may  err  in  his  estimate  of  motives,  but  he  can  hardly  be  mis 
taken  about  plain  facts,  nor  would  he  have  been  guilty  of  misstatement  where 
contradiction  was  easy. 

*  The  memorial  petitioning  for  the  removal  of  Sonmans  is  in  the  New  Jersey- 
Archives,  vol.  iii.  p.  35.     It  is  not  dated,  but  was  received  January  27,  1704. 

*  Quarry's  dispatch  quoted  above.     N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  iii.  p.   18. 


INTRIGUES  AND  DISPUTES  IN  THE  ASSEMBLY.     361 

The  defeated  party  saw  that  their  only  chance  was  a  dissolu 
tion  and  a  fresh  election.  At  first  they  sought  to  induce  Corn- 
intrigues  bury  to  dissolve,  by  a  message  sent  through  Quarry, 
Assembly.!  hinting  that  a  different  Assembly  might  deal  with  him 
more  liberally  in  the  matter  of  salary.  They  found,  however, 
that  Cornbury  wanted  something  more  certain  and  tangible  than 
this  prospective  advantage.  Accordingly,  as  it  was  said  with 
every  show  of  truth,  they  raised  a  fund  and  bribed  the  Governor 
to  dissolve  the  Assembly.1 

The  intrigue,  if  there  was  one,  was  clumsy  and  ineffectual, 
and  the  dominant  party  came  back  with  a  majority  in  the  new 
Assembly.  The  majority,  however,  was  brought  down  to  a 
narrow  one. 

It  was  now  an  open  battle  between  the  supporters  of  the  Pro 
prietors  and  the  general  body  of  freeholders  with  Cornbury's 
Disquaiifi-  influence  at  their  back.  It  is  plain  that  parties  in 
members.  the  Assembly  were  closely  balanced,  and  that  two  or 
three  votes  would  be  enough  to  turn  the  scale.  Two  members 
of  the  Governor's  Council  protested  against  the  return  of  three 
Representatives  as  not  possessing  the  needful  qualifications  in 
land.2  The  question,  according  to  the  precedent  of  elective 
petitions,  was  referred  to  the  Assembly.  They  found  in  favor 
of  the  Representatives.  The  Governor  then  claimed  that  not 
only  must  the  house,  but  also  he  himself,  be  satisfied.  This,  as 
his  opponents  pointed  out,  was  practically  a  claim  to  veto  any 
election. 

The  suspension  of  these  members  gave  the  enemies  of  the  Pro 
prietors  the  upper  hand,  and  it  is  plain  that  they  used  their 
power  harshly.  Parties,  in  fact,  were  in  that  unwholesome 
state  when  each  uses  any  temporary  superiority  not  merely  to 
carry  out  its  own  policy,  but  to  perpetuate  its  ascendency  and 
permanently  cripple  its  opponents.  Three  measures  in  par 
ticular  are  mentioned,  and  though  the  statement  comes  from 
one  of  the  oppressed  party,  and  is  no  doubt  colored  by  pre- 


1  Various  documents  substantiating  this  charge  are  to  be  found  in  the  third 
volume  of  the  Archives. 

2  On  the  question  of  the  qualification  of  the  three  members  both  parties  were 
agreed  as  to  the  facts.     These  are  set  forth  by  Cornbury's  opponents  in  a  Re 
monstrance  sent  to  him,  May  8,  1707  (N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  iii.  pp.   174-80),  and 
admitted  in  Cornbury's  answer  (ib.  pp.   180-98).     These  two  documents  are  my 
authority  for  what  followed. 


.362  NEW  JERSEY  A    CROWN  COLONY. 

judice,  yet  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  it  is  in  substance  well 
founded.1 

A  revenue  of  two  thousand  a  year  was  granted  to  the  Gov 
ernor.  It  was  supposed  that  the  bulk  of  this  would  be  raised  by 
Oppressive  a  rate  on  uncultivated  lands.  This  was  in  itself  a 
majority.  violation  of  Lord  Cornbury's  instructions,  and,  if  the 
Proprietors  were  right  in  their  contention  that  those  instructions 
were  deliberately  intended  as  terms  of  surrender,  it  was  a 
breach  of  faith.  It  appears,  however,  to  have  recoiled  on  the 
heads  of  those  who  designed  it,  since  the  unoccupied  lands  were 
'quite  insufficient  for  the  purpose,  and  the  tax  fell  with  crushing 
weight  on  the  bulk  of  the  settlers. 

In  passing  a  militia  Act  it  was  provided  that  the  Quakers 
jnight  compound  for  a  money  payment.  These  payments,  we 
•are  told,  were  unfairly  assessed,  and  when  enforced,  the  neces 
sary  distraints  were  carried  out  harshly  and  inequitably.  It  is 
also  alleged  that  the  officials  appointed  to  lay  out  the  highways 
deliberately  used  their  powers  to  inflict  wanton  damage  on  the 
defeated  party. 

A  more  legitimate  measure  was  a  bill  for  altering  the  qualifi- 
•cation  of  voters  and  representatives.  Here,  again,  the  Proprie 
tors  contended  that  the  existing  qualification  was  inserted  as  one 
-of  the  conditions  on  which  they  consented  to  the  surrender.  As 
a  matter  of  equity  and  expediency  one  may  question  whether  the 
Proprietors  were  a  fit  body  to  determine  such  a  question  once  for 
•all,  and  one  assuredly  cannot  blame  the  settlers  for  doing  their 
utmost  to  secure  a  change.  The  existing  qualification  was  not 
•only  unjust  to  those  whom  it  excluded;  it  is  clear  that  it  did  not 
a  little  to  cripple  the  efficiency  of  the  legislative  machine.  It 
was  in  all  likelihood  due  to  this  that  when  Cornbury  had  ad 
journed  the  Assembly  to  meet  at  Burlington  in  May  1705,  he 
found  it  impossible  to  carry  on  business  owing  to  the  absence  of 
members.1  An  adjournment  of  five  months  to  Perth  Amboy  did 
not  wholly  mend  matters.*  This  illustrates  what  indeed  might 
have  been  plain  enough  to  the  authorities  in  England,  that  Bur- 


1  All  these  proceedings  are  set  forth  in  a  letter  written  by  Lewis  Morris  to 
the  Secretary  of  State,  Feb.  9,  1708.  The  letter  gives  a  very  clear  account  of 
the  state  of  parties  in  the  colony  and  of  their  proceedings.  N.  *J.  Archives, 
•vol.  iii.  p.  274. 

'N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  iii.  p.  104.  •  Ib.  p.  112. 


CONSTITUTION  OF   THE  ASSEMBLY  CHANGED.     363 

lington  and  the  rest  of  West  Jersey  would  have  been  far  better 
attached  to  Pennsylvania. 

Before  the  proceedings  of  the  Assembly  could  be  sent  to  Eng 
land  for  confirmation,  the  object  at  which  they  aimed  had  been 
change  m  practically  effected.  An  instruction  from  the  Queen, 
chise.  acting  by  the  advice  of  the  Lords  of  Trade,  altered 

the  whole  system  of  representation.1  Each  province,  the  Eastern 
and  the  Western,  was  no  longer  to  return  ten  members  in  a 
lump,  but  the  Eastern  half  was  to  have  two  members  for  each  of 
the  five  counties,  the  Western  two  for  each  of  the  four  and  two 
for  the  township  of  Salem.  The  qualifications  were  also  modi 
fied.  A  property  qualification  was  retained,  but  it  was  no  longer 
to  be  exclusively  in  land.  Personal  estate  of  five  pounds  was  to 
be  now  taken  as  equivalent  to  real  estate  of  ten  acres. 

On  two  important  points  the  Lords  of  Trade  showed  no  in 
clination  to  encourage  Cornbury.  He  was  admonished  to  be 
content  with  a  revenue  of  fifteen  hundred  pounds  for 


English         his  first  year  and  one  thousand  for  subsequent  years. 

Govern-  TT  ,  .,  .  .  .... 

ment.  He  was  also  cautioned   against  interfering  in  any 

•question  of  the  qualification  of  members  for  Assembly. 

Almost  immediately  after  this  the  Lords  of  Trade  received 
Cornbury's  report  of  the  state  of  affairs  in  the  colony,  together 
with  the  draft  of  the  Acts  passed  by  the  Assembly.  Their  re 
ception  of  it  showed  an  honest  wish  to  deal  fairly  and  impartially 
with  the  parties  at  strife.*  It  was  plainly  declared  that  the  sur 
render  by  the  Proprietors  was  unconditional,  that  whatever  con 
cession  was  made  to  them  was  made  as  an  act  of  grace.  At  the 
same  time  Cornbury  was  admonished  as  to  his  future  conduct  in 
terms  which  were  a  severe  censure  on  his  past.  The  qualifica 
tion  of  individual  members  was  a  question  for  the  Assembly,  not 
for  the  Governor.  He  had  removed  Morris  from  the  Council; 
he  was  instructed  to  replace  him.  As  things  stood,  the  sums 
levied  as  a  commutation  for  service  in  the  militia  were  to  be  spent 
at  the  Governor's  discretion.  This  manifest  abuse  was  checked. 
Henceforth  they  were  to  be  paid  to  the  Receiver-General  for  the 
colony,  and  to  be  applied  to  purposes  specified  in  the  Act  under 
which  they  were  levied. 

1  Lords  of  Trade  to  Cornbury,  April  20,  1705.     N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  iii.  p.  96. 

'Lords  of  Trade  to  Cornbury,  Feb.  14,  1706,  N.  J.  Archives,  p.  124.  There 
is  also  (p.  117)  a  memorandum  in  which  the  views  of  the  Board  on  each 
special  charge  brought  against  Cornbury  are  given. 


364  NEW  JERSEY  A    CROWN  COLONY. 

Cornbury,  too,  had  compelled  the  Proprietors  for  the 
Western  province  to  deliver  over  their  official  papers  to  Bass, 
and  they  had  in  consequence  been  carried  out  of  the  colony. 
They  were  now  to  be  restored  and  the  proceeding  not  to  be 
repeated. 

Reports,  too,  had  reached  the  Lords  that  Cornbury  had  com 
missioned  unfit  persons  as  militia  officers  and  justices  of  the 
peace.  They  do  not  go  into  the  question,  and  neither  accept  nor 
disbelieve  the  charge.  But  the  Governor  is  cautioned  to  exercise 
due  care  in  such  matters.  Such  a  reprimand  was  practically  a 
condemnation. 

It  was  now  plain  to  Cornbury  that  the  field  of  New  Jersey- 
politics  was  one  in  which  there  was  little  hope  of  personal  profit, 
Cornbury  and  as  SOOn  as  he  saw  that  his  interest  in  the  colony- 
interest  ceased.  He  was  not,  like  Randolph,  a  harsh  and  ag- 

himself  in  .  ...  .   ,  i    /•    •          i  r        i 

the  colony,  gressive  administrator,  with  a  definite  theory  of  colo 
nial  government,  and  with  at  the  same  time  a  certain  sense  of 
satisfaction  in  thwarting  the  wishes  of  the  colonists.  Cornbury 
was,  as  far  as  one  can  see,  simply  corrupt.  Every  cause  and 
every  party  was  simply  measured  by  the  power  of  filling  his 
pockets.  One  other  motive  did  indeed  color  his  language  and 
feelings,  though  it  hardly  affected  his  policy.  He  had  inherited 
so  much  of  the  religious  principles  of  his  ancestors  as  taught  him 
to  dislike  Nonconformists  as  factious,  underbred  dogs.  He  had 
just  enough  of  the  conventional  Churchmanship  of  the  eighteenth 
century  to  despise  Quakers  as  enthusiasts,  and  quite  enough  of 
the  profligate  to  hate  them  as  kill-joys. 

During  the  whole  of  1706  Cornbury  does  not  seem  to  have  set 
foot  in  New  Jersey.  The  death  of  his  wife  furnished  an  excuse, 
The  perhaps  a  reason,  for  his  absence.  In  March  1707 

of  1707.  he  called  an  Assembly.  The  change  in  the  franchise 
does  not  seem  to  have  altered  the  character  of  this  body,  nor  to- 
have  detached  it  from  the  interest  of  the  Proprietors.  Nor  was 
the  proprietary  party  one  whit  more  inclined  to  deal  in  friendly 
fashion  with  the  Governor.  It  would  seem  during  the  interval 
to  have  become  more  influential  and  better  organized,  and  it  en 
joyed  the  advantage  of  having  two  efficient  leaders  in  Morris 
and  Samuel  Jennings.  Cornbury  had  endeavored  to  weaken 
the  influence  of  the  latter  by  placing  him  on  the  Council.  But, 
much  to  the  annoyance  of  his  opponents,  he  declined  the  appoint- 


GRIEVANCES  OF   THE  ASSEMBLY.  365 

ment,  preferring  to  sit  as  a  member  of  the  elected  body.1  Mor 
ris  was  in  a  somewhat  similar  position.  Cornbury  had  been 
instructed  by  the  Government  at  home  to  replace  him  on  the 
Council.  This  the  Governor  offered  to  do  if  Morris  would 
make  proper  submission.2  Morris  no  doubt  felt  that  he  was  in 
a  far  stronger  position  as  an  elected  member,  excluded  from  the 
Council  by  the  arbitrary  will  of  the  Governor.  The  first  pro 
ceeding  of  the  Assembly  was,  in  Cornbury 's  language,  "to  set  up 
a  committee  of  grievances  and  spend  a  whole  month  in  rinding 
out  grievances  which  nobody  in  the  province  had  ever  heard  of 
before,"  "imaginary  grievances,  the  produce  of  Mr.  Morris's 
peevish  brain."3  How  far  his  description  is  just  may  be  judged 
from  a  petition  which  the  Assembly  presented  to  the  Crown  and 
a  remonstrance  to  the  Governor.  In  these  two  their  complaints 
are  set  forth  with  statesmanlike  clearness,  force,  and  self- 
restraint.4 

The  main  charges  fall  under  two  heads :  the  levying  of  illegal 
dues,  and  the  hindrance  and  added  cost  of  public  business  owing 
Grievances  to  the  absence  of  the  Governor.  Prisoners  are  com- 
Assembiy.  pclled  to  pay  court  fees  even  when  the  grand  jury  fail 
to  find  a  true  bill  against  them.  Official  fees  have  been  fixed  not 
by  the  whole  Assembly,  but  by  the  Governor  in  Council.  The 
Governor  has  granted  patents  to  carriers  between  Burlington  and 
Perth  Amboy,  and  has  prohibited  all  persons  not  so  licensed  from 
carrying  goods  for  hire.  Owing  to  the  Governor's  long  absence 
from  the  colony,  offenders  committed  for  trial  have  remained  in 
prison  untried. 

There  are  also  other  grievances:  there  is  only  one  office  for 
the  probate  of  wills,  that  at  Burlington,  and  consequently  all 
settlers  living  in  the  Eastern  province  have  to  resort  thither  for 
business.  The  records  of  the  Eastern  province  have  been  en 
trusted  to  Sonmans,  the  agent  of  a  section  of  the  Proprietors,  a 
man  living  out  of  the  colony.  Finally,  the  remonstrants  recall 
the  case  of  the  three  excluded  members,  and  the  story  of  the 

1  Cornbury  to  the  Lords  of  Trade,  June  7,  1707.  N.  Y.  Docs,  vol.  v.  pp. 
234-9.  As  Cornbury  puts  it,  the  true  reason  why  he  (Jennings)  desired  to  be 
dismissed  from  the  Council  was  that  he  might  be  chosen  into  the  Assembly, 
where  he  knew  he  could  oppose  the  Queen's  service  more  effectually  than  he 
could  do  in  the  Council. 

3  Cornbury  as  above. 

*Ib. 

*  For  the  remonstrance  and  Cornbury's  answer,  v.  s.  pp.  362,  n.  i,  and  366. 


366  NEW  JERSEY  A    CROWN  COLONY. 

bribes  offered  to  Cornbury  to  bring  about  the  dissolution  of  the 
Assembly. 

Cornbury 's  answer  illustrates  his  character  and  temper  as  a 
ruler,  and  his  fitness  for  administering  a  colony  largely  peopled 
Cornbury-s  by  Quakers.  He  begins  by  declaring  that  the  real 
answer.  calamity  of  the  province  is  "the  dangerous  and 
abominable  doctrines  of  those  who  under  the  pretended  names  of 
Christians  have  dared  to  deny  the  very  essence  and  being  of  the 
Saviour  of  the  world."  The  document  as  a  whole  was  worthy 
of  this  exordium,  its  arguments  throughout  overlaid  by  diffuse 
rhetoric  and  vague  countercharges.  The  charge  of  having  dis 
solved  the  Assembly  from  corrupt  motives,  a  charge  supported  by 
abundant  testimony,  was  met  by  a  bare  denial.  One  specimen, 
may  serve  tp  illustrate  the  spirit  in  which  Cornbury  was  pre 
pared  to  meet  the  complaints  and  to  consider  the  need  of  the 
settlers.  He  admits  that  the  absence  of  a  probate  office  com 
pelled  them  to  visit  New  York.  But  what  hardship  is  that 
journey  to  Quakers  who  never  complain  of  traveling  several 
hundred  miles  to  one  of  their  meetings,  "where  continual  con 
trivances  are  carried  on  for  the  undermining  the  government 
both  in  Church  and  State?" 

On  one  or  two  detailed  points  Cornbury  was  undoubtedly  able 
to  show  that  the  remonstrants  were  in  the  wrong.  In  fixing  the 
scale  of  fees  with  the  aid  of  his  Council,  instead  of  leaving  it  to 
the  Assembly,  he  was  only  carrying  out  the  letter  of  his  in 
structions.  To  license  public  carriers  was  hardly  the  same  thing 
as  creating  a  monopoly,  at  least  in  any  bad  sense. 

Not  content  with  acting  on  the  defensive,  Cornbury  en 
deavored  to  bring  countercharges  against  the  Assembly.  They 
had  given  a  man  into  custody,  they  had  expelled  a  member  for 
refusing  to  take  an  oath,  they  had  arbitrarily  discharged  a  pris 
oner,  and  had  appointed  their  clerk  out  of  their  own  body,  con 
trary  to  law. 

This  called  out  an  exceedingly  vigorous  rejoinder.  Each  of 
the  acts  alleged  against  the  Assembly  was  shown  to  be  in  accord- 
Rejoinder  ance  either  with  positive  law  or  with  Parliamentary 
Assembly.!  precedent.  The  charges  of  having  interfered  in  the 
question  of  members'  qualifications  were  insisted  upon  and 

1  Published  in  the  New  Jersey  Archives,  vol.  iii.  pp.  242-67.  It  is  also  in 
Smith's  History. 


THE  ASSEMBLY  OF  1708.  367 

brought  out  more  fully.  On  one  point  Cornbury's  argument  is 
disposed  of  with  no  little  controversial  neatness.  He  pleaded 
that  the  absence  of  a  registration  office  at  Perth  Amboy  was  no 
hardship,  since  wherever  the  Governor  was  there  was  the  office.. 
The  office  then  might  be  in  the  West  Indies  or  in  England,  and 
the  case  of  the  settlers  would  be  far  worse  than  they  had  im 
agined. 

Next  year  another  Assembly  met.  They  chose  as  Speaker 
Gordon,  one  known  to  be  hostile  to  the  Governor.  At  the  same 
The  time  the  tone  of  their  communications  with  Corn- 

of*?7o8.i y  bury  was  on  both  sides  less  acrimonious.  Yet  the- 
Assembly  practically  took  the  same  ground  as  their  predecessors. 
Most  of  the  grievances,  they  say,  still  remain  unredressed. 
They  continue,  too,  to  find  some  fresh  ones;  the  law  officers  of 
the  Crown  are  in  the  habit  of  instituting  frivolous  prosecutions 
and  intimidating  the  advocates  who  appear  for  the  prisoners.. 
Most  of  the  legal  business  of  the  colony  is  carried  on  at  Perth. 
Amboy  and  Burlington,  to  the  inconvenience  of  those  who  live 
elsewhere. 

Morris  acting  as  the  authorized  agent  of  the  Assembly  wrote 
a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  State  giving  a  very  clear  and  forcible, . 
Account  of  though  no  doubt  an  ex  parte,  description  of  the  state 

matters  by         »    «,«  -i  i  2       T  <•  11-  1-1 

Moms.  of  things  in  the  colony."  If  we  may  believe  this,  the 
opposite  party  had  not  weakened  their  hold  on  popular  favor  by 
their  ill-judged  financial  policy.  To  conciliate  Cornbury  and 
secure  his  support  they  had  voted  him  a  revenue  of  two  thousand 
a  year  for  two  years.  They  had,  however,  so  arranged  that  the 
money  should  all  be  raised  in  one  year,  hoping,  so  Morris  says,, 
that  the  rate  would  fall  mainly  on  the  wealthy  landowners. 
But  they  were  wrong  in  their  calculation.  The  wealthy  men. 
were  able  to  bear  the  strain.  It  really  fell  heavily  on  the  small. 
Proprietors,  many  of  whom  it  brought  near  bankruptcy. 

In  its  denunciations  of  Cornbury  the  letter  went  beyond  the 
ordinary  decencies  of  official  correspondence.  He  puts  a  stop 
to  all  public  business  that  he  may  please  himself  "with  that 
peculiar,  but  detestable  maggot  of  dressing  in  woman's  clothes." 


1  The  Journal  of  the  Assembly  is  in  the  New  Jersey  Archives,  vol.  iii.  pp. 
291-3.  It  was  sent  home  by  the  Lieutenant-Governor  and  Council  to  the  Lords 
of  Trade,  with  a  remonstrance  against  the  proceedings  recorded  in  it. 

J  This  is  the  letter  which  1  mentioned  at  p.  362,  n.  i. 


368  NEW  JERSEY  A    CROWN  COLONY. 

He  is  a  "wretch  who  by  the  whole  conduct  of  his  life  here  has 
evinced  that  he  has  no  regard  to  honor  and  virtue."  That  such 
language  should  have  been  pardoned,  that  it  should  have  been  no 
bar  to  the  success  of  Morris  in  public  life,  says  much  for  his 
capacity,  something,  too,  for  the  forbearance  of  those  whom  he 
addressed,  while  it  is  also  an  indication  of  a  somewhat  low 
standard  in  such  matters. 

Morris's  letter  was  followed  about  three  months  later  by  a 
counter-declaration  from  the  Council.  It  was  alleged  at  a  later 
Answer  day  that  signatures  were  obtained  by  deceit,  that 
Council.'  the  document  was  drafted  by  those  who  were  specially 
the  adherents  of  Cornbury  and  never  made  the  subject  of  open 
deliberation  in  Council ;  that  some  who  would  have  withheld  their 
signatures  were  told  that  it  was  a  document  duly  drafted  by  a 
majority  of  the  Council  and  thus  induced  to  sign.2  The  docu 
ment  was  in  truth  no  more  than  a  vague  denunciation  of  Jen 
nings,  Morris,  and  their  allies  as  disturbers  of  the  public  peace. 

The  best  practical  proof  that  Cornbury's  opponents  had,  in  the 
main,  justice  on  their  side  is  to  be  found  in  the  action  of  the 
Lovelace's  Lords  of  Trade.  They  had  before  them  a  full  ac 
tions.  3  count  of  the  grievances  of  each  party.  Before  an 
answer  could  come  Cornbury's  official  career  was  at  an  end. 
But  the  instructions  given  to  his  successor  Lovelace  are  prac 
tically  a  judgment  on  the  main  points  at  issue,  and  on  almost 
every  one  the  Board  found  against  Cornbury.  They  specially 
recommend,  in  accordance  with  the  opinion  of  the  remon 
strants,  that  all  money  levied  under  the  militia  Act  should  be 
paid  to  the  Receiver-General,  and  employed  not  at  the  discretion 
of  the  Governor,  but  for  purposes  specified  in  the  Act.  The 
papers  belonging  to  the  Proprietors  should  not  have  been  handed 
to  Bass  and  carried  out  of  the  colony.  Prisoners  against  whom 
the  grand  jury  do  not  find  a  true  bill  are  not  liable  for  any  fees. 
The  Lords  approve  of  the  proposal  to  establish  a  probate  office 
in  each  division  of  the  colony.  The  patent  for  carriers  is  a  vio 
lation  of  the  Statute  against  Monopolies.  No  fees  are  lawful 

1  N.  J.   Archives,  vol.  iii.  p.  287. 

*  This  is  stated  in  an  address  from  the  Assembly  to  Hunter,  Lovelace's  suc 
cessor.  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  iv.  p.  24. 

8  The  instructions  given  to  Lovelace  were  up  to  a  certain  point  identical  with 
those  given  to  Cornbury.  So  much  ot  them  as  was  different  is  in  the  New 
Jersey  Archives,  vol.  in.  pp.  316-23. 


IMPORTANCE   OF  DISPUTE    WITH  CORNBURY.      369 

unless  warranted  by  prescription  or  established  by  the  legisla 
ture. 

Jennings  and  Morris  could  not  have  asked  for  a  more  com 
plete  justification  of  their  complaints,  and  the  tribunal  which 
gave  it  was  one  which  was  not  likely  to  lean  towards  the  side 
of  disaffected  colonists  or  to  be  eager  to  condemn  a  Governor 
who  had  special  claims  on  the  favor  of  the  Crown. 

The  dispute  between  Cornbury  and  the  New  Jersey  Assembly 
is  of  greater  importance  than  on  the  face  seems  to  attach  to  it. 
tanP°r  f  ^  marked  the  rise  of  a  new  spirit  in  colonial  politics, 
the  dispute  There  had  before  been  resistance  to  the  English  Gov- 

between  ,  <••»*•  i  11 

combury  ernment  on  the  part  or  Massachusetts,  but  the  action 
Assembly,  of  that  colony  was  largely  due  to  influences  whose 
power  was  by  this  time  spent.  It  was  not  the  general  spirit  of 
constitutional  resistance  to  arbitrary  government,  it  was  the 
determination  of  an  exclusive  oligarchy  to  withstand  any  en 
croachment  on  its  rule.  Between  the  New  Englanders  who 
fought  Andros  and  Randolph  and  the  New  Englanders  who 
fought  Hutchinson  and  Bernard  a  great  gulf  is  set.  The  old 
crust  of  Puritan  exclusiveness  had  broken  up.  Mather  and 
Danforth  deemed  themselves  the  champions  of  a  chosen  people. 
Otis  and  Adams  deemed  themselves  the  spokesmen  of  doctrines 
common  to  and  needful  for  all  mankind.  But  in  the  resistance 
of  the  New  Jersey  politicians  to  Cornbury  we  see  a  forecast  on  a 
small  scale  of  the  great  struggle  sixty  years  later.  There  is  in 
Cornbury  the  same  dull  obstinacy,  the  same  narrowness  of  view 
that  we  see  in  Gage  and  Dunmore. 

Like  George  III.  and  too  many  of  George's  Ministers,  Corn- 
bury  deals  with  the  question  as  though  it  were  a  mere  legal  con 
troversy.  It  is  enough  for  him  if  he  can  answer  his  opponents 
on  side  issues.  He  wholly  fails  to  see  that  the  very  fact  of  their 
being  dissatisfied  and  disaffected  is  in  itself  of  importance. 

The  parallel,  too,  holds  good  on  the  other  side.  In  Morris 
and  Jennings,  as  in  the  Revolutionary  leaders,  there  is  the  same 
mixture  of  public  spirit  and  lawyer-like  adroitness.  They  are 
patriots  after  a  fashion,  but  there  runs  through  their  patriotism 
a  leaven  of  ungenerousness  and  unscrupulousness.  And  it  was 
this  very  mixture  of  qualities  which  made  the  weakness  and  the 
strength  of  the  American  Revolution.  The  national  cause  was 
perpetually  being  endangered  by  the  selfishness  and  pettiness  of 


37°  NEW  JERSEY  A    CROWN  COLONY. 

its  own  supporters,  their  narrow  views  and  incapacity  for  self- 
sacrifice.  On  the  other  hand  it  was  strong  in  that  it  rested  on 
motives  obvious  enough  and  wide  enough  to  appeal  to  every  man 
who  had  taxes  to  pay. 

In  two  important  respects  the  earlier  movement  differed  from, 
the  later.  In  each,  the  motive  force  was  given  by  a  class  with 
many  of  the  prejudices  and  feelings  of  an  oligarchy.  But 
though  the  leaders  of  the  American  Revolution,  with  a  few  ex 
ceptions,  were  not  men  of  wide  sympathies,  yet  the  movement 
soon  extended  itself.  There  may  have  been  a  lack  of  generous 
enthusiasm  and  of  readiness  for  self-sacrifice  in  the  spirit  with 
which  the  rank  and  file  followed  their  leaders,  but  unquestion 
ably  the  voice  of  the  whole  commonalty  was  on  the  side  of  those 
leaders.  In  New  Jersey  it  would  rather  seem  as  if  the  opposi 
tion  to  Cornbury  was  confined  to  the  well-to-do  and  to  those 
who  had  the  leisure  and  the  means  to  take  some  active  part  in 
political  life. 

There  was  yet  another  difference.  When  we  compare  the 
colonial  policy  of  Queen  Anne's  advisers  with  that  of  George 
III.  and  his  Ministers,  the  comparison  is  all  to  the  advantage  of 
the  former.  Among  those  who  were  personally  responsible  for 
the  policy  adopted  towards  New  Jersey,  Dartmouth  and  Stam 
ford  are  the  only  ones  whose  names  have  gained  any  place  in 
history.  Neither  of  them  was  in  anything  more  than  the  second 
rank  of  public  life.  Yet  they  and  the  less  known  men  associated 
with  them  showed  an  anxiety  to  enter  into  the  views  of  the  colo 
nists,  and  a  readiness  to  redress  grievances,  which  we  look  for  in 
vain  in  Grenville  and  Townshend  and  their  followers. 

The  career  of  Cornbury's  successor,  Lovelace,  was  cut  short 
by  death  before  his  personal  character  could  make  itself  felt  either 
for  good  or  evil.  In  New  Jersey,  as  in  New  York,  his  praise  and 
the  laments  over  him  probably  reflect  the  conventional  voice  of 
official  flattery.  The  chief  feature  of  his  short  term  of  office  was 
the  persistency  with  which  those  who  had  supported  Cornbury 
strove  to  discredit  Morris,  and  exclude  him  from  office.  It  says 
a  good  deal  for  the  caution  and  sobriety  of  his  later  conduct  that 
his  enemies  should  have  been  forced  to  rake  up  the  old  charges 
of  misconduct  when  Bass  was  Governor  ten  years  before. 

It  is  clear  that  at  the  time  of  Lovelace's  death  the  anti-proprie 
tary  party  were  in  the  ascendency  in  the  Assembly.  Thus  the 


INTERREGNUM  BETWEEN  GOVERNORS.  37 * 

Council  and  the  dominant  party  among  the  Representatives 
were  at  one,  and  they  at  once  used  their  ascendency  to  strike  a 
inter-  series  of  blows  at  their  opponents.  It  was,  however, 

between  necessary  to  secure  the  compliance  of  the  Lieutenant- 
Lovelace  Governor,  Ingoldsby.  This  was  done  by  bribing 
Hunter.*  njm  at  the  expense  of  Lady  Lovelace,  the  widow  and 
inheritress  of  the  late  Governor.  Lovelace's  salary  of  eight  hun 
dred  pounds  had  been  voted  before  his  death.  Unfortunately 
the  Act  had  prescribed  that  the  warrant  for  the  money  must  be 
signed  by  the  Governor  in  Council,  and  did  not  provide  for  the 
possibility  of  a  vacancy.  There  could  be  no  doubt  that  the  claim 
of  Lady  Lovelace  to  the  money  was  an  equitable  one.  But 
instead  of  rectifying  their  omission  by  providing  that  the 
warrant  might  be  signed  by  the  Deputy-Governor,  the  Assembly 
treated  the  vote  as  null  and  void,  and  voted  six  hundred 
pounds  out  of  the  eight  hundred  to  Ingoldsby,  in  addition 
to  his  existing  salary.  The  Council  themselves,  if  we  may 
believe  the  evidence  of  Lovelace's  successor,  had  their  share  in 
the  spoil,  since  by  a  private  agreement  between  them  and  In 
goldsby  a  portion  of  the  money  was  set  aside  to  buy  each  Coun 
cilor  a  silver  cup.1 

The  majority  of  the  Assembly  then  struck  a  blow  intended 
permanently  to  weaken  their  opponents.  A  precedent  was  set 
which  had  its  parallel  in  New  England,  which  at  a  later  day  be 
came  an  accepted  principle  in  American  politics  and  has  had 
far-reaching  results.  It  was  enacted  that  no  person  should  be 
returned  to  the  Assembly  who  was  not  a  resident  within  the 
colony.  Among  the  wealthier  planters  there  were  a  certain 
number  who  had  their  principal  houses  in  New  York,  chiefly,  it 
is  said,  to  give  their  children  better  schooling  than  New  Jersey 
could  offer.  Among  these  were  Morris  and  one  of  his  chief 
allies,  John  Johnstone.  The  mere  possession  of  property  without 
local  knowledge  or  local  interest  may  be  a  bad  title  to  political 
power.  But  that  this  was  not  the  case  with  Morris  is  suf 
ficiently  proved  out  of  the  mouths  of  his  enemies.  He  could  not 
be  at  once  an  absentee  and  a  dangerous  intriguer. 

Another  Act  limited  the  right  of  impounding  cattle  to  cases 

1  All   the   proceedings   of   this   time   are   fully   described   in   a  dispatch   from 
Hunter  to  the  Lords  of  Trade,  May  7,  1711.     N.  Y.  Docs.  vol.  v.  p.  199. 

2  Hunter  as  above.     N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  iv.  p.  66. 


372  NEW  JERSEY  A    CROWN    COLONY. 

where  they  had  been  actually  found  breaking  fences.  In  the 
same  spirit  an  earlier  Act  for  restraining  stray  swine  was  now 
repealed.  Both  these  Acts,  it  is  said,  were  aimed  at  the  larger 
and  wealthier  landholders.  Most  of  the  inclosed  and  well-cul 
tivated  land  was  in  their  hands,  and  they  were  the  chief  sufferers 
by  the  incursions  of  stray  animals.1 

Another  Act  shows  the  traces  of  what  we  have  not  seen  be 
fore,  local  jealousy  between  the  Eastern  and  Western  divisions 
of  the  province.  The  instructions  given  by  the  Queen  to  Love 
lace  provided  that  the  Assembly  should  sit  alternately  at  Perth 
Amboy  and  Burlington.  The  dominant  party,  it  is  clear,  be 
longed  mainly  to  the  Western  province,  and  they  endeavored  in 
their  own  interest  and  that  of  the  electors  who  supported  them  to 
fix  the  Assembly  permanently  at  Burlington.2 

The  appointment  of  Lovelace's  successor,  Hunter,  at  once 
changed  the  balance  of  parties.  Appointed  by  the  great  Whig 
Hunter  Ministry,  Hunter  almost  inevitably  approached  his 

appointed  .     .  ,  .  ...  ....  .  _,. 

Governor,  task  in  something  or  the  spirit  of  a  partisan.  1  here 
was  not  indeed  any  exact  coincidence  between  the  lines  which 
divided  parties  at  home  and  those  which  divided  them  in  the 
colony.  But  though  there  was  not  identity  there  was  likeness. 
In  the  colony  we  have  on  the  one  side  an  oligarchy  of  large  land 
holders  and  wealthy  merchants,  clinging  firmly  to  certain  forms 
of  constitutional  government;  on  the  other  side  we  have  the 
official  party,  resting  hitherto  on  the  arbitrary  authority  of  the 
Governor  and  the  Council,  at  the  same  time  claiming  as 
against  their  opponents  to  be  the  friends  of  the  people.  The 
likeness  to  English  Tories  and  Whigs  was  strengthened  by  the 
fact  that  the  party  of  Hunter's  allies,  Morris  and  Johnstone, 
was  also  the  party  of  the  Quakers  and  Presbyterians. 

Hunter  from  the  outset  made  no  attempt  to  ignore  this  state 
of  things,  nor  to  carry  on  the  administration  of  the  colony  above 
Hunter's  or  independent  of  parties.  In  New  Jersey,  as  in 
towards  New  York,  he  at  once  reversed  Cornbury's  policy  and 
the  colony,  threw  in  his  lot  with  the  party  of  Morris.  He 
formed  for  himself  what  his  opponents  called  a  Cabinet  Coun 
cil'1 — that  is,  a  small  knot  of  favored  advisers  within  the  Council 

1  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  iv.  p.   69.  *  Ib.  p.  67. 

*  This  expression  is  used  in  a  letter  sent  to  Dockwra  in  England  from  the 
colony  in  July,  1711.  The  writer  of  the  letter  is  unknown.  N.  J.  Archives, 
vol.  iv.  p.  119. 


HUNTER'S  POLICY.  373 

itself,  of  whom  Morris  was  one.  His  policy  was  in  all  likeli 
hood  the  best  that  could  have  been  adopted  in  the  interests  of  the 
colony.  When  parties  have  once  been  thoroughly  established  in 
a  community  it  is  a  hopeless  attempt  to  govern  on  any  but  a 
party  system.  There  may  be  an  acknowledged  truce,  a  tempo 
rary  suspension  of  party  hostilities  in  the  face  of  some  special 
danger.  But  the  attempt  to  form  an  executive  which  shall  be 
independent  of  party  ties,  while  party  feeling  exists,  is  almost 
certain  to  be  a  failure.  It  was  probably  well  for  New  Jersey 
that  Hunter  was  no  idealist,  but  a  party  politician,  not  un 
scrupulous,  but  fully  capable  of  entering  into  party  politics,  and 
using  their  recognized  and  legitimate  arts.  In  all  likelihood 
his  Whiggery  predisposed  him  in  the  first  instance  towards  the 
party  of  Morris.  Yet  we  cannot  doubt  that  any  clear-sighted 
and  public-spirited  man  starting  without  bias  would  have  been 
drawn  that  way.  Morris  may  not  have  been  a  very  high-prin 
cipled  man — a  vein  of  arrogance  and  self-seeking  runs  through 
his  whole  career;  but  he  was  at  least  a  capable  man,  and  if  he 
was  a  self-seeker,  it  was  at  the  bidding  of  ambition,  not  of 
avarice.  He  and  his  associates  are  accused  of  acting  in  the  in 
terests  of  a  class,  but  no  charge  of  personal  corruption  is  brought 
against  them.  On  the  other  side  it  is  clear  that  Bass  was  a  weak 
man,  and  Sonmans  a  vicious  one.  The  charge  of  having  sup 
ported  Ingoldsby  from  corrupt  motives  was  never  even  contra 
dicted,  and  men  who  upheld  Cornbury  can  have  had  no  sense  of 
official  decorum  and  personal  dignity. 

Hunter  at  once  succeeded  in  weakening  his  opponents  in  the 
Council  by  detaching  Quarry  from  their  party.1  He  had,  as 
we  have  seen,  been  sent  out  by  the  Lords  of  Trade  to  observe 
and  report  on  the  state  of  things  in  the  American  colonies,  and 
his  word  was  therefore  sure  to  carry  weight  with  the  English 
Government. 

Unfortunately  for  the  colony,  parties  were,  as  we  have  seen, 
in  that  evenly  balanced  condition  when  each  is  tempted  to  use 
sandford  every  moment  of  superiority  to  crush  and  cripple  the 
frTm'the  other,  when  each  is  compelled  in  self-defense  to  think 
Assembly.  more  of  strengthening  and  perpetuating  its  power 
than  of  using  it.  In  the  Assembly  returned  in  1711,  the  year 

1  See  Quarry's  letter  to  John  Pulteney,  one  of  the  Lords  of  Trade.  N.  J. 
Archives,  vol.  iv.  p.  6. 


374  NEW  JERSE  Y  A    CROWN  COLONY. 

after  Hunter's  arrival,  the  Whigs,  as  we  may  call  them,  had  re 
covered  their  ascendency.1  Among  the  members  was  one  Sand- 
ford.  He  was  also  a  member  of  the  Council,  and  as  such  had 
signed  the  address  sent  to  the  Queen  in  1707,  in  which  Cornbury 
and  his  Council  made  an  attack  upon  the  Assembly.  The  Pro 
prietors,  or  at  least  that  majority  of  them  who  were  favorable  to 
Morris,  had  petitioned  the  Queen  to  remove  Sandford  together 
with  certain  others  of  the  same  way  of  thinking  from  the  Coun 
cil.1  This  was  not  complied  with,  and  when  on  Hunter's  ap 
pointment  a  fresh  list  of  Councilors  was  drawn  up,  Sandford's 
name  appeared  in  it.  But  the  first  dispatch  sent  home  by 
Hunter  pressed  for  the  removal  of  the  other  Councilors  to  whom 
objection  had  been  made.  A  seat  on  the  Council  and  one  in  the 
Assembly  plainly  could  not  be  held  by  the  same  man.  Sandford 
either  preferring  the  latter,  or  more  probably  anticipating  expul 
sion,  stood  for  the  Assembly  and  was  elected.  The  house  there 
upon  passed  a  general  resolution  that  no  person  who  had  signed 
the  address  was  fit  to  be  a  member.  At  the  same  time  they  gave 
Sandford  the  opportunity  of  apologizing.  This  he  refused  to  do 
and  accordingly  was  expelled.  His  constituency  re-elected  him, 
but  the  Assembly  stood  firm  and  he  was  excluded.3  The  drama 
of  the  Middlesex  election,  at  least  in  its  earlier  scenes,  was  antici 
pated  in  the  sphere  of  colonial  politics. 

The  dominant  party  in  the  Assembly  followed  up  this  by  an 
attack  on  their  opponents  contained  in  an  address  to  Hunter. 
Address  by  Severe  as  it  was,  it  offered  a  complete  contrast  to  the 
his^artjTfo  document  to  which  it  was  opposed  alike  in  its  definite- 
Hunter.*  ness  an(j  jn  tjie  method  with  which  the  charges  were 
arranged.  We  are  again  reminded  of  the  documents  in  which 
the  aggrieved  colonists  pleaded  their  case  fifty  years  later,  by  the 
persistency  with  which  Morris  and  his  associates  disclaim  any 
disaffection  towards  the  mother  country,  and  discriminate  be 
tween  Cornbury  and  the  Sovereign  whom  he  unworthily  repre 
sents. 

The  conflict  between  the  Assembly  and  the  Council  had  the 

1  This  is  plain  from  the  address  of  the  Assembly  to  Hunter,  N.  J.  Archives, 
vol.  iv.  p.  24,  and  from  the  letter  to  Dockwra,  quoted  above. 

*  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  iii.  p.  497.     The  other  Councilors  whose  removal  was 
asked  for  were — Cox,  Motnpesson,  Townly,  Sonmans  and  Pinhorn. 

8  Letter  to  Dockwra,  as  above. 

*  The  address  is  in  the  Archives,  vol.  iv.  pp.  24-48. 


THE   COUNCIL   OPPOSES  HUNTER.  375 

effect  of  paralyzing  legislation.  Of  the  Acts  sent  up  by  the 
House  of  Representatives  to  the  Council,  every  one  was  either 
ch"ncii  rejected,  or  sent  back  so  loaded  with  amendments  as 
veto  the  to  be  unacceptable  to  the  lower  house.1  Two,  indeed, 

Acts  of  the         /•     i         A  11          -i  •  i  •  •      a       it 

Assembly,  or  the  Acts  dealt  with  matters  in  which  the  Repre 
sentatives  must  have  known  beforehand  that  they  were  at  vari 
ance  with  the  Council.  Though  in  the  case  of  elected  Repre 
sentatives  a  declaration  was  allowed  instead  of  an  oath,  in  legal 
proceedings  an  oath  was  required.  This  excluded  Quakers  from 
serving  on  juries,  and  in  many  cases  from  obtaining  redress. 
The  Assembly  now  sought  to  remedy  this  by  an  Act  substituting 
a  declaration  in  all  cases.  Another  measure  obnoxious  to  the 
Council  was  a  proposal  to  extend  the  English  law  of  bankruptcy 
to  the  colony.  This,  it  was  urged,  would  invalidate  such  titles 
to  land  as  rested  on  purchase  from  Fenwick  and  Bylling,  since 
both  had  become  bankrupts.  It  is  absurd  to  suppose  that  there 
could  have  been  any  difficulty  in  securing  all  existing  titles  by  a 
special  enactment.  With  far  better  reason,  the  advocates  of  the 
measure  pointed  out  that  the  absence  of  a  bankruptcy  law  would 
make  the  colony  a  refuge  for  disreputable  debtors. 

In  opposing  this  Act  the  Council  were  combating  not  only  the 
Representatives,  but  also  the  Lords  of  Trade.  Hunter's  in 
struction  had  specially  referred  to  such  a  law  as  desirable.  He 
vainly  pointed  out  to  the  Council  that  by  their  action  they  were 
opposing  the  judgment  alike  of  the  Queen's  advisers  and  the 
Representatives  of  the  people,  and  he  plainly  hinted  that  the  per 
sonal  interests  of  Councilors  were  the  real  cause  of  rejection  and 
would  be  recognized  as  such. 

If  the  Council  had  singled  out  these  Acts  for  opposition,  they 
might  have  been  looked  on  as  confining  themselves  to  a  policy 
constitutionally  legitimate,  though  certainly  barren  and  probably 
unwise.  But  their  opposition  to  every  Act  sent  up  to  them  by 
the  Representatives  was  a  plain  avowal  of  their  intention  to 
hinder  public  business  if  they  were  denied  their  own  way. 

There,  however,  their  success  ended.  From  that  time  onward 
the  persistent  determination  of  Hunter  and  the  Assembly  pre 
vailed.  There  is  nothing  in  the  records  of  the  colony  to  show 
precisely  the  causes  to  which  the  change  was  due.  The  Council 

1  For  this  dispute  see  Hunter's  dispatch  of  May  7,  1711.  N.  Y.  Docs.  vol. 
v.  pp.  199-212. 


376  NEW  JERSEY  A    CROWN  COLONY. 

seems  to  have  been  weakened  by  the  death  of  one  or  two  mem 
bers,  and  Hunter  was  quite  astute  enough  as  a  political  tactician 
Triumph  to  find  means  for  disuniting  and  crippling  his  as- 
whlg  sailants.  The  overthrow  of  the  Whig  Ministry  did 

party.  indeed  give  hopes  to  Hunter's  opponents  of  his  over 

throw,  and  of  a  reversal  of  policy  in  England.  The  parallel  be 
tween  the  politics  of  the  mother  country  and  those  of  the  colony 
became  more  marked  indeed  as  time  goes  on.  Hunter  reports 
the  formation  of  a  Jacobite  party  under  a  nonjuring  clergyman, 
Talbot.1  He  denounces  an  opponent,  Mr.  Vesey,  as  "a  sour 
Jacobite,"  and  likens  him  to  a  Sacheverell.2  And  we  find  one 
of  the  worst  features  of  English  politics  reproducing  itself  in  the 
apprehensions  of  outrage.  Just  as  Swift  believes  that  the  Mo 
hocks  were  political  assassins,  bent  on  waylaying  him  and  other 
Tory  leaders,  just  as  he  detects  a  Whig  plot  to  blow  up  Harley 
with  an  infernal  machine,8  so  Willocks,  a  strenuous  partisan  of 
Hunter,  mentions  vague  rumors  of  a  purpose  to  burn  down  the 
Quaker  places  of  worship  and  dwelling-houses  at  the  time  of  an 
election.4 

To  the  great  body  of  the  American  colonies  the  accession  of 
the  House  of  Hanover  was  a  matter  of  little  direct  importance. 
New  Jersey  was  an  exception.  There  beyond  a  doubt  it  finally 
turned  the  scale  in  favor  of  Hunter  and  Morris  and  their  allies, 
and  overthrew  the  last  hopes  of  their  opponents.  Not  indeed 
that  the  strife  altogether  ceased ;  the  Tories  made  a  last  desperate 
attempt  to  deprive  the  Quakers  of  their  civil  rights  by  a  forced 
and  palpably  unfair  interpretation  of  an  Act  of  the  English 
Parliament.  That  Act,  passed  in  1713,  provided  that  a  decla 
ration  should  be  accepted  from  a  Quaker  for  all  civil  purposes  in 
stead  of  an  oath.5  This,  however,  was  not  to  extend  to  the 
colonies,  and  a  clause  was  specially  added  to  the  effect  that  no 
Quaker  should  by  virtue  of  this  Act  be  qualified  to  hold  office 
there.  The  opponents  of  the  Quakers  contended  that  this  clause 
was  intended  as  a  positive  disqualification,  that  under  it  the 
Quakers  in  the  colonies  were  not  merely  to  enjoy  no  fresh  rights, 

1  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  iv.  p.  209.     Talbot  and  his  real  or  supposed  Jacobitismi 
will  come  before  us  again. 

2  Ib.  vol.  iv.  p.  219. 

8  See  the  forty-third  and  forty-fifth  letters  in  the  journal  to  Stella. 

4  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  iv.  p.  302. 

8 1  shall  deal  with  this  act  more  fully  in  connection  with  Pennsylvania- 


THE   COUNCIL   OPPOSE  HUNTER.  37 T 

but  were  to  forfeit  those  which  they  already  enjoyed.  In  other 
words,  the  very  Act  which  was  designed  to  improve  the  con 
dition  of  the  Quakers  was  to  put  a  large  and  important  body  of 
them  in  a  worse  position  than  before.  This  contention,  however, 
was  overruled  by  the  Lords  of  Trade.1 

So,  too,  Hunter  was  still  harassed  by  petty  complaints  against 
his  administrative  proceedings.  One  may  serve  as  a  specimen. 
He  has  invaded  the  freeholds  of  private  men  by  cutting  down 
their  timber,  and  he  has  burnt  and  destroyed  titles  to  land. 
Hunter  gives  a  full  account  of  what  is  meant  by  each  charge, 
and  his  explanation  was  allowed  to  go  unchallenged.2  He  had  to 
provide  a  certain  number  of  flat-bottomed  boats  for  the  expe 
dition  of  1711  against  Canada.  For  these  some  short,  crooked 
timbers  were  required.  Hunter  accordingly,  on  his  own  re 
sponsibility,  ordered  them  to  be  cut  on  some  waste  land,  "where," 
as  he  says,  "they  might  have  remained  uncut  till  the  end  of  the 
world,"  giving  notice  at  the  same  time  that  he  would  indemnify 
anyone  whose  property  was  injured.  He  explains  that  he  had 
exposed  himself  to  the  other  charge  by  protecting  an  unfortunate 
native  chief  against  a  trader  who,  in  defiance  of  the  law,  had 
made  him  drunk  and  swindled  him  out  of  his  land. 

These,  however,  were  but  the  ineffectual  railings  of  a  beaten 
faction.  The  report  which  Hunter  sent  home  in  1714  shows, 
that  the  majority  in  the  Assembly  was  able  to  apply  itself  to  the 
work  of  practical  legislation,  and  that  changes  either  in  the  com 
position  of  the  Council  or  in  the  temper  of  its  members  made  it 
no  longer  a  hindrance.  Acts  were  passed  simplifying  legal  pro 
cedure,  and  making  it  easier  to  establish  a  title  to  land.  In  one 
important  respect  the  policy  declared  by  the  English  Crown  in 
Hunter's  instructions  was  reversed :  a  duty  was  laid  on  imported 
negroes  with  a  view  to  encourage  the  influx  of  white  servants. 

To  have  brought  to  a  successful  issue  the  affairs  of  an  obscure 
colony  on  the  Atlantic  seaboard  is  to  the  great  Whig  Ministry 
of  Queen  Anne's  reign  but  a  trifle  of  added  praise.  Yet  their 
work  there  was  thoroughly  useful  and  honorable,  and  wholly 
worthy  of  their  traditions.  It  may  well  be  that  Hunter's  con- 


1  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  iv.  pp.   342-5. 

1  Hunter's  answer  to  these  charges  is  given  in  a  letter  to  Ambrose  Philips, 
agent  in  England  for  New  York,  July  27,  1717.  N.  J.  Archives,  vol.  iv.  pp.- 
312-24. 


378  NEW  JERSEY  A   CROWN  COLONY. 

duct  as  a  Governor  was  not  faultless,  that  there  were  elements  of 
truth  in  the  attacks  upon  him,  that  he  was  guilty  in  special  in 
stances  of  administrative  errors,  and  even  of  administrative  in 
justice.  But  if  we  look  at  his  career  as  a  whole  we  may  truly 
say  that  he,  almost  alone  among  colonial  Governors  of  his  age, 
had,  though  beset  by  many  adverse  influences,  set  on  foot  a 
system  which  left  the  Crown  in  full  possession  of  every  right  that 
it  could  justly  claim,  and  at  the  same  time  satisfied  every  reason 
able  aspiration  towards  self-government. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE   FOUNDATION   OF   PENNSYLVANIA.1 

IN  studying  the  history  of  the  American  colonies  we  are  at  once 
struck  with  a  certain  lack  of  biographical  interest,  with  the 
Absence  absence  of  conspicuous  figures  who  have  towered 
graphical  above  their  fellow-men,  and  stamped  their  own  per- 
*Amlrican  sonal  influence  on  the  community.  New  England  in 
history.  ;ts  early  days  is  in  some  measure  an  exception  to  this. 
There,  indeed,  Calvinism,  which  in  theory  annihiliated  the  will 
of  the  individual,  but  in  practice  gave  it  intenser  force  by  identi 
fying  it  with  the  Divine  purpose,  Puritan  discipline,  which  crushed 
weak  natures  but  braced  and  stimulated  strong  ones,  had  pro 
duced  men  of  some  real  greatness  such  as  Bradford  and  Win- 
throp,  men  of  at  least  marked  character  such  as  Endicott  and 
Dudley.  Yet  even  there  we  feel  that  the  biographical  interest 
which  attaches  to  particular  men  is  swallowed  up  in  the  collect 
ive  interest  which  attaches  to  the  corporate  growth  of  the  whole 
community.  And  if  we  except  that  short  era  when  Puritanism 
informed  and  dominated  New  England,  almost  to  the  exclusion 
of  every  other  motive,  there  is  scarcely  an  exception  to  this  tend 
ency.  Everywhere  among  the  colonies  the  life  of  the  com 
munity  is  far  more  interesting  than  the  life  of  any  man  in  it. 

'Our  chief  authorities  for  the  early  history  of  Pennsylvania  are: 

1.  The  Colonial   State  Papers. 

2.  The   Pennsylvania  Archives,   Philadelphia,    1852-6. 

3.  Colonial   Records,   Philadelphia,   1852. 

4.  Proud's  History  of  Pennsylvania,   Philadelphia,   1797. 

Proud  has  preserved  several  original  documents  of  value,  not  accessible  else 
where.  He  is  a  sound,  laborious  writer,  one  of  the  best  of  the  early  colonial 
historians. 

Shepherd's  History  of  Proprietary  Government  in  Pennsylvania  (1891)  is  an 
exceedingly  valuable  work,  based  on  unpublished  documents. 

There  are  several  lives  of  Penn,  but  none  of  them  throw  much  fresh  light 
on  the  history  of  the  colony.  Decidedly  the  best  in  that  respect  is  Mr.  Fisher's 
The  True  William  Penn,  Philadelphia,  1900.  Mr.  Fisher  has  written  two  other 
books  on  Pennsylvania:  The  Making  of  Pennsylvania,  1896,  and  Pennsylvania 
Colony  and  Commonwealth,  1897.  The  former  is  the  best  account  that  I 
know  of  the  various  waves  of  emigration  which  together  made  up  Pennsylva 
nia.  In  both  books  Mr.  Fisher  is  at  times  somewhat  dogmatic  in  tone. 


380  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

There  is  no  disparagement  in  this.  It  is  rather  praise  to  say  that 
a  community  is  better  and  stronger  than  its  best  and  strongest 
men.  For  that  means  that  a  community  has  in  its  institutions, 
its  faith,  and  its  corporate  morality,  guarantees  for  its  well-being 
of  which  it  cannot  be  robbed  by  chance.  But  it  is  a  state  of 
things  likely  to  mislead  historians,  above  all  to  mislead  contem 
porary  and  partial  chroniclers.  The  absence  of  real  greatness 
tempts  them  to  manufacture  an  image  of  greatness  out  of  ma 
terials  in  which  it  has  no  existence.  They  seize  greedily  on  a 
figure  endowed  with  attributes  faintly  resembling  heroism,  and 
he  becomes  under  their  hands  a  hero. 

This  has  been  in  some  measure  the  case  with  the  founder  of 
Pennsylvania.  Only  blinded  partisanship  can  withhold  from 
character  Penn  the  praise  of  being  a  good  man.  We  may  even  go 
ofpenn.  further  and  say  that  he  had  in  him  elements  of  real 
greatness.  Benevolence,  disinterestedness,  the  power  of  self- 
sacrifice,  a  rare  capacity  for  understanding  and  loving  things 
spiritual  and  for  dealing  effectively  with  things  temporal — these 
qualities,  joined  to  the  conspicuous  success  of  the  colony  to  which 
he  gave  his  name,  and  which  was  in  some  measure  the  creation  of 
his  judgment,  all  amply  explain  the  reputation  which  attaches 
to  the  name  of  William  Penn.  Yet  we  can  hardly  say  that  as  a 
colonial  statesman  Penn  was  great,  or  that  his  work  in  America 
brought  out  the  best  qualities  of  his  mind  or  character.  When 
we  analyze  that  work  with  care,  much  of  the  traditional  glory 
that  attaches  to  it  fades  away. 

It  is  needless  to  go  again  over  the  oft-told  tale  of  Penn's  early 
days.  When  we  read  of  one  who  is  alternately  a  fanatical  en 
thusiast  denouncing  the  conventional  standard  of  social  life,  and 
crying  aloud  for  a  far  more  rigid  observance  of  religious  and 
moral  precepts,  or  a  fashionable  fine  gentleman,  mixing  freely 
with  the  lax  and  corrupt  society  into  which  he  was  born,  one  of 
two  explanations  at  once  suggests  itself.  Either  he  is  seeking 
to  serve  God  and  Mammon,  craftily  building  up  a  reputation 
in  pious  circles,  without  forfeiting  worldly  pleasures  or  worldly 
advantages ;  or  it  may  be  said  that  he  is  an  unstable  enthusiast, 
drawn  hither  or  thither  as  emotions  leading  him  towards  God 
or  emotions  leading  him  towards  pleasure  gained  the  upper 
hand.  Either  explanation  is  at  variance  with  the  whole  tenor 
of  Penn's  life.  If  a  man  of  his  astute  perception,  gifted  with. 


CHARACTER   OF  PENN.  3Sl 

rare  fascination  of  manner  and  keen  insight  into  character,  had 
played  a  double  game  he  would  have  played  it  to  better  purpose. 
Nowhere  do  his  writings  breathe  anything  of  the  spirit  of  pas 
sion;  his  morality  was  far-sighted  and  self-restrained.  To 
charge  a  man  with  inconsistency  is  often  but  a  convenient  way  of 
confessing  the  limitations  of  our  own  view,  our  inability  to  un 
derstand  how  features  of  character  usually  separated  may  in  ex 
ceptional  cases  be  conjoined.  The  more  one  studies  Penn's 
writings  the  more  one  sees  the  singular  catholicity  of  his  mind, 
his  power  of  recognizing  what  was  good  in  all  men,  his  real  in 
difference  to  all  external  marks  whether  of  creed  or  station. 
Thus  it  was  that  Penn's  character  and  his  formal  creed  were 
thoroughly  at  one,  that  he  out-Quakered  those  who  were  recog 
nized  as  the  founders  of  his  sect.  Fox  admitted  formally  and  in 
theory  that  the  divine  spirit  dwelt  within  every  man.  In  prac 
tice  he  would  have  found  it  hard  to  recognize  its  presence  in  the 
squire  who  committed  Quakers  to  jail  or  the  priest  who  served 
in  a  steeple-house.  In  Penn  the  formal  principles  of  his  creed 
worked  in  harmony  with  a  kindly  and  sympathetic  temper.  He 
was  by  nature  the  friend  of  all  men,  be  their  condition  what  it 
might,  and  his  innate  simplicity  and  independence  saved  him 
alike  from  servility  in  dealing  with  the  rich  or  patronage  to 
wards  the  poor. 

Penn  may,  indeed,  justly  claim  that  praise  which  is  often 
claimed  with  no  truth  for  earlier  Nonconformists,  of  being  in 
the  true  sense  of  the  word  tolerant.  He  is  the  follower  of 
Jeremy  Taylor,  the  forerunner  of  John  Mill.  As  fully  as  either 
does  he  recognize  that  a  dogmatic  creed  has  no  value  in  it 
unless  it  be  the  root  of  active  morality;  that  human  tests  can 
measure  only  the  morality,  and  that  a  mere  formal  compliance 
with  any  particular  creed,  such  as  can  be  exacted  by  tests,  is 
valueless.  "That  man  cannot  be  said  to  have  any  religion  that 
takes  it  by  another  man's  choice,  not  his  own."1  "The  way  of 
force  makes  instead  of  an  honest  dissenter  but  a  hypocritical  con 
formist,  than  whom  nothing  is  more  detestable  to  God  and 
man."2 

It  is  clear  that  his  attitude  was  made  easy  to  him  by  the  fact 

'The  Great  Case  of  Liberty  of  Conscience.     Penn's  Works   (ed.   1726),  vol. 
i.  p.  451. 
2/fr.  p.  457. 


382  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

that  he  himself  was  indifferent  to  dogma,  that  religion  was  for 
him  not  a  philosophy  but  a  moral  code.  He  protests  against  the 
attempt  to  overlay  religious  teaching  with  metaphysical  propo 
sitions  ;  it  is  quite  clear  that  he  could  not  in  the  least  enter  into 
the  feelings  of  those  with  whom  the  difference  between  Atha- 
nasius  and  Arius,  between  Arminian  and  Calvinist  is  vital. 
Penn  indeed  fully  anticipates  the  eighteenth-century  doctrine, 
"He  can't  be  wrong  whose  life  is  in  the  right."  It  is  hardly 
needful  to  point  out  how  that  view  overlooks  the  fact  that 
dogma  may  be  itself  an  influence  towards  the  formation  of  char 
acter.  And  it  also  overlooks  this,  that  the  spiritual  life  of  the 
individual  and  of  the  society  do  not  stand  on  precisely  the  same 
footing.  Dogmatic  articles  of  faith,  embodying  the  convictions 
of  some  and  outraging  those  of  none,  may  be  valuable  as  a  basis 
for  outward  agreement. 

As  it  was  with  Penn  in  spiritual  so  was  it  in  secular  matters. 
There,  too,  he  would  have  fully  admitted,  "whate'er  is  best  ad 
ministered  is  best."  The  religious  and  the  political  side  of  his 
teaching  had  each  their  dangers,  dangers  specially  felt  in  the 
position  which  Penn  occupied.  Through  all  the  errors,  and  even 
the  atrocities,  of  which  New  England  dogmatists  were  guilty, 
there  ran  a  conviction  that  a  new  society  is  beset  by  peculiar 
perils,  and  that  external  unity  capable  of  being  enforced  by  posi 
tive  law  is  the  only  safeguard.  And  in  civil  matters  we  shall 
constantly  see  how  the  relations  between  Penn  and  his  colonists 
were  impaired  by  his  indifference  to  specified  rules  and  fixed 
terms  of  agreement.  He  could  not  understand  that  a  general 
reliance  on  the  goodness  of  his  intentions  was  not  a  sufficient 
guarantee  for  his  colonists.  It  is  not  enough  that  a  system  of 
government  is  well  administered.  It  must  contain  in  itself 
some  security  for  the  continuance  of  good  administration,  over 
and  above  the  good  will  of  the  individual  ruler.  Penn's  ina 
bility  to  see  that  fully  explains  his  toleration  of  James  II.,  one 
may  even  say  his  sympathy  with  him.  James,  like  Penn,  dis 
tinctly  recognized  that  a  ruler  had  moral  obligations  which  he 
must  fulfill,  though  his  view  of  those  obligations  was  far  cruder 
and  meaner.  Both  men  failed  to  see  that  the  subject  reasonably 
demanded  something  more  certain  and  more  lasting  than  the 
good  will  of  the  individual  ruler. 

The  conditions  of  the  time  were  such  as  might  naturally  en- 


PENATS  SCHEMES  OF  COLONIZATION.  383 

courage  Penn  to  believe  in  the  possibility  of  a  colony  where  all 
creeds  might  find  a  common  home.  The  system  of  rigidity  and 
Penn's  the  system  of  laxity  had  each  been  tried,  and  the 
of  couml-  victory  might  well  seem  to  be  on  the  side  of  the  latter, 
zation.  Massachusetts  was  in  troubled  water.  New  Haven, 
the  very  type  of  the  sectarian  colony,  was  blotted  out,  absorbed 
in  her  more  liberal  neighbor  Connecticut.  In  Maryland,  In 
dependents  and  Quakers  seemed  to  be  entering  into  the  inherit 
ance  prepared  by  a  Roman  Catholic  founder.  The  conquest  of 
New  Netherlands  transferred  to  English  dominion  a  colony  in 
which,  despite  the  efforts  of  some  among  its  rulers,  the  principle 
of  religious  equality  had  firmly  established  itself.  Nor  did  the 
effect  of  the  conquest  end  there.  It  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the 
English  nation  a  large  territory  on  which  to  try  the  experiment 
of  colonization,  religious  in  character,  yet  non-sectarian.  The 
time  assuredly  had  not  come — one  may  doubt  whether  it  will 
come  till  human  nature  is  widely  changed — when  that  experi 
ment  could  be  made  successfully.  Penn  was  endeavoring  to 
found  a  colony  which  should  rest  on  Quakerism  as  its  main 
foundation,  yet  which  should  not  be  sectarian.  His  position  was 
not  unlike  that  of  Roger  Williams.  And  if  all  Baptists  had  been 
as  tolerant  as  Williams,  all  Quakers  as  undogmatic  as  Penn, 
the  experiment  might  well  have  succeeded.  As  it  was,  both 
in  Pennsylvania  and  New  Jersey,  there  was  enough  nominal 
toleration  to  bring  sects  together,  hardly  enough  of  the  real  spirit 
of  toleration  to  enable  them  to  live  together  peaceably.  Yet 
when  we  look  back  on  Massachusetts  we  feel  that  the  bickerings 
of  Quakers  in  New  Jersey  and  Pennsylvania  were  in  many  ways 
better  than  the  uncontrolled  domination  of  Puritanism. 

It  was  in  all  likelihood  the  desire  to  try  the  experiment  of 
State-building  with  a  freer  hand  than  he  could  have  as  one  of 
the  part  Proprietors  of  New  Jersey  that  urged  Penn  to  sue  for 
an  independent  grant.  He  was  able  to  ask  it  as  something  more 
than  a  favor.  Sixteen  thousand  pounds  was  due  from  the 
Crown  to  his  father's  estate.  The  conquest  of  New  Nether 
lands  had  put  the  Crown  in  a  position  to  pay  the  debt.  The 
annihilation  of  the  Dutch  title  was  a  consequence  of  that  con 
quest.  Thus  Charles  II.  was  in  a  position  to  claim  sovereignty 
over  the  whole  territory  between  Connecticut  and  Maryland. 
The  grant  to  the  Duke  of  York  absorbed  only  a  portion  of  that ; 


THE   FOUNDATION   OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

it  left  the  southwest  bank  of  the  Delaware  and  all  the  upper 
valley  of  the  Sugquehanna,  and  the  soil  watered  by  its  tribu 
taries.  This  accordingly  was  handed  over  to  Penn.1 

The  formal  boundaries  of  the  new  province  were  as  follows: 
The  Delaware  was  to  be  the  eastern  boundary  and  the  north- 
Limits  of  east  corner  was  to  be  the  point  where  that  river  in- 
grant.  tersects  the  forty-third  degree  of  latitude ;  a  northern 

frontier  of  five  degrees  of  longitude  extended  to  the  edge  of 
Lake  Erie,  thence  the  line  ran  due  south  through  the  wilderness. 
The  southern  boundary  was  the  point  where  complication  arose, 
and  the  question  was  one  of  moment  not  only  to  Penn  and  his 
.settlers,  but  to  his  neighbors.  It  determined,  what  was  yet  an 
open  question,  the  boundary  of  the  Duke  of  York's  province, 
and  it  altered  that  of  Maryland.  As  we  have  seen,  the  grant  to 
the  Duke  of  York  gave  him  no  territory  west  of  the  Delaware. 
That  portion  of  the  soil  conquered  from  New  Netherlands  was 
in  a  strangely  undefined  condition.  It  was  claimed  by  Mary 
land.  De  jure  it  either  belonged  to  that  colony  or  was  a  waif, 
placed  by  right  of  conquest  in  direct  dependence  on  the  Crown. 
De  facto,  as  we  have  seen,  it  was  an  outlying  dependency,  under 
the  Governor  of  New  York,  but  separate  from  that  colony.  No 
attempt  had  been  made  to  define  the  limits  of  this  jurisdiction. 
But  Penn's  charter  now  fixed  them,  and  in  doing  so  fixed  the 
boundary  of  Maryland.  But  this  was  done  in  such  ambiguous 
language  as  to  leave  a  loophole  for  future  dispute.  The  new 
province  was  to  be  bounded  "on  the  south  by  a  circle  drawn  at 
twelve  miles'  distance  from  Newcastle  northward  and  west 
ward  into  the  beginning  of  the  fortieth  degree  of  northern  lati 
tude;  and  then  by  a  straight  line  westward."  There  was,  how 
ever,  one  objection  to  this  boundary:  a  radius  of  twelve  miles 
from  Newcastle  would  not  at  any  point  reach  the  fortieth  de 
gree  of  latitude.  Accordingly  Penn  claimed,  and  finally, 
though  not  without  years  of  dispute,  succeeded  in  establishing, 
the  right  to  draw  his  southern  boundary  from  a  point  twelve 
miles  due  west  of  Newcastle.  This  line  fell  south  of  that  origi 
nally  assigned  to  Maryland  as  its  northern  frontier,  and  thus 
transferred,  at  least  in  theory,  from  Lord  Baltimore  to  Penn  a 
belt  of  land  nearly  three  hundred  miles  long  and  fifteen  miles 

1  The  charter,  wherein  the  grant  is  set  forth,  is  given  in  full  by  Proud,  vol. 
i.  pp.   171-87. 


PENN'S  CHARTER.  38S 

wide.  It  is  to  be  noticed,  too,  that  while  this  document  assumed 
the  existence  of  a  territory  attached  to  Newcastle,  there  had 
never  been  any  attempt  to  define  the  limits  of  that  territory. 
Moreover  the  apportionment  of  the  west  bank  of  the  Delaware 
between  Penn  and  the  Duke  of  York  was  purely  arbitrary.  Of 
the  land  occupied  by  the  Swedes,  a  portion  was  retained  for  the 
Duke,  a  part  handed  over  to  Penn.  The  latter  included  Up 
land,  a  small  rural  township,  of  which  the  nucleus  was  Swedish, 
but  which  had  been  strengthened  by  an  influx  of  English  settlers. 
Thus  Penn's  grant,  like  that  to  Berkeley  and  Carteret,  but  even 
more  distinctly,  was  a  grant  not  of  vacant  territory,  but  of  juris 
diction  over  an  existing  settlement. 

There  were  certain  important  differences  between  this  and  any 
earlier  proprietary  grant.  It  resembled  the  grants  to  Lord 
Provisions  Baltimore  and  to  the  Duke  of  York  in  vesting  the  soil 
charter.  of  the  colony  in  the  Proprietor,  and  requiring  from 
him  a  nominal  acknowledgment  and  the  reservation  of  a  quit- 
rent.  But  in  two  important  points  it  differed.  Those  who 
drafted  the  earlier  documents  had  been  content  with  a  general 
provision  of  allegiance  to  the  Crown  and  conformity  to  the  laws 
of  England.  This  charter  prescribed  certain  definite  forms  of 
control.  All  laws  enacted  within  the  colony  were  to  be  sent 
home  for  approval.  The  King  might  then  within  six  months 
veto  them.  But  by  a  singularly  ill-judged  arrangement  five 
years  might  elapse  between  the  passing  of  a  law  and  the  trans 
mission  of  it.  For  that  time  the  colonists  might  be  living  under 
conditions  which  would  only  be  temporary.  The  patent  also 
provided  that  while  Penn  might  constitute  ports,  and  with  the 
•consent  of  the  inhabitants  levy  customs,  this  was  not  to  hinder 
the  enforcement  of  the  general  revenue  laws  of  the  kingdom, 
nor  the  right  of  the  revenue  officers  to  visit  such  ports.  As  a 
further  security  a  novel  provision  was  introduced.  The  Pro 
prietor  must  always  have  an  agent  living  in  or  near  London. 
His  place  of  abode  must  always  be  notified  to  the  Privy  Council. 
If  the  Proprietors  should  at  any  time  be  held  to  have  violated 
the  Navigation  laws,  the  agent  was  to  be  summoned  and  was  to 
give  an  explanation.  If  this  were  not  satisfactory,  the  Proprie 
tor  was  to  make  good  any  damage  sustained  by  the  Crown. 
If  he  failed  to  do  this,  his  grant  was  to  be  forfeited  pending 
payment. 


386  THE  FOUNDATION'  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

Another  special  feature  of  the  charter  was  that  it  made  some 
attempt  to  prescribe  the  relations  which  should  exist  between 
the  Proprietors  and  the  settlers.  The  Proprietor  was  em 
powered  to  pass  laws  "for  raising  money  for  public  uses,  or  for 
any  other  end  appertaining  either  unto  the  public  state  and 
peace,  or  safety  of"  the  colony,  with  the  approval  and  assent  of 
the  freemen  or  their  deputies.  If  this  did  not  make  it  absolutely 
clear  that  such  assent  was  necessary,  that  was  further  declared 
by  a  clause  allowing  the  Proprietor  in  case  of  emergency  to  pass 
ordinances  which,  however,  should  not  affect  life  or  property. 

A  clause  was  also  inserted  by  which  the  Crown  renounced  for 
itself  all  right  of  taxation.  But  the  very  same  clause  expressly 
declared  that  Parliament  had  that  right.  No  tax  might  be 
levied  but  with  the  consent  of  the  Proprietors,  or  Governor  or 
Assembly,  or  by  Act  of  Parliament  in  England.  The  question 
of  the  right  of  Parliament  to  tax  a  colony  was  assuredly  not  a 
question  to  be  settled  by  mere  precedent  or  by  the  will  of  Charles. 
II.  and  his  counselors.  One  can  only  say  that  there  was  noth 
ing  in  the  Pennsylvania  charter  which  protected  the  colonists 
against  the  exercise  of  such  a  right.  The  Proprietor  was,  as- 
usual  in  such  cases,  the  supreme  fountain  of  justice.  He  had 
the  right  to  establish  courts,  and  to  appoint  judges  and  magis 
trates.  Only  he  might  not  pardon  treason  or  murder,  but  grant 
a  respite  till  the  pleasure  of  the  Crown  should  be  known.  One 
provision,  and  one  only,  was  made  on  behalf  of  religion. 
Twenty  of  the  inhabitants  might  by  a  signed  requisition  to  the 
Bishop  of  London  have  a  licensed  preacher  allotted  to  them.  It 
is  not  unlikely  that  the  insertion  of  this  clause  was  due  to 
Penn's  personal  friendship  with  Compton.  It  was  also  by 
Compton's  advice  that  Penn  settled  the  claims  of  the  natives  to 
the  land  by  purchase  from  them.1  The  proceeding,  however, 
was  too  much  in  consonance  with  Penn's  own  temper  and  prin 
ciples  to  have  needed  the  intervention  of  any  adviser. 

As  we  have  seen,  the  grant  included  territory  already  inhab 
ited.  Accordingly  the  King,  following  the  course  adopted  in 
the  case  of  the  second  grant  to  Berkeley  and  Carteret,  issued  a 
declaration  commanding  all  persons  within  the  limits  of  the 
patent  to  obey  the  Proprietor. 

1  Penn  to  Lords  of  Trade,  Col.  Papers,  August  6,   1683. 


intentions 


PENN'S  PURPOSE  AS  A    COLONIZER.  387 

According  to  Penn's  own  story  his  modesty  would  have  avoided 
associating  his  name  with  that  of  the  new  colony. 
q-^e  King,  however,  insisted,  out  of  respect  to  the 
colonizer.  memory  of  the  Admiral,  and  Penn  yielded. 

It  is  plain  that  Penn  had  no  intention  of  making  his  colony 
specially  a  refuge  for  those  of  his  own  religion.  Quakers  no 
doubt  would  be  welcome.  But  the  colony  was  to  fulfill  Penn's, 
ideal,  not  by  its  creed,  but  by  its  conformity  with  his  moral 
standard,  by  applying  the  principles  of  primitive  Christianity  to 
its  dealings  whether  with  civilized  men  or  savages,  by  the 
spectacle  of  a  harmony  unbroken  by  any  divisions  resting  upon 
dogma. 

This  was  clearly  shown  by  the  Address  in  which  Penn  invited! 
settlers,  and  in  the  first  document  in  which  he  set  forth  the  prin 
ciples  on  which  he  would  deal  with  his  colony.  He  issued  a 
general  account  of  the  character  of  the  territory,  and  published 
appended  to  it  a  copy  of  his  patent.1  Land  might  be  had  on 
three  conditions.  Emigrants  might  acquire  the  fee-simple  of 
their  land,  subject  to  a  quit-rent,  by  payment  of  two  pounds  for 
a  hundred  acres,  the  renewed  quit-rent  being  one  shilling  for 
every  such  parcel.  Or  those  who  were  content  to  come  as 
annual  tenants  might  do  so  at  a  payment  of  a  shilling  an  acre. 
As  in  most  colonies  a  portion  of  land  (fifty  acres)  was  to  be 
allotted  to  every  indented  servant  when  his  time  was  out. 

We  must  take  in  conjunction  with  this  another  document 
which  appeared  immediately  afterwards,  and  which  one  would 
The  con-  suppose  might  have  better  been  incorporated  with  it. 
cessions."  gy  these  so-called  conditions  or  concessions,  the 
method  of  land  tenure  was  more  fully  prescribed.  There  was 
no  restraint  on  the  amount  of  land  which  might  be  held  by  a 
single  Proprietor.  But  it  was  provided  that  no  one  might  have 
a  continuous  estate  of  more  than  a  thousand  acres  unless  he 
parceled  it  into  farms  of  that  extent,  each  occupied  by  a  family. 
Any  landholder  who  failed  to  occupy  his  ground  within  three 
years  after  obtaining  his  grant  might  be  dispossessed  with  com 
pensation.  Regard  was  shown  to  two  industries  which  might 
become  important  by  a  clause  providing  that  no  more  than  four- 

1  Proud  gives  the  substance  of  these  conditions.  As  he  does  not  publish 
the  text,  the  probability  is  that  he  could  not  discover  it. 

*  These  are  printed  by  Proud  in  an  appendix  to  his  second  volume. 


388  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA, 

fifths  of  any  ground  was  to  be  cleared;  the  rest  was  to  be  left 
woodland,  so  that  there  might  be  no  lack  of  oaks  for  shipping  or 
mulberries  for  feeding  silkworms.  Yet  it  is  not  easy  to  see  how 
this  provision  was  to  be  turned  to  account  without  some  rather 
elaborate  system  of  public  forestry. 

Special  and  just  honor  has  always  been  paid  to  Penn  for  his 
scrupulous  regard  for  the  rights  of  the  natives,  and  for  the  suc- 
Poiicy  cess  with  which  he  enforced  such  regard  on  his  fol- 
towards  lowers,  and  succeeded  in  embodying  it  as  a  part  of 
natives.  their  traditional  policy.  All  goods  sold  to  them  were 
to  be  tested  by  public  assayers.  Every  provision  of  the  penal 
law  was  to  apply  as  fully  to  the  protection  of  the  Indian  as  of 
the  white  man,  and  all  differences  were  to  be  tried  by  a  mixed 
jury.  In  the  last  provision  there  may  have  been  little  practical 
wisdom,  but  it  at  least  strongly  shows  how  the  equality  of  all 
men  was  with  Penn  no  mere  doctrinal  tenet  of  the  schools. 

Penn's  charter  was  signed  in  March  1681,  and  by  October  a 
party  of  emigrants  were  ready  to  sail.1  The  colonists  were  not 
The  first  venturing  to  an  unknown  land.  The  climate,  soil, 
tionfra  and  the  general  conditions  of  life-industry  closely 
resembled  those  already  in  existence  in  New  Jersey.  The  emi 
grants  found  the  natives  friendly,  the  woods  teeming  with  game 
and  the  streams  with  fish.  The  leader  of  the  expedition, 
William  Markham,  could  write  home  to  his  wife,  "If  a  country 
life  be  liked  by  any  it  might  be  here."2 

The  patent  had  done  no  more  than  suggest  the  skeleton  of  a 
constitution.  There  was  already  extant  in  the  colony  a  local 
consti-  government  sufficient  for  the  wants  of  a  small  and 
arrange-  simple  community.  As  we  have  seen,  a  court  sat  at 
ments.  Upland,  acknowledging  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Gov 
ernor  of  New  York.  That  court  was  continued  as  the  judicial 
tribunal.  A  council  of  nine  of  the  chief  settlers,  with  Markham 
as  Deputy-Governor  at  the  head,  served  as  the  executive.* 

Meanwhile  Penn  was  fashioning  a  system  of  government 
suited  to  the  wants  of  a  larger  and  more  scattered  community. 
His  conduct  in  this  showed  that  he  belonged  to  a  rare  class, 
that  he  was  a  philanthropist  who  was  willing  to  help  men 

1  Proud,  vol.  i.   p.   193. 

*  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History,  vol.  vi. 

'Hazard's  Annals  of  Pennsylvania,  pp.  37,  51. 


PENN'S  FRAME  OF  GOVERNMENT.  389 

according  to  their  wishes,  not  according  to  his  own.  He  did 
not  start  with  a  constitution  and  then  invite  settlers.  He  got 
Penn's  together  the  material  for  his  colony,  and  then  framed 
gown*/  a  constitution  in  conjunction  with  those  who  were 
ment.i  to  jjve  unc[er  Jt.  Beside  consulting  those  who  had 
formed  his  colony,  Penn  took  the  advice  of  the  chief  legal  au 
thority,  Sir  William  Jones,  the  Attorney-General.  We  read, 
too,  with  some  surprise,  that  he  consulted  one  who  was  in 
private  life  a  dissolute  courtier,  in  public  at  best  an  adroit  di 
plomatist,  Henry  Sidney.* 

Penn's  own  view  about  constitutional  and  political  forms 
made  it  all  the  easier  for  him  to  accept  and  adopt  suggestions. 
That  view  is  very  clearly  set  forth  in  some  remarks  which  Penn 
prefixed  to  the  draft  of  the  new  constitution.  "There  is,"  he 
says,  "hardly  one  frame  of  government  in  the  world  so  ill- 
designed  by  its  first  founders,  that  in  good  hands  would  not  do 
well  enough,  and  history  tells  us  the  best  in  ill  ones  can  do  noth 
ing  that  is  great  and  good."  "Let  men  be  good  and  the  gov 
ernment  cannot  be  bad ;  if  it  be  ill  they  will  cure  it."  He  wholly 
overlooks  the  fact  that  neither  men  nor  governments  are  divided 
by  a  hard-and-fast  line  into  good  and  bad;  he  assumes  that  the 
individual  and  the  state  are  each  in  a  fixed  condition,  forgetting 
that  in  each  at  its  best  there  are  evil  tendencies  which  act  and 
react  on  one  another. 

Penn's  practical  sagacity  did  not  wholly  save  him  from  the 
error  which  seemed  inevitably  to  beset  colonial  Proprietors  in 
the  task  of  drafting  a  constitution.  He  made  his  government 
unnecessarily  complex.  The  government  was  to  be  nominally 
after  the  regular  pattern,  consisting  of  three  members :  the  Gov 
ernor,  the  Council,  and  the  House  of  Representatives.  But  in 
Pennsylvania,  alone  among  all  the  colonies  outside  New  Eng 
land,  both  houses  were  to  be  chosen  by  the  whole  commonalty. 
The  Council  was  to  consist  of  seventy-two,  twenty-four  chosen 
each  year.  The  lower  chamber  was,  in  the  first  instance,  to 
consist  of  the  whole  body  of  freemen.  The  meaning  of  this, 
plainly,  was  that  the  first  acceptance  and  ratification  of  the  con- 

1  The  draft  of  this  instrument  is  published  by  Proud  in  an  appendix,  vol. 
ii.  pp.  5-20. 

1  Penn's  adviser  may  have  been  Henry's  brother  Algernon.  The  evidence 
on  the  point  does  not  seem  to  me  conclusive.  It  is  shortly  discussed,  and  the 
original  authorities  referred  to,  in  the  Memorial  History,  vol.  iii.  p.  506. 


39°  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

stitution  should  be  the  direct  act  of  the  whole  body  of  freemen. 
So  far  the  Council  was  really  an  upper  chamber  with  the  essential 
qualification  of  such  a  body  in  that  it  differed  essentially  in  its 
structure  from  the  lower  chamber.  But  after  the  first  year  the 
lower  chamber  was  no  longer  to  be  a  primary  body,  but  to  con 
sist  of  two  hundred  elected  deputies.  This  number  might  be 
increased  till  it  reached  five  hundred.  Several  obvious  objec 
tions  to  this  constitution  at  once  suggest  themselves.  It  is  easy 
to  see  what  hopelessly  unwieldy  bodies  would  be  two  chambers 
of  seventy-two  and  five  hundred,  or  even  two  hundred,  respect 
ively.  It  would  be  wholly  impossible  for  the  colony  for  many  a 
day  to  supply  that  number  of  men  capable  of  public  service  and 
willing  to  undertake  it.  The  Council,  too,  was  wholly  unfitted 
by  its  size  for  the  discharge  of  executive  functions.  An  almost 
inevitable  result  would  be  the  informal  creation  of  a  small  body 
within  the  Council,  possessing  no  recognized  constitution  nor 
power,  but  monopolizing  those  portions  of  public  business 
which  require  dispatch,  secrecy,  or  frequent  communication. 
A"  closer  examination  of  Penn's  work  to  some  extent  removes 
these  difficulties,  but  in  doing  so  it  discloses  others,  not  less 
serious. 

The  size  of  the  lower  house  was  not  as  material  as  it  seems, 
for  it  is  plain  that  Penn  did  not  design  his  Assembly  to  be  a  leg 
islative  body.  That  is  clearly  implied  in  the  clause  which  pro 
vides  for  the  holding  of  Assemblies  "to  the  end  that  all  laws  pre 
pared  by  the  Governor  and  Provincial  Council  aforesaid  may 
yet  have  the  more  full  concurrence  of  the  freemen  of  the 
province."  The  Council  elected  by  the  freemen  was  to  legislate, 
the  larger  representative  body  was  only  to  accept  and  ratify. 
Thus  we  must  not  judge  the  constitution  of  Pennsylvania  by  the 
analogy  of  other  colonies.  We  are  tempted  to  look  at  it  as 
though  it  consisted  of  a  council  answering  to  the  ordinary  council 
in  its  functions,  but  chosen  by  the  people,  and  a  lower  house 
also  of  representatives.  It  would  be  more  true  to  say  that  there 
was  to  be  no  council  in  the  sense  in  which  one  existed  elsewhere. 
The  so-called  Council  answered  to  the  ordinary  legislative  As 
sembly.  Below  that  there  was  to  be  a  body  at  first  primary, 
afterwards  representative,  which  had  nothing  analogous  to  it 
elsewhere,  and  which  was  to  exist  merely  for  the  purpose  of  re 
affirming  the  approval  of  the  whole  body  of  settlers  of  that  which 


DEFECTS  IN  PENN'S  CONSTITUTION.  391 

had  been  enacted  by  their  representatives.  It  is  difficult  to  see 
what  useful  function  this  last  body  was  really  to  serve,  or  what 
inducement  the  settlers  would  have  to  make  it  a  working  reality. 
It  is  always  difficult  in  a  new  country  where  no  class  enjoys 
leisure,  and  where  a  political  career  has  no  rewards  to  offer,  to 
induce  men  to  leave  their  business  and  attend  to  public  affairs. 
But  it  would  be  indeed  hopeless  to  expect  such  attendance  in  the 
members  of  a  body  so  entirely  subordinate  in  its  rights  and 
duties. 

And  if  Penn's  constitution  erred  there  in  excess,  it  also  erred 
•elsewhere  in  defect.  The  so-called  Council  might  be  well  fitted 
for  a  legislative  body,  but  it  was  far  too  large  for  executive  pur 
poses.  An  attempt  was  made  to  get  over  this  by  breaking  it  up 
into  four  committees.  The  various  functions  assigned  to  these 
bodies  are  more  easily  enumerated  than  analyzed  or  translated. 
The  first  was  to  be  "a  committee  of  plantations  to  situate  and 
settle  cities,  ports,  market-towns,  and  highways,  and  to  hear  and 
decide  all  suits  and  controversies  relating  to  plantations."  The 
second  was  to  be  "a  committee  of  justice  and  safety  to  secure  the 
peace  of  the  province  and  punish  the  maladministration  of  those 
who  subvert  justice,  to  the  prejudice  of  the  public  or  private 
interest."  The  third  was  to  be  "a  committee  of  trade  and 
treasury  who  shall  regulate  all  trade  and  commerce  according  to 
law,  encourage  manufacture  and  country  growth,  and  defray 
the  public  charge  of  the  province."  The  fourth  was  to  be  "a 
committee  of  manners  and  education  and  arts,  that  all  wicked 
and  scandalous  living  may  be  prevented,  and  that  youth  may  be 
successively  trained  up  in  virtue  and  useful  knowledge  and  arts." 
It  is  obvious  on  the  face  of  it  that  the  functions  of  the  first  com 
mittee  would  perpetually  clash  with  those  of  the  second  and 
third,  that  in  fact  there  was  no  real  distinction  between  their 
provinces. 

It  is  to  be  noticed,  too,  that  although  the  Council  was  chosen 
by  the  whole  body  of  settlers,  yet  it  was  not  so  chosen  as  to  make 
it  a  certain  and  effective  representative  of  popular  wishes.  One- 
third  of  the  members  were  to  be  chosen  each  year.  In  other 
"words,  that  portion  of  the  legislative  body  which  was  most  in 
touch  with  popular  opinion  was  to  be  within  the  legislature  itself 
the  least  influential.  For  it  is  obvious  that  when  a  new  element, 
and  that  a  minority,  is  added  to  an  existing  body  it  is  powerless 


392  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

against  the  predominant  feeling  of  those  already  in  office.  Its 
members  are  hindered  by  feeling  themselves  unfamiliar  with  the 
forms  and  traditions  of  business;  they  soon  become  assimilated 
to  the  body  into  which  they  have  been  elected.  Thus  the  system 
of  partial  election  is  specially  ill  fitted  for  enabling  the  electors 
to  make  their  wishes  known  and  felt,  for  giving  them  direct  and 
efficient  control  over  the  legislature.  The  fact,  too,  that  at  a 
time  when  public  feeling  ran  high,  when  there  might  be  a  de 
mand  for  important  legislative  changes,  one-third  of  the  com 
munity  had  the  right  of  election  which  was  denied  to  the  rest, 
could  not  fail  to  call  out  ill-feeling.  The  right  which  was  with 
held  from  the  electors  was  at  the  same  time  brought  near  them. 
Moreover  a  clause  was  inserted  providing  that  no  outgoing 
member  should  be  eligible  for  re-election  for  seven  years.  This 
would  in  itself  go  far  to  cripple  the  efficiency  of  the  Council, 
to  prevent  continuity  of  principle  and  tradition,  or  that  forma 
tion  of  organized  parties  under  acknowledged  leaders  which  is 
essential  to  the  efficiency  of  a  representative  body.  It  might, 
too,  seriously  limit  the  electors  in  their  choice  of  representatives, 
and  by  weakening  the  Council  it  would  strengthen  the  hands  of 
the  Governor  in  any  attempt  to  encroach  on  their  functions. 
Penn's  system  appeared  to  vest  all  government  in  the  com 
monalty.  In  reality  popular  representation  would  have  been  far 
better  secured,  with  a  nominated  Council  and  a  House  of  Repre 
sentatives,  the  latter  all  elected  together  at  stated  intervals  with 
a  short  tenure  of  office. 

There  was,  too,  a  lack  of  practical  sense  in  the  declaration  that 
this  fundamental  frame  of  government  could  only  be  altered  by 
the  consent  of  the  Proprietor  and  six-sevenths  of  the  Assembly. 
Such  limitations  of  power  may  be  of  use  in  mere  matters  of 
formal  procedure.  It  may  be  well,  for  example,  to  limit  the 
power  of  suddenly  reversing  a  motion  or  bringing  one  forward 
without  notice ;  it  may  be  well  to  prohibit  absolutely  the  revival 
of  a  proposal  within  a  certain  time  of  its  rejection.  Such  re 
straints  are  in  reality  declarations  of  a  very  emphatic  opinion  that 
a  particular  course  is  undesirable ;  the  restraints  which  they  im 
pose  are  seldom  irksome ;  if  they  were  so  in  any  special  instance 
they  would  no  doubt  be  set  aside  by  the  vote  of  a  majority.  But 
this  was  an  attempt  to  enable  one-seventh  of  the  community  on 
a  point  of  vital  importance  to  defy  the  wishes  and  opinion  of  the 


GRANT  OF  DELA  WARE    TO  PENN.  393 

remaining  six-sevenths,  and  such  an  attempt  is  by  its  very  nature 
foredoomed  to  failure. 

A  wiser  part  of  the  frame  of  government  was  the  declaration 
that  no  theist  should  be  molested  for  his  religion,  or  compelled  to 
attend  or  support  any  form  of  worship  of  which  he  did  not  ap 
prove.  A  clause  of  some  importance  was  that  which  provided 
that  all  elections  were  to  be  by  ballot,  though  in  both  houses  of 
the  legislature  voting  was  to  be  open.  The  appointment  of  law 
officers  was  vested  jointly  in  the  Proprietors  and  the  freemen. 
The  latter,  acting  through  their  deputies  or  the  Assembly,  were 
to  nominate  two  candidates  for  each  office,  of  whom  the  Gov 
ernor  was  to  appoint  one. 

There  was  always  a  possibility  that  the  Duke  of  York  might 
assert  a  claim  of  conquest  over  Penn's  territory.  This  danger 
Further  was  disposed  of  by  a  deed  from  the  Duke  relinquish- 
ferrltory  mg  anY  such  claim.1  This  was  followed  by  a  far 
EUike'of  more  important  concession.  The  territory  assigned 
York-  to  Penn  labored  under  one  serious — indeed  almost 

fatal — drawback,  a  want  of  seaboard.  Not  merely  had  he  no 
harbor ;  but  the  navigation  of  the  estuary  was,  on  the  west  bank, 
in  the  hands  of  the  New  Jersey  Proprietors,  on  the  east,  in  those 
of  the  Duke.  The  outlying  dependency  of  scattered  settlements 
grouped  round  Newcastle  was  useless  as  a  part  of  New  York, 
but  it  would  be  of  inestimable  value  to  Penn.  Accordingly  by 
a  wise  arrangement,  the  whole  bank  of  the  river  as  far  as  the 
Hoarkills,  and  to  a  breadth  of  twelve  miles,  was  made  over  to 
Penn.2  It  would  have  made  the  arrangement  more  complete 
and  more  satisfactory  if  the  boundary  between  the  territory  and 
Maryland  had  been  at  once  authoritatively  defined.  The  line 
was,  in  fact,  an  arbitrary  one,  and  it  was  almost  certain  that  the 
Proprietor  of  Maryland  would  make  some  protest.  It  would 
have  been  far  better  if  the  King  had  at  once  anticipated  the  diffi 
culty  instead  of  leaving  it  to  be  disputed  over  by  the  Proprietors. 

In  1682  Penn  himself  set  sail  for  his  colony,  with  three  ships 
freighted  with  settlers.3  He  was  preceded  by  a  band  of  emi 
grants  from  a  country  which  as  yet  had  borne  little  or  no  part 

1  The  deed  is  given  by  Proud  in  a  note,  vol.  i.  p.  200. 

2  The  concession   is   cited   in   an    Act   of   the   Pennsylvania   Assembly.     This 
also  is  given  by  Proud,  vol.  ii.  p.  202. 

*  Penn's    departure   is    mentioned   in    the   London    Gazette    of    September    4,. 
1682.     I  owe  my  knowledge  of  this  fact  to  the  Narrative  and  Critical  History- 


.394  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

in  the  task  of  colonization.  Almost  every  great  wave  of  reli 
gious  enthusiasm  had  made  itself  felt  with  full  force  in  Wales. 
The  Welsh  The  emotional  nature  of  the  race,  and  their  accessibil- 
settiers.  jtv  to  a\\  those  external  influences  through  which  reli 
gion  works,  insure  a  ready  access  for  any  new  creed  looked  at  on 
its  devotional  side ;  their  mental  subtlety  makes  them  approach  it 
with  interest  in  its  doctrinal  and  metaphysical  aspect.  The 
Church  of  England  had  not  yet  learnt  the  great  lesson  of  adapt 
ing  herself  to  the  wants  of  a  Welsh-speaking  people.  On  the 
•other  hand  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  any  of  the  forms  of  Dis 
sent  had  laid  hold  on  the  affections  of  a  people  to  whom  a  barren 
worship  and  an  austere  morality  were  uncongenial.  The  teach 
ing  of  the  first  Quaker  missionaries  took  root  and  bore  fruit 
among  the  Welsh,  and  Fox  could  report  that  "a  precious  seed 
the  Lord  hath  thereaways,  and  a  great  people  in  those  parts  is 
since  gathered  to  the  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  to  sit  down  under  His 
free  teaching,  and  have  suffered  much  for  Him."1 

If  the  Welsh  had  shown  no  inclination  to  bear  a  hand  in  the 
work  of  colonization,  it  was  from  no  inherent  unfitness  for  the 
task,  but  from  lack  of  opportunity  and  necessity.  The  Welsh 
man  has  in  a  high  degree  that  versatility  which  is  specially  need 
ful  in  a  colonist.  But  the  obstacle  of  language  would  naturally 
withhold  isolated  settlers,  or  even  small  societies ;  and  Wales  too 
was  then  an  underpeopled  and  a  prosperous  country,  and  was  re 
garded  by  her  children  with  an  intensely  tenacious  patriotism 
which  disinclined  them  to  exile.  But  the  loyalty  of  the  Welsh 
Quakers  to  their  new  ties  was  too  strong  for  this,  and  a  large 
body  of  settlers,  in  all  likelihood  some  four  hundred  households, 
took  part  in  the  emigration  of  1682. 

They  had,  however,  no  intention  of  being  absorbed  in  the 
general  community  of  English  settlers.  A  territory  was 
marked  off  for  them.  That  peculiar  arrangement  by  which 
much  civil  and  judicial  business  was  left  to  be  managed  by  the 
•community  as  organized  for  religious  purposes,  enabled  them  to 
be  in  a  great  measure  a  self-governing  community.  Like  the 
Puritan  settlers  of  New  England,  they  named  their  new  town 
ships  after  the  homes  which  they  had  left.  Such  names  as 
Uwchlan,  Tredyffren,  Whiteland,  Newtown,  Haverford,  Rad- 

1  Fox's  Journal,  vol.  i.  p.  378  (ed.  1891). 


THE  FIRST  ASSEMBLY.  395 

nor,  and  Merion  told  plainly  the  nationality  of  their  first  civil 
ized  inhabitants,  and  showed  that  the  counties  of  Pembrokeshire, 
Montgomeryshire,  and  Radnorshire  had  contributed  to  the 
stream  of  emigration. 

Penn  first  landed  at  Newcastle.  It  is  clear  that  it  was  his 
original  purpose  to  deal  with  this  as  a  separate  territory,  since  he 
Newcastle  promised  the  settlers  there  to  hold  a  legislative  As- 
rated,  sembly.  At  the  same  time  he  told  them  that  their 
constitutional  rights  were  to  be  the  same  as  those  of  the  settlers 
in  Pennsylvania.1  The  ease  with  which  this  amalgamation  was 
-effected  is  a  remarkable  contrast  to  the  difficulties  which  beset 
€very  attempt  at  consolidation  in  New  England.  Neither  for 
good  nor  evil  had  the  middle  colonies  any  share  in  that  intense 
and  isolating  spirit  of  local  patriotism  which  marked  Puritan 
.New  England. 

The  foundation  of  a  city,  to  be  the  capital  of  his  province, 
was,  as  we  shall  see,  a  leading  feature  in  Penn's  schemes.  For 
The  first  tne  present  he  made  Upland  the  center  of  govern- 
Assembiy."  ment(  changing  its  name  to  Chester,  at  the  request,  it 
is  said,  of  a  friend  and  companion,  Pearson,  who  came  from  that 
city.3  There  the  earliest  Pennsylvania  Assembly  met.  One  of 
the  first  proceedings  was  to  pass  an  Act  incorporating  the  three 
•counties  recently  made  over  by  the  Duke  of  York.  It  is  clear 
that  the  Assembly  was  not  intended  to  be  in  the  ordinary  sense 
a  legislative  body.  A  constitution  and  a  code  were  to  be  sub 
mitted  to  it,  to  be  accepted,  ratified,  and  possibly  altered  in  de 
tail.  The  code  had,  no  doubt,  been  drawn  up  by  Penn,  together 
with  the  frame  of  government  in  England.  This  explains  what 
is  otherwise  hardly  intelligible,  the  great  size  of  the  Assembly  as 
.designed  by  Penn.  Such  a  body  would  be  ill  fitted  for  the  work 
of  making  laws.  But  if  the  real  work  of  constructive  legislation 
was  done  by  the  Proprietor  with  a  small  circle  of  confidential 
.advisers,  then  the  size  of  the  Assembly  was  rather  an  advantage. 
When  all  that  is  required  is  an  expression  of  assent  and  confi 
dence,  a  large  body  is  as  effective  as  a  small  one.  It  is  probably 
more  likely  to  accept  measures  without  discussion.  One  may 
doubt  whether  such  a  system  was  likely  to  satisfy  Englishmen 
who  kept  their  hereditary  liking  and  capacity  for  self-govern- 

1  Proud,  vol.  i.   p.   205.  '  Ib.  p    206.  •  Clarkson,  vol.  i.  p.   332. 


396  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

ment,  a  liking  which  had  never  grown  less  by  transportation  be 
yond  the  Atlantic. 

That  the  work  of  drafting  the  laws  to  be  enacted  had  been 
done  in  advance  by  the  Proprietor  and  his  advisers  may  be  almost 
The  Great  assumed  for  certain  from  the  short  time  taken  up  by 

Body  of  ,     .       ,    , ..  .  ..  .  ,      .  Z-      • 

Laws.*  their  deliberations.  A  session  of  three  days  sufficed 
to  pass  a  code  of  sixty  articles,  known  as  the  Great  Body  of 
Laws.  The  work  was,  no  doubt,  made  easier  by  the  fact  that 
many  of  the  heads  only  repeated  and  expanded  what  had  been 
already  set  forth  in  the  code  drawn  up  a  year  earlier  by  Penn. 
Yet  there  was  enough  new  matter  to  have  furnished  far  more 
than  a  three  days'  sitting,  and  it  is  almost  certain  that  the  Assem 
bly  can  only  have  ratified,  and  here  and  there  amplified  and 
amended,  a  code  already  submitted  to  them. 

The  clauses  in  Penn's  code  which  secured  the  more  important 
spiritual  and  civil  rights  of  the  subjects  were  re-enacted.  The 
provision  whereby  all  theists  were  to  enjoy  freedom  of  worship 
and  belief  was  brought  into  greater  prominence.  No  tax  was  to- 
be  levied  save  by  the  Governor  and  the  Assembly.  Not  only, 
as  we  have  seen,  were  the  offenses  of  Indians  to  be  tried  by  a 
mixed  jury,  but  any  purchase  of  land  from  the  Indians  was  void, 
and  the  buyer  was  to  forfeit  one  hundred  pounds.  One  pro 
vision  illustrates  the  view  of  political  duties  which  may  be  ex 
pected  in  a  new  country.  Anyone  elected  to  the  Assembly  and 
neglecting  to  attend  was  to  be  fined  five  shillings  a  day  for  such 
absence.  No  person  might  leave  the  colony  without  thirty  days* 
notice,  and  no  unknown  person  might  travel  without  a  pass  from 
a  magistrate  or  a  certificate  from  some  authority  representing  his- 
country.  No  servant  might  be  taken  for  a  debt.  This  was  not, 
as  might  be  thought,  a  humane  protection  of  the  servant ;  it  was. 
for  the  benefit  of  the  master,  "that  the  means  of  livelihood  may 
net  be  taken  from  him."  We  are  reminded  of  the  provision  in 
Magna  Charta  exempting  the  necessary  tools  of  the  husbandman 
from  seizure. 

The  same  conditions  of  land  tenure  were  prescribed  as  have 
been  already  mentioned.  Various  Acts  were  passed  designed  to 
further  and  protect  husbandry.  All  cornfields  were  to  be  fenced 
five  feet  high.  To  encourage  the  breeding  of  live  stock  no 

1  Printed  in  Hazard's  Annals,  p.  619,  &c. 


FOUNDATION  OF  PHILADELPHIA.  397 

heifer,  calf,  nor  ewe  lamb  was  to  be  killed.  As  in  New  Jersey, 
no  stallion  under  thirteen  and  a  half  hands  might  run  in  the 
public  pasture.  There  were  to  be  three  public  ferries,  and  each 
county  was  bound  to  build  bridges,  ten  feet  wide,  with  a  rail. 
Certain  restraints  were  imposed  on  the  disposition  of  land.  No 
testator  might  leave  more  than  one-third  of  his  real  estate  away 
from  his  family,  nor  might  he  make  any  settlement  extending 
beyond  fifty  years.  All  children  were  to  be  taught  reading, 
writing,  and  a  trade.  Parents  neglecting  this  were  liable  to  a 
fine  of  five  pounds.  One  clause  in  which  the  Assembly  followed, 
but  expanded,  the  legislation  submitted  to  them  is  almost  verb 
ally  identical  with  the  law  of  New  Jersey,  and  reminds  us  of 
the  close  connection  between  the  two  colonies.  It  forbade 
''riotous  practices,  such  as  prizes,  stage  plays,  masques,  revels, 
bull-baitings,  and  cock  fights,"  under  a  penalty  of  ten  days'  im 
prisonment,  while  half  that  penalty  was  imposed  on  those  guilty 
of  "dealing  with  cards,  dice,  lotteries,  or  any  such  enticing,  vain, 
and  evil  sport."1 

It  is  clear  that  this  code  is  to  be  taken  in  conjunction  with  the 
Conditions  and  Concessions,  as  making  up  the  system  of  law 
under  which  the  colonies  were  to  live,  supplemented  as  in  every 
colony  by  the  application  of  the  Common  Law  of  England  in 
cases  not  otherwise  provided  for. 

Penn's  next  step  was  to  lay  the  foundations  of  a  capital  city 
for  his  province.  As  a  rule  cities,  like  constitutions,  grow  and 
Founda-  are  not  made.  Events  in  their  course  generally  make 
phTia-f  a  better  choice  of  a  site  than  the  wit  of  man  can  make, 
deiphia.  jt  [s  a  strong  evidence  of  Penn's  practical  turn  of 
mind  that  he  should  at  once  have  chosen  a  site,  marked  out  by 
nature  as  the  best  one  for  his  province,  and  proving  its  fitness  by 
the  fact  that  no  rival  ever  contested  its  ascendency. 

In  1683  took  place  that  event  which  more  than  any  other  in 
the  early  history  of  Pennsylvania  has  secured  a  hold  on  popular 
Penn's  tradition.  Markham,  acting  on  Penn's  behalf,  had 
withVhe  already  confirmed  Penn's  title  to  the  soil  by  a  pur- 
indians.  chase  from  the  Indians.*  Penn  had  also  in  June 
1682  written  a  letter  from  London,  somewhat  strangely  ad 
dressed  to  the  "Emperor  of  Canada."  It  begins  with  the  charac- 

1  Compare  the  law  of  New  Jersey  in  Learning  and  Spicer,  p.  233. 
a  See  Penn's  letter  of  August  1681,  given  by  Proud,  vol.  i.  p.   195. 


398  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

teristic  words,  "The  great  God  that  made  thee  and  me  and  all 
the  world  incline  our  hearts  to  love  justice."  Penn  goes  on  ta 
say  that  the  King  of  England,  "who  is  a  great  Prince,"  has- 
granted  them  a  large  county  in  America.  He  is  bringing  out 
"just,  plain,  and  honest  people,  who  neither  make  war,  nor  dread 
war,"  and  he  is  establishing  a  Company  of  Traders  who  will 
deal  with  the  natives  on  fair  and  reasonable  terms.1  Even  if  the 
letter  is  not  authentic,  it  is  thoroughly  representative  of  Penn's 
temper  and  attitude  towards  the  natives. 

Penn,  with  instinctive  perception  of  the  savage  character,  saw 
that  it  would  be  well  to  impress  the  natives  by  some  special  cere 
monial.  On  June  23  he  met  the  chiefs  of  the  Delaware  at 
Shackamaxon,  on  a  spot  now  included  in  the  city  of  Philadelphia. 

Tradition  and  the  legitimate  pride  with  which  Penn's  brethren 
have  treasured  his  memory  have  woven  round  his  simple  descrip 
tion  of  the  scene  a  mass  of  picturesque  details.  The  very  'dress 
which  he  is  supposed  to  have  worn  was  long  treasured  as  a 
sacred  relic  in  a  Quaker  household.2  What  we  learn  as  au 
thentic  from  Penn  himself  is  that  he  unfolded  to  the  assembled 
chiefs  his  general  purpose  of  that  friendship  which  ought  to  exist 
between  all  the  children  of  one  Divine  Father.  His  purchase  of 
land,  he  explained  to  them,  was  not  to  lead  to  any  exercise  of 
superior  authority.8  They  were  still  to  enjoy  for  their  own  pur 
poses  any  portions  of  it  which  might  be  unoccupied.  It  was  in 
fact  not  such  a  transfer  as  should  dispossess  the  previous  occu 
pants.  It  was  only  to  give  the  new  comers  common  rights  in- 
the  soil.  He  also  explained  to  the  Indians  that  all  disputes  be 
tween  the  two  peoples  were  to  be  settled  by  joint  tribunals. 

Though  tradition  may  have  erred  in  some  of  the  details  with 
which  it  has  embellished  this  scene,  it  has  assuredly  not  overrated 
its  importance. 

It  is  impossible  not  to  see  in  Penn's  attitude  towards  the  In 
dians  an  evidence  of  the  depth  and  sincerity  of  his  religious  con- 

1  The  letters  are  in  the  Archives,  vol.  vii.  appendix. 

'  Clarkson,  vol.  i.  p.  340. 

*  All  that  is  authentic  in  the  account  of  this  conference  by  later  historians; 
is  derived  from  Penn's  own  letters.  He  describes  it  in  his  letter  to  the  So 
ciety  of  Friends  mentioned  below  (p.  401),  and  again  somewhat  more  fully  in  a 
document  found  in  a  public  office  at  Harrisburgh.  This  is  indorsed,  "  Min 
utes  of  the  Indian  Conference  in  relation  to  the  Great  Treaty  made  with  Wil 
liam  Penn  at  the  Big  Tree  Shackamaxon.  on  the  i4th  of  the  tenth  month 
1682."  Bowdoin,  History  of  Friends  in  America,  vol.  ii.  p.  62. 


SECOND  ASSEMBLY.  399- 

viction.  The  light  indwelling  in  all  men  was  not  with  him  a 
conventional  doctrine  of  the  schools,  but  a  guiding  principle  of 
action.  Yet  in  his  Indian  policy  he  bequeathed  to  his  successors 
a  legacy  in  which  good  and  evil,  justice  and  weakness,  were 
mingled.  In  its  steadfast  policy  of  fair  dealing  with  the  natives, 
Pennsylvania  was  an  honorable  exception  to  the  rest  of  the  Eng 
lish  colonies.  An  optimistic  conviction  that  justice  and  human 
ity  were  by  themselves  all  that  was  needed  in  determining  the 
attitude  of  the  white  man  to  the  Indian  was  responsible  for 
many  errors  and  tragedies,  and  that  conviction  was  a  legacy  be 
queathed  to  the  colony  by  its  founder. 

The  first  Assembly  was  hardly  intended  as  an  ordinary  meet 
ing  for  purposes  of  legislation  and  government.  It  was  rather 
The  second  °f  tne  nature  of  a  special  convention  met  to  accept 
Assembiy.»  an(j  ratify  the  constitution  as  prescribed  by  Penn.. 
This,  indeed,  was  implied  in  the  clause  which  made  the  Assem 
bly  of  the  first  year  a  primary  one,  while  those  which  succeeded 
it  were  to  be  of  the  ordinary  representative  pattern.  Accord 
ingly,  another  Assembly  was  summoned  early  in  1683.  The 
result  of  their  labors  was  practically  the  remodeling  of  the  con 
stitution.  Time  had  not  yet  revealed  all  the  defects  inherent  in. 
the  charter  granted  by  Penn  to  his  colonists.  But  one  very 
practical  difficulty  of  a  kind  likely  to  impress  ordinary  men  had 
at  once  made  itself  felt.  The  colonists  protested  that  it  was 
impossible  to  furnish  the  necessary  number  of  members,  either 
for  the  Council  or  the  Assembly.  Accordingly,  they  returned 
but  three  Councilors  and  nine  Representatives  for  each  county. 

Whether  this  failure  showed  Penn  the  need  for  remodeling- 
his  constitution,  or  whether,  as  it  was  put  to  the  test  of  practice, 
its  other  defects  became  manifest,  does  not  appear.  But  Penn's 
opening  words  to  the  Representatives  seem  to  imply  that  changes 
had  been  suggested.  They  petitioned  that  the  failure  of  the 
electors  to  comply  with  the  requirements  of  the  charter  might 
not  invalidate  their  rights.  Penn  replied  that  they  might 
amend,  alter,  or  add  for  the  public  good.  If,  like  most  founders 
of  commonwealths,  he  erred  somewhat  in  overrating  his  own 
prescience,  in  endeavoring  to  fashion  an  ideal  constitution  with 
out  waiting  for  the  teaching  of  events,  in  this  instance  at  least 

1  Proud,  vol.  i.  p.  235. 


400  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

he  made  ample  amends  by  his  readiness  to  abandon  an  untenable 
position. 

Penn  and  his  colonists  seem  to  have  thought  that  it  was  wiser 
policy  to  construct  a  fresh  instrument  than  to  piece  and  patch  the 
The  new  °^  charter.  When  he  offered  the  alternative  of 
charter.*  fa  o\£  charter  or  a  new  one,  the  unanimous  demand 
was  for  the  latter.  Accordingly,  a  joint  committee  of  the  two 
houses  was  set  to  work,  with  general  instructions  to  frame  the 
required  instrument. 

The  result  of  their  labors  was  the  issue  of  a  new  charter. 
This  removed  the  most  obvious  blot  on  the  earlier  charter,  the 
feature  which  had  been  most  productive  of  immediate  incon 
venience.  The  numbers  of  both  houses  were  reduced.  The 
charter  only  required  for  the  present  eighteen  members  for  the 
Council  and  thirty-six  for  the  Assembly.  These  might  be  ulti 
mately  expanded  to  the  original  limits  of  seventy-two  and  two 
hundred.  The  cumbrous  arrangement  of  breaking  up  the 
Council  into  committees  was  abandoned.  But  a  very  signifi 
cant  clause  was  introduced,  providing  that  "one-third  of  the  pro 
vincial  Council,  residing  with  the  Governor  from  time  to  time, 
shall  with  the  Governor  have  the  care  of  the  management  of 
public  affairs  relating  to  the  peace,  justice,  treasury,  and  improve 
ment  of  the  province  and  territories,  and  to  the  good  education 
of  youth  and  sobriety  of  the  manners  of  the  inhabitants  therein 
as  aforesaid."  This  was  practically  the  creation  of  a  Council 
in  the  generally  recognized  sense  of  the  word. 

At  the  same  time  there  was  no  vital  change  in  the  system  of 
legislation.  Measures  were  to  be  introduced  by  the  Council. 
The  power  of  the  Assembly  was,  indeed,  somewhat  strengthened 
by  a  clause  providing  that  their  approval  of  any  new  law  must 
be  carried  by  a  majority  of  two-thirds.  This  in  a  somewhat 
cumbrous  fashion  increased  the  power  of  the  popular  Represent 
atives  to  resist  encroachments  by  the  Governor  or  the  Council. 
It  did  not  give  the  popular  Representatives  any  power  in  the  way 
of  constructive  legislation  and  it  greatly  increased  the  chance  of 
a  deadlock  in  administration.  It  might  deter  the  Governor  and 
Council  from  bringing  forward  unpopular  measures;  it  in  no 
way  compelled  them  to  bring  forward  popular  ones.  In  the 

1  Printed  in  Proud,  vol.  ii.  p.  21. 


THE  NEW  CHARTER.  4°* 

matter  of  the  appointment  of  officials  and  in  the  provisions  for 
secrecy  of  voting  the  provisions  of  the  old  charter  were  left 
intact. 

One  practical  advantage  there  was  no  doubt  in  the  formal 
introduction  and  acceptance  of  a  new  charter.  The  incorpora 
tion  of  Delaware  was  subsequent  to  the  passing  of  the  old 
charter.  The  application  of  the  charter,  therefore,  to  those 
three  counties  was  implied,  not  expressed,  and  future  complica 
tions  might  be  avoided  if  a  new  charter  were  accepted  by  the 
whole  united  colony. 

One  matter  of  discussion,  and  in  some  measure  of  dispute,  was 
the  appointment  of  public  officers.  Was  it  to  be  vested  in  the 
Governor  or  in  the  Assembly?  The  first  clause  in  the  new 
charter  vested  the  appointment  of  all  officers  in  the  Assembly. 
It  was  agreed,  however,  that  this  should  be  suspended  during 
the  life  of  the  Proprietor,  and  that  his  power  of  appointment 
should  not  be  curtailed. 

A  letter  which  Penn  sent  home  this  summer  is,  perhaps,  the 
most  important  document  in  the  history  of  the  colony.1  Hack- 
Penn-s  neyed  though  it  is  by  constant  quotation,  its  in- 

account  of  .7,  ,  ,  •  «       i         T       •          <• 

the  colony,  terest  is  neither  exhausted  nor  impaired.  It  is  or 
double  interest. 

It  is  the  description  of  a  new  country,  its  resources  and  its  in 
habitants,  by  a  singularly  acute  observer,  detached  from  all  prej 
udices  likely  to  impair  his  judgment.  It  also  shows  us  the  hopes 
and  expectations  that  guided  Penn  in  his  work  as  a  constructive 
statesman. 

In  his  description  of  the  country  Penn  shows  himself  equally 
alive  to  its  picturesqueness  and  attractiveness  as  an  abode  and  to 
its  material  resources.  He  dwells  on  the  rich  woodland  flowers, 
from  which  even  the  best-stored  London  gardens  might  borrow 
something.  March  brings  with  it  cold,  but  not,  as  in  England, 
accompanied  by  north-east  winds  and  "foul  thick  black 
weather,"  but  dry  frost,  with  a  sky  as  clear  as  summer.  The 
woods  abound  in  wild  fowl,  and  the  soil  is  naturally  productive. 
There  are  wild  vines.  These  he  hopes  may  with  care  be  im 
proved  into  yielding  wine.  He  will  not,  however,  rely  on  that 
but  will  import  vines.  Between  the  two  he  hopes  to  make  as 

1  The  letter  is  addressed  to  the  Society  ot  Friends.     Proud  prints  it  in  full, 
-vol.  vi.   pp.    246-64. 


402  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

good  wine  as  any  European  country  of  the  same  latitude  can 
yield.  Live  stock,  too,  of  every  sort  is  increasing ;  two  cargoes  of 
horses  have  already  been  exported  to  Barbadoes.  Unfounded 
stories  of  scarcity  have  reached  England.  "The  greatest  hard 
ship  we  have  suffered  hath  been  salt  meat." 

Penn's  account  of  the  natives  is  of  peculiar  interest.  It  is 
pervaded  by  a  pathetic  optimism.  First  and  almost  alone  among 
Penn's  European  travelers,  he  writes  of  the  Indians  not  as 
of  tn"ptlon  a  people  on  a  wholly  lower  level,  but  as  having  opin- 
natwes.  jons  to  |je  respected  aruj  institutions  to  be  seriously 
studied  and  respected.  He  dwells  throughout  on  the  happier  side 
of  their  life  and  the  better  side  of  their  character.  Penn's  con 
ception  of  the  equality  of  man  leads  him  in  the  track  followed  by 
Rousseau.  He  finds  true  happiness  and  true  wisdom  in  the 
woods.  If  the  savages  are  "ignorant  of  our  pleasures,  they  are 
also  free  from  our  pains.  They  are  not  disquieted  with  bills  of 
lading  and  exchange,  nor  perplexed  with  chancery  suits  and  ex 
chequer  reckonings.  We  sweat  and  toil  to  live;  their  pleasure 
feeds  them ;  I  mean  their  hunting,  fishing  and  fowling,  and  their 
table  is  spread  everywhere."  Their  one  source  of  unhappiness 
is  that  which  civilized  men  have  brought  among  them,  drink. 

He  dwells  on  their  hospitality  and  their  mirthfulness  in  ordi 
nary  life.  "The  most  merry  creatures  that  live,  they  feast  and 
dance  perpetually,"  yet  he  is  not  less  struck  with  their  gravity 
in  all  public  matters.  At  a  conference  not  a  man  is  seen  to 
whisper  and  smile.  He  has  "never  seen  more  natural  sagacity 
without  the  help  (I  was  going  to  say  the  spoil)  of  tradition.  It 
is  admirable  to  consider  how  powerful  the  Kings  are,  and  yet 
how  they  move  by  the  breath  of  their  people."  His  enthusiasm 
extends  to  all  details.  He  dwells  on  the  personal  comeliness  of 
the  natives.  Their  features  may  find  a  prototype  in  ancient 
Rome,  their  complexion  in  modern  Italy.  No  European  lan 
guage  "hath  words  of  more  sweetness  or  greatness  or  accent  or 
emphasis."  A  list  of  place-names  quoted  "have  grandeur  in 
them."  With  the  taste  not  uncommon  among  Biblical  students 
for  strange  ethnological  speculations,  Penn  endeavors  to  trace 
back  the  stock  of  the  natives  to  the  Jews. 

Penn's  indifference  to  dogma,  to  the  introduction  of  any  met 
aphysical  element  into  religion,  enables  him  to  enter  into  the- 
theology  of  the  Indians  with  a  sympathy  far  beyond  the  reach. 


DISPUTE    WITH  MARYLAND.  4°3 

of  the  ordinary  missionary.  He  does  not  see  dark  superstitions 
to  be  extirpated.  Rather  he  would  tell  the  natives  in  the  spirit 
of  St.  Paul  that  he  had  to  declare  to  them  the  God  whom  they 
ignorantly  worshiped.  "Without  the  help  of  metaphysics," 
they  have  arrived  at  the  two  essential  articles  of  faith,  belief  in 
God  and  in  a  future  life. 

Of  the  civilized  inhabitants  already  in  the  country  Penn  tells 
us  no  more  than  we  already  know.  But  we  learn  something  of 
Progress  the  progress  of  his  favorite  project,  the  formation  of 

of  Phila-  -1       •  ™  M     i    i    i  •      i_  1         j       t 

deiphia.  a  capital  city.  Philadelphia  has  already  four-score 
houses,  with  merchants  and  craftsmen  following  their  vocations 
as  fast  as  they  can. 

It  was  inevitable  from  the  outset  that  Penn's  grant  should 
bring  him  into  conflict  with  the  Proprietor  of  Maryland.  Of 
Dispute  all  the  disputes  which  had  their  origin  in  the  slipshod 
Maryland,  dealings  of  the  Crown  with  American  territory,  that 
was  the  bitterest  and  the  most  prolonged.  It  can  be  more  con 
veniently  dealt  with,  not  now,  but  as  a  detached  episode  belong 
ing  to  a  later  phase  of  our  subject. 

In  1684  Penn  left  his  colony.  The  years  which  followed 
were  years  of  trouble  and  disappointment  to  Penn  himself,  years 
Penn  de-  of  anarchy  in  the  colony.  Penn's  friendship  with 

fends  him-  .  *       «.          .,.  ,.  -11  i 

self  against  James  brought  him  into  discredit  with  those  who 
of  Popery,  would  naturally  have  been  his  political  allies.  The 
old  charge  of  Jesuitry  was  revived.  A  letter  from  Sir  William 
Popple,  the  Secretary  to  the  Lords  of  Trade,  shows  that  the  ac 
cusation  was  influencing  those  who  had  to  deal  with  Penn  in 
his  character  of  a  colonial  Proprietor.1  Penn's  reply  is  a  thor 
oughly  characteristic  exposition  of  his  doctrine  of  toleration. 
He  plainly  denies  the  charge  of  being  a  Papist,  and  in  more  than 
in  one  detail  proves  its  utter  absurdity.  But  he  shows  as  plainly 
that  the  charge  of  belonging  to  any  particular  school  of  Chris 
tianity  or  holding  any  set  of  dogmas  is  one  which  he  esteems  but 
lightly.  "As  if,"  he  says,  "a  mistake  about  an  obscure  proposi 
tion  of  faith  were  a  greater  evil  than  the  breach  of  an  undoubted 
precept.  Such  a  religion  the  devils  themselves  are  not  without ; 
for  they  have  both  faith  and  knowledge :  but  their  faith  doth  not 
work  by  love,  nor  their  knowledge  by  obedience."  And  one 

1  Popple's  letter  and  Penn's  answer  are  both  given  in  full  by  Proud,  vol.  i. 
pp.  314-32. 


404  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

may  almost  say  that  the  whole  doctrine  of  toleration  is  summed 
up  when  Penn  says,  of  liberty  of  conscience,  "I  ever  understood 
that  to  be  the  natural  right  of  all  men,  and  that  he  that  had  a 
religion  without  it  his  religion  were  none  of  his  own."  Un 
happily  Penn  failed  to  see  that  to  many  men  such  an  attitude  was 
incomprehensible.  That  toleration  was  compatible  with  earnest 
ness  was  a  conviction  so  deeply  rooted  in  his  own  mind  that  he 
could  not  even  imagine  others  in  honesty  holding  a  contrary  be 
lief.  Confident  in  the  stability  of  his  own  religious  convictions, 
he  could  not  in  the  least  comprehend  how  they  could  become  sus 
pected  in  the  eyes  of  others. 

The  same  inability  to  understand  the  views,  possibly  too 
limited,  and  the  suspicions,  possibly  unreasonable,  of  his  fellow- 
Difficulty  men  was  telling  against  Penn  in  his  secular  career. 
ind!smthe  Discontent  was  showing  itself  among  the  colonists, 
trade.  Although  Penn  had  refused  to  alienate  the  Indian 

trade,  yet  he  had  allowed  a  body  to  come  into  existence  with  cer 
tain  restricted  rights  of  trade  and  with  the  right  to  acquire  land. 
Their  President,  Nicholas  Moore,  was  also  Chief  Justice,  a  some 
what  undesirable  combination  of  offices.  He  incurred  the  dis 
pleasure  of  the  Representatives,  and  was  by  them  impeached  be 
fore  the  Council.  After  two  refusals  to  appear,  he  was  pro 
visionally  deprived  of  all  his  public  offices.  Whether  he  made 
submission  and  was  acquitted  does  not  appear,  nor  is  there  any 
evidence  that  he  was  restored  to  the  office  of  Chief  Justice. 
But  in  the  following  year  he  was  appointed  by  the  Proprietor  one 
of  the  Commissioners  to  administer  the  colony  in  his  absence.1 
The  spirit  in  which  Penn  met  the  complaints  of  his  settlers  was 
characteristic.  He  writes  to  some  of  his  principal  followers 
exhorting  them  to  concord.  "Be  not  so  governmentish,  so  noisy 
and  open  in  your  dissatisfactions."  In  other  words,  leave  the 
forms  of  government  to  be  settled  for  you  by  a  well-meaning 
ruler  who  knows  what  you  really  want. 

One  inherent  defect  of  the  constitution  at  once  showed  itself. 
The  Committee  of  the  Council  nominated  by  the  Proprietor  was 
found  too  large  for  practical  work.  In  1686  he  cut  it  down  to  a 
Council  of  Five,  or  one  might  rather  say  he  superseded  the  Coun 
cil  by  an  appointment  of  that  number,  by  the  title  of  Commis- 

1  Proud,  vol.  i.  pp.  295-9. 


LACK  OF  ACTIVITY  IN  PUBLIC  LIFE.  4°5 

sioners  of  State.  Penn's  instructions  to  these  Commissioners  are 
trenchantly  despotic.  Three  of  them  are  to  form  a  quorum, 
Establish-  anj  may  exercise  the  power  delegated  to  them  by 

ment  of  a  *  ^  fc  >    « 

small  the  Proprietor  of  vetoing  the  amending  laws.     If  the 

Privy  .-,  .,  ,.  ...  ,  , 

councii.»  Council  are  negligent  in  their  attendance  they  are  to 
be  dissolved.  No  conference  is  to  be  held  between  the  two 
chambers;  each  is  to  be  kept  strictly  to  its  own  functions,  the 
Council  to  proposing  laws,  the  Lower  House  to  accepting  or  re 
jecting  them.  Furthermore  the  Council  was  to  abrogate  all  laws 
passed  since  Penn's  departure,  and  to  pass  them  afresh  amended 
by  the  Council  in  conjunction  with  a  new  Assembly. 

The  Council  are  also  instructed  to  maintain  the  decisions  of 
the  law  courts  by  "turning  their  severe  brow  upon  all  the 
troublesome  and  vexatious,  more  especially  trifling  appeals.'* 
No  Stuart  king,  no  minister  of  the  school  of  Strafford,  could 
have  given  instructions  more  despotic  in  tone,  more  calculated 
to  uproot  constitutional  liberty.  A  constitution  containing  in 
it  many  elements  of  arbitrary  government  was  to  be  so  adminis 
tered  as  to  deprive  it  of  all  those  influences  which  made  for 
freedom.  Such  conduct  in  one  like  Penn,  a  man  of  real  and 
even  intense  benevolence,  no  self-seeker,  in  many  respects  humble 
and  distrustful  of  his  own  judgment,  should  make  us  often 
pause  before  we  condemn  the  moral  principles  of  those  whose 
political  action  we  justly  reprobate. 

One  matter  of  complaint  in  Penn's  instructions  to  his  Coun 
cilors  is  "the  most  slothful  and  dishonorable  attendance  of  the 
Lack  of  Council."  We  see  other  traces  of  this  lack  of  public 

activity  in  .   .  .    .     ..-..  •  i«      i      •  T         /-n        i 

public  life,  spirit  and  indifference  to  public  duties.  In  1684  the 
Assembly  found  it  necessary  to  require  that  at  least  one  Repre 
sentative  from  each  county  should  attend  under  pain  of  a  fine  of 
one  pound  for  every  day's  absence.2  The  same  temper  showed 
itself  in  the  neglect  of  judicial  duties.  An  Act  was  passed  im 
posing  a  fine  of  thirty  shillings  on  justices  and  ten  shillings  on 
jurors  who  should  fail  to  attend  County  Courts.8  To  curtail 
still  further  the  political  action  of  the  general  body  of  citizens, 
and  to  vest  power  practically  in  a  little  oligarchy  nominated  by 
the  Proprietor,  was  assuredly  not  the  way  to  cure  this,  or  to  in- 

1  Penn's  instructions  to  these  five  Commissioners  are  contained  in  a  letter  of 
December  i,  1686,  printed  by  Proud,  vol.  i.  p.  305. 

*  Laws,    p.    167.  8  Ib.   p.    176. 


4°6  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

spire  the  settlers  with  an  interest  in  public  affairs,  or  a  sense  of 
public  responsibility. 

The  scanty  records  of  the  legislation  of  this  time  throw  little 
light  on  the  life  of  the  colony.  An  Act  limiting  the  rate  of 
Legislative  interest  to  eight  per  cent,  shows  that  the  colony  suf- 
measures.  fered  from  that  lack  of  money  which  was  such  an 
economical  hindrance  alike  in  the  mercantile  commonwealths  of 
New  England  and  the  slave  plantations  of  the  south.1 

It  may  also  be  taken  probably,  though  less  certainly,  as  evi 
dence  of  the  growing  prosperity  of  the  colony,  or  one  should  per 
haps  rather  say,  of  its  increasing  commercial  enterprise.  Bor 
rowers  are  of  two  classes,  those  who  borrow  to  meet  unproduc 
tive  expenditure  and  those  who  use  their  credit  to  extend  their 
business  beyond  the  limits  of  their  available  capital.  The 
usages  and  traditions  of  the  Quaker  colony  made  it  certain  that 
there  would  be  no  borrowers  of  the  first  class  to  need  what  is 
considered  the  protection  of  the  State.  If  men  sought  to  borrow 
it  shows  that  the  trade  of  the  colony  held  out  prospects,  which 
tempted  traders  to  strain  their  credit  to  what  seemed  dangerous 
lengths. 

Another  Act  passed  about  this  time  illustrates  that  unpractical 
optimism  which  not  infrequently  appeared  in  Penn's  constructive 
Act  against  policy.  It  prohibited  paid  lawyers,  by  providing  that 
lawyers.  no  one  should  plead  incourt  till  he  had  made  a  formal 
declaration  that  he  had  not  and  would  not  receive  any  reward.2 

By  1685  Philadelphia  contained  over  three  hundred  and  fifty 
houses,  and  as  a  consequence  the  value  of  town  lots  had  risen  in 
Growth  of  some  cases  it  is  said  as  much  as  four  thousand  per 
cmy^and  cent.3  There  is  also  indirect  evidence  of  the  rapid 
moraiquent  growth  of  the  colony  in  a  letter  from  Penn,  where  he 
decline.  speaks  of  the  number  of  drinking  houses  and  of  the 
looseness  that  is  committed  in  the  caves.4  It  is  plain  that 
settlers,  pressing  in  faster  than  houses  could  be  built  for  them, 
took  up  their  abodes,  like  the  dwellers  by  the  Loire,  in  caves 
on  the  bank  of  the  Delaware.  It  is  easy  to  see  how  the  colony 
was  peculiarly  exposed  to  the  risk  of  moral  disorder.  In  com 
mon  with  New  York  and  New  Jersey,  it  lacked  the  restraints 

1  Laws,  p.  180.  *  Records,  vol.  i.  p.    172. 

•  This  is  stated  in  the  Memorial  History,  vol.  v.  p.  493.     See  Appendix  V. 

*  The  letter  is  published  by  Proud,  vol.  i.  p.  296. 


INDIAN  ALARM.  4°7 

which  operated  on  their  northern  and  southern  neighbors.  New 
Hampshire  was  protected  by  its  poverty  and  unattractiveness, 
and  in  all  the  other  northern  colonies  the  system  of  exclusive 
churches  operated  as  a  process  of  selection,  and  tended  to  make 
every  individual  citizen  in  some  measure  responsible  for  the  cor 
porate  morality  of  the  whole  society.  In  the  southern  colonies 
all  public  life  was  in  the  hands  of  an  oligarchy,  with  no  doubt 
the  failings,  but  also  some  of  the  redeeming  virtues,  of  an  oli 
garchy.  Anarchy  below  was  repressed  by  the  system  of  servi 
tude.  Nor  were  the  southern  colonies  exposed  to  those  tempta 
tions  and  dangers  which  the  Greek  philospher  dreaded  for  his 
model  state  in  the  coming  and  going  of  a  crowd  of  traders  and 
sailors.  But  the  Quaker  colonies,  New  York  and  in  a  great 
measure  Rhode  Island,  were  exposed  to  those  temptations  and 
dangers  with  no  counteracting  influence.  There  men  were 
neither  restrained  by  the  ecclesiastical  machinery  and  the  exact 
ing  corporate  morality  of  New  England,  nor  by  the  semi-feudal 
system  of  the  southern  plantations. 

Another  measure  shows  that  the  possibility  of  danger  from  the 
Indians  was  wholly  forgotten.  An  attempt  was  made  to  repeal 
Alarm  the  Act  which  prohibited  the  sale  of  drink  to  the 

from  the  .          t       ,-,-,,  .  ..  .  , 

Indians.  natives.  1  his  sense  or  security  was  for  a  moment 
dispelled.  During  the  year  1688  a  rumor  reached  the  colonists, 
set  on  foot  as  it  would  seem  by  two  mischief-making  or  foolish 
squaws  in  New  Jersey,  that  the  Indians  were  about  to  invade 
Pennsylvania  and  massacre  the  settlers.2  The  report  soon 
gathered  substance  and  definiteness.  Three  families,  it  was  said, 
had  actually  been  cut  off.  In  many  colonies  such  a  panic  would 
have  led  to  a  wild  outburst  of  retaliation.  That  it  was  not  so 
was  largely  due  to  the  principles  which  Penn  and  the  Quaker 
teachers  associated  with  him  had  impressed  on  the  colonists.  A 
peaceful  embassy  was  sent  to  the  Indian  head  chief.  Himself 
old  and  crippled,  he  was  surrounded  by  an  armed  force  of  five 
hundred  warriors.  If  any  evil  designs  had  been  entertained  this 
show  of  boldness  and  confidence  on  the  part  of  the  settlers  at 
once  put  an  end  to  them.  Kindly  words  were  exchanged,  and 
the  friendship  which  Penn  had  labored  to  build  up  suffered  no 
hurt. 

1  Laws,  p.   169.  *  Proud,  vol.   i.   p.  336. 


4°8  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

In  1688  Lloyd,  whom  Penn  had  left  as  his  deputy,  resigned. 
Penn  appointed  in  his  stead  one  John  Blackwell,  who  was  not  a 
Penn's  in-  Quaker.  At  a  later  day  Penn  apologized  for  this  ap- 

structions  .  J  r        0 

to  his  pomtment,  pleading  that  no  Friend  would  take  the 

BUckweii.  post.  Yet  it  is  clear  that  at  the  time  of  the  appoint 
ment  Penn  felt  satisfied  with  it,  and  not  as  it  would  seem  with 
out  good  reason.  Blackwell  was  in  Penn's  judgment  "a  grave, 
sober,  wise  man,  I  suppose  independent  in  judgment."  He  was 
well  connected,  having  married  a  daughter  of  General  Lambert, 
and  he  had  been  in  the  paymasters'  department  of  the  Common 
wealth  army.1  In  a  later  letter,  after  Blackwell  had  disap 
pointed  the  hopes  formed  of  him,  Penn  describes  him  as  "being 
in  England  and  Ireland  of  great  repute  for  integrity,  ability,  and 
virtue."  Yet  in  this  same  letter  Penn  manifestly  admits  that  the 
appointment  had  been  a  failure,  owing  in  part  to  the  "peevish 
ness"  which  Blackwell  had  shown  to  the  Quakers.2  The  in 
structions  given  to  Blackwell  are  curiously  illustrative  of  the 
weaker  side  of  Penn's  character  as  a  statesman.*  They  are  per 
vaded  by  vagueness,  by  general  declarations  of  principles,  of 
which  everyone  would  accept  the  propriety  and  almost  everyone 
dispute  the  application.  Blackwell  is  instructed  "to  be  careful 
that  speedy,  as  well  as  thorough  and  impartial,  justice  be  done; 
and  virtue  in  all  cherished  and  vice  punished ;  that  feuds  between 
persuasions  or  nations  or  countries  be  suppressed  and  extin 
guished  if  any  be ;  and  if  none,  that  by  a  good  conduct  they  may 
be  prevented."  In  other  words,  Blackwell  is,  by  some  mysteri 
ous  process  not  specified,  to  create  a  morally  perfect  community. 
The  provinces  of  law  and  morality  are  confused  by  instructions, 
"that  the  widow  and  orphan  and  absent  may  be  particularly  re 
garded  in  their  rights,"  and  that  Blackwell  is  to  "rule  the  meek 
meekly,  and  those  that  will  not  be  ruled,  rule  with  authority." 

Even  instructions  that  sound  more  definite  are  tinged  by  the 
same  fault.  Blackwell  is  to  support  the  commissioners  of  prop 
erty  where  people  are  unruly  in  their  settlements,  or  "comply 
not  with  reasonable  obligations."  Sheriffs  and  Clerks  of  the 

1  "Treasurer  to  the  Commonwealth's  army  in  England,  Scotland  and  Ireland," 
are  Penn's  actual  words.     The  letter  is  quoted  by  Clarkson,  vol.  ii.  p.  40. 

2  This   letter   is   given   by   Proud  in   a  note,   vol.   i.   p.    340.     It   is   here  that 
Penn   states   that  he   could  not  find  one  of  his   own   denomination   to   take   the 
post.     It  will  be  seen  hereafter  what  this  peevishness  in  all  likelihood  was. 

8  These  are  given  by  Proud,  vol.  i.  p.  339. 


GEORGE  KEITH.  4°9> 

Peace  are  not  to  impose  on  the  people,  and  "magistrates  are  to< 
live  peaceably  and  soberly,  for  I  could  not  endure  one  loose  or 
litigious  person  in  authority."  Penn  fails  to  see  that  he  is. 
throughout  using  terms  which  in  all  likelihood  the  settlers  and 
his  representative  will  interpret  each  in  his  own  fashion.  The 
whole  document,  indeed,  illustrates  that  tendency  of  Penn's 
mind  which  made  toleration  seem  to  him  so  simple  a  matter,  in 
tolerance  so  incomprehensible.  He  evidently  thought  that  there 
was  a  broad  ground  of  moral  truth  on  which  all  men  might 
agree,  disregarding  theological  differences.  He  forgot  that 
while  men  may  agree  on  the  abstract  doctrines  of  morality,  any 
attempt  to  apply  these  doctrines  to  details  of  practice  would  be 
sure  to  reveal  differences  just  as  real  as  those  which  separate 
theologians. 

Meanwhile  that  spirit  of  theological  discord  which  Penn  so. 
dreaded,  and  which  he  believed  himself  to  have  exorcised,  was 
George  making  itself  felt  among  the  settlers.  The  dispute  as 
Keith.  recorded  seems  to  have  been  from  the  outset  per 

sonal.  But  in  theological,  as  in  political,  quarrels  the  personal 
element  readily  comes  to  the  front,  and  becomes  not  only  the 
most  prominent  but  to  many  the  most  important  feature  in  the 
contest.  Earlier  differences  in  which  that  personal  element  is 
absent  are  forgotten.  As  it  has  come  down  to  us,  the  dispute 
was  mainly  due  to  the  independence  and  pugnacity  of  one  man, 
George  Keith. 

Keith  was,  with  the  possible  exception  of  Penn,  the  most 
cultivated  and  brilliant  of  all  the  early  Quakers.  He  was 
born  about  1640,  and  graduated  as  a  Master  of  Arts  at 
Aberdeen.  He  was  a  born  fighter,  and  it  was  probably  rather 
opposition  to  authority  than  any  positive  adherence  to  the 
essential  principles  of  Quakerism  which  led  him  to  join  the 
brotherhood. 

In  1689  Keith  went  to  Philadelphia.  There  he  soon  created 
scandal  by  holding,  though  not,  as  it  would  seem,  very  openly 
advocating,  the  doctrine  of  transmigration  of  souls.  He  also 
quarreled  with  Penn's  deputy,  with  Lloyd,  and  with  another  in 
fluential  man,  Stockdale.  They  retaliated  by  charging  Keith 
with  heresy.  A  large  section,  including,  it  is  said,  a  majority  of 
elders,  took  his  part.  Finally,  however,  the  magistrates,  with 
probably  an  intuitive  feeling  that  Keith's  attitude  and  temper 


410  I 'HE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

were  subversive  of  Quaker  principles,  had  him  tried  for  heresy 
by  a  tribunal  specially  appointed  for  that  end. 

As  the  result,  Keith  was  inhibited  from  teaching.  Neverthe 
less,  he  and  a  number  of  followers  held  to  their  principles,  call 
ing  themselves  Christian  Quakers.  In  some  respects  his  attitude 
seems  to  have  been  an  application  of  Quaker  doctrine  too  severely 
logical  to  be  practical.  He  denounced  the  magistrates  for  help 
ing  the  friendly  Indians  against  their  enemies  by  supplying  them 
with  arms  and  ammunition,  and  for  employing  force  against 
privateers.  He  also  denounced  slavery.  Mixed  with  these 
moral  protests  were  personal  attacks  on  Lloyd. 

In  1694  Keith  left  Pennsylvania  for  England.  There  he 
held  his  ground  for  five  years  as  the  head  of  a  congregation 
nominally  Quaker,  but  bitterly  opposed  to  the  recognized 
Quaker  practice  and  teaching.  In  1700  he  abandoned  this  po 
sition  and  received  episcopal  ordination.  Two  years  later  he  re 
turned  to  America,  employed  by  the  Society  for  the  Propagation 
of  the  Gospel,  and  acting  as  a  strenuous  and  proselytizing  repre 
sentative  of  the  Church  of  England.1 

At  the  same  time  that  Keith  was  disturbing  the  religious 
peace  of  the  colony,  it  was  being  harassed  by  a  series  of  secular 
disputes.  In  1689,  one  Samuel  Richardson,  a  member  of  the 
Council,  was  expelled  by  a  vote  of  that  body  for  having  used  un 
becoming  language  about  the  Governor.  The  right  of  the 
Council  to  take  this  step  became  the  subject  of  much  such  a  dis 
pute  as  raged  over  the  expulsion  of  Wilkes.2  This  was  followed 
by  a  dispute  prophetic  of  many  future  ones.  There  was  an 
alarm  of  an  Indian  attack.  Blackwell  contended  that  the  con 
trol  of  the  militia  was  vested  in  the  Governor,  as  it  is  in  Eng 
land  in  the  Crown.  To  this  some  objected  on  the  ground  that 
their  conscience  forbade  them  to  approve  of  any  use  of  force. 
One  member  of  the  Assembly,  Dr.  Hues,  boldly  defied  public 
opinion,  and  proposed  that  every  man  should  provide  himself 
with  arms  and  ammunition.  Apparently,  however,  the  danger 
passed  over  without  the  difference  of  opinions  coming  to  a  head.3 


1  There  is  a  full  account  of  Keith  in  the  Dictionary  of  National  Biography. 
His  writings,   mostly  controversial,   are  numerous,   often  acute,   but   somewhat 
verbose. 

2  Records,  vol.  i.   p.   188. 

*  For  this  dispute  see  Records,  vol.  i.  pp.   299-307. 


THE  PROVINCE  AND    THE    TERRITORIES.         4" 

A  dispute  which  followed  had  more  definite  and  abiding  conse 
quences.  Lloyd,  the  President  of  the  Council,  and  Blackwell, 
Dispute  the  Governor,  seem  to  have  been  respectively  the 
between  heads  of  the  Quaker  and  the  non-Quaker  parties. 
andvthe*  Blackwell  endeavored  in  the  first  instance  to  deprive 
territories.  Lloyd  of  the  custody  of  the  great  seal,  and  then  to 
invalidate  his  election  as  a  Councilor.  Lloyd,  backed  by  the 
Quakers,  held  his  ground  on  both  points.1  Blackwell  thereupon 
left  the  colony,  but  as  it  would  seem  without  formally  resigning 
his  post  as  Governor.  Before  departing  he  read  certain  in 
structions  which  he  had  received  from  Penn.  The  Assembly 
was  to  choose  three,  out  of  whom  Penn  would  appoint  one 
Deputy-Governor.  Pending  the  arrival  of  his  commission  that 
one  of  the  three  who  had  received  most  votes  was  to  act  pro 
visionally  as  Governor.  At  the  same  time  that  Blackwell  re 
ported  this  instruction,  he  apologized  for  his  own  "ignorance  and 
weakness,"  and  acknowledged  his  deserved  unpopularity.* 

The  Assembly  then  reappointed  Lloyd  Deputy-Governor,  as 
it  would  seem  without  authority  from  the  Proprietors,  and  with 
out  any  acknowledgment  that  necessity  had  driven  them  to  an 
irregular  step.  The  immediate  result  of  this  was  a  rupture  be 
tween  the  two  sections  of  the  colony,  between  the  three  counties 
of  the  original  royal  grant  and  those  afterwards  acquired  from 
the  Duke  of  York.8 

There  is  little  to  show  what  determined  the  attitude  taken  up 
by  the  two  parties.  It  may  well  be  that  some  personal  question 
which  has  left  no  trace  in  the  records  entered  into  it.  Visibly 
and  externally  the  main  ground  was  the  appointment  of  judges. 
The  inhabitants  of  the  lower  province  seem  to  have  thought  that 
in  this  matter  their  due  rights  were  overlooked.  Their  demand 
apparently  was  the  not  unreasonable  one  that  a  separate  commis 
sion  should  be  made  out  for  each  portion  of  the  colony.  Each 
commission  should  contain  the  names  of  all  the  judges  in  the 
colony,  but  in  that  for  the  upper  half  one  of  the  judges  appointed 
for  that  district  should  have  precedence,  and  so  for  the  lower 
half.  Lloyd  and  those  members  of  the  Council  who  represented 
the  wishes  of  the  upper  province  resisted  this  concession.  Six  of 
the  Councilors  from  that  district  met  and,  taking  upon  themselves 

1  Laws,  p.  520.  2  Records,  vol.  i.  p.  312. 

3  See  Penn's  letter,  29  iv.  1682,  in  Proud,  vol.  i.  p.  357. 


412  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

the  functions  of  the  Council,  appointed  six  judges  for  their  own 
counties.1 

It  is  hardly  to  be  expected  that  Penn,  living  in  England, 
harassed  by  private  anxieties  and  hunted  down  as  a  Jacobite 
spy,  could  give  much  profitable  attention  to  the  affairs  of  his  col 
ony,  least  of  all  to  a  dispute  involving  probably  complex  per 
sonal  issues.  His  belief,  too,  that  forms  were  all  much  the  same, 
that  there  was  always  in  the  citizens  a  fund  of  good  sense  and 
moderation  which  would  keep  matters  straight,  now  led  him  to 
suggest  a  way  out  of  the  difficulty.  He  suggested  the  adoption 
of  one  among  three  alternative  schemes  of  government.  The 
executive  power  might  be  vested  in  the  Deputy-Governor,  in  the 
Council,  or  in  a  Committee  of  Five.  The  Upper  Counties  were 
in  favor  of  a  Deputy-Governor.  The  Lower,  however,  or  at 
least  seven  Representatives  who  claimed  to  speak  in  their  name> 
objected.2  They  should  prefer  government  by  five  Commis 
sioners  ;  they  would  accept  that  by  the  Council.  But  they 
wholly  objected  to  the  cost  of  a  Deputy-Governor,  and  to  a 
scheme  which  would  vest  all  power  in  the  hands  of  one  person. 
In  all  likelihood  their  objection  lay  in  the  certainty  that  a 
Deputy-Governor  would  be  chosen  from  the  Upper  Counties. 
They  further  stipulated  that  if  the  Government  were  vested  in 
the  Council,  the  representatives  of  the  lower  half  should  have  a 
veto  in  all  appointments  of  officials  within  their  own  district. 

None  of  these  terms  of  agreement  were  acceptable  to  the  in 
habitants  of  the  Upper  Counties.  A  compromise  was  then  ef 
fected,  introducing  a  novel  and  peculiar  arrangement.  There 
was  to  be  one  representative  Assembly  legislating  for  the  whole 
colony,  but  two  executives,  one  for  the  Upper,  the  other  for  the 
Lower  province. 

It  was  but  natural  that  every  adherent  of  the  fallen  house 
should  be  looked  on  with  suspicion  as  a  probable  malcontent  and 
a  possible  spy.  There  seems  to  have  been  some  delay  in  the  proc 
lamation  of  the  new  Sovereigns,3  which  may  have  given  rise  to  a 
suspicion  that  there  was  a  Jacobite  tendency  in  the  colony.  By 

1  The   demand     of    the    six    Councilors    for    the   territories    is    given   in   the 
Archives. 

Their  action  is  condemned  in  a  declaration  drawn  up  by  Lloyd  and  the 
Councilors  for  the  province.  This  is  given  in  Proud,  vol.  i.  p.  352. 

2  This  declaration  is  given  in  Proud,  vol.  i.  p.  355. 

3  Records,  vol.  i.  p.  302. 


PENN  REMONSTRATES    WITH  FLETCHER.         4*3 

1692  the  tide  of  Whig  feeling  was  running  with  such  force 
against  Penn  as  to  bring  with  it  the  loss  of  his  privileges  as  a 
Pennsyi-  Proprietor.  The  mode  of  his  deprivation  was  alto- 
chided?n  gether  peculiar.  There  was  no  formal  revocation 
commi"'8  °^  his  charter.  But  while  his  charter  was  left  intact, 
sion.  Fletcher,  the  Governor  of  New  York,  received  a  com 

mission  extending  his  authority  to  Pennsylvania.  The  only  an 
nouncement  of  the  extent  and  nature  of  the  change  was  that 
implied  in  this  commission  to  Fletcher.1  This  set  forth  that 
by  great  neglects  and  miscarriages,  and  the  absence  of  the  Propri 
etor,  Pennsylvania  had  fallen  in  great  confusion,  and  that  it 
was  therefore  necessary  that  "we  (the  King)  should  take  the 
government  into  our  own  hands." 

At  the  same  time  the  system  of  government  was  modified. 
There  was  still  to  be  a  Council  and  an  Assembly  of  Representa 
tives.  But  the  Council  was  to  be  nominated  by  Fletcher.  It 
was  to  consist  of  twelve,  and  three  were  to  be  a  quorum.  The 
only  change  in  the  system  of  administration  was  beyond  doubt 
an  improvement.  All  laws  were  to  be  transmitted  within  three 
months  of  their  passing,  and  the  approval  or  dissent  of  the  Crown 
was  to  be  declared  at  once.2 

Penn  did  not  suffer  this  encroachment  on  his  rights  to  pass  un 
challenged.  In  December  1692  we  find  him  writing  to  Fletcher 
Penn's  in  a  tone  of  vigorous  remonstrance.  There  is  little 
strance.  of  Quakerly  submissiveness  in  the  opening  words,  "I 
caution  thee  that  I  am  an  Englishman."  Pennsylvania,  the 
soil  and  the  government,  have  been  "dearly  purchased"  by  him. 
There  have  been  no  judicial  proceedings  against  him.  The 
abrogation  of  his  rights  can  only  be  due  to  misinformation  given 
to  the  Board  of  Trade.  "I  hope  therefore  thou  wilt  tread  softly, 
and  with  caution  in  this  matter."* 

About  the  same  time  we  find  Penn  writing  to  a  friend  in 
Pennsylvania  in  a  more  moderate  and  diplomatic  strain : 

"The  bearer  will  inform  you  of  the  transfer  of  Pennsylvania 
to  the  Governor  of  New  York  during  the  war  and  my  absence. 
Insist  upon  your  Patent  with  wisdom  and  moderation  but  steady 
integrity.  You  will  obey  the  Crown  of  England  speaking  the 

1  For  Fletcher's  commission  see  Col.  Papers,  1696-7,  2296. 
1  Colonial   State  Papers,    1692,   2296. 
*  Ib.   December  5,    1692. 


414  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

language  and  voice  of  the  law,  which  this  is  not,  but  sic  volo,  sic 
jubeo,  due  doubtless  to  misadvice  of  your  neighbors  that  the 
French  will  make  their  way  into  the  colonies  through  you.  Set 
forth  the  falsehood  of  it  by  your  singular  situation  on  land  and 
sea,  your  hazards,  charges,  labors — that  the  government  was 
your  motive  more  than  land,  that  you  were  a  people  who  could 
have  lived  at  home,  and  went  there  not  upon  motives  of  guilt  or 
poverty,  and  that  it  will  ruin  the  Colony  which  brings  more 
customs  to  the  Crown  than  revenue  to  the  colonial  government." 
"Friends  will  deliver  your  representations  to  the  Lords  of  Trade 
or  the  King  in  Council,  if  you  protest  against  any  proceedings  of 
the  Governor  of  New  York  upon  this  arbitrary  commission  and 
excessive  anxiety  as  to  the  French."1 

In  1693  Fletcher  reached  Philadelphia,  and  was  apparently 
well  received  by  the  settlers.2  The  tranquillity  with  which  they 
vuusher  accepted  the  change  shows  that  with  all  Penn's 
Phiia-  benevolence  and  public  spirit  he  had  not  succeeded  in 

delphia  .         .    .  r  . 

and  inspiring  his  colonists  as  a  whole  with  reverence  or 

authority,  affection.  It  illustrates  perhaps  more  strongly  the 
absence  among  the  Pennsylvanians  of  that  tenacious  respect  for 
the  forms  of  law  which  existed  so  intensely  in  New  England* 
The  colonists  were  liable  to  two  incompatible  sets  of  claims,  both 
existing  as  far  as  one  can  see  in  legal  force:  the  claims  of  the 
Proprietor  as  authorized  by  his  charter,  the  claims  of  the  Crown 
as  implied  in  the  commission  to  Fletcher.  The  Assembly  of  a 
New  England  colony  would  at  once  have  seen  the  difficulties  of 
the  situation.  The  Pennsylvanian  settlers  can  hardly  be  said  to 
have  questioned  the  legality  of  this  procedure.  All  that  they  did 
was  to  endeavor  while  acquiescing  to  secure  from  Fletcher,  as  a 
matter  of  favor,  the  rights  which  Penn  had  granted  to  them. 
They  petitioned  that  in  summoning  an  Assembly  all  the  forms- 
required  by  the  charter  should  be  observed,  and  that  all  laws 
hitherto  passed  should  be  still  in  force.3  They  also  in  the  pre 
amble  to  this  second  request  declared  that  it  had  pleased  the 
King  and  Queen  in  the  Proprietor's  absence  to  supply  his  place 
by  the  appointment  of  Fletcher.  This  half-hearted  effort  to 


1  Colonial   State  Papers,   1689-90,  2668.     The  letter  was  probably  sent  to  the 
Board  of  Trade  by  Fletcher. 
a  Ib.   1693,  397.  i»- 
'  Their  petition  is  given  by  Proud,  vol.  i.  p.  353. 


FLETCHER  AND    THE  ASSEMBLY.  4*5 

turn  the  flank  of  the  attack  was  wholly  without  effect.  Fletcher 
showed  no  corresponding  wish  to  shirk  the  real  difficulties  of  the 
case  or  to  take  refuge  in  diplomatic  courtesies.1  He  plainly 
told  the  Assembly  that  "their  desires  were  grounded  on  great 
mistakes."  The  King,  as  we  have  seen,  had  not  except  by  im 
plication  condemned  Penn's  charter.  Fletcher  now  produced, 
and  in  all  likelihood  devised  for  the  occasion,  a  new  and  sweep 
ing  plea.  Charles  II.,  he  said,  could  only  alienate  the  rights  of 
the  Crown  for  his  own  life.  Penn's  grant,  so  far  as  it  was 
political  and  not  merely  territorial,  was,  he  said,  at  an  end.  Of 
the  causes  for  the  action  of  the  Crown,  the  absence  of  the  Pro 
prietor  was  the  least ;  there  had  been  dangerous  neglects  and  mis 
carriages  ;  as  for  retaining  the  privileges  granted  by  the  Proprie 
tor,  "the  constitution  of  her  Majesty's  Government  and  that  of 
Mr.  Penn  were  in  a  direct  opposition  one  to  another." 

At  the  same  time  Fletcher  at  once  came  to  close  quarters  with 
the  Assembly  on  that  ever-recurring  battlefield,  the  need  for 
Disputes  public  defense.  The  time  was,  he  pointed  out,  one  of 

between  .  111 

Fletcher  special  danger,  since  the  French,  exasperated  by  the 
Assembly.2  recent  loss  of  Martinique,  would  in  all  likelihood  re 
taliate  on  the  English  colonies.  Quakers  though  they  might  be, 
they  must,  he  said,  keep  soldiers  and  forts,  just  as  they  wall  their 
gardens  and  keep  watch-dogs.  If  any  had  tender  consciences 
their  contributions  can  be  applied  to  civil  purposes.  Fletcher 
must  have  rated  the  intelligence  of  his  opponents  low  if  they 
could  be  satisfied  with  an  arrangement  whereby  their  own  pay 
ments  set  other  funds  free  for  purposes  which  they  condemned. 

One  passage  in  Fletcher's  speech  tends  to  confirm  one  of  the 
worst  charges  made  against  him,  that  of  conniving  at  piracy. 
An  Act  had  been  drafted  in  England,  sent  out  to  Fletcher,  and 
adopted  by  the  New  York  Assembly,  to  suppress  that  class  of 
crime.  Pirates  were  allowed  a  certain  time  within  which  to 
submit  and  give  security  for  good  behavior.  Fletcher  recom 
mended  to  the  Assembly  of  Pennsylvania  the  passing  of  a  like 


1  Fletcher's  answer  to  the  Assembly  was  given  in  writing.  It  is  in  Proud,, 
vol.  i.  p.  355.  It  was  prefaced  by  a  speech  reported  in  the  Archives. 

It  was  in  the  speech  that  he  propounded  the  doctrine  of  the  temporary  nature 
of  Penn's  grant. 

'  For  the  whole  of  the  dispute  between  Fletcher  and  the  Assembly  see  the 
Records,  vol.  i.  pp.  399-459. 


-4 ' 6  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

enactment,  and  suggested  that  the  time  of  grace  might  be 
lengthened,  with  the  comment  "pirates  and  privateers  may  be 
come  good  men  at  last." 

One  recommendation  of  Fletcher's  deserves  notice,  as  showing 
liow  schemes  for  bringing  the  whole  body  of  colonists  into  closer 
union  were  in  the  air.  He  recommended  to  the  Assembly  a 
project  for  a  postal  service  from  Virginia  to  Boston. 

In  conclusion  Fletcher  told  the  Assembly  that  his  time  was 
precious,  and  that  he  hoped  they  would  desist  from  all  unneces 
sary  debates. 

The  Assembly  might  be  slow  to  perceive  the  strong  constitu 
tional  ground  on  which  they  could  take  their  stand,  but  the  over 
bearing  discourtesy  of  Fletcher  could  not  fail  to  call  out  a  spirit 
of  resistance.  In  a  dignified  and  temperate  tone  the  Representa 
tives  pointed  out  that  his  charges  of  misgovernment  and  failure 
to  administer  justice  were  unfounded,  and  that  in  spite  of  the 
peace  principles  of  many  of  the  settlers  the  colony  was  exposed  to 
no  dangers  from  without. 

A  public  man  like  Fletcher,  whose  corrupt  practices  placed 
him  at  the  mercy  of  private  individuals,  can  hardly  play  the 
tyrant  with  consistency  or  success.  Moreover  his  duties  at  New 
York  kept  him  from  giving  much  of  his  time  to  Pennsylvania, 
and  his  intermittent  violence  was  no  match  for  the  steady  ob 
stinacy  of  his  opponents. 

One  important  advantage  was  gained  by  the  Assembly.  Ac 
cording  to  the  original  constitution  as  devised  by  Penn,  the  As 
sembly  was  to  have  no  right  of  initiating  legislation.  But  it 
seems  to  have  been  a  singular  and  undesigned  result  of  Fletcher's 
appointment  that  in  this  respect  the  Assembly  actually  gained 
by  it.  They  apparently  claimed  and  he  admitted  that  they  had 
the  ordinary  rights  of  a  representative  Assembly,  and  might 
therefore  pass  bills  which  were  to  be  sent  up  to  the  Council  for 
approval  and  amendment. 

>  The  Assembly,  while  prepared  to  fight  Fletcher  upon  essen 
tials,  showed  a  somewhat  grotesque  anxiety  to  avoid  giving 
offense  on  a  mere  matter  of  form.  A  resolution  was  passed 
voting  certain  moneys  to  Lloyd  and  Markham  as  Deputy-Gov 
ernors  of  Pennsylvania  and  of  the  Territories  respectively,  and 
to  Fletcher.  In  the  resolution  Fletcher's  name  appeared  last. 
The  Speaker  of  the  Assembly,  fearing  that  Fletcher  would  be 


DIFFICULTY  ABOUT  LEGISLATION.  4*7 

offended,  pointed  out  that  in  Holy  Writ  the  name  of  the  Baptist 
precedes  that  of  Christ ! 

Their  fears  were  apparently  unfounded,  since  Fletcher  pro 
fessed  himself  indifferent  on  the  point.  But  another  phrase 
used  by  the  Assembly  did  give  offense.  In  a  remonstrance  ad 
dressed  to  Fletcher  they  referred  to  Penn's  proprietary  rights 
having  been  taken  away  because  their  Majesties  were  misin 
formed.  Against  this  Fletcher  protested,  as  "very  unman 
nerly." 

A  more  serious  and  substantial  dispute  arose  over  the  whole 
question  of  legislation.  The  Assembly  apologized  for  their  lack 
Difficulty  of  legislative  and  administrative  skill  on  the  ground 
isiation.  that  they  had  been  "put  out  of  their  old  methods," 
and  they  petitioned  that  the  whole  body  of  extant  laws,  a  hun 
dred  and  two  in  number,  should  be  confirmed.  To  this  Fletcher 
replied  that  he  would  consent  to  any  laws  not  repugnant  to  the 
laws  of  England,  but  that  he  could  not  go  blindfold  and 
accept  laws  of  which  he  only  knew  the  titles.  The  point  was 
one  on  which  the  colonial  legislature  was  at  variance  within 
itself.  This  appeared  at  a  conference  between  the  Council  and 
the  Assembly.  The  former  took  the  ground  that  laws  passed  by 
the  colonial  government  required  special  and  affirmative  approval 
by  the  Crown.  The  Assembly  contended  that  the  absence  of  a 
specific  veto  was  sufficient.  The  point  was  of  some  constitu 
tional  importance,  as  the  systems  differed  in  the  directness  and 
efficiency  of  the  control  vested  in  the  Home  Government.  The 
course  of  the  dispute  is  not  very  clear,  but  ultimately  the  laws 
came  before  Fletcher  for  approval,  and  the  Assembly,  according 
to  sound  constitutional  precedent,  made  the  granting  of  a  supply 
dependent  on  the  Governor's  acceptance  of  their  proposals. 

Gradually,  by  a  process  of  compromise,  of  which  the  details 
are  not  recorded,  the  conflicting  parties  came  together.  The 
Final  Assembly  granted  a  subsidy  of  a  penny  in  the  pound, 

bftweeennt  and  Fletcher  accepted  some  of  the  laws  proposed, 
and'th"  One  recorded  incident  in  the  dispute  throws  a  gro- 
Assembiy.  tesque  light  on  Fletcher's  character.  The  legislature 
proposed  to  punish  drunkenness,  in  the  case  of  an  official  by  dep 
rivation,  of  an  ordinary  citizen  by  disfranchisement.  Fletcher 
protested  against  this  as  unduly  severe.  "It  is  hard  for  a  false 
step  in  drinking  a  cup  perhaps  too  much  a  man  should  be  de- 


41 8  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

prived  of  his  birthright."  He  added,  with  confidence  hardly 
justified  by  facts,  "I  will  give  you  leave  to  banish  me  out  of  the 
government  when  you  find  me  drunk." 

Next  year  Fletcher  had  to  reopen  that  strife  which  formed  so 
long  and  so  weary  a  chapter  in  the  history  of  Pennsylvania,  and 
Disputes  to  reprove  the  Assembly  for  their  indifference  to  the 
defense  common  defense  of  the  colonies  against  the  Indians, 
colony.  The  Five  Nations  are  going  over  to  the  French. 
Unless  the  natives  on  the  frontier  of  Pennsylvania  see  that  the 
English  can  and  will  fight,  they  will  in  self-defense  do  the  same. 
The  country  above  Albany  is  deserted.  "I  pray  God  this 
leprosy  may  spread  no  further."  New  Jersey  has  set  a  good 
example  by  contributing  four  hundred  pounds  and  sixty  men. 
If  the  principles  of  the  Quaker  settlers  forbid  war,  they  may  at 
least  help  the  distressed  Indians  on  their  frontier,  feeding  the 
hungry  and  clothing  the  naked.1 

Meanwhile  the  influence  of  Penn's  friends  at  Court  so  far 
prevailed  that  the  question  of  his  restoration  was  opened.  The 
Restora-  law  officers  of  the  Crown. were  requested  to  report  on 
Penn.  the  matter.  They  did  so,  and  advised  that  the  Crown 

had  a  right  in  a  special  emergency  to  grant  a  commission  such 
as  Fletcher's ;  when,  however,  the  emergency  ceased  Penn's  rights 
revived.2 

The  report  was  read  by  the  Board  of  Trade.  Penn  was  then 
called  in.  He  undertook,  if  restored,  to  comply  with  the  royal 
commands,  and  to  provide  for  the  support  of  government. 
Therefore  his  restoration  was  recommended  by  the  Board  to  the 
Crown  and  carried  through.3 

This,  however,  did  not  carry  with  it  the  immediate  super 
session  of  Fletcher. 

In  June  1695  the  dispute  between  the  Governor  and  the  As 
sembly  began  again.  Fletcher  asked  for  eighty  men  as  a  contri- 
Fietcher's  bution  to  a  joint  military  force.4  The  Assembly 
ihe*5  colony  pleaded  the  business  of  the  harvest  as  an  excuse  for 
ceases.  refusing  to  consider  the  matter.  At  this  point 


1  Colonial   State  Papers,   1694,  2271. 

2  The  statement  of  the  case  and  the  opinion  upon  it  are  among  the  Colonial 
State  Papers,  July   12,   1694. 

8  Ib.  July  13,   1694. 

*  Records,    vol.    i.    p.    480. 


ACT  OF  SETTLEMENT  PASSED.  4*9 

Fletcher  seems  to  have  given  up  the  contest  as  hopeless,  and  we 
hear  no  more  of  him  in  connection  with  Pennsylvania. 

The  strife,  however,  was  carried  on  by  Deputy-Governor 
Markham.  The  Assembly  refused  to  make  a  grant  of  money 
Dispute  be-  except  with  an  Act  of  Settlement,  equivalent  in  its 
Assembly  purpose  to  the  Bill  of  Rights,  appended.  This  Mark- 
Markham.»  ham  refused  to  accept  as  prejudicial  to  the  Proprie 
tor's  interest.  Neither  party  would  yield  and  the  Lieutenant- 
Governor  dissolved  the  Assembly. 

The  necessities  of  government,  however,  forced  him  to  call 
another  Assembly  in  the  following  year,  and  the  strife  began 
Act  of  again.  The  dogged  persistence  of  the  Assembly  pre 

paid""  vailed,  and  the  Act  of  Settlement  was  passed.  This 
was  a  modification  of  the  constitution  of  1683.  The  tendency 
of  the  new  instrument  was  wholly  to  strengthen  the  position  of 
the  electorate  as  against  the  Proprietor.  The  Assembly  was  to 
consist  of  four  members  from  each  county,  elected  in  the  usual 
manner,  all  at  once,  not,  as  heretofore,  one-third  at  a  time. 
The  Council  was  also  to  be  an  elective  body  of  two  members 
from  each  county.  By  the  constitution  of  1683,  it  will  be  re 
membered,  the  Proprietor  was  to  select  an  inner  council,  a  real 
council  as  it  might  be  called,  consisting  of  one-third  of  the 
elective  council.  As  nothing  is  said  of  such  a  provision  we  must 
suppose  that  it  was  now  abrogated.  The  Council  and  the  As 
sembly  were  both  to  be  elected  annually.  They  were  in  fact  two 
chambers,  differing  not  in  their  composition,  but  only  in  the 
positions  assigned  to  them.  Either  might  initiate  legislation. 
The  Council,  however,  could  only  do  so  by  way  of  suggestion  to 
the  Assembly.  Speaking  broadly,  the  Governor  and  Council 
were  to  be  the  chief  administrative  body,  the  Assembly  the  legis 
lative.  To  avoid  the  necessity  of  oaths,  forms  of  declaration 
were  drawn  up  for  the  various  public  officials. 

One  change  of  form  is  a  slight  but  significant  illustration  of 
the  change  from  Quaker  authority  to  the  Anglican  authority 
and  back  again.  In  the  records  till  1693  the  months  are  in 
dicated  by  numbers.  Then  they  receive  their  conventional 
names,  till  1701,  when  the  use  of  numbers  reappears.8 

1  Records,  vol.  i.  p.  480. 

2  The  text  of  this  is  given  by  Proud  in  an  appendix,  vol.  ii.  p.  30. 
8  Records,  vol.  i.  p.  380. 


420  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

The  close  of  the  century  shows  a  somewhat  melancholy  con 
trast  between  Penn  the  founder  and  the  beneficent  ruler  of  a 
Penn's  Utopia  free  from  the  corruptions  of  the  Old  World 
of  thlati°n  and  from  the  special  dangers  and  temptations  of  the 
colonists.*  young  communities  around  it,  and  Penn  with  limited 
and  debatable  powers  over  a  community  which  was  fast  yield 
ing  to  lowering  influences  and  putting  on  moral  and  social  habits 
not  a  whit  better  than  those  of  the  ordinary  Englishmen  who 
had  crossed  the  Atlantic.  Within  less  than  a  year  of  his  resto 
ration  we  find  Penn  writing  to  the  Council  a  strong  protest 
against  general  laxity  of  life  in  the  colony,  and  especially  conniv 
ance  with  pirates  and  smugglers.  The  colonists,  as  Penn  rather 
oddly  put  it,  not  only  wink  at  pirates  but  embrace  them.  They 
violate  the  navigation  laws,  bringing  goods  from  Holland  and 
exporting  their  own  produce  to  Scotland. 

A  special  committee  of  the  Council  was  appointed  to  deal  with 
these  charges.  The  existence  of  piracy  they  denied.  There 
The  coio-  might  be  smuggling.  If  so,  it  was  due  to  the  malad- 
thVcharge  ministration  of  the  revenue  officers  appointed  by  Ran- 
of  piracy.  dolph.  They  admit,  however,  that  the  increase  in 
the  number  of  ordinaries  had  brought  with  it  laxity  of  morals. 

In  the  following  year  Penn  revisited  the  colony.  His  address 
to  the  Council  shortly  after  his  arrival  showed  a  characteristic 
Penn  re-  tendency  to  take  refuge  in  generalities.  "Away  with 
colony.*  all  parties,  and  look  on  yourself  and  what  is  good  for 
the  body  politic."3  A  man  who  had  enjoyed  the  opportunity  of 
observing  political  life  for  a  quarter  of  a  century  might  have  learnt 
that  "good"  is  a  phrase  patient  of  many  interpretations,  and  that 
men  embrace  parties  as  an  end  to  what  they  believe  to  be  good. 
That  the  departure  of  Fletcher  brought  with  it  a  certain  restora 
tion  of  Quaker  ascendency  may  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that 
the  numbers  of  the  months  now  reappear  instead  of  names. 

Penn  had  not  been  in  the  colony  long  before  he  found  himself 
in  pronounced  opposition  to  the  settlers  on  what  they  deemed  a 
fundamental  article  of  their  common  creed.  A  letter  from  the 
King  required  from  the  settlers  a  payment  of  three  hundred  and 

1  Penn's  letter  and  the  reply  of  the  colonists  are  in  the  Records,  vol.  i. 
P-  527- 

*  I  cannot  find  any  specific  record  of  his  arrival.     But  the  Records    (vol.  i. 
p.  506)  show  that  on  April  i,  1700,  he  was  addressing  the  Council. 

*  Records,  vol.  i.  p.  506. 


PENWS  PROPRIETORSHIP    THREATENED.          421 

fifty  pounds  towards  the  fortification  of  New  York.  That  a 
demand  which  infringed  the  rights  of  self-taxation  was  un- 
The  constitutional,  that  one  colony  could  not  be  expected 

Assembly  .  , 

refuse  to  to  contribute  money  to  be  spent  at  the  discretion  or 
to  th"  forti-  the  authorities  in  another  colony,  were  pleas  which 
New  York.f»  would  have  been  wholly  consonant  with  the  political 
tradition  of  the  colonies.  To  protest  against  military  expendi 
ture  of  any  sort  would  have  been  no  more  than  consistent 
Quakerism  demanded.  The  Assembly,  however,  took  lower 
and  less  tenable  ground,  pleading  their  own  poverty  and  the 
inaction  of  the  neighboring  colonies. 

Penn  had  reason  to  look  with  dread  on  anything  which  might 
bring  the  colony  into  conflict  with  the  Crown.  The  mere  terri- 
Penn's  torial  rights  inherent  in  proprietorship  which  had  just 

mVnVTn  been  restored  to  Penn  might  be  secure.  But,  as  we 
danger.  learn  from  a  letter  written  by  him  to  his  son,  there 
was  reason  to  fear  that  the  proprietary  government  would  be  dis 
solved  and  the  colony  brought  into  direct  dependence  on  the 
Crown.  To  lose  that  would  be,  as  Penn  said,  to  lose  everything 
that  he  valued.  "The  land  was  but  as  the  shell  or  ring,  the 
government  as  the  kernel  or  stone." 

The  rights  of  the  Crown,  Penn  pointed  out,  were  fully 
secured  as  long  as  the  King  could  veto  the  appointment  of  a 
Deputy-Governor.  Proprietary  governments  had  thriven  better 
and  more  quickly  than  those  dependent  on  the  Crown.  In  sup 
port  of  this  contention  he  cites  the  cases  of  New  England  and 
Rhode  Island,  neither  of  which  ever  had  the  semblance  of  a 
proprietary  system.  When  one  compares  the  fortunes  of  Mary 
land,  Carolina,  and  New  Jersey  with  those  of  Virginia,  Massa 
chusetts,  and  Connecticut,  it  is  hard  to  say  whether  the  general 
proposition  or  the  selection  of  instance  was  the  more  daringly 
inaccurate.2 

In  February  1701  Penn  announced  to  his  colonists  his  in 
tended  departure.  Statesmanlike  regard  for  the  public  weal 
was  in  his  case  too  strong  for  sectarian  theories,  and  he  sought 
to  impress  on  the  settlers  the  need  for  contributing  to  the  com 
mon  defense.  The  reply  was  a  petition  from  the  Assembly  in 
twenty-one  heads,  all  dealing  with  means  for  making  the  tenure 

1  For  this  dispute  see  Proud,  vol.  i.  pp.  425-6. 

*The  letter  is  in  the  Archives,  vol.  iii.  p.    n.     It  is  dated  2.11.1700. 


422  THE   FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

of  land  by  the  colonists  more  secure.  Of  the  main  point  urged 
by  Penn,  that  of  defense,  it  said  nothing.  When  Penn  became 
Territorial  more  urgent  the  Assembly  answered  that  "the 
between  country  having  been  much  straitened  of  late  by  the 
and  the  necessary  payment  of  their  debts  and  taxes,  and  as 
settlers .«  nothing  appears  what  any  of  the  other  colonies  who 
are  equally  concerned  have  done  in  the  like  demands  on  them, 
they  must  for  the  present  desire  to  be  excused." 

It  is  clear  from  the  general  tenor  of  the  petition  above  re 
ferred  to  that  the  Proprietor  and  the  colonists  were  becoming 
alienated  by  such  grievances  as  always  arise  in  the  case  of  an 
absentee  landholder.  His  expenditure  in  the  past  is  forgotten. 
All  that  is  remembered  is  the  contrast  between  those  whose 
labor  is  building  up  a  fabric  of  prosperity  and  the  man  who  con 
tributes  nothing  and  enjoys  "unearned  increment."  The  set 
tlers  asked  that  a  large  part  of  the  Proprietor's  lands  should  be 
treated  as  common,  that  rents  should  be  fixed  once  for  all  irre 
spective  of  increase  or  value,  and  that  quit-rents  may  be  extin 
guished  by  a  fixed  payment.  One  clause  in  the  petition  sug 
gests,  though  the  matter  is  open  to  doubt,  that  the  existing  occu 
piers  of  land  were  asking  to  be  protected  not  against  the  de 
mands  of  the  Proprietor,  but  against  the  original  grantees  from 
whom  Penn  had  acquired  his  rights.  Land,  the  petitioners  say, 
had  been  granted  as  a  free  gift  for  the  foundation  of  the  city  of 
Philadelphia.  It  is  now  "clogged  with  divers  rents  and  reserva 
tions  contrary  to  the  first  design  and  grant." 

The  tone  of  Penn  is  curt  and  businesslike,  dealing  with  the 
petition  article  by  article.  It  clearly  shows  a  sense  of  estrange 
ment  and  of  irritation  at  what  he  not  unjustly  regarded  as  in 
gratitude. 

This  was  not  the  only  matter  embittering  the  Proprietor's 
visit.  At  no  small  trouble  and  cost  to  himself  he  had  united  his 
Demand  of  original  colony  and  the  Delaware  Territories  in  a 
for'seplra-  single  government.  Now  the  inhabitants  of  the  Ter 
ritories  were  calling  out  for  a  repeal  of  that  Union. 
The  main  grievance  specified  was  this:  the  Assembly  met  alter 
nately  at  Philadelphia  and  Newcastle.  The  representatives  of 
the  upper  colony  were  now  trying  to  put  the  meetings  at  New- 

1  For  the  whole  of  this  dispute  see  Records,  vol.  ii.  pp.  41-4. 
*  Records,   vol.    ii.    p.    49. 


THE    TERRITORIES  SEPARATED.  423 

castle  on  a  lower  footing  by  demanding  that  all  laws  passed  there 
.should  be  ratified  at  Philadelphia.  Theoretically  each  Assembly 
consisted  of  the  whole  body  of  colonists.  Practically,  we  may 
be  sure  that  the  difficulties  of  traveling  must  have  given  a  de 
cided  advantage  to  the  locality  in  which  the  Assembly  met.  The 
demand  for  ratification  was  practically  one  for  giving  the  Terri 
tories  a  subordinate  legislature. 

Penn  pointed  out  to  the  settlers  that  to  effect  the  union  of  the 
provinces  had  cost  him  over  two  thousand  pounds ;  that  the  Eng 
lish  Government  in  its  recent  administrative  arrangements  had 
dealt  with  Pennsylvania  and  the  Territories  as  one  colony,  and 
that  the  demand  for  separation  would  certainly  prejudice  the 
colony  with  the  English  Government.  The  colonists  showed 
that  pertinacity  which  was  their  most  fixed  and  abiding  charac 
teristic  in  public  affairs,  and  affirmed  their  desire  for  separation. 
Penn's  answer  is  so  characteristic  as  to  be  worth  quoting  in  full. 
"Your  union  is  what  I  desire;  but  your  peace  and  accommodat 
ing  each  other  is  what  I  most  expect  from  you ;  the  reputation  of 
it  is  something,  the  reality  much  more.  And  I  desire  you  to  re 
member  and  observe  what  I  say ;  yield  in  circumstantials  to  pre 
serve  essentials,  and  being  safe  in  one  another  you  will  always 
be  so  in  esteem  with  me.  Make  me  not  sad  now  I  am  going  to 
leave  you ;  sure  it  is  for  you  as  well  as  for  your  Friend  and  Pro 
prietary  and  Governor,  William  Penn."1 

The  vagueness  and  suavity,  the  inability  to  see  that  "essen 
tials"  often  need  to  be  defined  and  guarded  by  "circumstantials," 
are  thoroughly  characteristic  of  Penn.  So,  too,  is  the  underly 
ing  conviction  that  political  benefits  cease  to  be  benefits  when 
they  are  forced  upon  men  against  their  will  and  judgment. 

Nor  did  the  inevitable  sense  of  disappointment  make  Penn 
backward  in  gratifying  the  reasonable  requirements  of  the 
The  new  settlers.  That  another  formal  exposition  of  the  con- 
tion.*  stitution  should  have  been  needed,  shows  not  so  much 

the  imperfection  of  the  previous  instruments  as  the  impossibility 
of  giving  a  definite  and  final  form  to  the  political  life  of  a  young 
and  plastic  community,  with  ever-changing  conditions  and  ever 
growing  needs.  In  1700  the  colonists  had  surrendered  their 
charter.  In  the  following  October  a  fresh  charter  was  granted, 

1  The  letter  is  in  Proud,  vol.  i.  p.  442. 

2  The  text  of  the  charter  of  1701  is  given  in  Proud,  vol.  i.  p.  443. 


424  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

setting  forth,  this  time  finally,  the  constitution  of  the  colony. 
Neither  in  the  act  of  surrender  nor  in  the  conditions  of  the  new 
instrument  does  there  seem  to  have  been  any  difference  of 
opinion  between  the  Proprietor  and  the  legislature.  The  right 
of  all  to  religious  toleration  and  freedom  of  worship  was  set 
forth  more  formally  than  in  previous  instruments.  There  was, 
however,  no  modification  of  any  importance  in  the  constitutional 
arrangements.  The  mode  of  election  was  left  as  it  was,  and  the 
condition  which  required  a  majority  of  six-sevenths  for  any  con 
stitutional  alteration  was  retained.  Two  important  clauses, 
however,  were  left  open  for  subsequent  change.  The  govern 
ment  and  Assembly  might  increase  the  number  of  representa 
tives,  and  the  Territories  might  withdraw  and  have  an  Assembly 
of  their  own. 

Almost  simultaneously  with  this  instrument,  the  Proprietor 
granted  a  charter  incorporating  Philadelphia  as  a  city,  with 
charter  Mayor,  Aldermen,  and  Common  Council,  nominated 
!d  to  m  tne  first  instance  by  the  Proprietor,  but  thereafter 
ia.i  to  ^  a  self-electing  body. 

Penn  departed,  never  to  behold  his  colony  again.  His  declin 
ing  years  were  clouded.  His  mental  faculties  soon  showed  signs 
Penn  of  failure;  impoverished  and  discredited  as  he  was, 

departs.  his  benevolence  could  find  no  fitting  sphere  of  action. 
His  eldest  son  was  wayward  and  shallow,  wholly  unfitted  to  be 
the  legatee  of  Penn's  beneficent  schemes.  From  the  philosophic 
ruler,  the  creator  of  an  ideal  commonwealth,  Penn  passes  into  an 
ordinary  absentee  landholder.  Yet  even  in  Penn's  decline,  that 
which,  if  we  may  not  call  greatness,  we  at  least  call  magnanim 
ity,  still  abides.  In  his  days  of  energy  and  hopefulness  he  had 
consistently  regarded  himself  as  a  trustee,  administering  his  prop 
erty  conscientiously  and  generously,  for  the  public  good.  It  is 
not  every  deposed  sovereign  who  can  contentedly  accept  the  post 
of  an  acquiescent  and  benevolent  onlooker,  but  neither  disap 
pointment  nor  ingratitude  could  force  Penn  into  an  attitude  un 
worthy  of  his  past. 

About  this  time  we  find  Penn  involved  in  a  dispute  with 
Quarry,  the  judge  of  Admiralty  cases  in  New  York  and  Pennsyl- 
Penn'sdis-  vania.  According  to  Penn,  Quarry  was  without 

pute  with        ....  ,b,  '  . 

Quarry.         legal  training.     Moreover,  he  was  in  two  ways  per- 

1  The  charter  is  in  Proud,  appendix  vi.  vol.  ii.  p.  45. 


ANDREW  HAMILTON.  4*5 

sonally  interested.  Being  himself  largely  concerned  in  trade, 
he  could  not  deal  with  cases  impartially.  His  salary  consisted 
of  a  royalty  of  one-third  on  the  duties  received,  which  acted  as  a 
direct  inducement  to  extortion. 

Quarry's  answer  was,  if  not  evasive,  at  least  incomplete.  His 
ignorance  of  law  he  practically  admitted.  That  he  was  paid  by 
a  royalty  of  a  third  he  denies.  He  could  not,  he  said,  be  a  great 
trader  because  he  was  undersold  by  smugglers  from  Curesaw 
(sic)  and  Scotland. 

He  retorts  on  Penn  by  a  charge  of  corruption.  A  Danish 
ship  had  brought  in  a  cargo  of  prohibited  commodities  worth 
three  thousand  pounds.  Penn,  so  Quarry  avers,  waited  till  the 
cargo  had  been  landed,  and  the  ship  stripped  of  tackle,  sails, 
and  all  fitting,  and  then  made  a  show  of  zeal  by  seizing  the  bare 
hulk.1 

At  the  same  time  the  Privy  Council  were  addressing  certain 
questions  to  Penn  which  showed,  if  not  hostility,  at  least  sus 
picion.  Did  all  persons  in  a  judicial  position  take  an  oath,  or  if 
not  make  an  affirmation?  Were  all  persons  who  were  willing 
to  take  an  oath  permitted  to  do  so  ?2 

How  completely  Penn's  last  visit  had  brought  with  it  a  sense 
of  failure  may  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that  in  1703  he  offered 
to  resign  to  the  Crown  that  proprietorship  for  which  a  short 
while  before  he  had  battled  so  strenuously,  and  of  whose  value 
he  had  spoken  so  highly.8 

The  career  of  Hamilton,  the  Governor  whom  Penn  had 
placed  at  the  head  of  affairs  when  he  left  the  colony,  was  in  a 
Andrew  little  more  than  a  year  cut  short  by  death.  He  did 

Hamilton,  ,  . 

Governor,  not,  however,  escape  the  experience,  common  to 
almost  every  Governor  of  Pennsylvania,  of  an  unsuccessful 
attempt  to  induce  the  settlers  to  assist  the  neighboring  colonies 
in  the  task  of  defense.4 

His  death  was  followed  by  an  interregnum  of  a  year.  Dur 
ing  that  time  the  two  sections  of  the  colony  availed  themselves 
An  inter-  °f  tne  right  given  them  by  the  last  charter  and 
regnum.  formed  separate  representative  Assemblies.5 

Penn's  wide  experience  of  the  world  had  not,  if  we  may  judge 

1  Penn's  complaint  and  Quarry's  answer  are  among  the  Pennsylvania  Papers 
in  the  Record  Office.     Pennsylvania,   559. 

2  Ib.  *  Ib.  *  Records,    vol.    ii.    p.    79.        *  Proud,  vol.  i.   pp.  452-57. 


426  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

by  his  choice  of  subordinates,  endowed  him  with  the  gift  of  in 
sight  into  character.  His  appointment  of  Blackwell  was  far 
Appoint-  from  fortunate,  and  he  fared  even  worse  in  his  selec- 
Evans'as  ^on  °f  a  successor  to  Hamilton.  His  choice  fell  on 
Governor.  John  Evans,  a  Welshman,  without,  as  far  as  our 
records  show,  any  experience  of  colonial  life. 

Evans's  career  as  Governor  was  but  one  series  of  squabbles 
with  the  Assembly.  At  the  very  outset  he  made  an  unsuccessful 
attempt  to  induce  the  settlers  to  reverse  the  arrangement  just 
.arrived  at  for  separation.  Resistance  came,  we  are  told,  not, 
as  we  would  expect,  from  the  weaker  partner,  but  from  the  in 
habitants  of  the  upper  province,  who  could  no  longer  endure  the 
fractiousness  of  their  colleagues  from  the  Territories. 

One  of  the  points  of  dispute  between  Evans  and  the  Assembly 
was  the  standing  question  of  military  defense.  Evans  expected 

Dispute         the  Assembly  to  bear  their  share  with  the  neighbor- 
between  J  ° 
Evans           ing  colonies.     That  he  should  meet  with  refusal  was 

Land  the  ,  TT        ,  ,  . 

{Assembly. »  a  matter  or  course.  He  then  made  an  acrimonious 
attack,  accusing  the  settlers  of  gross  ingratitude  in  raising  un 
necessary  disputes,  and  in  not  raising  money  for  the  expenses  of 
the  government  or  the  collective  defense  of  the  colonies. 

The  answer  of  the  Assembly  was  temperate  in  tone.  It  was 
"unfair  of  Evans  to  argue  as  if  the  Proprietor  had  done  every 
thing  and  they  nothing.  Many  of  them  had  settled  at  consider 
able  cost  and  with  much  effort.  Evans  replied  with  a  general 
denunciation  of  the  Assembly  as  disaffected. 

At  the  same  time  there  were  other  disputes  touching  the  rela 
tions  between  the  Assembly  and  the  executive.  The  Governor 
claimed  the  right  of  proroguing  or  dissolving  the  Assembly. 
The  Representatives  contended  that  the  right  was  in  them.2  As 
a  compromise,  however,  they  were  willing  to  limit  any  session  to 
twenty  days,  unless  specially  extended  by  the  Governor's  permis 
sion,  and  to  accept  the  further  restriction  that  they  might  not 
meet  again  within  three  months.  They  also  claimed  and  ob 
tained  the  right  to  judge  of  their  own  qualifications  and  the 
validity  of  their  own  elections.  Other  disputes  there  were,  all 
illustrating  Evans's  lack  of  judgment  and  tact.  Wishing  for  a 
conference  with  the  Assembly  he  insisted  on  meeting  the  whole 

1  These  disputes  are  all  very  fully  set  forth  in  the  Archives  of  the  colony. 
3  See   Logan  to   Penn,   22.9.1704.     Archives,   vol.   vii. 


JOHN  EVANS,  427 

.tody,  in  spite  of  their  desire  to  be  represented  by  a  committee. 
In  all  likelihood  both  parties  felt  that  a  committee  would  be  a 
more  effective  fighting  body.  He  prosecuted  a  member  for 
language  used  in  the  Assembly,  and  then  followed  up  this  breach 
of  privilege  by  arbitrarily  demanding  his  expulsion.  On  one 
occasion  the  Speaker  addressed  the  Governor  sitting  instead  of 
standing,  and  this  breach  of  etiquette  was  treated  by  Evans  as 
a  serious  offense.  When  the  Assembly  demanded  that  judges 
should  be  removable  at  their  pleasure  Evans  objected.  His  ob 
jection  was  no  doubt  in  conformity  with  English  political  prin 
ciples.  But  it  was  a  shallow  piece  of  sophistry  to  charge  the 
Assembly  with  hindering  justice  by  their  refusal  to  give  way. 
On  that  ground  concession  might  as  wrell  have  been  demanded 
from  the  Governor. 

Trifling  and  paltry  though  these  disputes  might  be  in  them 
selves,  they  were  far  from  unimportant  in  their  consequences. 
For  good  or  evil,  they  were  part  of  the  political  education  of  the 
colony.  Just  at  the  time  when  it  was  taking  definite  shape  as  a 
body  politic  it  was  forced  into  certain  tendencies  of  thought  and 
conduct.  A  bent  was  given  to  the  tree  which  grew  with  its 
growth,  greatly  influencing  its  character  and  determining  the 
part  which  it  should  play  half  a  century  later.  Indeed,  it  is 
easy  to  see  in  these  bickerings  a  foreshadowing  of  the  later  strife. 
The  position  of  the  judiciary  was  a  burning  question  in  the  dis 
putes  which  preceded  independence.  Moreover,  the  claim  of 
the  colonists  to  be  exempt  from  all  taxation  save  that  imposed  by 
their  own  Representatives,  formed  a  part  of  the  earlier  dispute. 
The  Assembly  for  the  Territories,  urged  thereto  it  is  said  by 
Evans,  imposed  on  all  trading  vessels  not  belonging  to  inhab 
itants  of  that  district  a  duty  of  half  a  pound  of  gunpowder  for 
•every  ton  of  freight,  and  the  commander  of  the  fort  was  ordered 
to  fire  on  any  vessel  which  refused  to  weigh  anchor  and  submit 
to  inspection.  Evans's  own  private  house  was  near  Newcastle, 
and  it  is  not  unlikely  that  the  dispute  was  embittered  by  a  belief 
that  he  was  acting  as  the  supporter  of  the  Territories.1 

As  so  often  in  the  later  dispute,  an  alleged  infraction  of  con 
stitutional  rights  was  met  by  open  defiance.2  A  loaded  vessel 

1  The   fact  of   Evans   having  a   plantation   at   Newcastle,   and  often    residing 
there,  is  mentioned  in  the  Records,  vol.  ii.  p.  423. 

2  There  is  a  very  full  and  clear  account  of  this  in  Proud,  vol.  i.  pp.  471-5. 


428  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

from  Philadelphia  ran  under  the  guns  of  the  fort  and  received 
a  shot  through  her  main-sail.  French,  the  commander  of  the 
fort,  then  boarded  her.  While  he  was  on  board  the  owner  of 
the  vessel,  who  was  himself  navigating  her,  cut  the  painter  of 
French's  boat.  Cornbury  happened  to  be  cruising  about  in  Del 
aware  Bay,  and  French  was  brought  before  him.  It  would  be 
idle  to  speculate  as  to  the  motives  which  influenced  such  a  man  as 
Cornbury,  in  whose  evil  doing  there  was  no  touch  of  system  or 
consistency.  Acting  apparently  in  his  capacity  of  Vice-Admiral^ 
he  severely  reprimanded  French. 

The  opponents  of  the  tax  were  not  content  with  this  measure 
of  success.  Hill,  the  owner  of  the  vessel,  petitioned  the  Assem 
bly,  and  they,  acting  on  the  petition,  drafted  an  address  to  the 
Governor.  This  document  did  not  go  into  the  abstract  question 
of  right.  It  took  the  ground  that  the  settlers  had  under  the 
charter  a  right  to  the  free  navigation  of  the  river.  At  the  same 
time  the  drafters  of  the  protest  at  least  suggested,  if  they  did  not 
explicitly  assert,  a  claim  to  the  right  of  self-taxation.  "How 
far  they  (the  Representatives  of  the  Territories)  can  be  justified 
in  making  laws  to  raise  money  on  the  Queen's  subjects  in  this 
government  we  intend  shall  be  further  considered  hereafter." 

A  like  spirit  shows  itself  in  the  answer  which  the  Assembly 
gives  to  a  manifesto  drawn  up  by  the  Governor  and  Council. 
"We  cannot  but  observe  how  it  borders  upon  an  opinion  that  the 
privileges  of  the  subject  in  the  Plantations  are  merely  dative  and 
at  the  will  of  the  Prince,  which  opinion  had  been  formerly  prop 
agated  in  these  parts  though  it  had  been  theretofore  as  well  as 
since  exploded,  and  several  authorities  of  law  have  been  pro 
duced  in  this  House  to  shew  that  the  subjects  coming  into  the 
Queen's  Plantations  abroad,  have  not  the  claim  to  their  native 
English  rights."  In  that  sentence  we  seem  to  hear  a  faint  pre 
monitory  murmur  of  the  storm  which  burst  sixty  years  later.1 

In  February  1707,  the  Assembly  extended  its  hostile  action 
from  the  Governor  to  the  Secretary,  James  Logan.  He  was 
Attack  both  a  political  supporter  and  a  personal  friend  of  the 
Assembly  Proprietor.  The  charges  brought  against  Logan,  and 
on  Logan."  at  ieast  jn  large  part  admitted  by  him,  show  exactly 


1  Records,  vol.  ii.  p.  293. 

1  For  the  impeachment  of  Logan  see  the  Records,  vol.  ii. 


IMPEACHMENT  OF  LOGAN.  4*9 

that  want  of  definite  adhesion  to  sound  political  principles  which 
was  the  besetting  fault  of  Penn  himself. 

Beside  a  general  charge  of  illegal  and  arbitrary  practices,  six 
specific  counts  were  preferred  against  Logan. 

In  drafting  the  commission  for  Evans,  Logan  had  inserted 
two  clauses  contrary  to  the  charter.  One  gave  the  Proprietor 
the  right  of  veto;  the  other  transferred  the  power  of  adjourning 
the  Assembly  from  that  body  itself  to  the  Governor.  He  had 
compelled  tenants  with  a  legal  right  to  lands  to  take  out  patents 
for  them;  he  had  imposed  illegal  quit-rents,  and  when  land  had 
been  granted  in  partnership  he  had  apportioned  it  arbitrarily. 
He  had  combined  in  his  own  person  the  offices  of  Proprietor's 
Secretary  and  Surveyor-General,  intended  to  act  as  a  check  on 
each  other.  He  had  concealed  certain  communications  from  the 
Crown.  As  a  result  the  Assembly  had  sent  home  certain  laws 
which  were  vetoed,  but  which  with  fuller  knowledge  they  would 
have  amended. 

All  these  charges  Logan  admitted.  To  the  last  two  he 
pleaded  instructions  received  from  certain  members  of  the  As 
sembly.  In  the  other  cases  he  defended  himself  on  the  ground 
that  he  had  acted  for  the  good  of  the  colony,  a  plea  quite  in  keep 
ing  with  Penn's  mode  of  thought. 

The  attack  was  frustrated  by  the  Governor,  who  refused  to 
admit  the  right  of  impeachment,  regardless  of  the  plea  urged  by 
the  Assembly  that  against  certain  offenses  there  was  no  other 
weapon.1  Yet  the  vote  of  the  Assembly  was  not  a  mere 
brutum  fulrnen.  A  formal  vote  of  censure,  even  if  followed  by 
no  penalty,  acts  as  a  restraint  on  the  offender  and  a  deterrent  to 
others.  It  puts  on  record  a  formal  and  official  opinion  on  a 
question  of  public  policy. 

Internal  dissensions  were  not  the  only  trouble  under  which 
the  colony  was  suffering.  In  August  1708  Evans  had  to  tell 
Further  the  Assembly  that  the  rivers  and  capes  of  the  colony 
between  were  so  beset  with  French  vessels  that  navigation  was 
°nd'ernor  impracticable.2  The  appeal  was  answered,  as  every 
Assembly,  appeal  was  answered  in  the  Assembly  at  Philadelphia 
for  many  a  year  to  come.  The  Proprietor  is  the  person  who 
profits  by  the  colony,  and  on  him  the  burden  of  defense  ought  to 

1  Records,    vol.    ii.    p.    362. 
*  Ib.  p.  414. 


43°  THE   FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

fall.  Evans  pointed  out  that  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  Proprietor 
was  a  loser  by  the  colony.  His  plea  was  good  in  substance,  but 
Evans  according  to  his  wont  was  needlessly  prolix  and  need 
lessly  contentious. 

The  question  was  complicated  by  a  doubt  as  to  the  quarter  in 
which  naval  authority  was  vested.  Evans  held  that  it  was  in 
Seymour,  the  Governor  of  Maryland,  the  Assembly  that  it  was 
in  Cornbury.  There  could  hardly  have  been  a  stronger  instance 
of  the  evil  wrought  by  the  absence  of  any  effective  central  con 
trol  acting  within  the  different  colonies. 

Evans  had  a  like  conflict  with  the  Assembly  of  the  Territories- 
sitting  at  Newcastle,  and  fared  no  better.  When  he  called  on 
Dispute  them  to  make  efforts  for  defense  they  raised  technical 

between  .  ...  .        .  ,     ,       ^ 

Evans  points,  questioning  the  authority  of  the  Governor  and 

settlers  inquiring  what  would  be  his  position  if  war  broke 
castieT  out.  The  opponents  of  Evans  were,  however,  but  a 
bare  majority,  nine  out  of  seventeen.  After  a  division  the  de 
feated  minority  seceded. 

There  were  rumors  of  danger  more  formidable  to  the  general 
view  of  the  settlers  than  the  prospect  of  a  French  naval  attack. 
French  French  agents  were  intriguing  among  the  Indians^ 
withethe*  During  the  summer  of  1707,  Evans  thought  it  neces- 
indians.  sarv  to  gO  himself  into  the  Indian  county,  where 
he  had  a  friendly  interview  with  the  Shawnees,  Senecas,  and 
others,  and  about  the  same  time  we  find  one  Martin  Chartier 
summoned  to  appear  at  Philadelphia  and  give  an  account  of  his 
dealings  with  the  natives.2 

In   1708  Penn  superseded  Evans.     There  is  no  evidence  as- 
to  the  special  circumstances  of  his  dismissal,  but  his  endless 
Gookin          disputes  with  the  settlers  present  an  ample  explana- 
Govemor.      tion.     His  successor,  Gookin,  reached  the  colony  in 
I  disputes        January   1709.     There  is  nothing  to  show  that  he 
^AssemWy.3    had  any  administrative  experience  to  fit  him  for  his 
post.     His  opening  address  to  the  Assembly  was  a  vague  ex 
hortation  to  peace  and  goodwill,  with  a  modest  disclaimer  of 
any  knowledge  of  the  constitution  of  the  colony  which  he  was 
sent  to  administer.     His  pacific  counsels  bore  but  little  fruit.. 


1  Records,  vol.  ii.  pp.  362,  423.  *  Ib.  pp.   385-90. 

*  Ib.  p.  427.     The  Records  are  my  authority  for  what  follows. 


DISPUTE  ABOUT  DEFENSE.  43 l 

The  Assembly,  not  satisfied  with  having  got  rid  of  Evans,  drew 
up  resolutions  condemnatory  of  his  conduct.  In  one  of  these 
his  misdeeds  were  imputed  to  the  influence  of  evil  counselors. 
The  Council  protested  against  this  as  a  reflection  on  themselves, 
and  the  Assembly  so  far  gave  way  as  to  explain  that  they  only 
intended  certain  individuals,  not  the  whole  Council. 

In  the  following  June  the  ever-recurring  difficulty  about 
contributing  to  defense  broke  out  again.  Gookin  asked  for 
Dispute  money  for  military  purposes.  The  Assembly  re- 
defense.i  plied  that  their  principles  forbade  such  payments,  but 
they  would  vote  five  hundred  pounds  for  general  purposes. 
Gookin  represented  that  the  authorities  in  England  would  be 
greatly  dissatisfied  with  so  meager  a  contribution,  and  proposed 
a  rate  of  fourpence,  or  at  the  outside  of  sixpence,  in  the  pound. 
The  Assembly  stood  firm  and  Gookin  gave  way. 

This  dispute  was  speedily  followed  by  a  renewal  of  the 
attack  on  Logan.  In  a  resolution  passed  by  the  Assembly  in 
The  September  1709  he  was  denounced  as  an  "evil  minis- 

fttlck'sbly  ter»"  guilty  °f  "boundless  insolence  and  scurrility," 
Logan. «  an(j  of  "attacking  the  Assembly  with  vile  and  wicked 
aspersions."  It  is  certain  that  there  is  nothing  in  Logan's  ex 
tant  letters  to  justify  such  charges. 

His  reply  was  temperate.  He  might,  he  says,  answer  specific 
charges,  but  those  brought  against  him  are  "an  armament  of 
general  but  scandalous  calumnies."  For  this  reply  the  As 
sembly  ordered  Logan  to  be  arrested.  Gookin  thereupon,  aban 
doning  his  attitude  of  submission,  ordered  the  High  Sheriff 
to  see  that  Logan  was  not  molested. 

In  the  following  year  the  Assembly  received  a  long  and 
characteristic  letter  from  the  Proprietor.3  He  appeals  to  the 
Penn  re-  settlers  in  temperate  and  often  pathetic  language 
wfthSthetcs  against  the  ingratitude  of  their  opposition.  Their 
settlers.  hostility  to  Logan  is  due  to  the  fact  that  he  has 
throughout  studied  the  interests  of  the  Proprietor.  But  no 
where  in  the  letter  does  Penn  fail  to  come  to  close  quarters 
with  the  legal  question,  did  the  charter  assign  certain  powers 
to  the  legislature  or  not? 


1  Records,  vol.  ii.  pp.  460,  482.  *  Ib.  p.  497. 

3  The  letter  is  in  Proud,  vol.  ii.  p.  45. 


43 2  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

In    1710  a  new  Assembly  came  into  being.     Not  a  single 

member  was  re-elected.1     This  may  have  been  in  a  measure 

'  Fresh  due  to  some  personal  and  temporary  considerations 

Assembly  .        ,  .   .        ,  ,  T-»          •  i 

elected.  of  which  the  trace  is  lost,  rsut  it  at  least  proves 
that  the  attack  on  Penn  and  Logan  did  not  represent  the  views 
of  the  majority  of  the  settlers ;  and  this  is  confirmed  by  the  fact 
that  at  the  outset  at  least  the  relations  of  the  new  Assembly 
with  both  Gookin  and  Logan  were  harmonious. 

Meanwhile  troubles  had  been  heaping  themselves  thick  upon 
the  Proprietor.  It  is  clear  from  the  letters  which  Penn  re- 
Penn's  ceived  from  Logan  that  the  eldest  son,  Springett 
difficulties."  penn>  was  giving  trouble  in  the  colony,  partly  by 
jealousy  of  the  Proprietor's  second  family.  "I  have  had  some 
difficulty  to  carry  even  between  my  duty  to  thee  and  my  regard 
to  him,  but  I  hope  I  have  not  quite  miscarried.  .  .  .  He  has 
much  good  nature,  wants  not  very  good  sense,  but  is  unhappy 
by  indiscretion."3 

But  of  all  Penn's  troubles  the  worst  probably  were  those 
which  resulted  from  the  gross  dishonesty  of  his  steward,  Ford. 
So  transparent  and  shameless  were  the  devices  whereby  he 
swindled  Penn  that  it  is  difficult  not  to  think  that  he  had  ac 
quired  some  hold  over  Penn,  possibly  by  knowledge  of  political 
secrets.  This  view  is  confirmed  when  we  read  of  his  extracting 
a  certain  document  from  Penn  "by  threats."  He  falsified  ac 
counts.  He  held  over  money  of  Penn's  which  he  had  in  hand, 
while  he  was  actually  at  the  same  time  meeting  payments  on 
Penn's  behalf  by  advances  from  his  own  pocket  at  compound 
interest.  Finally  he  induced  Penn  to  mortgage  to  him  his 
colonial  property  and  then  re-let  it  to  Penn  as  his  tenant,  claim 
ing  at  the  same  time  that  the  mortgage  carried  with  it  a 
transfer  of  political  rights. 

Soon  after  this  Ford  died.  Thereupon  his  widow  and  son 
claimed  the  property,  and  arrested  Penn  for  an  alleged  debt  of 
three  thousand  pounds. 

At  this  stage  Penn's  friends  seem  to  have  intervened.  They 
arranged  to  pay  off  Ford's  representatives,  and  to  transfer  the 


1  Proud  states  this,  vol.  ii.  p.  S3-     His  statement  is  confirmed  by  the  Records. 
J  All    these    troubles    which    befell    Penn    are    set    forth    in    Mr.    Shepherd's 
monograph  above  referred  to. 

3  Logan  to  Penn,  22,  ix.  1704.     Pennsylvania  Archives,  vol.  vii.  p.  u. 


PENN  DIES.  433 

mortgage  to  certain  friendly  parties  who  would  act  as  trustees 
for  Penn. 

In  reality  this  necessity  to  mortgage  may  have  been  in  one 
way  a  blessing  in  disguise.  In  1717  the  Earl  of  Sunderland 
petitioned  to  have  the  Territories  assigned  to  him  in  quittance 
of  a  sum  of  money  due  to  him  from  the  Crown.  His  plea  was 
that  when  the  Duke  of  York  assigned  the  Territories  to  Penn 
he  himself  had  no  legal  right  to  the  Territories.  Moreover, 
the  grant  was  charged  with  a  condition  that  Penn  should  pay 
half  his  profits  to  the  Crown,  and  that  condition  had  not  been 
fulfilled. 

It  was  further  set  forth  that  Baltimore  had  in  1683  chal 
lenged  Penn's  right  to  the  Territories.  Apparently  Sunder- 
land's  policy  was  to  use  Baltimore's  claim  as  a  means  of  over 
throwing  Penn's,  and  then  argue  that  Baltimore's  title  had  be 
come  null  and  void.  The  law  officers  of  the  Crown  advised 
in  the  case.  They  reported  that  to  cancel  Penn's  grant  would 
be  unfair  to  the  mortgagees.  He  must,  however,  comply  with 
the  conditions  of  the  grant  and  make  over  half  the  profits  to 
the  Crown.1  Again  Penn  offered  to  make  that  very  sacrifice 
against  which  he  had  before  protested  so  strongly,  and  to  ar 
range  for  the  surrender  of  his  colony  to  the  Crown.  That 
arrangement  was  prevented  by  a  stroke  of  paralysis  or  apoplexy 
which  left  Penn  incapacitated.  It  might  have  been  well  for 
Pennsylvania  and  for  the  whole  body  of  American  colonists  if 
the  surrender  had  taken  place.  The  tenets  and  temper  of  the 
settlers  would  probably  have  made  it  impossible  in  any  case  for 
Pennsylvania  to  come  into  line  and  take  her  place  effectively  in 
a  connected  scheme  for  colonial  defense  against  France.  But 
the  continuation  of  the  proprietary  government  gave  the  settlers 
at  once  a  motive  and  a  weapon  in  their  attitude  of  factious 
independence. 

Penn  died  in  1718.  During  the  later  years  of  his  life  the 
prostration  of  his  faculties  had  prevented  him  from  taking  any 
part  in  the  affairs  of  the  province.  Henceforth  the  settlers 
could  assert  those  claims  of  self-government  without  any  show 
of  personal  ingratitude  to  their  founder. 

In  1715  strife  again  broke  out.     In  February  of  that  year 

1  For  the  whole  of  this  transaction  see  Colonial  Papers,  Pennsylvania,  559, 
under  the  year  1717. 


434  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

the  Assembly  submitted  to  the  Governor  and  Council  certain- 
bills  for  the  establishment  of  a  complete  judicial  system.  These, 
Dispute  as  it  would  seem,  were  approved  of  and  even  de- 
taxation.'  sired  by  the  Governor.  But  there  was  with  them  a. 
bill  for  providing  funds  for  the  support  of  government  by 
means  of  import  duties.  To  this  Gookin  objected,  pleading, 
that  the  amount  was  inadequate,  that  there  was  no  fixity  about 
the  duties,  and  that  they  would  be  unpopular  with  the  general 
body  of  settlers.  On  these  grounds  Gookin  refused  his  assent 
to  the  other  bills  till  this  one  was  amended.  After  some 
wrangling  the  Assembly  accepted  his  view  in  part,  increasing 
the  duty  and  supplementing  it  by  a  land  tax. 

The  conflict  was  renewed  the  next  year  on  different  grounds- 
Some  portion  of  Gookin's  conduct  was  such  as  to  make  one 
Further  believe  that  rumors  of  mental  aberration  were  welli 
between  founded.3  He  charged  both  Logan  and  the  Mayor' 
zmd" the  °^  Philadelphia,  who  was  likewise  the  Speaker  of 
Assembly.*  the  Assembly,  with  disaffection  to  the  Crown.  They 
had  both,  he  said,  wanted  him  to  proclaim  the  Pretender. 
When  the  Assembly  appointed  a  committee  to  inquire  into  this 
strange  charge,  Gookin  refused  to  furnish  them  with  any  in 
formation.  The  committee  reported  that  the  charges  were  un 
founded.  They  also  retaliated  against  Gookin  with  a  strange 
accusation.  He  had,  they  said,  taken  part  with  a  notorious 
public  criminal  by  granting  a  nolle  prosequi  in  the  case  of  one 
Lowder  who  had  attempted  to  murder  the  Speaker. 

This  was  followed  by  a  somewhat  curious  and  intricate 
Question  dispute  on  a  question  of  constitutional  law.  In  the 
oaths."  first  year  of  the  reign  of  George  I.  the  law  govern 
ing  oaths  and  declarations  was  altered. 

The  first  Act  on  the  subject  which  affected  the  Quaker 
colonies  was  that  passed  in  1696.  This  provided  that  while 
Quakers  might  for  certain  civil  purposes  substitute  a  declaration 
for  an  oath,  yet  that  no  Quaker  or  reputed  Quaker  might  by 
virtue  of  this  Act  give  evidence  in  a  criminal  case,  serve  on  a 
jury,  or  hold  any  ofEce  or  place  of  profit  under  the  Crown.6 

1  Records,  vol.   ii.  p.  507. 

2  The  Protest  of  the  Assembly  is  given  in  full  by  Proud,  vol.  ii.  pp.  74-93. 
8  This  rumor  is  mentioned  in  the  Memorial  History,  vol.  v.  p.  211. 

4  Records,  vol.  ii.  pp.  614-6. 

5  7  and  8  Win.  III.  c.  34. 


QUESTION  OF  OATHS  OR  DECLARATIONS.         435 

No  exception  was  made  in  favor  of  the  colonies.  There 
seems,  however,  to  have  been  an  understanding  that  the  last- 
named  disqualification  should  not  apply  to  an  official  appointed 
not  by  the  Crown,  but  by  a  colonial  Proprietor  or  Proprietors. 

This  Act  was  originally  passed  in  1696,  to  expire  in  1704. 
In  1701,  however,  it  was  re-enacted,  to  be  in  force  for  a 
further  period  of  eleven  years  from  that  date.1 

In  1711  the  Act  was  confirmed  and  amended  by  the  added 
provision  that  a  declaration  made  in  the  place  of  an  oath  must 
be  supported  by  the  oath  of  two  witnesses  who  should  swear 
that  the  person  making  the  declaration  was  a  Quaker.2 

In  1714  the  statute  of  William  III.  was  re-enacted.*  The 
Act  of  Anne  was  not  explicitly  repealed,  but  the  provisions  of 
the  new  Act  practically  dispensed  with  the  need  of  witnesses. 
The  new  Act  further  specified  that  so  much  of  it  as  related  to 
Quakers  should  be  extended  to  Scotland  and  the  colonies.  In 
all  likelihood  this  was  only  intended  to  apply  to  what  one  might 
call  the  beneficent  clauses  of  the  Act.  It  was,  however,  held 
that  it  also  applied  to  the  disqualifying  clauses,  and  that  under 
it  no  Quaker  was  eligible  for  office. 

Hitherto  the  various  changes  in  the  laws  were  a  matter  of 
indifference  to  the  Quakers  in  Pennsylvania.  Now  however  a 
question  arose,  Did  the  colonies  pass  again  under  the  operation 
of  their  own  laws  on  the  subject,  or  did  the  provision  which 
extended  the  Act  of  Anne  to  the  colonies  operate  so  as  to  bring 
them  under  the  new  statute?  To  the  settlers  in  Pennsylvania 
the  question  was  one  of  great  importance.  Gookin  took  the 
view  hostile  to  the  claim  of  the  settlers.  This  view  was  com 
bated  in  a  long  and  able  protest  issued  by  the  Assembly.4  Their 
pleading  was  at  once  dexterous  and  fair.  They  pointed  out 
that  in  a  community  which  had  from  the  outset  been  essentially 
Quaker,  the  application  of  the  Act  would  be  a  serious  hindrance 
to  the  administration  of  justice. 

They  were  also  able  to  quote  the  authority  of  Hunter.  He, 
with  characteristic  ingenuity  in  discovering  a  conciliatory  inter 
pretation,  had  ruled  that  although  the  Act  said  that  no  Quaker 
should  be  qualified,  yet  it  did  not  prevent  a  Quaker  from  be 
coming  qualified  by  some  special  indulgence.  This  assertion  of 

1  13  Wm.  III.  c.  4.  *  10  Anne,  c.  ii. 

*  i  George  I.  2,  c.  6.  *  Given  in  full  by  Proud,  vol.  ii.  pp.  74-93. 


436  THE  FOUNDATION  OF  PENNSYLVANIA. 

the  right  of  any  colonial  authority  whether  Governor  or  legis 
lator  to  interpret  an  Act  of  Parliament  might  carry  with  it  far- 
reaching  and  perilous  consequences. 

The  Assembly  in  their  protest  urged  with  reason  that  if 
Hunter  adopted  a  lenient  interpretation  all  the  more  should 
Gookin,  who  as  Penn's  deputy  was  under  special  obligations  to 
consider  the  interests  of  Quakers. 

They  were  also  able  in  support  of  their  view  to  quote  the 
authority  of  the  Chief  Justice  of  New  Jersey,  and  what  was 
even  a  stronger  point,  an  instruction  issued  by  the  King  im 
mediately  after  his  accession  to  Hunter,  as  Governor  of  New 
Jersey.  This  provided  that  Quakers  might  be  members  of  the 
Council  or  the  Assembly,  or  hold  any  office  of  trust  and  profit, 
and  might  make  a  declaration  instead  of  taking  an  oath. 

Gookin  seems  to  have  accepted  the  plea  of  the  colonists.  In 
the  following  year  he  announced  to  the  Assembly  his  impend 
ing  departure  and  received  a  present  of  two  hundred  pounds,  a 
fact  which  in  itself  raises  a  strong  presumption  of  his  surrender. 

The  disappearance  of  Penn  from  the  field  of  colonial  politics 
practically  coincides  with  the  accession  of  the  House  of  Han 
over.  As  in  the  case  of  the  other  colonies  we  may  regard  that 
as  a  convenient  landmark,  at  which  to  alter  our  course  and  to 
take  a  more  connected  and  comprehensive  view  of  what  was  now 
a  continuous  territory,  and  potentially,  though  far  from 
actually,  an  organic  political  body. 


APPENDICES. 


APPENDIX  I.  (p.  10). 

THE  following  is  the  monument  to  Peter  Heyn  In  the  old 
church  at  Delft: — 

Deo  Opt.  Max.  Et  Aeternae  Memoriae 
Sacrum,  lugete,  foederati  Mortuum,  quern  praeclara  in 
Remp.  Hanc  merita  non  sinunt  esse  mortalem. 

Petrus  Heinius.     Architalassus  Brasiliae,  mari 
Mexicano,  Lusitanis,  Morinis,  fatale  nomen,  hie  jacet 

cui  fortitude  Mortem,  Mors  vitam  dedit. 

Delphorum  Portu  sub  septentrione  editus,  natalis  soli 

Famam,  Reportatis  portu  Matancae,  ad  Occidentem  opimis 

spoliis,  gemino  orbi  intulit,  parentum  humilem  sortem  animi 

magnitudine,  et  rerum  gestarum  Gloria  transcendens,  non 

nasci  semper  Heroes  docuit,  sed  auderido  fieri,  per  inelucta- 

-biles  fortunae  terra  marique  casus  numinis  favore  eluctatus, 

Indiam,  Hispaniam,  Flandriam,  captivitatis  suae  mox 

libertatis  ac  Victoriae  testes  habuit,  sine  temeritate  intrepidus, 

sine  fastu  magnanimus,  disciplinae  navalis  tenax  non 

sine  severitate,  ut  obsequii  primum  omnis  patiens 

Sic  imperil  postmodum  omnis  capax. 

Anno  CID.  IDC.  XXIV.     Praefecti  vicem  gerens,  urbem 
Salvatoris  in  Brasilia  inter  primos  exscendens,   Lusitanis 
ereptvm  ivit.  A°.  CID.  IDC.  XXVII.     Classi  praefectus 
naves  hostium  sex  et  viginti,  sub  eiusdem  urbis  moenibus, 
Stupendo   facinore   expugnavit,    diripuit,   exussit:   alias  in- 
super  tres,  incredibili  ausu,  ad  Maream  insulam  aggressus, 
praemia  Belli  spectante  hoste  abduxit.  A°.  CID.  IDC.  XXVIII. 

Classem  navium  viginti,  auro,  argento,  mercibusque 

pretiosissimis  gravem,  at  Cube  littora  felici  occursu  offendens, 

feliciore  Marte  superavit,  et  novus  Argonauta,  e  nova 


438  APPENDICES. 

novi  orbis  Colchide,  aureum  Hispaniarum  Regis  vellus, 

Principibus  Europaeis  formidabile,  non  in  Graeciam  sed 

foederatorum  terras,  nullo  hactenus  exemplo,  trans- 

vexit  et  societati  Occidentalis  Indiae  immensas 

opes,  Hispano  inopiam,  Patriae  suae  robur,  sibi 

Immortale  decus  paravit. 

Tandem. 

Maris  Praefecturam  quam  foris  meruerat,  domi  adeptus 

dum  navali  praelio  cum  Morinis  decernit,  navium  hostium- 

que  post  cruentam  pugnam  victor,   ipse  machina  maiore 

ictus,  fatalem  metam,  sine  metu  gloriose  adivit. 

Eius  Famae  virtutisque  ergo, 
Ex  111.  et  praep.  ordinum  decreto  rei  maritimae  praefecti 

Senatores. 
Mon.  Hoc  Pos. 

Vixit  Annos  li  Mens.  VI.  Dies  XXIII. 
TO  •  MEN  •  6ANEIN  •  OTK  •  AISXPON  •  AAA'  •  AlSXPfiS  •  6ANEIN 

I  am  indebted  for  the  text  of  this  to  Mr.  G.  A.  Mounsey, 
of  the  British  Foreign  Office. 


APPENDICES  II.  AND  III.  (pp.  273  and  283). 

I  AM  sorry  to  say  that  I  mislaid  my  references  for  the  state 
ments  made  here.  I  had  hoped  to  recover  them  in  time  to 
place  them  in  an  Appendix,  but  failed  to  do  so.  I  must  there 
fore  ask  my  readers  to  take  them  on  trust. 


APPENDIX  IV.  (p.  296). 

THESE   special   privileges   are    recorded   in   the   New   Jersey 
Archives,  vol.  i.  p.  88. 


APPENDICES.  439 


APPENDIX  V.  (p.  406). 

THE  authority  for  this  statement  is  apparently  Gabriel 
Thomas.  His  account  of  the  matter  is  not  very  lucid.  His 
words  are:  "Now  for  these  lots  of  land  in  city  and  country, 
and  their  first  advancement  since  they  were  first  laid  out,  which 
was  within  the  compass  of  about  twelve  years,  that  which 
might  have  been  bought  for  fifteen  or  eighteen  shillings  was 
sold  for  four  score  pounds  in  ready  silver  and  some  other  lots 
that  might  have  been  the  purchase  of  three  pounds  within  the 
space  of  two  years  were  sold  for  a  hundred  pounds  a  piece  and 
I  believe  some  land  that  lies  near  the  city  that  sixteen  years 
ago  might  have  been  purchased  for  six  or  eight  pounds,  the 
hundred  acres  cannot  now  be  bought  under  a  hundred  and 
fifty  or  two  hundred  pounds." 


INDEX. 


ADD 

A  DDERLY,  Henry,  259 

J\     Adriaensen,  Marvyn,  22 

Albany,  114,  163,  182,  207-8,  231, 
243-4,  248;  name  given,  107; 
changed  to  Willelmstadt,  1395 
charter  of,  168-9;  convention 
at,  in  1689,  199;  conference 
at,  in  1693,  237;  in  1694, 
238 

Algonquin  Indians,  173 

Allen,  John,  142 

Allerton,  Isaac,  81 

Alrichs,  Jacob,  69-71 

Alrichs,  Peter,  140 

Altona,  Fort,  68 

Amersfort,,35,  37 

Amsterdam,  voyages  from,  3 

Amsterdam  Company,  7 

Amsterdam   Fort,   condition   of, 

97 

Andros,  95,  148-9,  150-2,  156,  188, 
190;  dealings  with  New  Eng 
land,  152-3;  replaces  Dongan, 
185;  dealings  with  New  Jersey, 
300,  301,  336-7;  dispute  with 
Philip  Carteret,  309-13 

Anne,  Fort,  120 

Annie's  Hook,  80 

Aquednek,  353 

Archangel,  the  frigate,  214-17 

Assize,  Court  of,  on  Long  Island, 
107 

Atwood,  Chief  Justice  in  New 
York,  261 

BALTIMORE,  Lord,  his  pat 
ent,  84;   his  claim   against 
Pennsylvania,  433 
Banks,  John,  142-3 
Barclay,  John,  318 
Barclay,  of  Ury,  318 
Barillon,  180,  182 


BYL 

Barneveldt,  his  colonial  policy,  $ 
Barre,  De  la,  176,  177-9,  180-1 
Bass,  340-2,  344-5,  349,  354-364* 

368,  373 

Baxter,  George,  81-2 
Bayard,  Colonel,  188-9,  193,  205, 

215,  218,  244-6,  249,  258-9,  263^ 
Beets  (or  Bates),  4 
Bellamont,    224    n.,    246-7,    256, 

310 ;     Cornbury's     charges 

against,     261 ;     dealings     with 

New  Jersey,  340-2 
Bergen,  290,  297,  353 ;  church  at, 

42 
Berkeley,  Sir  John,  90,  125,  133,. 

145-7,  290,  330 ;  grant  to,  232 
Berry,  John,  206-7 
Beverswyck,  30 ;  church  at,  42 
Bikker,  Grant,  66 
Birckes,  139 

Blackwell,  John,  408-11;  his  in 
structions,  408-9 
Bogardus,  Pastor,  41 
Bonrepos,  De,  183 
Brahe.  Peter,  62 
Brainford,  127 
Breda,  treaty  of,  118,  124 
Breuckelen,  29,  35-6;  church  at,. 

42 

Bridlington,  see  Burlington. 
Brockholls,  Anthony,   157-9,  33° 
Brodhead.  Daniel,  114-115 
Brooke,  Chidley,  214,  231-2 
BruvHs.  French  missionary,  178 
Budd.  Thomas,  351-2 
Burghership  in  New  Mountains, 

Greater,  Lesser,  38 
Burlington,    305,    325,    348,    362, 

365-  372 

Burrows,  Edward,  288 
Bylling,   Edward,    146,  299,  309,. 

334,  336-7,  375 


442 


INDEX. 


pADARAQUI,   see  Cataraqui. 

\j     Cadillac,  241 

Callieres,  De,  250 

Campbell,  Neil,  328 

Cantwell,    Edmund,    Sheriff    of 

Newcastle,  300,  305  n. 
Carignan  regiment,  120 
Carr,  John,  138,  150 
Carr,  Sir  Robert,  103,  105-7 
Carteret,  Sir  George,  90,   125-7, 

133-4,    145-7,     166,    290,    330; 

grant  to,  232;  death  of,  309-10 
Carteret,  James,  134,  295,  311 
Carteret,    Philip,    126,    134,    291, 

292,  295,  298,  299,  302,  3301; 

attacked  by  Andros,  311-12 
Carteret,  Lady,  330-1 
Cartwright,  99-103,  105 
Casimir,  Fort,  64.  65 
Cataracouy,  see  Cataraqui. 
Cataraqui,  241,  254 
Cayenguirayo,   Indian  name  for 

Fletcher,  239,  246 
Cayugas,  121,  175-77,  241,  251 
Chamberlain,   his   scheme   for  a 

land  bank,  352 
Champigny,  De,  181,  235  n. 
Champlain,  Lake,  120 
Charter    of    Liberties    in    New 

York.  163 

Chartier,  Martin,  430 
Chazy,  De,  123 
Chinese  in  Netherlands,  102 
Christina,  fort  at,  59-61 
Christina,   Queen,   59-60 
Church     of     England    in     New 

York,  170,  228 
Clarendon,  Lord,  171 
Clavborne,  sea-captain,  141-2 
Cohansick,  see  Cohanzey. 
Cohanzey,  300,  348 
Colbert,  119 

Colden,  Cadwallader,  224  n.,  240 
Coleman,  Henry,  135 
Collier,  John,  300-1 
Colve,  Anthony,  139-143,  148-9 
Conestago,  231 
Connecticut,  87,  141-3,  146,  152-3, 

166-7,  171,  201,  211,  231-3,  239, 

243,  290 

Corlaer,  177-8,  181 
Cornbury,    Lord,   224   n.,    261-2. 

430,    et    passim;    his    Indian 


policy,  261 ;  his  misconduct, 
265-270;  in  New  Jersey,  354 

Cortland,  Van,  188,  191,  195,  205, 
209,  215 

Courcelles,  De,  122,  189 

Coventry,  Sir  William,  90 

Cbxe,  Daniel,  336-7 

Curtius,   Alexander,  48 

Cuyler,  Henry,  192-3 

DARIEN,  319,  326 
Decanisora,  240 
Decker,  De,  105 
De  Lancey,  246 
Delaware.  422;  granted  to  Penn, 

394,  40i 

Dellius,  Dr.,  201,  244,  249 
Denonyille,    179.    180-1,    189,   240 
De  Vries,  David,  16-17,  21,  40-1, 

57 

Dionondadies,  237,  240-1 

Director  in  New  Netherlands,  15 

Donck,  Adrian  von  der,  80 

Dongan,  Thomas,  95,  160,  169- 
170,  176-8,  179-180,  230,  252, 
331,  et  passim;  his  anti-French 
policy,  171 ;  is  recalled,  185 

Dort,  Synod  of,  140 

Doughty,  Francis,  80 

Downing,  George,  96 

Dudley,  Joseph,  218,  338 

Duke's  Laws,  111-12 

Dutch  as  colonists,  I 

Dyer,  William,  157 

P  ASTHAMPTON,    131,    132, 

H/     141,  162, 163 

East  India  Company,  Dutch,  6, 
9 ;  its  monopoly  of  trade,  14 

Eelkens,  Jacques,  16-17 

Effingham,  Lord,  176 

Eight,  Council  of,  22 

Elizabethtown.  127,  140,  232, 
200,  294,  297,  298 

Elsenburg,  61 

Enchuysen,  voyages  from,  3 

Erie,  Lake,  173-4,  17% 

Esopus,  105,  163 

Evans,  John.  426-31 

Evertsen,  Cornelis,  139 

"DENWICK,    John,     146.    287, 
F      299-301,  303,  305-6,  333,  375 


INDEX. 


443 


FIN 

Finns  in  New  Jersey,  126 

Five  Nations,  119,  122,  173,  176, 
177,  179.  1 80- 1,  207,  234,  237- 
240,  243,  251,  261,  280;  rela 
tions  with  New  Netherlands, 
53;  make  over  their  territory 
to  the  English,  254.  See  also 
Cayugas,  Mohawks,  Oneidas, 
Onondagas,  Senecas. 

Fletcher,  Colonel  Benjamin,  228- 
9,  et  passim;  appointed  Gov 
ernor  of  New  York,  227;  his 
instructions,  228 ;  his  ecclesias 
tical  policy,  229;  dealings  with 
The  Five  Nations,  237;  his 
misdeeds,  244-6 ;  becomes 
Governor  of  Pennsylvania,  413; 
dispute  with  Penn,  413-14;  at 
Philadelphia,  414 ;  dispute  with 
Assembly  of  Pennsylvania,  415- 
16 

Fletcher  of  Saltoun,  319 

Flushing,    New    York,    34,    80, 

131 

Ford,  Penn's  steward,  432 
Fox,  George,  288 
Freehold,    New    Jersey,    Scotch 

church  at,  353 
French    and    the    Five    Nations, 

234-235 ;    torture    a    Mohawk 

prisoner,  240 
French,  Philip,  263 
Frontenac,  Count,  172-4,  176,  178, 

189,   206-7,   235,  237-9,   242-3; 

death  of,  250 
Frontenac,  Fort,  178-181,  280-1 

P  ARAKANTHIE,  175 

"  T     Gilbert,  Sir  Humfrey,  4 

Gookin,  430-6 

Gordon,    a    politician    in    New 

Jersey,  359,  367 
Gothenburg,  New.  61 
Gouverneur,  Abraham,  248 
Graham,    James,    Attorney-Gen 
eral  in  New  York,  250,  310 
Grande  Gueule,  177-8 
Grangula,  see  Grande  Gueule 
Gravesand,  see  Gravesend. 
Gravesend.  Long  Island,  29,  34, 

80.  83 ;  convention  at,  102 
Guildford,  153 
Gustavus  Adolphus,  56 


JEN 

HALL,  Thomas,  81 
Hamilton,     Andrew,     328, 
337,  339,  340.  344-6;  Governor 
of     Pennsylvania,     425 ;      his 
death,  358 

Hampton,  John,  266 

Hartford,  disputes  at,  between 
Dutch  and  English,  79 

Heathcote,  Caleb.  246 

Heemstede,  35,  80,  131 ;  conven 
tion  at,  108 

Hempstead,  see  Heemstede. 

Hester,  ship,  341 

Heyman,  Albert,  116 

Heyn,  Peter,  10,  437 

Hinoyossa,  Alexander  D',  71,  106 

Hopkins,  Samuel,  137,  140,  297 

Hudde,  Andries,  63 

Hudson,  Henry,  5,  6 

Hudson  River,  7 

Hues,  Dr.,  410 

Huguenots  in  New  Netherlands, 
15 ;  in  New  York,  166 

Hunter,  Colonel  Robert,  224  n., 
272,  435-6.  et  passim;  charac 
ter  of,  274-5 ;  in  New  Jersey, 
372-8 

Huntington  on  Long  Island,  131 

Hurons,  121,  175,  237 

Hutchins,  a  tavern-keeper  in 
New  York,  259  n. 

Hutchinson,  Anne,  80 

T  BERVILLE,  French  admiral, 
262 

Indians  in  New  Netherlands,  21 ; 
war  with  these,  23 ;  legislation 
about,  in  New  Jersey,  352 ;  de 
scribed  by  Penn,  402.  See  Five 
Nations,  Algonquins,  Hurons, 
etc. 

Ingoldsby,  Major  Richard,  213, 
218,  234,  371 ;  arrival  at  New 
York,  214 

Iroquois,  see  Five  Nations. 

T  AMAICA  Bay,  98 
J      Jamaica.    Long   Island,    131, 

192,  290;  dispute  at,  265 
James  Fort,  131 
James  II.,  see  Duke  of  York. 
Jennings,  Samuel,  334,  364,  365, 

368 


444 


INDEX. 


JBS 

Jesuit  missions,  234 
Jews  in  New  Netherlands,  15 
Jogues,  Father,  41,  74 
Johnson,  Thomas,  218 
Johnstone,  John,  328,  371 
Joncaire,  French  missionary,  273 
Jones,  Sir  William,  309 
Juet,  Robert,  6  n. 

T7EITH,  George,  409-10 
IV     Kieft,  William,  18,  et  pas 
sim 
Konigsmark,  Count,  134 

T    ABADISTS,  145 

Lrf     La    Chine,    destruction    of, 

189 

Lamberville,  181 
La  Salle,  171,  174 
Laurie,  Gawain,  299,  318-9,  323- 

325 

Lawyers,  Act  against,  in  Penn 
sylvania,  406 

Leisler,  Jacob,  155,  248,  258-9,  et 
passim;  authorities  for,  187; 
resists  Ingoldsby,  215-17;  sub 
mits,  218;  his  trial,  ib.;  sen 
tenced  to  death,  219 ;  executed, 
222 ;  effect  of  his  rebellion,  224 

Leisler,  the  younger,  257 

Leonard,  John,  346 

Lewiston,  57 

Livingstone,  Robert,  181,  253, 
256-258,  284 

Lloyd.  David,  408-11,  412,  416 

Lodwick,  Charles,  259  n. 

Lodwyck,  Colonel,  232 

Logan,  James,  428,  431-2 

London,  Bishop  of,  jurisdiction 
in  New  York,  228 

Long  Island,  163,  212;  settle 
ments  on,  ii ;  English  settle 
ments  on,  192 

Louis  XIV.,  180 

Lovelace,  Francis,  95,  130,  150, 
et  passim 

Lovelace,  Lord,  270-1 ;  in  New 
Jersey,  370-1 

Lovelace,  Lady,  371 

Lucas,  Nicolas,  299 

Lutherans  in  New  Netherlands, 

43 
Luyck,  48 


NAS 

MAINTENON,    Madame    de, 
208 

Manhattan,  church  at,  41 
Manhattan  Island,  7,  12 
Manning,  Captain  John,  137,  150 
Markham,     William,     388,     397, 

416-419 

Martha's  Vineyard,  163-4 
Maryland,  17,  105 ;  dispute  with 

New    Netherlands,    71,    85-6; 

raid    from,   on   the   Delaware,. 

135 
Massachusetts,    141-2,    169,    171, 

239 

Matthews,  Captain,  236 
Mauritius  River,  7 
May,  Jacobsen,  16 
Mecklenburg,  John  of,  41 
Mennonites,   73-75;  attacked  by 

Carr,  106-7 
Meules,    Intendant    in    Canada, 

178 

Michaelius,  42 
Michillimakinac,  Indian  fort  atr 

240 

Middelburg,  35 
Middletown,    290-1,    292,    296-7, 

317,  354,  438 

Midwout,  35-7;  church  at,  42 
Millborne,  Jacob,   135,  218,  248; 

at  Albany,  200-2;  sentenced  to 

death,  219 ;  executed,  222 
Millet,  Father,  a  Jesuit,  206,  238, 

242 

Minuit.  Peter,  16,  19 
M'Kemie,  Francis,  trial  of,  266-7 
Mohawks,  24.  119,  124,  175,  221, 

235,  236,  238;  dealings  with  the 

Dutch,  8 
Mohicans,  21 
Monseignat,    official    in    Canada, 

208 

Montreal.  181 
Moody,  Lady  Deborah,  29 
Moore,   Nicholas,  404 
Morris,    Lewis,   276,   344-6,   348, 

353,  364,  367,  368 

NANFAN,   Colonel,   251,   256, 
257,  263 

Nantucket,  163-4 
Nassau,  Fort,  on  the  Hudson,  7, 
8,  ii 


INDEX. 


445 


Nassau,  Fort,  on  the  Delaware, 
n,  59;  seized  by  Marylanders, 
17 

Negro  plot  to  burn  New  York, 
283,  284 

Negroes  in  New  Netherlands, 
48-9 

Nelson,  John,  230-1,  233 

New  Amstel,  foundation  of,  70; 
surrender  to  the  English,  106; 
name  changed  to  Newcastle, 
107 

New  Amsterdam,  variety  of  lan 
guages  at,  15;  becomes  a  city, 
30;  education  in,  76;  outward 
appearance  of,  76;  name 
changed  to  New  York,  107 

Newark,  N.  J.,  290,  294,  297 

Newcastle,  135,  395,  422 

New  Haven,  72,  88,  153,  290, 
291 

New  Jersey,  126,  147,  166,  232-3, 

239 

New  Jersey,  East,  first  constitu 
tion  of,  321-4 

New  Netherlands,  education  in, 
47;  slavery  in,  48;  commerce 
of,  49 ;  Anglicized,  78 

New  Rochelle.  80 

Newtown,  N.  Y.,  80,  83 

New  York  Colony,  ecclesiastical 
system  in,  112,  154;  religion  in, 
J33;  captured  by  the  Dutch, 
138;  restored  to  England,  144; 
settlement  of,  after  the  Revolu 
tion.  225-7,  285-7 

New  York  City,  name  changed 
to  Fort  Orange,  139;  in 
corporated,  166;  charter  of, 
168 

Nicholson,  Francis,  188,  190,  195, 
202-3,  214 

Nicolls,  Richard,  146,  150,  166, 
232,  343,  et  passim;  career  and 
character,  95,  128-9;  treatment 
of  the  Dutch,  114;  Indian 
policy,  123-4 

Nicolls,  William,  Councilor  in 
New  York,  215,  231,  268,  271 

Niewenhuysen,  Van,  155 

Nine,  Council  of,  27-8 

Nottingham,    Earl    of,    212,    214 

Noy,  Peter  de  la,  218 


PIS 

OLIVER,  Thomas,  334 
Oneidas,  120-1,  175,  238 
Onondagas,  177,  252 
Onontio,  177,  178 
Ontario,  Lake,  179,  181 
Orange     County,     New     York, 

248 
Orange    Fort,     n,     105;    name 

changed  to  Albany,  107 
Oswego,  254 
Oxenstierna,  57-8 

PALATINES,  284 

1        Palmer,  Captain,  182 

Palmer,  John,  330 

Patrick,  Captain,  79 

Patroons,  the,  12-3,  75 

Pemaquid,  163 

Penn,  Springett,  432 

Penn,  William,  159;  abused  by 
Leisler,  204;  becomes  a  Pro 
prietor  in  New  Jersey,  299 ;  re 
monstrates  with  Andros,  307- 
9;  his  character,  379-83;  his 
form  of  government,  388-93 ; 
extension  of  his  grant,  393 ; 
dealings  with  Indians,  397-9; 
dispute  with  Fletcher,  413-14; 
with  the  settlers,  420-4;  with 
Quarry,  424-5 ;  troubles  of  his 
latter  years,  432;  death  of,  433 

Pennsylvania,  231,  232,  243; 
grant  of,  384;  boundaries,  384; 
charter,  385-6;  first  Assembly 
in,  395 ;  great  body  of  laws, 
396;  second  charter,  400-1; 
described  by  Penn,  401 ;  con 
stitutional  changes  in,  404-5 ; 
Indian  alarm  in,  407;  piracy 
and  smuggling,  420;  third 
charter,  424 

Perth  Amboy,  324,  329,  341,  348, 
351,  359,  362,  365,  372 

Perth,  Earl  of,  318,  331 

Philadelphia,  foundation  of,  397; 
growth  of,  403,  406;  incor 
porated  as  a  city,  424 

Philipse,  Frederic,  188,  215 

Pinhorne,  William,  218 

Piracy  in  Pennsylvania,  420 

Piscataqua,  290,  294-97;  Baptists 
at,  353 

Piscataway,  see  Piscataqua, 


446 


INDEX. 


Popple,  William,  Secretary  to 
Board  of  Trade,  348,  403 

Potherie.  La,  241  n. 

Prairie  de  la  Madeleine,  211,  230, 
280 

Printz,  John,  60,  64-5 

Proud,  history  of  Pennsylvania, 
379 

QUAKERISM  as  a  power  in 

>&     politics,  287-9 

Quakers  in  New  Netherlands, 
44-6;  in  New  Jersey,  354;  dis 
pute  about  their  right  to  hold 
office,  434-6 

Quarry,     Colonel,     266,     359-60, 

424-5 
Queen's  County,  N.  Y.,  212 

F>  EKENKAMMER,  the,  25 
lv      Rensselaer,    Nicolaus    van, 

154-5 

Rensselaerwyck,  30,  163 
Richardson,  Samuel,  410 
Riggs,  John.  202 
Rising,  John,  64 
Robinson,  Sir  Robert,  218 
Rudyard,  Thomas,  319 
Ryswick,  peace  of,  243 

SALEM,  N.  J.,  300,  305,  306, 
363 
Sandford,   a   Councilor   in   New 

Jersey,  374 
Schaats,  Dominie,  154 
Schenectady,   121,   163,   182,  235, 

243,  250;  massacre  at,  207,  221 
Schute,  Ewen,  66 
Schuyler,  John,  182,  211,  230,233, 

234,  238,  250 
Schuyler,    Peter,    201,    208,    256, 

273,  274 

Schuylkill,  Swedish  settlement 
on,  58 

Scot,  Euphemia,  328 

Scot,  George,  of  Pitlochie,  326-8 

Scotch  traders  in  New  Nether 
lands.  15,  37 

Scott,  John,  89-91,  125 

Senecas,  119-121,  175-7,  241,  251 

Seignelay,  De,  French  colonial 
Minister.  179-181 

Seymour,  John,  430 


Shackamaxon.  398 

Shrewsbury,  N.  J.,  290,  291,  292, 

„  297,  317,  354-  438 

Skene,  John,  334 

Slavery  in  New  Netherlands,  48  j 

Slechtenhart,  Van,  30 

Sloughter,  Colonel,  225,  234;  ap 
pointed  Governor  of  New 
York,  213;  his  arrival  delayed, 
214;  reaches  New  York,  217; 
his  action  as  to  Leisler's 
execution,  221-3,  227;  death  of, 
227 

Smit,  Claus,  19 

Smith,  William,  Chief  Justice  in 
New  York.  249,  316 

Smith,  William,  of  New  York, 
the  historian,  224  n. 

Smuggling  in  Pennsylvania,  420 

Sonmans.  agent  in  New  Jersey, 
360.  373 

South  Carolina,  262 

Southampton,  N.  Y.,  80,  131-2, 
141,  152 

Southold,  N.  Y.,  131,  141,  143, 
152 

Southwell,  Sir  Robert,  214  n. 

Staten  Island,  163,  166,  290,  329,. 
331,  360 

Stirling,  Lord.  132 

Stuyvesant,  Peter,  appointed' 
Director  of  New  Netherlands, 
26,  et  passim;  his  character, 
26-7 ;  dealings  with  Indians,. 
50-4 ;  favors  the  English,  82 ; 
surrenders  New  Netherlands, 
97-8 

Sunderland,  Earl  of,  433 

Swanendael,  12,  57 

Swedes,  290-5 ;  on  the  Delaware,, 
attacked  by  Carr,  106-7 !  m 
New  Jersey,  126 

Swedish  colonization,  54-7 

Swedish  colony  destroyed  by 
Stuyvesant,  66 

Swedish  Company,  58,  60 

Sylvester,  Nathaniel,  143 

rrALBOT,  Rev.  John,  376 
I      Talon,  119 
Tatham,  338 
Tawasentha,  treaty  of.  8 
Territories,  see  Delaware. 


INDEX. 


447 


TIN 

Tinicum,  61 

Tracy,  Marquis  of,  120,  122,  123- 
4,  189-9? 

Trevor,  Sir  John,  232 

Twelve,  the,  in  New  Nether 
lands,  19 

Twiller,  Wouter  Van,  16,  17,  18 

T  T  NDERHILL  John,  23 

U      Upland,  388 

Usselinx,  William,  4,  7,  16,  54-7 

Utie,  Colonel,  85 

Utrecht,  peace  of,  280 

VAUDREUIL,  De,  270 
Verhulst,  William,  16 
Vesey,  a  Jacobite,  376 
Viele,  Arnout,  177 

WAALBOGHT,  12 
Waldenses  in  New  Neth 
erlands,  67 

Wales,  emigration  from,  to  Penn 
sylvania,  394 


Walloons  in   New   Netherlands, 

15 
Weaver,      Attorney-General     in 

New  York,  261 
Werden,  John,  152 
West  Chester,  N.  Y.,  42-3,  80 
Westminster,  treaty  of,  145 
Whitehall,  treaty  of,  180 
Willett.  Thomas,  81 
Willocks,  a  supporter  of  Hunter, 

3/6 

Wilmington,  N.  J.,  58 
Winthrop,    John,    Governor    of 

Connecticut,  88,  99,  101-2 
Winthrop,  Fitz-John,  143,  210-12 
Wodrow,  326 
Woodbridge,  290.  294.  297 
Wood  Creek,  expedition  against, 

272 

"y  ORK,  Duke  of,  170,  330,  et 
I      passim;  grant  to,   in   1664, 
92;    effects    of    his    policy    in 
New  York,  225 


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